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Mobility, migration and sustainability: re-figuring languages in diversity

Abstract: Global migratory patterns bring about significant changes in the linguistic and cultural ecologies at the local level in both the North and the South. These changes have coincided, for example, with attempts to fashion a European Union via complex legal and administrative instruments in the North. However, political change and conflict result in dislocation and mobility at individual and large-scale community levels. These become apparent through tension exhibited in social networks and structures which are at once centripetal and centrifugal (e.g. Lo Bianco 2010). Change is thus a function of ever evolving diversity as well as of new configurations of structures of restraint (e.g. Foucault 1977; Bourdieu 1991).

Debates within Europe, including “super-diversity” (Vertovec 2007), may offer a lens on discourses accompanying change in Australia, located in the geographic South, but with ambivalent aspirations towards the North. Migration from Africa, the Middle East/Afghanistan and Asia brings tangible, unequal movements in the local ecological landscape. As elsewhere, increasing diversification expels urbanized anxiety while civil and public layered responses exert pressure towards both divergence and convergence. Changing identities and “linguistic citizenship” (Stroud 2001) emerge in local narratives of attempts to widen or close spatial divides, and in seams of language shift, maintenance and sustainability.¹

Keywords: linguistic diversity; linguistic citizenship; migration; mobility; narratives.

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1 A background to considerations of sustainability and diversity

Patterns of migration to Europe from the former colonies have altered with the escalating mobility of individuals and communities from the Middle East and Asia, particularly in the past two decades. Historical residues of Orientalism of the 11th to 13th century (Christian) Crusades against the Saracens and newly-found feverish responses to a late 20th century resurgence of Islam, coupled with new complexities of migration, have brought an urgent need of interdisciplinary research. Current research in Europe includes a historiographic revisiting of social theory along with socio-political and economic practices in order to inform the management of change within a context of social morality and the principle of equality. One of the European Commission's initiatives has been to engage a network of scholars in a five-year interdisciplinary and theoretical enquiry of what it is that constitutes sustainable diversity and how might it be maintained (Janssens et al. 2010). In recognition of diversity and of diversity studies beyond Europe, scholars from Latin America, Africa and (South) Asia were included in a quest to build new theory of contemporary diversity. More explicitly, the purpose of this exploration has been to understand how and why the centrifugal and centripetal forces are propelled and how they might be kept in balance. This is of interest in urban contexts, where mismatches of various kinds appear to have exacerbated socio-economic anxiety and cleavage defined along ethnic, cultural, faith and linguistic lines.

Of concern are the consequences of new patterns of human migration, the impact of the information technology revolution on virtual mobility and the ever-increasing diversification of global market exchange of goods (e.g. Janssens et al. 2010; de Loebel et al. 2011).

Debates on social division and attempts to manage difference with cohesive strategies rooted in the principles of equality and morality date back to Plato's *Republic* and Thomas More's *Utopia* (cf. de Loebel et al. 2011). Considerations and theorization of diversity are therefore not new. What appear to be new are exponential changes in speed, scale and complexity. A consequence of the last two decades of globalization has been escalating changes to the demography of most countries of the world. In particular, this has resulted in significant shifts in patterns of in- and out-migration with an increasing multi-directional mobility of individuals and communities. These shifts are accompanied by inevitable socio-economic change affecting many dimensions of society including: poverty, housing, education, health, social services and faith. Contemporary manifestations of diversity, however, are more complex than the consequences of human spatial

mobility. Steven Vertovec has recently coined the term, “super-diversity” in order to signal the scale and multi-dimensional phenomena of mobilities of socio-cultural, spatial, technological, material and metaphysical conditions of human existence in the 21st century (Vertovec 2007). These mobilities focus attention on a growing recognition that dominant paradigms of the second half of the 20th century, assimilation, and multiculturalism often conceived of as multiple, almost hermetically sealed, variants of “culture”, offer inadequate responses. Migration is no longer a feature of uni-directional ethnic, cultural or faith-based mobility. It is no longer a specific feature of formerly colonized citizens of the South relocating to the North. It is both individual and community-based. The residues of 19th century concepts of the nation-state, and ethnolinguistic affiliations, no longer offer satisfactory categorizations of social structures. Communities cohere, diverge and reconverge along ever reconfiguring lines of gender, age, class, language, education, aspiration and digital and social network connectivity. We are witnessing emerging diaspora of affiliations to the 21st century rather than earlier affiliations to a particular community defined by faith, language, culture or geographic region. The speed, scale and complexities present challenges which are unlikely to be met via reactive or restrictive measures. An understanding of the gap between the theoretical underpinnings of social theory and the structures and apparatus of the state through painful lessons of history, however, may provide an avenue through which contemporary exploratory responses might be grounded.

