

Cryptography for Blockchain Applications

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Abstract

Blockchains were introduced in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto as a way to implement a trusted but decentralized append-only ledger. This simple functionality has given rise to a plethora of decentralized applications utilizing the blockchain as a public bulleting board. In recent years, it has become clear that this basic functionality is not enough to prevent widespread attacks on both the privacy and security of blockchain users, as evidenced by the blockchain analytics industry and the billions of dollars stolen via cryptocurrency exploits to date. This work explores the role cryptography has to play in the blockchain ecosystem to both enhance user privacy and secure user funds.

Contents

1	Introduction	2
1.1	Model and Preliminaries	2
1.2	Definitions	2
2	Privacy-Enhancing Building Blocks	2
2.1	Zero-Knowledge Proofs and their trust assumptions	2
2.1.1	Circuit-Succinct Universally Composable NIZKs with Updatable CRS [AGRS24]	3
3	Privacy-Enhancing Applications	3
3.1	Cryptocurrency Mixers	3
3.1.1	Blind Conditional Signatures	4
3.2	On-chain private voting	5
3.2.1	Cicada: A framework for private non-interactive on-chain auctions and voting [GSZB23]	5
4	Proposed Work	5
4.1	Registration-Based Encryption as a Web3 service	5
4.2	Threshold cryptocurrency wallets in the hot-cold paradigm	5
5	Timeline	5

1 Introduction

Bitcoin [Nak08] was the first digital currency to successfully implement a fully trustless and decentralized payment system. **todo: ...** Ethereum [But14] introduced programmability via *smart contracts* **todo: ...**

1.1 Model and Preliminaries

1.2 Definitions

2 Privacy-Enhancing Building Blocks

Although cryptocurrencies are often treated as fully anonymous digital currencies, numerous works have shown how to link transactions or even fully deanonymize users in many popular cryptocurrencies [BKP14, BT19, KKM14, MSH⁺18, KYMM18]. Numerous mitigations have been suggested, including cryptocurrency mixers (described below) and privacy-first cryptocurrencies like Zcash [zca] and Monero [mon].

2.1 Zero-Knowledge Proofs and their trust assumptions

Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs) are ubiquitous building blocks in many blockchains. Zcash [zca], as indicated by the letter “Z” in its name, relies heavily on a type of NIZK called zkSNARK (zero-knowledge succinct argument of knowledge) to achieve private payments: zkSNARKs are used to prove a party has sufficient funds to make a payment without revealing anything more about those funds [BCG⁺14]. On Ethereum, (zk-)rollups enhance scalability by leveraging the succinctness of (zk)SNARKs, though they may or may not offer the zero-knowledge property.

To achieve such a high level of succinctness, SNARKs rely on a trusted setup to generate a *common reference string* (CRS). In keeping with the primary innovation of the blockchain, which is the elimination of a trusted third party (TTP), practitioners use various approaches to minimize the trust in the CRS generation. Zcash uses a multi-party computation ceremony [zca16] with many independent participants to distribute the trust among several parties. Another trust-minimizing approach consists of using SNARKs with universal and updatable CRS [GKM⁺18, MBKM19, CHM⁺20, GWC19]. A universal CRS can be reused across applications, avoiding a new complicated setup ceremony for every use. Updatable CRSs allow any participant in a system to contribute randomness to the CRS at any point, including once the CRS is in production use, to enable a “one-out-of-many” trust scenario in which the user must only trust themselves to contribute (and then delete) good randomness to the CRS in order for the whole system to be secure.

An orthogonal concern is maintaining the security of SNARKs when they are composed with other protocols in the complex blockchain ecosystem. Formally, this is modeled by universally composable security via the UC frame-

work [Can01]. Unfortunately, most SNARKs in deployment today are not provably UC-secure. Although compilers to transform any SNARK or NIZK into a UC variant exist [KZM⁺15, GKO⁺23], these are not compatible with the aforementioned trust-minimizing properties like updatability. A generic compiler which adds UC-security while maintaining updatability would help ensure confidence in both the trusted setup and the operational security of deployed NIZKs.

2.1.1 Circuit-Succinct Universally Composable NIZKs with Updatable CRS [AGRS24]

In this section, we summarize the contributions and constructions of [AGRS24].
 todo: ...

	UC		succinctness-preserving		upd. CRS
	SE	BBE	in $ C $	in $ w $	
C0C0 [KZM ⁺ 15]	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
DS [DS19]	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗
LAMASSU [ARS20]	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓
This work [AGRS24]	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
Concurr. work [GKO ⁺ 23]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗

Table 1: Comparison with concurrent and previous work.

