Enhanced IoT Network Security: A Comparative Study of Advanced Deep and Recurrent Neural Networks for Intrusion Detection

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***Abstract*—To enhance anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), we developed and tested models using Deep Neural Networks (DNN), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), and Autoencoders (AE) on the IoT-23 dataset. Our approach achieved zero false negatives, improving detection capabilities against evolving security threats.**

INDEX TERMS: Autoencoders, Cyber security, Internet of Things, Intrusion detection systems, Machine learning, Deep learning, Anomaly detection.

**■THE INTRODUCTION**Telecommunication advancements are swiftly progressing, fostering greater global connectivity annually. Contemporary industries, like automotive transport, smart agriculture, and public safety, are embracing new standards and technologies such as Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. An average IoT setup comprises three tiers: the perception layer, network layer, and application layer**.** The Internet of Things (IoT) is exposed to security risks across all its architectural levels and has been grappling with security issues since its inception [**1**]. Broadly, the perception layer faces threats such as malicious code injection, eavesdropping, and interference [**2**], [**3**]. Similarly, the network layer is vulnerable to spoofing, denial of service, man-in-the-middle, and routing information attacks [**3**]. Additionally, the application layer is susceptible to viruses, worms, and phishing attempts. A botnet represents a targeted form of cyber attack leveraging Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Angrishi et al. [**4**] define a botnet as a large collection of internet-connected devices manipulated to inundate a specified server (or servers) with simultaneous requests, rendering it incapable of responding to genuine requests, effectively halting its operation. This assault constitutes a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. These attacks have become increasingly sophisticated, making detection challenging [**4**]. IoT botnets pose a threat not only to the owners of IoT devices but also to all internet users. Because DDoS attacks require substantial network traffic to disrupt services, IoT devices are ideal hosts due to their vast numbers and generally weak security measures, rendering them easy targets [**5**]. In their research, Das et al. [**6**] illustrate Mirai, a recent example of such a botnet, wherein a virus seeks out susceptible devices and links them to Command-and-Control Servers (C&C servers). Das et al. [**6**] and Tushir et al. [**7**] observed that IoT devices linked to Mirai Botnets are primarily utilized to execute DDoS assaults on targeted devices. Tushir et al. [**8**] investigated the impact of Mirai attacks on IoT devices, revealing a 40% surge in energy consumption and a 50% increase in storage usage. Subsequently, numerous iterations and variants of the Mirai botnet emerged, such as Persirai, Hajime, and BrickerBot [**8**]. Targets of DDoS attacks encompassed websites, cloud providers, individuals, educational institutions, telecommunication companies, and DNS providers (Dyn), which serviced multiple websites including Reddit, Amazon, Spotify, Airbnb, among others [**5**].

As per Statista [**9**], the global count of IoT-connected devices reached nearly 8.74 billion in 2021, with a Cisco white paper [**10**] projecting a rise to approximately 30 billion by 2023, compared to roughly 18 billion in 2018. By 2024, it's estimated that there will be 83 billion devices connected to the Internet of Things (IoT) **[11]**. Moreover, the same paper **[10]** anticipates a surge in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to around 15 million by 2023, contrasting with 7 million recorded in 2018 [**12**]. According to statistics, the frequency of attacks is doubling annually, resulting in significant financial losses, amounting to tens of millions of dollars specifically from ransomware attacks [**13**].

One effective strategy for thwarting such assaults involves implementing a robust Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [**13**] capable of identifying various forms of intrusion. Presently, IDSs employ two main detection approaches: signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature-based detection systems are hindered in their effectiveness by their incapacity to recognize emerging cyber threats and their reliance on manual updates to the signature database which can be laborious. Conversely, anomaly-based methods analyze data, relying on the system's comprehension of typical behavior to flag any incoming connections that appear aberrant. Network intrusion detection seeks to assess diverse network data using different behavioral analyses to uphold its security. Numerous methods exist for detecting anomalies in networks. Although machine learning has proven indispensable and efficient in promptly identifying cyber-attacks, Deep learning using extensive datasets for training can potentially avoid overfitting issues, as it possesses greater capacity for generalization compared to conventional learning models [**12**]. To train an AI model effectively, high-quality, large-scale data from IoT devices are essential. However, IoT devices are vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. By combining IoT's real-time data collection with AI's data analysis and decision-making capabilities, organizations can develop more responsive, adaptive, and efficient systems across various sectors. Although several anomaly detection techniques are employed, there have been fewer comparative studies of different deep learning models for anomaly detection. Since intrusions entail a sequence of linked malevolent actions executed by an internal or external perpetrator to compromise the security of the designated system, our attention will be directed towards Recurrent Neural Networks, primarily tailored for sequential data processing. During training, the RNN is fed sequences of data where, at each time step, it learns to predict the next item in the sequence and its hidden state acts as a form of memory, enabling the RNN to capture patterns and dependencies over time.