Diversity and cohesion as intrinsic and vulnerable features of a “moral” society were concerns of two of the most influential sociologists to inform late 19th and early 20th century theory. As the socio-economic consequences of the industrial revolution and capitalism became obvious, the field of sociology emerged in the work of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Durkheim’s contribution was to emphasize the moral dimension and imperative of society, and also the vulnerability of social integration to the momentum of mechanization, industrialization and scientific rationalism (Durkheim in Bellah [1973]). Max Weber was concerned with what he identified as “rationalization” of bureaucratic systems in the interests of the political economy of western capitalism. He was also concerned with the intersection of religious thought and economic theory, as evident in his essay, *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (Weber in Runciman [1978]). In essence, the industrial revolution precipitated the development of new theory which might account for and explain social phenomena. Much of these phenomena continue in the present, however, by definition revolutions keep turning and the instruments for understanding and even pre-empting consequences of the movements need to be recalibrated. Almost a century later, “globalization” has become a mesmerizing phenomenon coinciding with a revolution in information

technology. It is evident that there is a need for theory which might explain these and their implications for society.

Globalization, characterized by the widespread expansion of the English language and the political economy of Western liberal capitalism, has been metaphorically captured in the term “Macdonaldization” (Ritzer 1993). For Ritzer, following Max Weber’s earlier structural critique of society, “Macdonaldization of the world represents both the spread of something that was once local and the marginalization of the local on a global scale” (de Loebel et al. 2011: 12). While this process may be viewed as evident of “progress” on the one hand, it also “extinguishes diversity” (de Loebel et al. 2011: 12). It thus begs questions which have to do with (in)equality and (im)morality in society.

While globalization has proceeded along one continuum it has become evident that it is not a singularly dominant phenomenon conducted via what many had thought in the 1990s would become the universal language of wider communication. The immediacy of electronic information, initially couriered from the West via Microsoft and the Internet, in English, partially obscured for approximately two decades (1990–2010) the impact of political changes taking place across much of Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. China’s entry to the World Trade Organization (December 2001), securing of strategic mining (oil) contacts in East Africa (while the attention of the US and the UK was diverted towards an assault on Iraq and engagement in Afghanistan), and hosting of the 2008 Olympics, have launched this country as a major player on the global platform. India, whose population will exceed that of China within decades, is not far behind, while niche markets in South-East Asia are making a significant impact on the global trading floor. Simultaneously, a global economic crisis has brought about widespread anxiety, particularly in the US and Europe. Significant changes to the global economy along with increasing access to electronic communication across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East have brought significant changes to the linguistic profile of the internet. Users in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East now account for 63 percent of traffic, with considerable room for further expansion. Europe, North America and Oceania, on the other hand are approaching saturation (World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, April 28, 2012, <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>). What seemed to be the “un-assailable” position of English (Graddol 1997) towards the end of the 1990s lulled policy-makers and the private sector in the US, the UK and Australia into what may have been a false sense of the inevitability of convergence. The political economy of capitalism communicated increasingly through one language, English, is no longer certain. In Australia, vigorous debates on linguistic and cultural diversity of the late 1980s dissipated as the propulsion of the gyre turned inwards towards homogeneity, and debates within this country lost touch with

the analysis of reconfiguring migratory patterns elsewhere (see also Chiro 2010; Lo Bianco 2010).

2 Theorizing diversity

2.1 Building on earlier theory and moving towards new paradigms

It is increasingly obvious that complex manifestations of diversities require new paradigms which build on and move beyond earlier theory of social, economic, urban, and educational planning. They are necessary to hold multi-dimensional interests in tension and balance. One dimension of diversity appears to be constant gyred-like propelled motion. A centripetal force draws communities and individuals of economic and political migrants (Ram et al. 2007; Ram et al. 2012) towards urban and metropolitan centers, while a simultaneous and centrifugal propulsion of “constraint” (Ram et al. 2012) leads to extremities of social cleavage. “Sustainable diversity” (e.g. Janssens et al. 2010) following the long history of debates about socio-economic and political difference, is to do with balancing two apparently contradictory processes. It is about the perceived need for social cohesion on one side of the scales, in balance with a productive assertion and agency of difference on the other. Diversity offers opportunity, equality and a democratic utopia, yet, it is susceptible to conflict and violence.

One response to rapidly changing diversity in Europe has been the revival or reinvention of extreme right-wing organizations which focus on or hanker after ethnic and nationalistic views of the world. Potent examples of these have been in evidence in France, Italy and Denmark for some years and there are obvious indications that such positioning is strengthening. Another response has been post-11 September 2001 (the “9/11” assault on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington) urban bombings in London and Madrid which have resulted in a resurfacing of fearful “Orientalist” (e.g. Foucault 1977; Said 1979) and anti-Islamic discourses which may have been bubbling under the surface of twentieth century liberal capitalism and social democracy. The death of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam at the hands of a person identified as belonging to an Islamic faith-based-ethnic minority in 2004 and the recent massacre of young people in Oslo by a person identified as a right-wing “racist” extremist, in July 2011, offer sober signals of an urgency to find new paradigms to stabilize disequilibrium. Incidents of urban violence which began in London and spread with lightning speed through other cities of the UK in August 2011 illustrate another

