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ORIGINAL PAPER

Trust in Government Among British Muslims: The Importance of Migration Status

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Abstract This article engages debates about Muslim integration in Western societies by analyzing trust in government among British Muslims. A central finding of the article is that British Muslims are more likely than Christians to have high levels of trust in government. To account for these outcomes, I highlight the importance of general political satisfaction and political efficacy as opposed to the more specifically assimilation and segregation-related variables identified by the literature on minority attitudes. In addition, I posit that Muslims are more likely to have positive political attitudes because they are more likely than Christians to be migrants and migrants are more likely than natives to have optimistic evaluations of British society. I claim that these migration dynamics help account for much of the attitudinal differences between Muslims and Christians.

Keywords Muslim · Trust in government · Integration · Britain · Religion · Ethnic minority migrant

Recent examples of violent terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists in Europe and the United States raise important questions about the identity and affiliation of

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Muslims living in Western countries.[1] Pessimists argue that Muslims are alienated from capitalist societies, sympathetic to terrorists, and a threat to the stability of Western democracies (Garton Ash 2005; Sniderman and Hagendoorm 2007). To combat Islamic extremism, Western governments have tightened security and developed citizen education programs to better connect Muslim minorities to mainstream society (Joppke 2007; Uberoi 2007, pp. 141–142).

Concerns about Islamic extremism are especially salient in Britain where there have been several high-profile attempts of terrorist violence in recent years. Some observers have argued that Muslims in Britain are a growing security threat (Phillips 2006) and 'the most anti-Western Muslims in Europe' (Borger 2006; Hansen Forthcoming; Joppke 2009). In response, others have argued that these fears are exaggerated as only a small minority of Muslims support terrorism while the majority seeks peaceful integration into mainstream British society (Abbas 2007; Mogahed 2007). This article engages the debate on Muslim integration by comparing levels of trust in government among British Muslims and Christians. Trust in government (or the lack thereof) is not the only measure of alienation but it is an important indicator of Muslim attachment to mainstream politics because it measures the degree to which individuals feel government authority is legitimate and responsive to their needs.

A central finding of the article is that British Muslims are more likely than Christians to have high levels of trust in government. This result may surprise some readers because Christians are considered part of mainstream British society while Muslims are often viewed as marginalized minorities. However, one of the central claims in this article is that Muslims in Britain are better integrated than is commonly understood. To account for Muslim and Christian levels of government trust I highlight the importance of general political satisfaction and political efficacy, as opposed to the more specifically assimilation and segregation-related variables identified by the literature on minority attitudes. Moreover, I posit that Muslims are more likely to have positive political attitudes because they are more likely than Christians to be migrants and migrants are more likely than natives to have optimistic evaluations of British society. I claim that these migration dynamics help account for much of the attitudinal differences between Muslims and Christians.

In "Historical Background" section, I present a brief historical background of the British Muslim population. In "Explanations for Trust in Government Existing Literature", section, I discuss existing explanations for trust in government and develop my argument about migration dynamics. In "Data, Measures, and Methods" section, the data, measures, and methods used to analyze trust in government in Britain are reviewed. In "Results: Trust in Government Among British Muslims and Christians" section, I present data on Muslim and Christian trust in government and examine evidence for the competing explanations of trust. "The Importance of Migration Status for Political Attitudes" section develops my

[1] Examples include the 2001 attacks in the U.S., the 2004 attacks in Madrid, the assassination of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, and the multiple attacks in the UK since 2005.

argument about how migration status affects attitudes and the last section concludes.

Historical Background

The Muslim population in Britain has diverse ethnic and national backgrounds and has developed over several centuries and multiple waves of migration. Although Muslim settlements in Britain date back to the 1700s, the most recent large-scale migration occurred in the decades following World War II. During this period, migrants from Britain's former colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean arrived to fill labor shortages in low-skill low-wage jobs. The majority of Muslims in this wave of migration were from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Since the 1980s and 1990s, Muslim migrants from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the Balkans have arrived as political or economic refugees (Ansari 2004).

According to the 2001 UK Population Census, there are 1,591,000 Muslims living in Britain, for roughly 2.7% of the population. According to these data, Islam is the second-largest religion in Britain, after Christianity (which represents 71.6% of the population) and ahead of Hinduism (1.0%), Sikhism (0.6%) and Judaism (0.5%). The majority of Muslims are South Asian with roughly 43% of Pakistani origin, 16% of Bangladeshi origin and 9% of Indian origin. Smaller percentages of Muslims are of Middle Eastern, Asian, African, or Caribbean origin, as well as a tiny percentage of white British converts.[2]

Despite the existence of a small group of wealthy Arab Muslims living in London, British Muslims are more likely to suffer from economic disadvantages than the rest of the population. Most British Muslims have settled in impoverished sections of large metropolitan areas, with established Pakistani communities in the Midlands and migrants from recent decades primarily in London and the Southeast (Peach 2005, pp. 25–27).