Constructing an IDS for automatic cyber-attack detection necessitates a suitable dataset for training. We are going to explore the IoT-23 dataset by Garcia et al. [**14**] is a recent release specifically tailored to address cyber-attacks involving IoT devices, introduced in early 2020. Our proposed IDS use several deep learning-based models for the binary classification. There are several factors for selecting binary classification. First, binary classification simplifies the problem to distinguishing between normal (benign) and abnormal (malicious) activities. This can make the system easier to design, implement, and maintain.

Second, since the model only needs to learn two classes, training and prediction can be faster and require less computational resources. Finally, by focusing on identifying anomalies as a whole, the IDS can be more robust in catching new or unknown types of attacks that deviate significantly from normal behavior.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Literature Review discussed the related works. The proposed models are presented in Methodology section. The evaluation results are presented in Experiments Section, with comparison results. Finally, Discussion section discussed the results and limiations and Conclusion concludes the paper and offers ideas for future work.

**Literature Review**

Li et al. [**15**] used convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for intrusion classification, dividing the dataset into four segments based on feature correlations. They transformed one-dimensional features into grayscale graphs and trained four CNNs (CNN1, CNN2, CNN3, CNN4) individually for binary classification. A combined model, CNN0, integrated these outputs and trained on the entire dataset. Using the NSL-KDD dataset, CNN1 achieved 82.62% and 67.22% accuracy on KDDTest+ and KDDTest-21, respectively. The ensemble model achieved 86.95% and 76.67% on the same test sets. Martin et al. [**16**] proposed a model that uses a linear classifier based on a Neural Network (NN) with linear activations. This model incorporates feature transformations using kernel approximation algorithms such as Nystrom, Random Fourier Features, and Fastfood transformation, which add the necessary complexity and non-linear characteristics to the model. To test their model, they chose three datasets but only performed binary classification on the NSL-KDD [18] dataset. The highest accuracy achieved in this binary classification was 80%. As evident, the results were not particularly promising. Kim et al. [**17**] developed a hybrid model integrating a convolutional neural network (CNN) and a long short-term memory network (LSTM) for the binary classification. They tested this model on two publicly available datasets, CSIC-2010 and CICIDS2017, achieving accuracies of 91.5% and 93.0%, respectively. Susilo et al. [**18**] utilized three algorithms—Random Forests, Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)—to identify network intrusions. They employed the Bot-Iot dataset, created by UNSW Canberra [**19**] for multi-class classification. The CNN algorithm achieved the highest accuracy, reaching 91.25%. Yin et al. [**20**] introduced a deep learning method for intrusion detection using recurrent neural networks (RNN-IDS) and assessed its performance in both binary and multiclass classification tasks. They trained their model using the KDDTrain+ dataset and tested it with the KDDTest+ and KDDTest-21 datasets, the latter being a subset of the former. By experimenting with different hyperparameters (such as the number of nodes and learning rate), they achieved the highest accuracy of 83.28% on the KDDTest+ dataset and 68.55% on the KDDTest-21 dataset, with the optimal configuration being 80 hidden nodes and a learning rate of 0.1. Sokolov et al. [**21**] explored the use of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), specifically Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), for intrusion detection for the binary classification in Industrial Control Systems (ICS), due to their ability to handle sequential data. The study emphasized the importance of considering both network traffic and the state of industrial processes for effective intrusion detection. The experiments compared the performance of LSTM and GRU networks in detecting intrusions using the Gas Pipeline dataset. GRU networks showed slightly better performance with an accuracy of 91.70% compared to LSTM's 90.68%. The study found that GRU networks learn faster and are computationally more efficient than LSTMs. None of the papers didn't address dataset balancing or adequately report false rates. When one class significantly outnumbers another, models tend to become biased toward the majority class, leading to poor performance in detecting the minority class (anomalies). Thus, balancing the dataset helps the model generalize better to new, unseen data. High accuracy on an imbalanced dataset can be misleading. For example, if 95% of the data is normal and 5% is anomalous, a model predicting every instance as normal would achieve 95% accuracy but fail to detect intrusions. Balancing the dataset ensures that accuracy and other metrics truly reflect the model's performance and leads to better training dynamics, as gradient-based learning algorithms benefit from more stable gradients. Therefore, we balanced our dataset and included metrics such as False Positive and False Negative rates for comprehensive evaluation. Balancing false negatives and false positives is often the goal, but the operational context also influences prioritization. In stable environments, reducing false positives is crucial for operational efficiency. In dynamic environments, a low false negative rate is preferred to adapt to emerging threats. In high-security settings, minimizing false negatives is paramount, even at the cost of more false positives, to avoid missed detections leading to successful attacks. Hence, our primary aim is to minimize false negatives while maintaining an acceptable false positive rate.