dimension of the diversification of conflict, disaffection and social cleavage. This time, not specifically ethnic or faith-based, it was more an expression of the alienation of youth which cut across lines of social class and affiliations based on ethnicity, faith or language. The speed at which rioting youth organized themselves was facilitated via social network affiliations of the Internet. The British public was shocked, and reverberations of disbelief were felt across the globe. The British media, police and government were unprepared for the changing face of divergence. BBC journalists initially misinterpreted these incidents as essentially ethnic- or race-based. If such incidents are possible within societies with acute awareness of issues of equality and a myriad of organizations designed to promote cohesion and stability, studies in migration and diversity require further attention. Alternatively, they require a revisiting and reinvigoration of earlier theories of societal values and balancing the forces of tension within society. In the current environment, contemporary considerations of sustainable management of diversification are pressing.

While we may consider such incidents referred to above as part of the rapid socio-economic and demographic changes currently experienced in Europe and the north, they are not dissimilar to earlier eruptions of xenophobia which escalated, with surprising speed, into large-scale events of genocide in 20th century Europe, South-East Asia, Latin America and Africa. Social anxiety and discriminatory discourses directed towards “foreign” workers in Singapore (Rubdy and McKay, this issue) or perceived vulnerability of their linguistic identities are regular features of the experience of migrants. In another example, xenophobia arising from societal anxiety about the potential economic impact of migrants to South Africa has resulted in the pejorative labeling of African outsiders as *amakwerekwere* ‘foreigners’, systematic discriminatory attacks on Somali traders in Cape Town and Johannesburg, and more widespread incidents of violence against outsiders in 2008. Black South Africans, in an environment of scarce opportunity for employment coupled with political disappointment, have turned on those who are perceived as economic competitors. In many of these examples ethnic identity is often partly concealed by or equated with affiliations of faith and or language (see also Vigouroux 2008). Ethnic xenophobia is often closely associated with, or masqueraded as an ethnolinguistic phenomenon or “the problem” of linguistic diversity. This reanimates overt calls for monolingual policies in countries of the South and North. A recent UK newspaper report about a primary school in Bradford typifies this kind of response:

The school is in one of the city’s most deprived areas, and 90 per cent of the 417 pupils are from Pakistan. Many arrive at the school unable to speak a word of English . . . Shipley MP . . . criticised parents who allowed their children to start school with scant knowledge of

their adopted home's language "This is a totally unacceptable situation Primary schools have got to presume that children can at least communicate in some form . . ." (Eccles 2011: 11)

This media report is interesting on several levels. It demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding that diversity requires reciprocity, including structural and administrative adjustment. Despite several decades in which "child-centered" pedagogy has received policy commitment, educational theory and policy are disregarded or give way to the restrictive apparatus of systems and changing agents of administration. Neither the school system nor local political representatives have translated theory and policy into mechanisms which might attend to basic principles of equality or equity. Even if the system were immune to the theory of Durkheim and Weber and another three generations of considerations of social theory, one might have expected some recognition of international framework agreements on education in this narrative. UNESCO's *Education for All* and the Millennium Development Goals have some traction, as do a plethora of international human rights' based instruments, yet there is no evidence of connections with these in the *Daily Mail* report or in the public officials who are given voice in this report.

The media report furthermore articulates the powerful certainty of a monolingual Britain. Children who do not speak English are clearly unable to "communicate in some form". In an environment where only 10 percent of students speak English, does it make rational sense for a system to place teachers who are monolingual in English in such a setting? What this newspaper report illustrates is a significant gap between principles of theory and policy agreed to consensually and on an international platform, and the anachronistic rigidity of the structures of administration.

2.2 A sociolinguistic lens on migration and diversity

The focus here rests on the urgency of new attempts to theorise diversity in relation to migration, as evident in the post-Theo van Gogh and pre-Oslo incidents. There have been responsive European studies of national, city and organizational development planning (cf. Janssens et al. 2010) and within the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, linguistics and urban planning in various studies included in Knotter et al. (2011). The latter insist that discourses of diversity and equality cannot be separated and that the quest is for "peaceful coexistence" and an equilibrium in which the ever changing dynamics of difference and variation may be accommodated within ethical positions as well as positions of interest. Peaceful

coexistence, as illustrated in the South African reaction to *amakwerekwere*, is tied to the notion of “assets”, particularly socio-economic assets (de Loebel et al. 2011: 9–11; also Ram et al. 2012). Deliberations about assets follow an earlier discourse in which attempts were made to view languages as social, political, educational and economic resources (e.g. Ruiz 1984; Lo Bianco 1990; Grin 1996). While current explorations of diversity span possibly more disciplines of study than ever before, four disciplines are identified as ones in which diversity is inherent, viz. history, social anthropology, linguistics and economics. A new development within the field of economics, “ecological economics” (Nijkamp and Nunes 2011) articulates with the work of Monder Ram and colleagues who work with small business enterprises of migrant and minority communities, and also with the work of François Grin and colleagues who consider the economics of language.