Muslim engagement with British politics has gone through several phases. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, when many Muslim migrants first arrived in Britain, Muslim community leaders sought better social welfare services and mobilized for religious accommodations in local schools and hospitals. Muslim political mobilization became national in the late 1980s during protests that the government ban Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* (Hiro 1991). Several political organizations were then formed in the 1990s to better connect Muslims to the national government (most notably the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain in 1992 and the Muslim Council of Britain in 1997). In recent years, debates surrounding Muslims' role in British politics have been renewed after examples of violent terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists in Europe and the United States. The British government has responded with new policies to confront Islamic extremists and to increase cooperation with moderate Muslim organizations (Klausen 2009; Mandeville 2009; Watt 2009). In this environment, one of the most important

[2] *Source*: Census, April 2001, Office for National Statistics.

questions is the extent to which Muslims are alienated or attached to mainstream British political institutions.

Explanations for Trust in Government

Existing Literature

There are three main branches of literature that offer arguments which might account for trust in government outcomes among Muslims and Christians in Britain. One branch focuses on general social and political attitudes. A second highlights the individual-level integration challenges that Muslims may face as religious minorities in British society. The third strand of literature focuses on neighborhood-level effects that may shape attitudes among segregated Muslims in Britain.

General Social and Political Attitudes

The literature on general social and political attitudes highlights several factors that should influence trust in government among all individuals. One key factor is social trust. According to this literature, higher levels of trust in other members of society should connect individuals to a broader community and then spill over to increase levels of trust in political institutions. This is often framed as part of the social capital literature in which connections to other members of society are considered positive for a variety of outcomes (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 285; Keele 2007; Putnam 2001). According to these arguments, individuals with higher levels of trust in other members of society should have higher levels of government trust than individuals with lower levels of trust.

Another argument within the general literature focuses on attitudes that are more explicitly political. For these authors, satisfaction in government performance is a key determinant of trust in government because it measures the extent to which individuals feel government has met their needs. In addition, political efficacy (a measure of whether or not individuals feel that they can influence the political system) is an important factor for shaping individual attitudes towards the government (Citrin and Green 1986; Lawrence 1997; Mishler and Rose 2001). According to this literature, individuals should have higher levels of trust in government as they are more satisfied with the government's performance and more likely to feel that they can influence politics.

Individual-Level Integration

Literature on individual integration focuses on unique issues that shape attitudes among minorities and migrants. This may be especially relevant in Britain where most Muslims are ethnic and religious minorities with immigrant origins. One version of this literature emphasizes migrant assimilation as the key to promoting minority attachment to mainstream institutions. According to this logic, as individuals spend more time in the host country and begin to identify with the

host country society they should be more likely to have positive attitudes about mainstream institutions (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964; Joppke and Morawska 2003).

Another version of this literature emphasizes the barriers to assimilation that many minority migrants face. In particular, these arguments focus on how entrenched socio-economic difficulties, discrimination, and stigmatization may lead migrants to become alienated from mainstream institutions (Howell and Fagan 1988; Schildkraut 2005). These arguments may be especially relevant for Muslim attitudes in Britain because of their greater likelihood of suffering from socio-economic disadvantages (Modood 2005), their increased vulnerability to discrimination in the post-September 11, 2001 and post-July 7, 2005 environments (Ameli et al. 2007; Sheridan 2006), and the potential for some radical Muslim migrants in Britain to harbor loyalties to foreign political entities (Borger 2006; Phillips 2006; Werbner 2000).

Neighborhood-Level Effects

A final branch of literature argues that neighborhood-level effects are essential for understanding the formation of attitudes towards political institutions. In particular, individuals who live in socio-economically disadvantaged neighborhoods may be cut off from mainstream society and less likely to develop the social norms and the cultural capital to feel comfortable with civic and political institutions (Jencks and Mayer 1990; Mayer and Jencks 1989). Socio-economically disadvantaged neighborhoods may also suffer from general environments of unhappiness, stress, distrust, and limited cooperation that further reduce the likelihood of residents developing positive attitudes about mainstream institutions (Li et al. 2005; Ross et al. 2001). Another strand of literature argues that neighborhoods with larger percentages of ethnic and religious minority residents will facilitate a variety of negative attitudes. Neighborhoods with more minority residents who are not well-integrated into mainstream society will create a general atmosphere of distrust towards mainstream societal, civic, and political institutions (Alesina and Ferrara 2000, 2002; Putnam 2007). Given the relatively-high levels of Muslim spatial segregation in Britain, it is possible that neighborhood effects are an important part of Muslim attitude formation (Peach 2005).