**Methodology**

This study utilized the IoT-23 dataset, which comprises network traffic collected from Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It includes 20 instances of malware and 3 instances of benign activity. This dataset aims to provide a substantial collection of real-world labeled IoT malware infections and benign IoT traffic, facilitating the development of machine learning algorithms for researchers. It consists of 23 captures, referred to as scenarios, wherein 20 involve malicious activity and 3 involve benign activity. Each capture from infected devices may include the name of the potential malware sample executed in that scenario.

The IoT-23 dataset includes various labels representing threats such as Attack (exploits vulnerabilities), Command and Control (C&C), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), and botnets like Mirai and Okiru. Furthermore, Zeek functions as software for conducting network analysis. The IoT-23 dataset utilized it in the conn.log.labeled format, derived from the original pcap file through Zeek network analyzer. **Table 1** displays the dataset comprising 20 attributes. Specific attributes, such as conn\_state and history, hold significant value with characters that carry particular implications. For a detailed explanation of these specific values and their meanings, readers are referred to [22].

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| Table 1: Features Description | | |
|  | Feature | Description |
| 1 | ts | The time of the first packet |
| 2 | uid | A unique identifier of the connection |
| 3 | proto | The transport layer protocol of the connection |
| 4 | id.orig\_h | Originator/Source IP Address |
| 5 | id.orig\_p | Originator/Source Port number |
| 6 | id.resp\_h | Responder/Destination IP Address |
| 7 | id.resp\_p | Responder/Destination Port number |
| 8 | service | An identification of an application protocol |
| 9 | duration | How long the connection lasted |
| 10 | orig\_bytes | The number of payload bytes the originator sent |
| 11 | resp\_bytes | The number of payload bytes the responder sent |
| 12 | conn\_state | The possible connection state values  (e.g., S0: Connection attempt seen, no reply |
| 13 | local\_orig | If the connection is originated locally, this will be T and F for remotely |
| 14 | local\_resp | If the connection is responded locally, this will be T and F for remotely |
| 15 | missed\_bytes | Indicate the number of bytes missed in content gaps |
| 16 | history | Records the state history of connections as a string  (e.g., H: a SYN & ACK handshake |
| 17 | orig\_pkts | Number of packets that the originator sent |
| 18 | orig\_ip\_bytes | Number of IP level bytes that the originator sent |
| 19 | resp\_pkts | Number of packets that the responder sent |
| 20 | resp\_ip\_bytes | Number of IP level bytes that the responder sent |

We encountered a minimal number of missing values, which we addressed by substituting them with zeros. Features `local\_orig', `local\_resp' which were empty for all the files (scenarios) and hence they were dropped. Based on previous work on pre-processing of intrusion detection datasets like NSL-KDD, CICIDS2017, features id.orig\_h, id.orig\_p, id.resp\_h and id.resp\_p contained IP adresses and port numbers were dropped. Additionally, the 'history' attribute, representing a sequence detailing the connection history, was initially dropped.

Since our focus was on binary classification, we assigned a value of '1' for all attack instances and '0' for benign instances in the "label" column using Python's 'map' function. Following the encoding of object type features, we examined each column and observed that the majority of values in certain features were zero. Consequently, we decided to drop those features from consideration as well [**Table 2**].

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| Table 2: Additional Dropped features after encoding | | |
| Column | Unique Values | Value Counts |
| Conn\_state\_RSTO | 0 | 1444521 |
| 1 | 153 |
| Conn\_state\_RSTOS0 | 0 | 1444644 |
| 1 | 30 |
| Conn\_state\_RSTR | 0 | 1444123 |
| 1 | 551 |
| Conn\_state\_S2 | 0 | 1444647 |
| 1 | 27 |
| Conn\_state\_S3 | 0 | 1444217 |
| 1 | 2457 |

After removing all those columns, we now have a total of 15 columns, including the label column.