3 Privacy-Enhancing Applications

3.1 Cryptocurrency Mixers

Noemi: How to position this? Our focus will be on *off-chain* mixers, whose focus is on enabling *scalability* and *interoperability* rather than privacy... todo: Talk about how these also solve scalability and interoperability?

todo: citations [RMK14, SNBB19, TLK⁺18, BNM⁺14], Bitcoin (CoinJoin, CoinShuffle), Bolt, Blindcoin, Mixcoin Cryptocurrency mixers add a measure of k -anonymity to cryptocurrency tokens by employing a central party, or *mixer*, to shuffle the tokens among users of the service. Users deposit their coins into the service, and later retrieve them again (using a different address, otherwise anonymity is trivially broken). Any particular token (retrieved from the mixer) cannot be tied to a particular source (user who deposited money from the mixer): each of the k users is equally likely to be the source of a given token. For security, a mixer must offer *atomicity*, i.e., a user pays $c + \epsilon$ coins if and only if the “recipient” (normally the same user, but under a new address) is paid c coins (ϵ is a parameter which represents the mixer and transaction fees). todo: exit scams

Mixers come in two flavors: on- and off-chain mixers. On-chain mixers **todo:** □ are simply accounts into which users can deposit coins and later retrieve them (or allow another party to retrieve them) by redeeming some token, with atomicity enforced via an on-chain script. **Noemi: check this**

Off-chain mixers normally require more complicated protocols to enforce the atomicity requirement without the scripting functionality offered by the underlying blockchain. One line of work, initiated by TumbleBit [HAB⁺17], uses a protocol paradigm which we refer to as a *synchronization puzzle*. A synchronization puzzle is a three-party protocol between a sender (Alice), a mixer (Hub), and a recipient (Bob) **todo: insert figure**. Synchronization puzzle protocols consist of four steps: (1) Hub and Bob execute *puzzle promise* phase with respect to some message m_{HB} , which outputs a puzzle τ containing a hidden signature s on m_{HB} . (2) Bob sends τ to Alice via a private channel, who (3) uses it to execute the *puzzle solver* phase with Hub with respect to another message m_{AH} . At the end of this phase, Alice obtains the signature s on m_{HB} and Hub learns s' on m_{AH} . To conclude, (4) Alice sends s to Bob. A synchronization puzzle protocol should satisfy the following properties:

- **Blindness:** In the puzzle solver phase, Hub *blindly* helps solve τ , i.e., the phase should not reveal anything about τ to Hub. (This keeps Alice and Bob unlinkable from the point of view of Hub.)
- **Unlockability:** If the puzzle solver phase completes successfully, s must be a valid secret for τ . (This ensures that the Hub cannot learn s' without revealing s .)
- **Unforgeability:** Bob cannot output a valid signature s on m_{HB} before the puzzle solver phase completes. (This ensures Bob cannot learn s without Hub learning s' .)

To use a synchronization puzzle to realize an atomic payment, the parties set $m_{AH} : (A \xrightarrow{c+\epsilon} H)$ and $m_{HB} : (H \xrightarrow{c} B)$, where $(U_i \xrightarrow{c} U_j)$ denotes a payment of c coins from user U_i to U_j . Then s' and s are set to the signatures authorizing m_{AH} and m_{HB} , respectively. Thus, at the completion of the protocol Alice will have sent c coins to Bob (and paid a fee of ϵ to Hub).

Tumblebit realizes a synchronization puzzle via **todo: ???**.

todo: describe A²L sync puzzles (rerand enc + adaptor signatures) Anonymous Atomic Locks (A²L) [TMM21] uses so-called *adaptor signatures* to atomically complete payments on both the sender and recipient payment channels.

3.1.1 Blind Conditional Signatures

In this section, we summarize the contributions and constructions of [GMM⁺22]. In this paper, we analyzed the A²L protocol [TMM21] and found that, in contrast to its claims, it is not secure. Although A²L was proven secure in the universal composability (UC) [Can01] framework, we show that a gap in their formal model allows two constructions which are completely insecure despite

meeting their definitions: one admits a key recovery attack and the other allows a colluding sender and recipient to steal coins from the mixer. To close this gap, we introduce a new primitive called blind conditional signatures (BCS) which captures the core coin mixing functionality. We give game-based security definitions for BCS and show how to modify A^2L to obtain a new protocol, A^2L^+ , which meets these definitions. We also give a UC-secure construction of BCS, dubbed A^2L^{UC} , which requires much more complex machinery.

Counterexamples to A^2L . We show that there exist cryptographic primitives which satisfy the prerequisites of A^2L 's main theorem, but allow (a) a *key recovery attack*, in which a malicious user is able to learn the long-term secret of the hub or (b) a *one-more signature attack*, in which a sender and recipient can collude to obtain n tokens from the hub while only sending $n - 1$ tokens. Both attacks run in polynomial time and succeed with overwhelming probability. todo: write intuitive explanation of the attacks, refer to full paper for details

Definitions. todo: Write game-based defs, refer reader to A^2L and our paper for UC ideal functionality

Constructions. todo: Write both constructions?

3.2 On-chain private voting

3.2.1 Cicada: A framework for private non-interactive on-chain auctions and voting [GSZB23]

In this section, we summarize the contributions and constructions of [GSZB23]. todo: ...

4 Proposed Work

4.1 Registration-Based Encryption as a Web3 service

Noemi: Unclear if this can be included

4.2 Threshold cryptocurrency wallets in the hot-cold paradigm

5 Timeline

todo:

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