My Argument: Migration Status and Attitude Formation

In this article, I propose an alternative framework for understanding Muslim and Christian trust in government in Britain. I build on the general literature about political attitudes by claiming that satisfaction in government performance and political efficacy are the key variables that account for Muslim and Christian trust in government. I present evidence that when Muslims and Christians have the same levels of government satisfaction and political efficacy they also have the same levels of trust in government. However because Muslims are more likely to have high levels of satisfaction in government, they are more likely to have positive trust in government.

Existing literature about general political attitudes may help account for different government trust levels but because it purports to apply to all individuals it does not necessarily offer a satisfying account of why these attitudes differ among groups such as Muslims and Christians. In many respects, the higher levels of government satisfaction among Muslims just pose another puzzle for the general literature on political attitudes. Muslims in Britain are marginalized, stigmatized, and socio-economically disadvantaged so it is not clear why they should have higher levels of satisfaction in government. To account for this second puzzle, I go beyond the literature on general political attitudes to develop an argument about the importance of migration status for attitude formation.

I claim that migrants will be more likely than natives to have positive attitudes (e.g. satisfaction in government performance and trust in government) because most of them endured conscious sacrifices to migrate and therefore are predisposed to view the host society as an improvement for their lives. This does not ignore the fact that migrants often feel disappointment and frustration at the difficulties of living in a foreign society. However, migrants' dissatisfaction with the homeland prompted the move. Therefore, even difficult circumstances in the host society are likely to be viewed in a more positive light and migrants may be prepared to accept those circumstances as part of the price for moving to their chosen host society.

My argument builds upon a growing body of research that has found migrants to have more positive political attitudes than natives across various measures and national contexts (de la Garza et al. 1996; Escobar 2006; Kao and Tienda 1995; Maxwell 2009; Michelson 2003). This argument about migration status also helps account for the satisfaction in government performance outcomes in Britain because Muslims are more likely than Christians to be migrants. Muslims' greater percentage of migrants increases their group-wide satisfaction in government performance which then increases their group-wide levels of trust in government.

Data, Measures, and Methods

The data in this article are from the 2007 Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS), which was designed to provide information on local community empowerment. The HOCS is particularly well-suited to analyze Muslim political attitudes in Britain because it includes an extensive set of questions on political attitudes and social behavior and uses a representative national sample of 9,336 people and an ethnic minority booster sample of 4,759 people (Citizenship Survey Team 2008). The relatively large sample of ethnic minorities facilitates detailed analysis of Muslim attitudes. Most Muslims in Britain are ethnic minorities and do not appear in significant numbers in many national surveys but there are more than 1,700 Muslim respondents in the 2007 HOCS.

The timing of the HOCS is both an advantage and a disadvantage. An advantage is that it was conducted after September 11, 2001, after the U.S. and UK-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and after the July 2005 terror bombings in London. This allows us to analyze contemporary Muslim political attitudes in light

of the recent events that have generated intense public scrutiny of the British Muslim community.

A disadvantage to the 2007 HOCS is that it is limited to one year and does not allow examination of how Muslim trust in British institutions has changed over time. One alternative would be analyzing previous versions of the HOCS, as the 2007 HOCS is the fourth iteration of a survey that was also conducted in 2001, 2003, and 2005. Many of the same questions have been posed in each version of the HOCS but the 2007 iteration offers the most extensive set of questions to test for the importance of individual-level assimilation variables. Moreover, special permission from the National Centre for Social Research was required to access restricted data that allowed analysis of neighborhood-level variables and these data were not available for all versions of the HOCS. Finally, while the HOCS has a limited temporal scope, there are few other options for analyzing British Muslims' trust in government over time.[3]

I will now briefly discuss the measures for the central variables. See the Appendix for more details. To identify the Muslim and Christian respondents, I used a question about whether individuals identify with a religion even if not currently practicing. This was intended to capture the broadest possible definition of "Muslims" and "Christians".

There are two dependent variables of interest for this article. One asks "Do you trust Parliament?" and the other asks "Do you trust the local council?" Both are coded 0—Not at all, 1—Not very much, 2—A fair amount, 3—A lot.