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| C:\Users\12403\Documents\Catholic_Uni\Stochastic_Lab\Projects\Anomaly_detection_code\IoT-23\Thesis_Writing\Pics\label.png  1 1246865  0 197809 | C:\Users\12403\Documents\Catholic_Uni\Stochastic_Lab\Projects\Anomaly_detection_code\IoT-23\Thesis_Writing\Pics\blan.png  0.0 961750  1.0 934971 |
| Imbalanced | Balanced |
| Figure 1. Dataset Balancing | |

To balance our dataset, we developed a novel approach. Initially, we divided the dataset into two segments: training set (75%) and test set (25%). Subsequently, we constructed a sequential deep neural network (DNN) comprising four layers, culminating in an output layer with a single node for binary classification. Training the network on the training set yielded an accuracy of 89.3%.

Our objective now is to generate some randomly distributed normal data. We first constructed a dataset comprising only benign/normal flows, identified by a label column value of '0'. Next, we calculated the standard deviations of all 14 columns using the 'std()' function. We then scaled down each standard deviation by a factor of 0.1 to reduce and normalize the deviation values, converting them into a 'numpy' array. A function named 'random\_val()' was created to generate random values using a normal distribution via the 'tf.random.normal' function, with parameters including a seed value range of 1 to 256, a shape of 148534 rows and 14 columns, a mean of 0, and standard deviations derived from each column of the normal data. Finally, we employed our trained model to predict benign data from the generated random values. By iterating through a loop, we obtained the desired quantity of benign data and appended it to the original benign data. Following this procedure, we eliminated the duplicated entries and ultimately obtained a dataset that is reasonably balanced, as depicted in **Figure 1**(Right).

DNNs (Deep Neural Networks) are suitable for anomaly-based intrusion detection systems because they can learn complex patterns and representations from large volumes of network traffic data, enabling them to identify subtle deviations from normal behavior that may indicate potential threats. Their ability to capture intricate features and relationships helps improve the detection of previously unseen or sophisticated anomalies.Utilizing the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function across all hidden layers, our Deep Neural Networks (DNN) model is optimized using the “adam” optimizer, a widely used and optimized gradient descent algorithm, with the “binary\_crossentropy” serving as the loss function.

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| Table 3. Arch. of DNN | | |
| Layer (Type) | Output Shape | Number of parameters |
| Input(Dense) | (None, 100) | 1500 |
| Dense | (None, 50) | 5050 |
| Dense | (None, 40) | 2040 |
| Dense | (None, 40) | 1640 |
| Output(Dense) | (None, 1) | 41 |
| Total parameters: 10,271  Trainable parameters: 10,271  Non-trainable parameters: 0 | | |

LSTM networks are designed with memory cells that can retain information over extended periods, allowing them to capture long-term dependencies in data. This is particularly important in IoT environments, where the sequence of events leading to an intrusion may span multiple time steps. LSTM's ability to maintain and update memory selectively enables it to detect complex patterns in network traffic, improving the model's capability to identify subtle anomalies. We developed a very light-weighted sequential LSTM model comprising just three hidden (LSTM) layers with limited nodes. In the final hidden layer, we allocated only five nodes and excluded sequence return, opting instead for the dense layer as the output layer (Output at Final Time Step).

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| Table 4. Arch. of LSTM | | |
| Layer (Type) | Output Shape | Number of  parameters |
| Input(LSTM) | (None, None, 20) | 1760 |
| LSTM | (None, None, 10) | 1240 |
| LSTM | (None, 5) | 320 |
| Output(Dense) | (None, 1) | 6 |
| Total parameters: 3326  Trainable parameters: 3326  Non-trainable parameters: 0 | | |

GRU is a more computationally efficient variant of LSTM, with a simpler architecture that often provides similar performance while reducing the computational overhead. GRUs are particularly advantageous in IoT scenarios, where devices often have limited processing power and memory. By leveraging GRU's efficiency, we aimed to achieve high detection accuracy without imposing excessive computational demands, making it a practical choice for real-world IoT deployments. To improve outcomes, we adopted a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) model featuring three layers of hidden units. In the initial layer, we incorporated a one-dimensional Convolutional layer to compress the data, employing a filter count of five, a kernel size of two, a stride of two, and valid padding. For the second layer, we utilized just five nodes and ensured sequence retention. In the last hidden layer, we employed only three nodes without sequence retention.

