




## NGMUN V

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Secretaries-General

Under-Secretary-General

# Pablo Escobar & The Columbian Drug Crisis



**Table of Contents**

Letter from the Secretariat.....	3
Sensitivity Statement.....	4
Letter from the Chair.....	5
Overview.....	6
Current Situation.....	7
Delegate List.....	8
Questions to Consider.....	11

*Letter from the Co-Secretaries-General*

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to NGMUN V! As we prepare to open our fifth season of debate, we are grateful to finally welcome delegates back to campus. After three years of virtual committees, it is our honor and pleasure to host what we hope will be a diverse and thoughtful debate. When delegates begin their conference day in person (which may feel new to some), we urge all to remember the spirit of debate and the challenge of immersing oneself in the perspective and interests of one's country or character, rather than relying on personal tendencies. Debate craves healthy controversy. Delegates should present the imperatives of their country or character respectfully and thoughtfully. We look forward to and expect the utmost diplomacy.

The Nobles Model UN club has an extensive and impressive legacy, with recent accolades including Best Large Delegation at Harvard MUN 2021. Club successes in conferences across the nation have solidified Nobles as a leader in independent school Model UN. NGMUN began as an idea between two dedicated members of the club, Will Whalen (N' 19) and Julia Temple (N' 20). The first NGMUN was held in the spring of 2019. Since then, though NGMUN's leadership has separated from the MUN club's leadership, our secretariat and daises have grown significantly in experience, skill, and creativity. This year's staff have a wealth of experience both as delegates and as staff members. Your chairs and co-chairs have spent months preparing committees full of robust debates, critical problem-solving, and international intrigue. They are driven, intelligent, and enthusiastic. You should approach your committee with trust and respect for the forces that be – they are just as excited as you are.

Regarding our expectations for the conference, we look forward to a commitment from delegates to enable successful committees. First of all, position papers will be required for any delegate seeking an award and are highly encouraged for all. Not only will position papers expand your own knowledge of the issue and your delegation's stance, but they also show your chair and co-chair(s) that you take your position at this conference seriously. Secondly, while you should be excited to debate and resolve conflicts, if the discourse between you and other delegates gets too heated, remember that this conference is a simulation. You should exhibit diplomacy, not hostility. Even if you are assigned to a committee where fights and arguments are in the description, there will be no tolerance for directly disrespecting the character of any of your fellow delegates, or any personal attacks. Should issues beyond committee jurisdiction arise, delegates jeopardize their privilege to continue in the debate. We look forward to a day of intellectual growth, diplomacy, and thoughtful discourse. On behalf of your very excited secretariat, thank you for joining us for a weekend!

Sincerely,

Katie Cheung & Oona Lundgren

*Secretaries-General*

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*Sensitivity Statement*

You are assuming the roles and responsibilities of diplomats, and therefore will be held to the ethical standards of the role. During NGMUN, we expect all delegate behavior to reflect the gravity and sensitivity of the international and individual impact of the topics being addressed, just as such topics would be addressed by professional diplomats. While the issues you debate are on the world stage and may seem distant from your lived experience, we ask that you approach debate with a high level of respect and sensitivity for others. Absolutely no racism, sexism, xenophobia, homophobia, or any other forms of discrimination will be tolerated in or out of committee. This includes any such harmful rhetoric that can be attributed to the country or character you are representing. Any discriminatory language or ideas in speeches, resolutions, or at any other point in the conference is prohibited.

## Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Pablo Escobar Crisis Committee and to Noble and Greenough MUN!

I am Colin Levine, a sophomore at Noble and Greenough, and I am thrilled to be your chair in Escobar Crisis as we debate and hopefully solve the pressing issue of Pablo Escobar's evasion of authorities and potential fall from power. Having participated in my first Model UN conference in sixth grade, I have attended nearly two dozen conferences on varying geopolitical crises ranging from the environment to the House Un-American Activities Committee. This crisis presents countless challenges which cannot be addressed without considering several conflicting factors, principally the threat of corruption in the very organizations leading the hunt. Hence, I look forward to seeing you develop sound proposals that meet the issue's multifaceted nature.