I include four measures for the variables cited in the general literature on social and political attitudes. 'Social trust' measures responses to the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" To measure satisfaction in government performance I include the variable 'Satisfy', which is an index of responses to questions about satisfaction in local schools, public housing, street cleaning, police, health services, services for young people, public transportation, and waste collection.[4] Finally, there are two measures of political efficacy. For the dependent variable about trust in Parliament, I include responses to the question "Can you influence decisions affecting Britain?" For the dependent variable about trust in the local council, I include responses to the question "Can you influence decisions affecting the local area?"

I use a series of variables to evaluate the arguments about individual-level assimilation. The variable 'Country' measures whether individuals were born in the UK or abroad. Three variables measure assimilation and identification. "Feel British" measures responses to the question "To what extent do you agree or

[3] Since the 1960s, the British Election Studies, the Political Action Study and the British Social Surveys have included questions about trust in government. Unfortunately, these studies have not included questions in a consistent manner to allow for comparisons across time. In addition, these studies have not included enough ethnic and religious minority respondents to provide reliable results for Muslim levels of trust. One recent attempt to examine change in trust in government over time in Britain is Bromley et al. (2001), but without significant sample sizes of ethnic or religious minority groups.

[4] The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient for these eight items is .65, which suggests that they scale pretty well together given the diversity of services included.

disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?" "Dual ID" includes responses to the question "How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?" Finally, because much of the debate in Britain assumes that devout Muslims are more problematic than moderate Muslims, "Religiosity" measures responses to a question about "the importance of religion to a sense of who you are". For the literature about barriers to assimilation, I include the variable "Expected Discrimination", which is a measure of the sum of responses to questions that ask whether individuals feel they would be treated worse than other people because of their religion in twelve different situations.[5] The variable "Rel-Prej" includes responses to the question "How much religious prejudice do you feel there is in Britain today?" To evaluate the importance of socio-economic success or failure, I include dummy variables for professional occupation status and lack of educational qualifications. Finally, because Muslims are more likely than Christians to be ethnic minorities in Britain, I control for potential ethnic differences with a dummy variable 'White' coded 0—Not white, 1—White.

To evaluate the literature about neighborhood-level effects, I included four variables that measure ward characteristics. In Britain, wards are the electoral constituencies for municipal councils. The geographic size and population count varies according to whether the wards are in rural or urban areas but generally wards are fairly small units with an average of 5,500 residents. There are over 10,000 wards in the UK, of which over 1,180 are represented in the HOCS sample. To measure the importance of Muslim segregation, I include variables for the percentage of Muslim residents and of foreign residents in each ward. To measure the importance of socio-economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, I include a variable for the Index of Deprivation for each ward.[6] Finally, to measure the general social environment of the neighborhood, I include 'Neighborhood Trust' which is the mean response for individuals in each ward to the question "How much can people [in your neighborhood] be trusted?"

To analyze the determinants of trust in government satisfaction I estimate multi-level mixed-effects maximum likelihood models with random intercepts and respondents clustered by ward. The multi-level modeling approach is appropriate for evaluating the individual-level factors (e.g. employment status, expectations of discrimination) as well as the neighborhood-level factors (e.g. spatial segregation) that shape trust in government.

Results: Trust in Government among British Muslims and Christians

The results in Fig. 1 indicate that Muslims are more likely than Christians to have trust in Parliament and in the local council. For example, 16% of Muslims have 'A

[5] The 12 different situations were interacting with a local doctor, hospital, school, public housing department, local council, private landlord or real estate agent, courts, crown prosecution, police, immigration officials, prison, and probation officer. The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient for these twelve items is .66.

[6] For more on the deprivation indices see Noble et al. (2008).



Fig. 1 Trust in government among Muslims and Christians. *Source*: 2007 Home Office Citizenship Survey

lot' of trust in Parliament compared to only 4% of Christians and 16% of Muslims have 'A lot' of trust in the local council compared to 7% of Christians. These same patterns hold when the two positive response categories are combined, with an especially large gap between the 62% of Muslims and the 35% of Christians who either have 'A lot' or 'a fair amount' of trust in Parliament.

