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Capture the Flags Solo Project: ENPM685-0201

05/16/2025

Flag 1: I found flag 1 by first discovering the url "http://192.168.47.129/addclasses.php?uid=1" has a user input point. I ran SQLMap against the URL to test if it is vulnerable to SQL injection. My SQLMap output confirms a successful SQL injection vulnerability on the uid parameter. Then I performed database enumeration by dumping database names and found look_in_here database. I listed the tables in the database and dumped the data from the table to discover flag 1.

		·
id name	password	profile
	0d107d09f5bbe40cade3de5c71e9e9b7 (letmein)	My cracked password is flag1 Yes flag1 is the password for crackmypassword\n

Methodology

SQLmap scan against target URL: http://192.168.47.129/addclasses.php?uid=1

```
Please enter full target UML (-a): http://192.106.47.129/addclasses.phpTuid-1 -batch -banner POOST data (-data) [Enter for None]:

Injection difficulty (-level/-risk), Please choose:
[1] Norsal (default)
[2] Hedium
[3] Hard
[3] Hard
[4] Holing
[5] Hard
[5] Hasis (default)
[6] Hasis (default)
[7] Hasis (default)
[8] Hasis (default)
[9] Alt
[
```

Dumped database names, look in here looks interesting.

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
Dumped the tables from the database, and found the look_in_inside table

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Dumped the data from the table and found flag 1 with credentials.


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Flag 2: I found flag 2 by doing initial reconnaissance with wireshark to help discover the vm's IP address using the ARP protocol. Then, I performed a network scan with nmap to identify port 80 was running a web server using the HTTP protocol. I accessed that web server in my browser to discover the web page with multiple links. I clicked the "add a class" url link and noticed it uses user ids, which is a unique identifier assigned to each user in the system. Without proper access control, it could be vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), allowing me to change user IDs and discovering flag 2.



Methodology

To find the VM's IP address, I performed initial reconnaissance with Wireshark by filtering arp packets to look for arp requests and replies. This helped enumerate all active devices on a subnet because ARP maps IP addresses to MAC addresses. In the ARP reply packet, I discovered the vm's IP Address: 192.168.47.129




Ran an ARP scan to identify active devices on my LAN and confirmed the vm's IP address

Ran an Nmap scan to identify open ports and services

```
(tnewk® kali)-[~]
$ nmap 192.168.47.129
Starting Nmap 7.945VN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-05-14 21:13 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.47.129
Host is up (0.00064s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
10000/tcp open snet-sensor-mgmt
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.09 seconds
```

Opened a browser and accessed the server running on port 80.



Explored the application and noticed it uses user ids, which is a unique identifier assigned to each user in the system. Without proper access control, it could be vulnerable to **Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)** allowing me to access other user's data.

Originally, the UID is set to 1 for the user:demo



Add A Class -- this is in beta!

User: demo

Message: I'm a demo!!

Sorry add/drop a course is currently offline, please try again later

By changing the UID in the URL from uid=1 to uid=6, the user is now **bingo** and the message is flag 2.



Add A Class -- this is in beta!

User: bingo

Message: flag2: web app session? I like jam sessions better


Sorry add/drop a course is currently offline, please try again later

<u>Flag 3:</u> I found flag 3 by performing a hydra brute force attack with a list of possible usernames found from the contacts support page of the web server and password spraying with the password "**Spring2025!**" to remotely log into the vm.

flag3: "Would I rather be feared or loved? Easy. Both. I want people to be afraid of how much they love me."

Methodology:

Created a list of usernames from the IT support contact page into a users.txt file.



Usersnames: mscott, dwright, rhoward, jim, and pam

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Performed a hydra brute force attack with **users.txt** and password spraying with "**Spring2025!**" as the password to remotely log into the vm.

```
(thewk@kali):[-]

- | hydra -t users.tt -p Spring20251 192.168.47.129 ssh -V

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```

After successfully logging in, I discovered the "CONFIDENTIAL.pdf" file in the home directory.

```
The wave Skali-[*]

$ sish mscottal192.168.47.129
The authenticity of host '192.168.47.129 (192.168.47.129)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:8/9BuPu/BjflElM2JI7inPK912H5vzWh7vAFFb5otOs.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? y
Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.47.129' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
mscottal192.168.47.129's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-139-generic x86_64)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Management: https://lubuntu.com/pro

System information as of Fri May 16 07:36:59 PM UTC 2025

System load: 0.03
Usage of /: 45.7% of 9.7568
Users logged in: 0
Memory usage: 23%

* Strictly confined Kubernetes makes edge and IoT secure. Learn how MicroK8s
just raised the bar for easy, resilient and secure K8s cluster deployment.

https://ubuntu.com/engage/secure-kubernetes-at-the-edge

Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.

55 updates can be applied immediately.
To see these additional updates run: apt list —upgradable
Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/emg mor run: sudo pro status


New release '24.04.2 LTS' available.
Run 'do-release-upgrade' to upgrade to it.

*** System restart required ***
mscottdenpn605ctf:-$ ls
COMFIDENTIAL.ppf
```

To view the file, I transferred the pdf file to kali via scp.

```
(tnewk% kali)-[~]
$ scp mscott@192.168.47.129:/home/mscott/CONFIDENTIAL.pdf ~/Downloads/
mscott@192.168.47.129's password:
CONFIDENTIAL.pdf
```


<u>Flag 4</u>: I found flag 4 by doing an aggressive network scan with nmap to gather more information and discovered a HTTP web server running on port 10,000. Opening a web browser, I was immediately prompted with a login form and needed to use brute force to log in. I utilized hydra to guess valid passwords with the username **admin** to brute force pass HTTP form authentication. I logged in with the credentials from hydra's output and was taken to the web server admin page, where I was prompted to enter a command. This hinted at a command injection vulnerability that I could possibly exploit. I entered the server's ip address along with the ls command to explore the file system and found a txt file containing flag 4.




Methodology

Aggressive Nmap scan on port 10,000 to discover OS detection, version detection, script scanning, and traceroute.

Performed Hydra brute force HTTP authentication to get Admin's credentials and logged in.



Performed command injection on the admin web server.



Read the contents of youshouldopenthis.txt file with the cat command and found flag 4.