A little about me: my main academic interests are history, government, and linguistics. I have ardently studied languages spanning from Swahili and Malagasy, to Haitian Creole and Swedish. At Nobles, I play soccer and tennis, and I help lead our Mock Trial team. I love to cook and relax on a Sunday afternoon with NFL Redzone, and with my dog (Chloe) and cat (Ares) by my side.

I cannot stress enough the greatest advice that can ever be given in Model UN: Research! Research! Research! You will be able to use a deep understanding of the issue to make compelling arguments for or against any particular proposal, and you will be able to lead the committee with your breadth of knowledge. Study your country's policy and represent it well as if your entire career has been diplomatic service thereof. I would also like to remind all delegates that, as always, Model UN is a collaborative space where all should feel comfortable sharing their honest ideas without fear of ridicule, and any attempt to exclude delegates from that opportunity will not be tolerated.

I hope you are all as excited as I am to dive into the topic and discover innovative solutions to a crisis that challenged past leaders for decades. I would also like to reiterate my commitment to facilitating a welcoming and productive debate environment for each and every delegate. Feel free to reach out if you have any questions about our committee, and I will do my best to respond in a timely manner.

Sincerely,

Colin Levine

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**Overview:**

Pablo Escobar was born on December 1, 1949, in Rionegro, Colombia. He left school at seventeen years of age and sought a college degree at the Universidad Autónoma Latinoamericana in the city of Medellin. Showing ambition, he aspired to become a lawyer and a politician, but he was eventually forced to drop out due to a lack of funds. Instead, he quickly became notorious in the criminal underworld. At age 20, he was well known for the car thefts he orchestrated, and by age 22, he was in the business of kidnapping and holding VIPs for ransom.

Noticing the rapid expansion of the market for cocaine in the U.S. and other countries, Escobar organized the Medellin Group in the city of Medellin. He organized the assassination of a rival dealer named Fabio Restrepo, thus creating a large hole in the cocaine market which he himself was able to fill. A pivotal moment in Escobar's rise came in 1976 when he was captured by the Colombian police. Using collusion and bribery, he was able to obtain a favorable ruling from the judges in his case. He was set free and proceeded to assassinate the police officer who had arrested him. This was the beginning of Escobar's infamous "money or bullets" policy, which would manifest countless times in the coming years and which would make him one of the most widely feared people on Earth.

With the massive profits produced by the cocaine trade, the Medellin Group (now the Medellin Cartel) purchased the Bahamian island of Norman's Cay. The Cartel utilized Norman's Cay from 1978 to 1982 as a distribution center; it had a prime location for this purpose as it sat just a few hundred miles from the U.S. coastline where the majority of his customers resided. Aside from this extravagant purchase, the ways in which Escobar made use of the fortune his cartel generated varied. On one hand, he constructed an immense mansion known as the Hacienda Nápoles, complete with a zoo and bullring. On the other hand, he built critical infrastructure in the poorest areas of Medellin and constructed new housing for the homeless. Finally, Escobar, already having a large number of government officials in his pocket, decided to make his own entry into the political world. He was an important character in the formation of the Liberal Party and was himself elected as a member of that party to the Colombian Congress in 1982. Aside

from the direct power he wielded as a newly-minted politician, Colombian law granted him full protection from prosecution, trial, or punishment as a member of Congress.

With this new rise into the public sphere, however, Escobar could not fully hide his involvement in criminal activity. He was accused by Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla and Liberal party leader Luis Galán, with the latter expelling him from the Liberal party in 1984 and all but compelling him to resign as a Congressman. Lara-Bonilla was assassinated before the year was out; Galán would be assassinated five years later in 1989.

In 1985, Escobar offered to surrender himself to the Colombian government in exchange for a guarantee that he would not be extradited to stand trial in the U.S. The offer was rejected by the Colombian government on the basis that it was not willing to break the extradition treaty that it had signed with the U.S. In response, a group supported by Escobar stormed the Palace of Justice in Bogotá, the seat of the Colombian Supreme Court. By the end of the attack, eleven of the twenty-five Supreme Court justices had been killed, and the next year, the Supreme Court ruled the extradition treaty invalid on technical grounds. The technicalities were soon corrected by the Colombian executive, however.