One might doubt the validity of Muslim respondents' high levels of trust in government because in the post-September 11 and post 7/7 environments Muslim respondents may exaggerate their commitment to British institutions in order to avoid being labeled as terrorist sympathizers. However, the 2007 HOCS is the fourth iteration of a survey conducted every two years since 2001. In each of these previous surveys (2001 HOCS, 2003 HOCS, 2005 HOCS), Muslim levels of trust in government have been higher than those of Christians. Even among respondents interviewed prior to September 11, 2001 Muslims were more likely than Christians to have high levels of positive trust in Parliament and the local council.[7] It is impossible to know the exact extent to which Muslim respondents in the 2007 HOCS felt pressured to represent themselves as more positive about British government than they truly felt. But, results from earlier HOCS suggest that there

[7] Among respondents interviewed prior to September 11, 2001 in the 2001 HOCS 58% of Muslims had 'A lot' or 'a fair amount' of trust in Parliament, compared to 30% of Christians. Similarly, 61% of Muslims and 51% of Christians had 'A lot' or 'a fair amount' of trust in the local council. In the 2003 HOCS, 51% of Muslims had 'A lot' or 'a fair amount' of trust in Parliament, compared to 35% of Christians. For the local council, 63% of Muslims and 53% of Christians had 'A lot' or 'a fair amount' of trust. Finally, in the 2005 HOCS, 57% of Muslims had 'A lot' or 'a fair amount' of trust in Parliament, compared to 38% of Christians and 70% of Muslims and 58% of Christians had 'A lot' or 'a fair amount' of trust in the local council.

has been no significant change in Muslim trust responses in the pre and post-September 11, 2001 periods or in the pre and post-July 7, 2005 periods.

Regression Analysis

Table 1 presents results from multi-level maximum likelihood linear regression estimates of trust in Parliament and in the local council. The results indicate that several variables are statistically significant predictors of trust in government. In both models, all of the variables identified by the general literature on social and political attitudes are statistically significant at $p < .001$. This suggests that as individuals' social and political attitudes are more positive they will be more likely to have high levels of trust in government.

Table 1 Multi-level mixed-effects maximum likelihood estimates of trust in Parliament and trust in local council among Muslims and Christians

	Trust in Parliament	Trust in local council
Social trust	.043*** (.008)	.039*** (.007)
National influence	.206*** (.006)	
Local influence		.146*** (.008)
Satisfy	.038*** (.002)	.058*** (.002)
Born in UK	.242*** (.024)	.117*** (.021)
Dual ID	.041*** (.006)	.019*** (.005)
Feel British	.111*** (.009)	.070*** (.008)
Rel importance	.016** (.006)	.019*** (.005)
Discrim expect	−.024 (.017)	−.025 (.015)
Discrim evaluate	−.086*** (.008)	−.051*** (.007)
Professional	.074*** (.017)	.002 (.015)
Unqualified	−.041 (.021)	−.002 (.018)
White	−.100*** (.029)	−.043 (.026)
% Foreign ward	.102* (.047)	−.007 (.043)
% Muslim ward	.001 (.001)	000 (.001)
Neigh. deprivation	.008* (.003)	−.007* (.003)
Neigh. trust	.003 (.026)	.024 (.024)
Constant	−.159 (.089)	−.018 (.082)
Standard deviation of random intercept	.002 (.003)	.008 (.002)
Standard deviation of residuals	.526 (.008)	.401 (.006)
No. of observations	9432	9333
No. of groups	1182	1181
Wald χ^2 (df)	3058.85 (16)	3256.14 (16)

Source: 2007 Home Office Citizenship Survey

Note: Core and minority ethnic boost samples

Each cell gives the estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

The variables for individual-level integration present mixed results. All of the variables measuring respondents' identification are statistically significant in each model. This suggests that as individuals are (a) more likely to feel British, or (b) more likely to feel that it is possible to combine ethnic, religious, and British identities, or (c) more likely to value religion in their lives, they will also be more likely to have high levels of trust in government. These results support the literature on assimilation. However, the variable for Country of Birth is statistically significant at $p < .001$ in both models and suggests that individuals born abroad are more likely to have high levels of trust in government, which runs counter to the predictions of the assimilation literature.

The variables highlighted by the literature on barriers to assimilation also indicate mixed results. The measure for evaluating religious prejudice in British society is statistically significant at $p < .001$ in both models and suggests that as individuals are more pessimistic about general religious prejudice they will be less likely to have high levels of trust in government. However, the variable for personal expectations of discrimination is not statistically significant. Furthermore, variables measuring socio-economic outcomes and ethnic identity are only significant in the model for trust in Parliament. This suggests that professionals are more likely than non-professionals to have high levels of trust in Parliament (which supports the existing literature), but that whites are less likely than non-whites to have high levels of trust in Parliament (which runs counter to the existing literature).