Arguably some of the most robust theoretical perspectives of diversity of the last three decades have emerged from within sociolinguistic analyses of complex society/ies (e.g. in the work of Fishman 1972, 1993; Tollefson 1991; Wiley 1996; Deprez and Vos 1998; Spolsky 1998, 2004; Blommaert 1999, 2010). They have also been under consideration in the discourses of “linguistic human rights” (e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas 2000, 2010; Phillipson 1992, 2009), “minority rights” (e.g. May 2001); “language as a resource” (Ruiz 1984; Lo Bianco 1990; Grin 1996, 2008); “multicultural citizenship” (Kymlicka 1995); “functional multilingualism” (Heugh 1995); and “linguistic citizenship” (Stroud 2001; Stroud and Heugh 2004; Stroud and Wee 2007).

A key point of intersection of each of these, despite significant theoretical and paradigmatic distance among them, has been the articulation of the moral or ethical component of justice and equality which permeate contemporary debates on the co-existence of multiple linguistic communities. Collectively, the contribution to the debates on diversity from sociolinguistics, and those of linguistic pluralism in education, are regarded as having been resilient. They may therefore offer promise in the renewed quest for a robust cross-disciplinary theory of diversity in which migration and globalization are key elements (cf. de Loebel et al. 2011; Cenoz et al. 2011).

The European Commission’s research network tasked with reanimating discussions, debates and theory of diversity and cohesion revisited the work of Durkheim (and Weber) and formulated a working definition as follows:

We define sustainable diversity as the ability to structure and manage diversity in such a way that this diversity results in or promotes (ecological and social) sustainability implying stable and acceptable relationships within and between (groups of) people involving the maintenance of biological diversity, improving material standard of living, and equal (or at least fair) access to scarce resources of all kinds as (paid) labour, health, housing, education, income or whatever. (van Londen and de Ruijter 2010: 8)

Underlying this conceptualization is the utopian desire for equilibrium and equality. It is to maintain a balance between the potential for conflict and social cohesion or stability. This cohesion, however, is based on a “consensus ... on fundamental values and norms” (van Londen and de Ruijter 2010: 5). Furthermore:

... social cohesion arises out of solidarity between members of the community. Cohesion is thus not a matter of force and repression, but of moral order. It is exactly this moral order that comes under pressure in times of cultural variety within the borders of an “imagined community” such as the nation state (Anderson 1983). (van Londen and de Ruijter 2010: 6)

A second significant marker of a contemporary understanding of the phenomenon is that it is not necessarily confined to (changing) concepts of nation state and ethnicity. Diversification brings about reconfigurations of groups and mobile identities at the individual level and within a global rather than national context (de Loebel et al. 2011).

In this article, representations of migration are viewed through two lenses: contemporary theorization; and narrative accounts which position “newly arrived” migrant communities in (South) Australia at different points of the centripetal-centrifugal gyre. The purpose here is to look at diversity and migration through a window which shows how national and ethnic identity are seen to give way to multiple, changing, porous and even individual identities. It is to juxtapose conventional narratives of marginalization, victimization, scape-goating and stigma, with examples of productive socio-economic and linguistic exchange which embrace and cut across group identity. Narrative accounts drawn from government documents, the print media and formerly “refugee migrants” or asylum seekers from Southern Sudan and Afghanistan in South Australia demonstrate in-group and out-group exchanges in which linguistic and economic interests emerge as key elements in both static and changing notions of citizenship, identity and mobility. The former are indicative of high levels of societal disaffection and risk. The latter resonate with changes identified in new discourses of linguistic and social diversification (e.g. Stroud and Wee 2007; Cenoz et al. 2011; Djité 2010; Barkhuizen, this issue; Canagarajah, this issue; Kamwangamalu, this issue). The two sets of discourses intersect with changing political environments and opportunities of transcontinental positions of interest.

If the experience of several European, African, South-East Asian and Latin American countries in the last few years demonstrates that the consequences of offering inadequate responses to, or accentuating aspects of difference, exacerbate anxiety within civil society, then there is every reason to find an escalation of similar phenomena in Australia. If fear, prejudice, stigmatization, racism, a sense of failure and lack of self-esteem at an individual and community level are fea-

tures of contemporary urban societies, then these human conditions are also likely to appear in contexts like Australia where issues of in-migration, particularly during recent and apparently reappearing economic crisis, find fertile soil for social cleavage. If such matters of disquiet have been shown to have significant consequences, particularly in relation to social disaffection on the one hand and negative economic effects for particular groups (including migrant and mainstream communities) on the other hand, these ultimately have repercussions in the political and economic domain.