### **Current Situation:**

The date is December 7, 1989. Yesterday, the Medellin Cartel executed an attack on the head offices of the Administrative Department of Security, or DAS. The attack killed 67 people; however, the believed intended target, DAS Director Miguel Maza Márquez, was not harmed and is present today. This attack follows the bombing of Avianca Flight 203 just ten days ago, which took 107 lives but did not kill its intended target, Liberal party leader Cesar Gaviria. Among the 107 casualties in this attack were two Americans, solidifying the U.S. government's commitment to bring Escobar to justice.

This committee has been brought together for the purpose of negotiating Escobar's surrender. The Colombian authorities now have the support of both the American DEA and the Colombian people, as much of Escobar's criminal activity has become too violent and blatant for the public

to support despite his occasional philanthropy. Still, Escobar's immense wealth offers him many options to evade capture. Furthermore, some of the delegates to this committee are not fully committed to achieving Escobar's arrest. Rather, they, like many others, have been paid off by the Medellin Cartel, and may find it worthwhile to subvert this committee's proceedings.

### **Delegate List:**

Some of the information in this delegate list is embellished for the sake of a more interesting committee session. These embellishments are generally consistent with the historical record. You should take all the information in this delegate list to be true and supplement it with your own research.

**Dave Walter** is the Chair of the U.S. Libertarian National Committee. The Libertarian party does not support the Republican-backed War on Drugs. However, in the preceding U.S. presidential election, the Libertarian nominee received just 0.5% of the national vote. In order to help his party gain relevance, Walter needs a national news moment for Libertarians. He may be able to achieve this if he is able to aid in capturing Escobar, who is now not just a drug lord, but the murderer of two American citizens.

**Rose Mofford** is the Democratic Governor of Arizona. Much of the cocaine smuggled by the Medellin Cartel enters through states along the U.S.' southern border such as Arizona; therefore, she is interested in restricting this illegal transport. As a state official, her power over immigration and customs is limited. However, she has shown her passion for fighting drug abuse in her state through establishing the Governor's Alliance Against Drugs and the Arizona Drug Prevention Resource Center. Though she is currently popular in Arizona, her political position is somewhat unstable. She is a Democratic politician in a Republican-leaning state, and she became governor through the impeachment of her predecessor, not through election in her own right.

**Bill Clements** is the Governor of Texas. As the governor of a state with many of the Medellin Cartel's largest distribution centers, he has pursued a hardline anti-drug policy. His popularity in Texas has recently been greatly weakened by a scandal concerning misappropriation of funds at



Southern Methodist University where he served as the chair of the board of governors. A public win against the Cartel may provide a boost to his popularity, which he needs greatly as the 1991 Texas gubernatorial election looms.

**John C. Lawn** is the Administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration since his appointment by President Ronald Reagan in 1985. Former President Reagan and current President George H.W. Bush both relied on Lawn to implement their war-on-drugs policies. Lawn seeks the complete destruction of the Medellin Cartel. An FBI agent for over a decade, Lawn has particular expertise in the investigation of assassinations, serving as the FBI liaison for the Congressional investigations of the killings of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr.

**William H. Webster** is the Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Like Lawn, he was appointed by President Reagan and is now responsible for implementing many of President Bush's anti-drug-trafficking policies. The CIA has specialized personnel who are more capable of undertaking covert operations in a foreign nation such as Colombia, especially if official consent for a U.S. operation in Colombia cannot be obtained.

**Virgilio Barco** is the President of Colombia. He has close personal ties with the U.S. In 1950, he went into exile in the U.S. for several years; he is also a graduate of MIT and Boston University. He was elected President of Colombia in 1986 and since then has led a charge against the Medellin Cartel and other trafficking rings inside Colombia. Though he seeks the destruction of the cartels in order to benefit Colombia, his anti-smuggling campaign has caused widespread fear due to the increasingly violent tendencies of Escobar's operatives. Barco will need to weather these violent events while simultaneously ensuring he has enough political capital to continue the fight.

**Cesar Gaviria** is a candidate in the Colombian presidential election which will take place in May 1990. He is widely considered the frontrunner in this race. Gaviria holds similar views to and is in a similar position as Barco. He needs to lay the necessary groundwork now to ensure

that, when he takes office next May, his government will not be toppled, either by violent attacks or by public fear causing the inviability of continued suppression of cartel activity.