Finally, most of the variables for neighborhood-level effects are not statistically significant in either model. The measure for Neighborhood Deprivation is statistically significant in both cases but the direction is different in each model. This suggests that individuals living in deprived neighborhoods are more likely to have high levels of trust in Parliament but less likely to have high levels of trust in the local council. The variable for percentage of foreigners is statistically significant and positive in the model for trust in Parliament. This runs counter to the existing literature on neighborhood effects and suggests that respondents living in wards with higher percentages of foreign residents will be more likely to have high levels of trust in Parliament.

Substantive Effects

The results in Table 1 indicate that many of the variables highlighted in the existing literature are important predictors of trust in government, although not always in ways predicted by the literature. To help determine which of these control variables have the strongest substantive effects, Figs. 2 and 3 present the change in trust in government as each statistically significant variable moves from its minimum to its maximum value. In both cases, the variable 'Satisfy' has the largest effects on trust in government. 'Satisfy' is associated with a change of 1.68 points (on a scale of 0–3) for trust in Parliament and a change of 2.23 points for trust in the local council. The next closest measures are the variables for political efficacy which are associated with changes of .91 points for trust in Parliament and .70 for trust in the local council. Among the remaining variables, 'Feel British' is associated with a change of roughly .50 points in both models and the percent of foreigners has a



Fig. 2 The amount of change in the predicted outcomes for Trust in Parliament as control variables move from their minimum to maximum values. *Note*: Trust in Parliament is coded from 0 (no trust at all) to 3 (a lot of trust)



Fig. 3 The amount of change in the predicted outcomes for trust in the local council as control variables move from their minimum to maximum values. *Note*: Trust in local council is coded from 0 (no trust at all) to 3 (a lot of trust)

change of roughly .60 points for trust in Parliament. The rest of the variables all have changes that are well below .50 points.

These results suggest that while many variables may significantly affect outcomes for trust in government, the two variables with the largest substantive effects are satisfaction in government performance and political efficacy. Furthermore, the relatively minor importance of individual-level integration factors and neighborhood-level effects makes sense. In comparison to Christians, Muslims in Britain are generally less well-assimilated, more discriminated against, and more concentrated in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Therefore, if these factors were among the most important for government trust, Christians should be more likely than Muslims to have high levels of government trust. However, the HOCS 2007

data indicate that Muslims have higher levels of government trust than Christians, which raises doubts about the importance of these integration and segregation variables.

Further evidence that satisfaction in government performance and political efficacy may be driving much of the trust in government among Muslims and Christians in Britain can be found in Figs. 4 and 5. These figures use results from the models in Table 1 to predict trust in government scores for Muslims and Christians according to levels of government satisfaction and political efficacy. In each case the trust in government scores are pretty close for the two religious groups across different levels of satisfaction and efficacy. The gap between the groups is slightly larger for trust in Parliament with low satisfaction and low efficacy, but when both groups have high levels of satisfaction in government and high levels of political efficacy their scores for trust in Parliament and trust in the local council almost converge.

A review of the distributions for each of these variables indicates that Muslims and Christians have similar average levels of political efficacy but that Muslims are more likely than Christians to have high levels of satisfaction in government



Fig. 4 Predictions for trust in Parliament according to levels of satisfaction and political efficacy. *Note*: Trust in Parliament is coded from 0 (no trust at all) to 3 (a lot of trust)



Fig. 5 Predictions for trust in local council according to levels of satisfaction and political efficacy. *Note*: Trust in local council is coded from 0 (no trust at all) to 3 (a lot of trust)



Fig. 6 Mean levels of satisfaction in government performance according to religion and migration status. *Note*: Satisfaction is coded from 0 (least satisfaction) to 32 (most satisfaction)

performance.[8] This suggests that Muslims' higher levels of satisfaction in government performance may be the key to understanding their higher levels of trust in government.

The Importance of Migration Status for Political Attitudes

The significance of satisfaction in government for explaining the different levels of trust in government among British Muslims and Christians supports the general literature on social and political attitudes. However, in many respects, these results trade one puzzle for another because it is not clear why marginalized, stigmatized, and socio-economically disadvantaged British Muslims should be more likely than Christians to have high levels of satisfaction in government. To respond to this question, I claim that Muslims are more likely to have positive political attitudes because they are more likely than Christians to be migrants and migrants are more likely than natives to have high satisfaction levels.

Figure 6 presents mean levels of satisfaction in government according to religion and migration status. The bars on the far left side of the graph indicate that Muslims in general have higher levels of satisfaction in government than Christians with a roughly one point difference in mean scores (on a scale of 0–32), a gap which is statistically significant at $p < .001$. However, when results are analyzed according to migration status, Muslim and Christian satisfaction scores are much closer and the differences are no longer statistically significant. Among migrants, Muslims and Christians have the same mean satisfaction scores and among natives there is a difference of 0.1 points. The results in Fig. 6 also indicate that migrants in general have satisfaction in government scores that are higher than those of natives. Given

[8] On a scale of 0–3, the mean national political efficacy score is 1.1 for Muslims and 0.8 for Christians. The mean local political efficacy score is 1.3 for Muslims and 1.2 for Christians. On a scale of 0–32, the mean satisfaction in government performance score is 21 for Muslims and 20.2 for Christians.