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| Table 5. Arch. of GRU | | |
| Layer (Type) | Output Shape | Number of  parameters |
| Input(Conv1D) | (None, None, 5) | 15 |
| GRU | (None, None, 5) | 180 |
| GRU | (None, 3) | 90 |
| Output(Dense) | (None, 1) | 4 |
| Total parameters: 289  Trainable parameters: 289  Non-trainable parameters: 0 | | |

By training the autoencoder to reconstruct the input data, the model can identify anomalies based on the reconstruction error. Higher reconstruction errors often signify deviations from the learned normal patterns, making autoencoders a valuable tool for detecting previously unseen attacks or rare events in IoT networks. In our stacked auto-encoding setup, we utilized LSTM layers as the hidden layers due to their effectiveness in sequence learning. During the encoding phase, the model compressed the data from ten dimensions down to three (with three representing the latent representation). In the decoding phase, two hidden layers were employed to restore the dimensions from three back to ten.

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| Table 6. Arch. of Autoencoder(LSTM) | | |
| Layer (Type) | Output Shape | Number of  parameters |
| Input(LSTM) | (None, None, 10) |  |
| LSTM | (None, None, 5) |  |
| LSTM | (None, None, 3) |  |
| RepeatVector | (None, 1) |  |
| LSTM | (None, None, 5) | 800 |
| LSTM | (None, None, 10) | 966 |
| Output(Dense) | (None, 1) |  |
| Total parameters: 1,766  Trainable parameters: 1,766  Non-trainable parameters: 0 | | |

Likewise, we employed the GRU layer for autoencoding purposes.

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| Table 7: Arch. of Autoencoder(GRU) | | |
| Layer (Type) | Output Shape | Number of  parameters |
| Input(GRU) | (None, None, 10) |  |
| GRU | (None, None, 5) |  |
| GRU | (None, None, 3) |  |
| RepeatVector | (None, 1) |  |
| GRU | (None, None, 5) | 800 |
| GRU | (None, None, 10) | 966 |
| Output(Dense) | (None, 1) |  |
| Total parameters: 1,766  Trainable parameters: 1,766  Non-trainable parameters: 0 | | |

A Bi-directional RNN (Bi-RNN) consists of two separate RNNs: one that processes the sequence forward (from the start to the end) and another that processes it backward (from the end to the start). Bi-RNNs can leverage their bidirectional processing to recognize anomalies that might not be apparent when only considering past events. For instance, an unusual pattern might become clear when examining how it fits within the broader sequence of events, both before and after it. In the initial hidden layer, we utilized a basic RNN layer, while in the subsequent hidden layer, we employed an LSTM layer for bidirectional processing to address the previously mentioned challenges associated with RNNs.

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| Table 8. Arch. of Bi-RNN | | |
| Layer (Type) | Output Shape | Number of  parameters |
| Input  (RNN) | (None, None, 20) | 440 |
| Bidirectional  (LSTM) | (None, None, 20) | 2480 |
| Output(Dense) | (None, 1) | 21 |
| Total parameters: 2,941  Trainable parameters: 2,941  Non-trainable parameters: 0 | | |

The entire dataset was divided into a training portion comprising 75% and a testing portion making up 25% for all the models mentioned above.

We developed an innovative architecture where a Deep Neural Network (DNN) was used for feature extraction, and a Random Forest (RF) was employed for binary classification. The layered structure of DNNs allows them to capture hierarchical features in the data, ranging from low-level attributes to more abstract representations. This capability is crucial for intrusion detection in IoT networks, where raw data is often high-dimensional and heterogeneous. By using DNNs for feature extraction, we aimed to reduce the dimensionality of the data while preserving the most informative characteristics, thereby enhancing the performance of Random Forest classifiers.

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| C:\Users\12403\Documents\Publications\Thesis_publication\My_Paper_Writing\Figures_Pdf\Pics\F_DNN.png |
| Figure 2. ML & DNN Arch. |

To implement this, we first divided our dataset into two parts: 75% for training and 25% for testing. The training set was further split into 60% for actual training and 40% for validation. The DNN was trained using the 60% training data and validated with the remaining 40%. The DNN outputted extracted features as ten-dimensional vectors. These features, along with their corresponding labels, were then used to train the RF classifier. Finally, the classifier was tested on the 25% testing data, leading to superior results.

