
# **Global Assumptions**

- knowledge of any public key is known by any entity in the protocol
- the cost for courier transferred from one side to the other side is considered very high

# Scenario 1: Unilateral Authenticated

# Submit Scenario1



 $ts = Time\ Stamp$ 

### Preconditions

### Alice:

 $\bullet$  Alice holds a unique asymmetric key  ${\rm sk}_A$  which corresponds to its public key  ${\rm pk}_A$ 

#### Courier:

• None

#### Postconditions


#### Alice:

- Alice knows all the message is successfully sent to someone
- Alice doesn't know the identity of the receiver
- Alice doesn't know whether the message will be eventually deliver to Bob

#### Courier:

- Courier knows the integrity of the message is preserved
- Courier knows the authenticity of origin of Alice's messages

### Transmit Scenario1



where:

 $\begin{aligned} & \text{meta}_{B} = \text{E}_{pk_{B}}(\text{k}_{AB}|\text{Alice}|\text{Bob}|\text{timestamp})|\text{SIGN}_{A} \\ & \text{msg}_{B} = \text{E}_{k_{AB}}(\text{message})|\text{MAC}_{k_{AB}}(\text{message}) \end{aligned}$ 

### Preconditions

#### Bob:

ullet Bob holds a unique asymmetric key  ${\rm sk}_B$  which corresponds to its public key  ${\rm pk}_B$ 

### Courier:

• None

# Postconditions

# Bob:


- Bob accepts the message
- Bob doesn't know the identity of the message sender
- Bob doesn't know whether the message has been intercepted

# Courier:

• Courier knows Bob has successfully received and accepted the message

# Scenario 2: Bilateral Authenticated

# Upload Scenario2



#### Preconditions

### Alice:

• Alice holds a unique asymmetric key  $sk_A$  which corresponds to its public key  $pk_A$ 

#### Courier:

• Courier holds a unique asymmetric key  $sk_C$  which corresponds to its public key  $pk_C$ 

#### Postconditions

#### Alice:

- Alice knows all the message has been successfully received by Courier
- Alice doesn't know whether the message will be eventually deliver to Bob

#### Courier:

- Courier knows the integrity of Alice's messages is preserved
- Courier knows the authenticity of origin of Alice's messages

#### Transmit Scenario2

Exatly same with Download Scenario1

### Scenario 3: No Authentication

Considering the fact that anyone can pretend to be Alice and send fake message to Courier, Courier will never know which message is come from real Alice. So the Courier has to wait infinitely long before start transporting or it will be very likely that it carries all invalid messages after transporting. The potential cost is unacceptable and this method is not considered.

# **Pros and Cons**

#### Scenario 1:

- simpler for communication and easier to implement
- inefficient for Alice because she doesn't know which is the real responsible courier, she has to response for every request and send the message to infinite number of potential couriers
- most of the messages exchanged are unprotected including the recipient name
- in Transmit Scenario, Intruder can pretend to be Courier1 and send Courier2 fake messages. Although the message won't be accepted by Bob, it may prevent Courier2 from getting real message from Courier1. And the cost of that could be huge.

#### Scenario 2: Vice Versa