Fig. 7 Mean levels of satisfaction in government performance according to religion and migration status among respondents living in the most deprived wards. *Note*: Satisfaction is coded from 0 (least satisfaction) to 32 (most satisfaction) Results are shown for respondents in wards with multiple deprivation index scores higher than 34.20%. This represents 28% of the 2007 HOCS sample. For more on the deprivation indices see Noble et al. 2008

that 75% of Muslims in the 2007 HOCS sample are migrants compared to only 20% of Christians, the differences in migration status are likely to explain the overall differences in satisfaction scores and trust in government.

Existing research provides evidence that migrants have more positive attitudes than natives across a range of national contexts. This research argues that because migrants left their homeland in search of a better life they are predisposed to accept what they find. Regardless of their difficulties, migrants will then have positive evaluations about host society institutions in comparison to natives who may have higher expectations (de la Garza et al. 1996; Escobar 2006; Kao and Tienda 1995; Maxwell 2009; Michelson 2003). As evidence of this dynamic, Figs. 7 and 8 provide mean scores for satisfaction in government among HOCS respondents living in the most deprived wards and according to levels of fear of crime in the local area. In general, individuals who live in deprived areas and who are more fearful of crime should have lower levels of satisfaction in government services. However, I claim that migration status is an important mitigating factor which shapes how individuals evaluate their experiences. Therefore, even though migrants are more likely than natives to live in highly-deprived neighborhoods and are more likely to fear crime in their local community, migrants are also more likely to be satisfied in government performance.[9]

In Fig. 7 all respondents live in areas with roughly the same level of deprivation and with the poorest government services, but among those individuals migrants have higher levels of satisfaction than natives. The bars on the far left side of the graph indicate that Muslims in general have higher levels of satisfaction in

[9] In the 2007 HOCS, 50% of migrants are either 'very worried' or 'fairly worried' about crime in general, compared to 41% of natives. Similarly, in the HOCS 42% of migrants and only 22% of natives live in wards with multiple deprivation index scores higher than 34.20%. For more on the deprivation indices see Noble et al. (2008).



Fig. 8 Mean levels of satisfaction in government performance according to religion, migration status, and fear of crime in the local area. *Note*: Satisfaction is coded from 0 (least satisfaction) to 32 (most satisfaction)

government than Christians but once the data are divided by migration status those differences disappear. In Fig. 8, all groups have higher levels of satisfaction in government as they are less worried about crime. However, at the same levels of fear of crime both Christian and Muslim migrants have higher levels of satisfaction than natives. Moreover, satisfaction scores are roughly similar for Christian and Muslims once they are analyzed according to migration status. These results suggest that Muslims' higher levels of satisfaction in government performance are primarily a function of their larger percentage of migrants and the general dynamic of more positive evaluations among migrants as opposed to natives.[10]

Conclusion

This article analyzes data showing that Muslims are more likely than Christians to have high levels of government trust in Britain. This poses a puzzle because in Britain Muslims are often considered social and cultural outsiders with economic disadvantages who are prone to alienation and extremism. Thus, one would expect Christians to have higher levels of government trust than Muslims. However, I claim that Muslims are more likely to have positive political attitudes because they are more likely than Christians to be migrants and migrants are more likely than natives to have high satisfaction levels. This builds on the existing literature about social and political attitudes by arguing that migration status is an important factor that shapes the formation of those attitudes and is consistent with recent research

[10] Further evidence of this dynamic is the fact that satisfaction and government trust scores slowly decline as migrants spend more time in the host country. One possible confounding variable is age, as older people generally respond more positively to questions about satisfaction and government trust. However, this is not likely to explain the outcomes in this article as Muslims (and migrants in general) have population distributions with larger percentages of young people in comparison to Christians and native British respondents.

I have conducted about migrant attitudes across Western and Eastern Europe (Maxwell 2009).

A key implication of this article is that Muslims are better incorporated in British society than is commonly assumed. Muslims' high levels of trust in British Parliamentary and local government suggest that Muslims generally have positive attitudes towards mainstream British political institutions. Moreover, this trust in government is not primarily driven by factors related to cultural assimilation, segregation, or prospects for alienation but rather is a function of general social and political attitudes common to all individuals. Further evidence of the integrated normality of Muslim political attitudes is their relatively high levels of positive British identification, which are either close to or slightly more positive than those of Christians across the 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 HOCS.

