Penetration Testing Report





Client: Nicalc: Software Provider for Bookstores

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Executive Summary

Objective

The objective of this penetration test was to identify vulnerabilities in the client's website and provide recommendations to enhance its security. The client, a small company providing software for bookstores called Nicalc, requested this assessment to be conducted without DDOS testing to ensure uninterrupted service.

Scope

The scope of this test included all types of attacks, excluding DDOS or other actions that could shut down the website. The focus was on identifying security holes that the client can address to improve their security posture.

Key Findings

- 1. Open ports on the server, including SMTP (port 25) and IMAP (port 143), without mandatory SSL.
- 2. Potential directory listing vulnerabilities indicated by Dirbuster results.
- 3. XSS attempts blocked by site owner validation in the comments section.
- 4. Site was protected against brute force login attempts.
- 5. SQL Injection attempts on the SMTP server were secured.
- 6. XSS attempts did not manage to breach the security and were blocked.
- 7. Command Injection attempts did not find any vulnerabilities.

Recommendations

- Configure your email servers to use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols to encrypt the communication between email clients and servers. This ensures that the data transmitted is secure and cannot be easily intercepted or read by unauthorized parties.
- Evaluate and adjust the settings and configurations of directories (folders) on a web server to ensure that only authorized users can access or modify the files and directories. This is crucial for preventing unauthorized users, including attackers, from accessing sensitive information or exploiting vulnerabilities.

Methodology

Tools Used

- Dirbuster: For directory and file brute-forcing.
- Burp Suite: For intercepting and analyzing web traffic.
- Hydra: For brute-force attacks on login credentials.
- **NsLookup.io**: For hosting + extra information.

Steps Taken

- 1. **Reconnaissance**: Identified the target IP address and collected basic information about the server and services running.
- 2. Scanning: Used tools like Dirbuster to identify hidden directories and files.
- 3. **Exploitation**: Attempted various attacks including XSS, SQL Injection, and brute-force login. Tested for XSS and Command Injection: Checked different input fields to find possible vulnerabilities.
- 4. **Post-Exploitation**: Analyzed the results to determine potential impacts and recommend mitigations.

Findings

Open Ports

- **SMTP (Port 25**): We examined the open ports and found that the SMTP port was not using SSL/TLS. This means the communication between the email client and server is not encrypted, which could expose sensitive information.
- MAP (Port 143): No mandatory SSL/TLS. Similar to the SMTP port, the IMAP port was also not using SSL/TLS, which poses a security risk.
- **Port 4190 (Sieve)**: We found this port open and noted that it could be targeted to change mail filtering rules maliciously.

Below screenshots of nmap scan:



Directory Listing Vulnerability


- **Dirbuster Results**: Pages that return 403 errors instead of 404, indicating possible hidden directories without proper index files.

Using Dirbuster, we discovered that several directories returned a 403 Forbidden error instead of a 404 Not Found error. This suggests that these directories exist but lack the appropriate index files, which could expose sensitive information.










XSS Protection

- **Comments Section**: Attempts to inject XSS were blocked as comments required site owner validation.

We tried to inject XSS payloads in the comments section to see if we could execute malicious scripts. However, our attempts were unsuccessful because the comments required validation by the site owner, effectively blocking our attempts.

Brute-Force Attack

- **Login Interception**: We used Burp Suite to intercept login attempts and then employed Hydra to perform a brute-force attack on the login credentials. However, the site implemented a timeout mechanism and required strong passwords, which made our brute-force attempts unsuccessful.



SQL Injection

- We tested for SQL Injection by entering various SQL commands into input fields related to the SMTP server. For example, we used 'OR '1'='1 and other common SQL injection strings. The server effectively sanitized the inputs and prevented any SQL commands from executing, indicating robust protection against SQL injection.

SQLi Scanner (Light)

http://213.222.51.222/SOGo/index/
Target added due to a redirect from http://213.222.51.222/SOGo/

Scan summary



Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Many areas were tested, including search fields and user input forms. All XSS attempts were blocked, and no vulnerabilities were found. We manually entered various JavaScript payloads into search fields, comment sections, and other user input areas. Examples of payloads included <script>alert('XSS')</script> and other common XSS attack vectors. Each attempt was blocked by the website's input validation and output encoding mechanisms, demonstrating strong defenses against XSS attacks.

Attacks like this could lead to potential risk for the client, but since they have multiple filtering options it is very hard for us to manage to do something without having access to the filtering software.

Command Injection

- Various input fields and backend scripts were tested for command injection vulnerabilities. We manually tested by entering specially crafted strings into form fields to see if they would execute system commands. For instance, we tried inputs like `; ls, | whoami `, and & `cat /etc/passwd` in

different fields and URLs. The server consistently sanitized these inputs, preventing any command execution and indicating robust defenses against command injection.

Robots.txt

- We examined the robots.txt file and found no significant vulnerabilities. This file contained standard directives to web crawlers, and there were no exposed sensitive directories or files.


```
User-agent: googlebot-image
Disallow: /
User-agent: googlebot-video
Disallow: /
User-agent: *
Disallow:
Sitemap: https://www.nicalc.com/sitemap.xml
```

Hydra attack

We tried to attack the SoGo login page using hydra but it didn't work. SoGo has very nice protection against different attacks like brute force,XSS and much more. For more information check SoGo's CVE page.


DNS lookup

We also tried DNS lookup but unfortunately we couldn't find anything that we can use.



SoGo CVEs

This is the list with CVEs related to SoGo. As you can see the most crucial ones are solved and also there aren't any new ones.



Sieve

One of the best ways to get access to the system would be through manipulating Sieve and maliciously flooding SoGo. We tried to get access to the sieve service running on port 4190,but we couldn't reach it and gain control over the mail filtering.

Recommendations

- 1. **Implement SSL/TLS for SMTP and IMAP**: Encrypt communication channels to protect sensitive information and prevent eavesdropping.
- 2. **Review Directory Permissions**: Ensure proper permissions and configuration to prevent unauthorized access to directories and files.
- 3. **Enhance Input Validation**: Continue to use site owner validation for comments and apply similar measures across the site to prevent XSS.
- 4. **Rate Limiting and Account Lockout**: Implement these mechanisms to mitigate the risk of brute-force attacks on login forms.
- 5. **Regular Updates and Patching**: Keep all systems and software up-to-date to protect against known vulnerabilities.
- 6. Close ports: close the open port for the Sieve service