3 The current context in Australia

In Australia, the centripetal-centrifugal tensions in relation to demographic mobility and increasing diversity met with a short-lived creative response which embraced multiculturalism in the 1980s. Language policy based on a value of plurilingualism featured as a key ingredient of a “multicultural Australia” (cf. Lo Bianco 1990; Smolicz 1991; Chiro 2010). The late 1980s saw a flourishing of interest in linguistic diversity which led to the establishment of innovative telephone interpreting services to cater for the needs of new migrants. A positive view of diversity was accompanied by a vigorous interest in the teaching and learning of priority languages of trade and diplomacy, in addition to the maintenance and teaching of languages of 19th and 20th century migrant communities. Australia was engaged in a centrifugal broadening its horizons, casting towards the Pacific and Asia. While attention focused outwards to opportunities for strategic and economic alliances, the initiative suffered from a fatal flaw in which Indigenous Australian languages were largely overlooked. Since the early 1990s, however, this impetus has drawn inwards, but not as one may have thought in the direction of Indigenous communities. Two decades of a centripetal momentum has brought about a gradual atrophy of the principles of multiculturalism and a whittling away of conditions that encourage multilingualism. Public discourses have come to be characterized by an impetus toward homogeneity. They reflect a satisfaction with monolingualism along with a singularly unsatisfactory consideration of how the majority of Australians, who are migrants of one generation or another, might coexist in productive ways with Indigenous Australians. Bilingual education for remote communities in the Northern Territory has been systematically removed *via* a monolingual view of literacy, despite Australia’s participation, for example in UNESCO’s *Education for All* frameworks. The interest in multiculturalism, however theoretically dated and fragile, came to an end with recent restructuring of an Australian Labor Party government. Although perceived as the more progressive of the major political parties, Labor, under Prime Minister Julia Gil-

lard, downgraded a ministerial portfolio for multiculturalism to a responsibility which was handed over to a parliamentary secretary for immigration and multiculturalism in September 2010. Although there has been some backtracking of this symbolic decision, there is no clear plan or set of principles which engage with current research on and theory of multi/interculturalism. Neither has there been any obvious engagement with the implications of increasing linguistic and cultural diversity within Australia. There does not appear to have been adequate recognition of the linguistic changes to Internet traffic; the changing balance of trade and industry towards China, South East Asia and India; or what these may mean for an increasingly monolingual Australia. In the present context, given the mobility of disengagement with society witnessed in Europe, and exacerbated by economic collapse in both the US and Europe, this is short-sighted. Australia is not immune to the contemporary dynamics of change.

4 Labeling and stigmatization: race and ethnicity

4.1 Labeling and stigmatization of migrants and refugees

Internationally, Australia has not had a good press in relation to the last two hundred years of in-migration and matters of race or ethnicity. During a twelve-year period of Liberal Party rule in Australia under John Howard (1996–2007), what many critics labeled a climate of “xenophobic racism” was directed via public discourses towards refugees and people with Islamic affiliations (Kuhn 2009). This increased subsequent to the international fall-out of the 9/11 events in the USA. Yet, during the same period, the Howard government simultaneously increased the number of humanitarian visas for refugees from the Sudan and Afghanistan. These two apparently contradictory trends resulted in a climate of uncertainty, lack of clarity, and ambiguity for domestic communities. What was unambiguous was that refugee status and humanitarian visas were to be assessed offshore. Immigrants who arrived by sea without the necessary documentation, even if, from a moral perspective, they might have legitimate claim for asylum-seeker status, were characterized as “illegal”. Illegal arrivals were detained in order to stem what was presented as a possible “tidal wave of boat people”.

The apparent contradiction between a humanitarian programme on the one hand and detention on the other led to ambiguous and contradictory positions towards in-migration in controversial public political discourses of “illegal” immigrants who arrive by sea. Metaphors which conjure powerful images of “tsunamis” of “boat people” arriving anywhere along an exceptionally vast coastline

infuse the debates on both sides of the political divide, and are amplified in the media. "Boat people" are intimately associated with the criminal activities of the "people smugglers" rather than the desperate circumstances which have driven them to seek dangerous passage to Australia. Elsewhere we note that migration and diversity are associated with crime (Stenius 2011). "Stigma" is resilient (Goffman 2003 [1963]) and refugee communities are positioned as subaltern. (See also: "labeling theory" of Becker [1963]; and in Gardini [2011: 48]). If migrant communities are represented in ethnically defined and pejorative terms, the mobility and integrative success of individuals and groupings of people are likely to be obscured. Where acknowledgement of integrative contributions to society is withheld, newly-arrived communities and individuals experience alienation and may be forced to retreat into ethicized enclaves. The following commentary points towards complicity of the media with government rhetoric.

[Y]ou could have been forgiven for thinking some catastrophe was about to engulf Australia. The language employed in the press was designed to make you think so: a "human tide", a "massive influx", a "new wave" of "illegals", and the "biggest number ever" of boat people arriving.

The "tidal wave" turned out to be no more than 2,800 for the whole year – if the government's scaremongering turns out to be right.

