

Computer Algorithm: permanent non-competes

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1. Guess L^F

(a) Guess g

i. Guess $w(q, m)$, the wage paid to labor not bound by non-competes¹

A. Guess $M(q)$, which implies guess for $L^E(q, m) = \xi \min(m, M(q))$

B. Guess $x(q, m)$, the non-compete policy of the incumbent².

C. Using these guesses, solve for $V(q, m), W(q, m)$ using Moll's algorithm. For now, just set boundary conditions on initial (really, final) guess and hope it works, come back to this if it doesn't. Boundary on $V(q, m, T)$ comes from $V(0, m) = 0$ and $V_m(q, m) = 0$ for $m > M(q)$. Boundary on $W(q, m, T)$ comes, again, from $W(0, m) = 0$ and $W(q, m) = 0$ for $m > M(q)$.

D. Check that $x(q, m)$ is consistent with incumbent optimality: $x(q, m) = 1$ exactly when $|V_m(q, m)| < W(q, m)$ and zero $x(q, m) = 0$ otherwise. If not, return to (1aiB) and guess a new value $x(q, m)$.³

E. Check that $M(q)$, and hence $L^E(q, m)$, is consistent with entrant optimality: that is,

$$M(q) = \sup \left\{ m : \chi_E \phi(L^I(q, m) + L^E(q, m)(V((1 + \lambda)q, 0) - W(q, m))) > w(q, m) \right\}$$

If not, return to (1aiA) and guess a new value for $M(q)$.⁴

¹Labor bound by non-competes will receive wage \bar{w} , which can be written in closed form as function of parameters

²Entrants are infinitesimal relative to their industry j hence not take into account their effect on industry j aggregates; hence, they perceive no cost from leaking knowledge and endogenously do not require their employees to sign non-competes

³I think this will converge, but it's not entirely obvious since there is a strategic interaction - the guess $x(q, m)$ affects $W(q, m)$ which then affects the optimal $x(q, m)$.

⁴Again, not 100% sure if this will converge...

- ii. Check that $w(q, m) = \bar{w} - \nu W(q, m)$. If not, return to (1ai) and make a new guess.
 - (b) Now, given $L^I(q, m), L^E(q, m)$ computed above, compute stationary distribution of (q, m) and then aggregate to compute growth rate g^* . If not equal to guess g , return to (1a) and guess a new value of g .
2. Finally, the above allocation gives us functions $L^I(L^F), L^{R\&D}(L^F)$. Check that $L^I + L^{R\&D} + L^F = 1$; otherwise, go back to (1) and guess a new value of L^F .