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| Table 9: Arch. of DNN | | |
| Layer (Type) | Output Shape | Number of  parameters |
| Input(Dense) | (None, 100) | 1500 |
| Dense | (None, 50) | 5050 |
| Dense | (None, 40) | 2040 |
| Dense | (None, 10) | 410 |
| Total parameters: 9000  Trainable parameters: 9000  Non-trainable parameters: 0 | | |

**Experiments**

In this study, we used Keras on the backend Tensorflow (Version: 2.10.0), known for its speed, simplicity and popularity in deep learning. The experiment was conducted using Jupyter Notebook (Version: 6.4.12) on a HP Pavilion personal computer equipped with an Intel Core i7-1195G7 CPU @ 2.90GHz and 16 GB of RAM.

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| Table 10. Accuracy of the models | |
| Model | Accuracy |
| DNN | 94.41 |
| LSTM | 96.10 |
| GRU | 96.23 |
| LSTM & AE | 94.39 |
| GRU & AE | 94.44 |
| Bi-Directional RNN | 94.47 |
| ML & DNN | 96.21 |

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| Table 11. Precision(P), Recall(R), & F1 | | | | |
| Model  (Thr>0.5) | Label | P | R | F1 |
| DNN | 0 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.94 |
| 1 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 0.95 |
| LSTM | 0 | 0.99 | 0.93 | 0.96 |
| 1 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.96 |
| GRU | 0 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.96 |
| 1 | 0.93 | 1.00 | 0.96 |
| LSTM  & AE | 0 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.94 |
| 1 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 0.95 |
| GRU  & AE | 0 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.94 |
| 1 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 0.95 |
| Bi-Directional RNN | 0 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.94 |
| 1 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 0.95 |
| ML & DNN | 0 | 0.99 | 0.93 | 0.96 |
| 1 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.96 |

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| Table 12. False Positive & False Negative Rates | | |
| Model | F/P | F/N |
| DNN | 10.9 | 0.2 |
| LSTM | 7.2 | 0.5 |
| GRU | 7.0 | 0.5 |
| LSTM & AE | 11.0 | 0.0 |
| GRU & AE | 10.9 | 0.1 |
| Bi-Directional RNN | 10.8 | 0.1 |
| ML & DNN | 6.9 | 0.5 |

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| Table 13. Comparison of binary classification models using deep learning for anomaly detection. | | | |
| Article | Model | Year | Accuracy |
| Martin et al.[16] | NN | 2019 | 80.00 |
| Li et al. [15] | CNN | 2020 | 86.95 |
| Susilo et al. [18] | CNN | 2020 | 91.25 |
| Sokolov et al. [21] | GRU | 2019 | 91.70 |
| Our Proposed | ML+DNN | 2024 | 96.21 |
| Our Proposed | GRU | 2024 | 96.23 |

**Discussion**

Through multiple experiments, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed models in addressing not only reducing the model’s features number but also enhancing its classification detection ability. Despite the notable improvements in detection accuracy attained by the proposed models, there remain certain limitations that warrant attention. In particular, the rate of false positives. Future research endeavors may include the exploration of alternative strategies to enhance the binary classification performance of the proposed models. This may involve investigating diverse model architectures, such as incorporating attention mechanisms or exploring novel loss functions that are better equipped to capture the unique characteristics of the dataset or generate more data to extract more insightful information. Additionally, efforts could be made to improve the interpretability of the model by analyzing the attention weights of the models and identifying significant features for intrusion detection. These approaches may culminate in further improvements in the overall detection performance and can have far-reaching implications beyond the scope of intrusion detection. Overall, this study contributes to the knowledge system by proposing several with novel approaches and demonstrating its effectiveness in addressing those issues in intrusion detection models, while also emphasizing the need for further research and improvement in this area.

**Conclusion**

The rapid rise in the use of IoT devices has turned them into unsuspecting vectors for cyber-attacks. This paper demonstrates that for certain attacks and IoT devices, deep learning methods such as RNN and BiRNN can effectively classify attacks with high accuracy. While there are numerous datasets available for intrusion detection, it is preferable to use a dataset specifically generated from IoT devices. Thus, this study utilizes the recent IoT-23 dataset. We implemented baseline models, including GRU+AE and DNN+ML. Our findings indicate that RNN-based models are particularly effective (0% False Negative) in identifying and classifying attacks. Additionally, we have shown the effective use of DNN for feature extraction and ML for classification as this approach resulted in better accuracy compared to several other models, specifically in reducing both False Positives and False Negatives. Given the critical role of AE, future research could explore anomaly detection further using various types of AE, such as Sparse, Generative AE and Variational AE.

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