The Age, that "quality" Melbourne newspaper, in an effort to make their hysteria credible, dragged out the number for the last 10 years – shock, horror! – the grand total of 4,785 people. (Bloodworth 1999)

The apparently more inclusive and more left-wing Australian Labor Party touted detention of illegal immigrants as unethical and in violation of human rights' principles. However, the flow of people arriving by sea slowed to a trickle. Kuhn, as do others, suggests that the demise of the Howard Government was a direct consequence of a reaction against perceived xenophobia and racism in its policies. The Australian Labor Party, under the leadership of Kevin Rudd and more recently, Julia Gillard, was highly critical of the more conservative policies of the Liberal Party government under John Howard. On the surface, the Labor government sought to find alternative policies which appear less draconian. However, these have resulted in a resumption of the arrival of people by sea and an increase in the business of people smugglers, hence crime, and thus a return of the public fear of a tidal wave of human cargo. Government has responded by expanding the number of detention centers and more people than ever before are now detained, even though such establishments had been criticized by Labor as unacceptable during the Howard government years. Refugees in overcrowded and lengthy detention have not been entirely compliant. Minor eruptions in which detainees have given agency to their frustrations and disaffection have

fanned the public discourses of racism and Orientalism. The Australian taxpayer is resentful of costs; however, government is slow to acknowledge that detention centers are equally good for business. Delays in processing refugees have been profitable for the coteries of attendant service providers: airline companies, suppliers of food and other basic requirements; hardship wages for legal, health and social workers; and so on.

For political reasons, the Labor government, using precisely the same incendiary vocabulary as the earlier Liberal government, has now been obliged to attempt alternative policies to “stem the tide”. Ironically, these have drawn right wing criticism of Labor government as being in violation of human rights. It is not the details of these political maneuverings that is the subject of concern: rather, it is the discourse of fear, Orientalism, racism, and right-wing politics that have gripped both major political parties. Such reactionary response arises from a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of contemporary diversity. Note has not been taken of lessons to be learned from the numerous examples of recent social disaffection in Europe, the US, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. The disappearance of a moderate discourse of multiculturalism, including a theoretical association of language as a core (social) value (e.g. Smolicz 1991; Smolicz and Secombe 2003), together with a dismantling of the National Policy on Languages (cf. Lo Bianco 1987, 1990, 2010), has left a gaping chasm in the domain of national policy and planning. In the absence of a continued or more robust understanding of multiculturalism, linguistic pluralism, migration and diversity, public discourses in Australia have turned towards the kind of disequilibrium which has given rise to conflict and violent eruptions such as the one in Oslo in July 2011.

4.2 Narratives of ethnicity and racism

We now turn to narratives of migration and linguistic diversity in the contemporary Australia where government and media appear mired in paradigms in which ethnic identity is presented as frozen, static and threatening the stability of older established communities, which, except in the case of Indigenous Australians, are themselves of migrant origin. The focus here is on Sudanese refugees, processed “off-shore” and thus admitted “legitimately”. In the section which follows, the focus shifts to Afghan refugees who have arrived as asylum seekers, by sea, and hence labeled “illegal”. In the first case, even though Sudanese refugees have been admitted through the preferred channels, they have not escaped labeling and stigma.

In 2007, the Howard Government's Minister of Immigration:

... cut the intake of Sudanese refugees because "some groups don't seem to be settling and adjusting into the Australian way of life" ... [because] the Sudanese came from "a vastly different culture" and formed "race based" African gangs. (Kuhn 2009: 75)

This kind of ethicized labeling and stigmatization was continued in the media even after a change to a Labor government. In 2008 a series of newspaper reports carried headlines designed to engender fear rather than encourage stability. For example: "Sudanese crime wave in South Australia" (*Adelaide Now*, 17 November 2008) followed an earlier report, "Sudanese crime rate double the general SA rate", in which the deputy police commissioner said:

... police were concerned by rising levels of violence in the Sudanese community. In the past 16 months, Sudanese people had been involved in 450 offences, resulting in 258 arrests. "This is double the level of offending for the population of the state ... They come from a culture which has had serious warfare, some have been child soldiers, and they don't have the conflict-resolution skills that others who have grown up in Australia have, and as a result we have seen an increase in crime". (*Adelaide Now*, November 14 2008)

While most media coverage followed the position of the immigration minister and the police commissioner cited above, there was some coverage of responses from the Sudanese community, captured in the following:

Minister ... has inflamed tensions with the African community by releasing a dossier claiming African refugees were involved in gangs, nightclub fights and drinking alcohol in parks at night. (Topsfield et al. 2007)

One articulate response from Sudanese community leaders is particularly pertinent after analysis of the recent London riots of August 2011 point towards the disaffection of youth towards contemporary structures of power and exclusion on the one hand, and new affiliations based on age, on the other.