Another implication of this article is that if Muslim political attitudes are primarily shaped by their migration status and not by their religion, the attitudes of second and third-generation Muslims should converge with those of native Britons. This notion is supported by the HOCS data, as this article has indicated that attitudes among native Muslims (97% of whom are second-generation migrants) are similar to those of native Christians and of natives in general. These findings do not preclude the possibility of second generation dissatisfaction developing over time and they do not address the difficult issue of how to prevent dangerous violent extremism among a small alienated minority. However, these results do suggest that the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Britain are committed to British governmental institutions.

The findings in this article present a different picture from those who claim that British Muslims are the most alienated and dangerous Muslims in Europe (Borger 2006; Hansen Forthcoming; Joppke 2009). These authors point to studies which find that Muslims in Britain are more likely than Muslims in other European countries to have negative views about non-Muslims and to support strict fundamentalist religious practices (Pew Research Center 2006; Policy Exchange 2007). Such findings are important for what they tell us about the nature of British Muslims' integration and for the insight they offer on why British Muslims may be more politically mobilized and religiously devout than in other European countries. However, integration does not have to mean perfect harmony and it is possible for Muslims (just like any other group) to be critical of British society while accepting its basic political institutions. The HOCS data suggest that although hurdles may remain before Muslims' socio-economic disadvantages are erased and their social integration into mainstream British circles is successful, ensuring Muslim commitment to British government institutions is not one of those challenges.

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Appendix: Variable Definitions in the 2007 Home Office Citizenship Survey

Dependent Variables

Parliament: How much do you trust Parliament?

Local Council: How much do you trust the local council?

0—Not at all, 1—Not very much, 2—A fair amount, 3—A lot.

Control Variables

Social trust: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"

0—You can't be too careful, 1—It depends, 2—People can be trusted

Satisfy: An index of responses to questions about satisfaction in local schools, public housing, street cleaning, police, health services, services for young people, public transportation, and waste collection.

Each variable is coded: 0—Very dissatisfied, 1—Fairly dissatisfied, 2—Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 3—Fairly satisfied, 4—Very satisfied.

Political efficacy: Can you influence decisions affecting either Britain or the local community?

0—Definitely disagree, 1—Tend to disagree, 2—Tend to agree, 3—Definitely agree

Born in UK: 0—No, 1—Yes

Feel British: "To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?"

0—Strongly disagree, 1—Tend to disagree, 2—Don't know, 3—Tend to agree, 4—Strongly agree

Dual ID: "How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity?"

0—Strongly disagree, 1—Tend to disagree, 2—Don't know, 3—Tend to agree, 4—Strongly agree

Religiosity: "Importance of religion to sense of who you are"

0—Not at all important, 1—Not very important, 2—Don't know, 3—Quite important, 4—Very important

Discrimination Expected: An index of responses to questions about whether or not respondents would be treated worse because of their religion. The twelve situations were when interacting with a local doctor, hospital, school, public housing department, local council, private landlord or real estate agent, courts, crown prosecution, police, immigration officials, prison, and probation officer. The variable ranges from 0—12 according to the number of situations in which respondents expected to be treated worse because of their religion.

Discrimination Evaluated: "How much religious prejudice do you feel there is in Britain today?"

0—None, 1—A little, 2—A fair amount, 3—A lot

Professional: 0—Not employed in professional or managerial occupation, 1—Employed in professional or managerial occupation.

Unqualified: 0—Some educational qualifications, 1—No educational qualifications.

White: 0—No, 1—Yes.

% Foreign Ward: The percentage of residents in each ward born outside the UK.

% Muslim Ward: The percentage of residents in each ward who are Muslim according to the 2001 Population Census.

Neighborhood Trust: The mean score for each ward on responses to the following question: "How much can people be trusted?"

0—None of the people in your neighborhood can be trusted, 1—A few can be trusted, 2—Some can be trusted, Many of the people in your neighborhood can be trusted.

Neighborhood Deprivation: The 2006 ranking for each ward on the index of multiple deprivation (from least deprived to most deprived).

1—0 → 5.74, 2—5.75 → 8.34, 3—8.35 → 10.95, 4—10.96 → 13.71, 5—13.72 → 17.02, 6—17.03 → 21.15, 7—21.16 → 26.61, 8—26.62 → 34.20, 9—34.21 → 45.22, 10—45.23 → 86.36.

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