**Miguel Maza Márquez** is the Director of the Administrative Department of Security, or DAS. After the attempt on his life yesterday, he is a staunch opponent of Escobar and his cartel. His official position at the head of the Colombian security forces means that, if Escobar is captured, Maza will likely be his captor and, as such, will wield immense personal power. Seeing Gaviria as a political opponent, he in fact aided the cartel in Gaviria's attempted assassination ten days ago, although this fact is not yet publicly known.

**Rosso Serrano** is a General of the Colombian National Police. Having first joined the force in 1960, he is highly experienced and is currently acting as a double-agent for the Colombian Government in the Medellin Cartel. His abilities and current positioning within Escobar's inner circle will allow him to hinder the Cartel from within, although he must be careful not to be found out by Escobar's agents or his influence will be destroyed and his life will be in jeopardy.

**Carlos Perez** is the President of Venezuela. He does hold ties to Escobar and the Cartel. However, his highest priority is the Venezuelan economy, which is largely propped up by oil exports to the United States. Perez has maintained relatively friendly relations with the U.S. government, but to ensure that Venezuela does not become an American puppet state, he has balanced this with strong diplomatic relationships with the USSR, China, Romania, and Cuba. Perez is able to contribute resources to Escobar's capture, but may want to obtain international leverage before doing so. Alternatively, if Perez does not cooperate with U.S. demands, the U.S. may cut Venezuela off, severely harming the Venezuelan economy.

**Hernando Zuniga** is a General of the Colombian Military Forces. He has been paid off by Escobar, and therefore, he will aim to use the troops under his control to ensure Escobar continues to evade capture. To maintain the appearance of legitimacy, however, he should strive not to use his military power directly in armed conflict on Escobar's side and to continue to obey the orders of President Barco, his commander-in-chief, whenever possible.

**Hugo Martínez** is a General of the Colombian National Police and the head of President Barco's efforts to arrest Escobar. Being a relatively new officer elevated to a high political position, it was easy for Escobar to pay him off. Martínez is therefore in a similar position as Zuniga, although the police officers under his control might not be as loyal to him as Zuniga's troops are to him as their general.

**Alberto Santofimio** is a member of the Colombian Senate for the Liberal party. The presidential hopeful is rumored to have been complicit in Escobar's assassination of Galán, who was seen as the frontrunner for the Liberal party nomination. Escobar therefore has blackmail over Santofimio and is likely also paying him, meaning that Santofimio is interested in using his political power to secure Escobar's freedom.

**Craig Washington** is the Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 18th District of Texas. Washington is not particularly politically savvy. Elected in a hastily held special election following the death of the incumbent, he has fought against projects such as the International Space Station which would bring jobs to his own district. Nonetheless, Washington seeks power and wealth, and Escobar is willing to provide those two things to Washington if he covertly supports the Medellin Cartel in Congress.

**Dandeny Muñoz Mosquera** is Escobar's leading hitman. He was principally responsible for the bombing of Avianca Flight 203 ten days ago, in the aftermath of which he was covertly captured by Colombian authorities. He is extremely close to Escobar, and since Escobar is not yet aware of Muñoz Mosquera's arrest, if this committee strikes a deal with him, he could be released and used as a double-agent. Given that he has Escobar's trust, he might be able to orchestrate Escobar's capture upon being freed. However, once released, there is no telling whether Muñoz Mosquera honors his deal or reports everything to Escobar.

### **Questions to Consider:**

1. How can the U.S. and Colombia collaborate and pool their resources to catch Escobar?
2. How can the two governments reconcile their interests with those of Escobar to most immediately bring him to the DAS with minimal loss of life?

3. How can the broader masses be mobilized to bring Escobar down?
4. How can Colombia prevent poor youth from turning to the Medellin Cartel as their only way out?
5. How can corrupt officials be rooted out in order to mitigate Escobar's stranglehold?

Corrupt candidates will most likely want to see the committee's attempts to answer these questions fail. However, they should still strive to appear as though they support the committee's goal of bringing Escobar to justice.