The Minister says that African refugees are not integrating well ... Yet we need to look at why. A recent study by the Centre for Displacement Studies says that children across the Sudan have faced "extensive ... killing, maiming, rape and other forms of sexual violence, abduction, denial of humanitarian assistance, forced labor, trafficking, and recruitment by armed forces ..."

... So ... refugees from Sudan have very special needs, especially the young people. And this is why we need to take special care in the settlement of Sudanese.

One example of the problems ... with the settlement process ... is the age of social workers These social workers are in many cases very near the age of the youth themselves, and identify very closely with them.

In many cases, Sudanese young people are encouraged by these young social workers to declare themselves independent from their own families, believing that this is the best way for the youth to obtain Government benefits. This comes with the apparent advantage of providing these young people with an independent social life outside of their family, but it of course is merely opening the door to many social problems which the Sudanese Community is finding difficult to tackle, because the youths are already somewhat removed from their community.

... I agree with the Minister ... when he says that the settlement process is not working for many African refugees. It is not working when youth are encouraged to separate from their families, and in so doing, lose the very support that they need to assist them to settle in Australia. Youth that are separate from their families are at risk of causing many of the problems that the government is finding hard to control. (Abass 2007)

Unless such views and analysis are given sufficient opportunity for traction, the conventional highly charged ethnic or racist labels of stigma stick, and this exacerbates cleavage. What Abass (2007) points to is a general principle of the disaffection of youth, which has been repeated in similar explanations of the riots in UK cities in 2011 (e.g. Johnson 2011; Power 2011). Such argument has little to do with ethnic affiliation, as perfectly clear in the UK setting. In the Australian setting, however, the ethnic label has stuck fast.

5 Alternative discourses of bi-/multi-lingualism, biculturalism and integration

The discussion here turns towards Hazara refugees from Afghanistan and Dinka refugees from Southern Sudan whose narratives reveal attachments to language, culture, art, music, literature and faith. These attachments are both towards the heritage language and culture and also towards integration with mainstream globalised society, mediated through English, sport, and music. Attachment to the language/s of the Hazara people (Dari and or Hazaraghi) and Dinka might appear to be ethnolinguistically based if one is rooted in a nineteenth century conceptualization of nations and nation-states. However in the current context, they are in fact a manifestation of the complexity of living in a diverse global society in which individuals, family groups, and groups based on age or gender, and so on, reconfigure their citizenship in multiple ways. Attachments to Hazaraghi/Dari and Dinka do not appear to inhibit integration nor attempts to conform to highly prized symbols of Australianness and Australian values.

5.1 Narratives in the Hazara community in South Australia

The first arrival of Afghan refugees, fleeing persecution based on ethnicity, language and faith by the Taliban and other dominant groups, was by sea, between 1998 and 2001. The second “wave” began to arrive in 2008 shortly after Labor came to power. The majority of refugees are identified in Afghanistan and they continue to identify themselves as Hazaras. Their persecution is linked to a division within Muslim traditions between followers of Shi’ite (Hazaras) and Sunni (Pashtun and other dominant groups) Islamic faith. Excerpts of narratives from five informants from the Afghan community in South Australia are discussed in this section. Hazara Informant HIA (female) is a student of psychology who has gained skills as an interpreter. She has undertaken contract work as an interpreter for the Department of Immigration in two detention centers, Christmas Island and in Northern Queensland. Hazara Informant HIB (male) is a community leader, activist, entrepreneur, and social worker. Hazara Informant HIC (male) is a refugee who spent some time in Pakistan before arriving in Australia. Informants HID (female) and HIE (male) are volunteer teachers of Dari-Farsi in a non-formal community school on Saturdays. The languages used by the two largest communities of speakers in Afghanistan are Dari (50 percent) and Pashto (35 percent). Hazaras speak Hazaraghi, which is regarded as a dialect of Dari by some, but which may also be “distinct” from Dari (Lewis 2009). The status of Hazaraghi *vis à vis* Dari, also known as Persian or Farsi, is accompanied by debates within the Hazara communities in South Australia. Informant HIA holds significantly different views from informants HIB and HIC on whether or not Hazaraghi should be identified as a language in its own right.

Informant HIA was employed by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to act as an interpreter between government officials and asylum seekers in detention centers. This is on the basis that she speaks English, Dari and Hazaraghi. In her own classification of the languages she speaks, she includes Persian, thereby making a distinction between Dari and Persian. As a member of an earlier group of refugees, she reported that she had internalized a subaltern position of the Hazaras *vis à vis* members of the dominant Pashtun community and also other users of Dari. Hazaras in Afghanistan have had little access to formal education and Hazaraghi is not found in written text, so she assumed that she and her community were a subset of the Dari community and thus spoke a stigmatized dialect of Dari. Within the Hazara community, partly owing to the repression of the Taliban over the last ten to fifteen years, women have had even less access to education than men. Upon arriving at the detention centre on Christmas Island in 2009, as an interpreter, she found that the Australian Department of Immigration gave tacit recognition to Hazaraghi as a language in its own right. “I

never knew and my family never knew that we had our own language" (HIA November 2010). She believes that the Australian government is responsible for being the first official structure of power to give recognition to Hazaraghi as a language and she regards this as a positive aspect of its engagement with asylum seekers.

I speak pure Hazaraghi for Hazara clients so everything would be as clear as possible for them Hearing and speaking Hazaraghi in formal and official places such as detention centers give them sense of confidence and free from fear of prejudice and inferiority. (HIA)²

Her participation as an interpreter has contributed to a sense of pride in her linguistic repertoire and a sense that this allows her to exercise linguistic citizenship. She sees that recognition of Hazaraghi as a language and the appointing of an interpreter who speaks this language and other languages of Afghanistan offers perhaps the only example of symbolic capital and dignity to detainees. For the rest, they are reduced to long periods of psychological trauma in the centers while their legal status is under scrutiny. Recognition of Hazaraghi offers linguistic citizenship to a community whose identity has been stripped away from them over centuries of persecution in Afghanistan.

Informants HIB and HIC, both male, however, have a different stance towards Hazaraghi.

Hazaraghi is a dialect not a language Farsi-Dari is a written language, but Hazaraghi . . . what makes a language independent? (HIB)

Persian-Farsi-Dari is the language of educated people Hazaraghi does have some words from Mongolian and Turkic . . . but most Hazaras are illiterate. (HIC)

Both HIB and HIC are keen to locate the Hazara community within a broad diaspora of Persian speaking peoples in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and wherever else they may have dispersed. Claiming membership of the larger community signals a reconfiguring of ethnolinguistic identity and this allows release from the repressive constraints of centuries of exclusion. Instead it offers entry to a world of literature, art and music in which membership of the wider Persian diaspora represents prestigious "symbolic capital" (Bourdieu 1991). "There are at least three very famous Persian poets in Adelaide and we are very proud of our traditions" (HIB).

2 All Hazara informants were interviewed in August 2011.

Informant HIB, a highly active member of the community, initiated the establishment of a community school the purpose of which is to maintain the language, culture, religion and identity of the Afghan people in Adelaide. This is the Shammamah Farsi-Dari School of the Afghan Community of South Australia, in which approximately 120 students are enrolled. HIB is anxious to circumvent labeling, and is concerned that the school may be construed as an enclave based on faith or ethnicity.

Originally we like to live close together . . . then we want to be seen as part of main society here [South Australia]. We don't want to be seen as ethnic minority . . . and we move out . . . all over . . . (HIB)

Participants in this school, HIB and two teachers, HID and HIE, demonstrate a number of interesting characteristics of agency: resisting labeling, re-labeling, language maintenance and building linguistic and cultural bridges and repertoires.

We know that maintaining a language with a three-hour class once a week is not enough . . . but the community believe – something is better than nothing . . .

Younger ones try to interact in English in primary school and outside the Afghan community. The older generation keep Dari. Losing language causes family tensions . . . makes communication difficult for parents and children – sometimes. (HIB)

HIB thus signals recognition that the younger generation is crossing the divides between migrancy and mainstream citizenship, but that the home language has an important role for family solidarity and internal cohesion. Language maintenance in the home and community does not constitute an attempt to remain separate from or without the mainstream.

A young female teacher, herself in upper secondary school, demonstrates remarkable insight into migrant and mainstream societies:

We are worried about language loss and culture and identity . . . our showcases on multicultural days show the value of Afghan people and this adds to Australian culture. The more you understand about your own culture the more you get from other cultures. If you know the language you can follow the religion. We renew our traditions here . . . Although we can't do exactly as in our own country . . . it is our responsibility to teach the younger children Dari writing, poetry, novels. (HID)

She makes a claim for the value of linguistic and cultural diversity and sees that strengthening the repertoires of the home and community is likely to facilitate the acquisition of mainstream language and culture. She also demonstrates a strong desire to contribute to both the migrant and mainstream societies by teaching

younger children. She demonstrates social responsibility and agency, both of which are fundamentally cohesive values. Another young teacher in this school, a male university student, makes it clear that he is conscious of the integrative possibilities of linguistic pluralism, and he offers a strategy, which he recognizes carries risk, to defuse negative stereotyping in the following:

Language, culture ... 95% of (Afghan) students think this benefits Afghan and Australian cultures and communities ... Some Australians are influenced by the media ... When you are in a new country – you try to integrate – through making jokes – you get into – get in – make jokes about Osama bin Laden! (HIE)

The young female student teacher adopts another strategy for defusing prejudice based on affiliations of faith (anti-Muslim sentiment) in the mainstream:

Media brings bad news – war – we never see celebrations and good news ... When we are at school we try to integrate, we go to the Christian [Roman Catholic] church ... (HID)

Her strategy, thus, is to signal her willingness to participate in Catholic observances while at school in order to demonstrate moves of cohesion and to allay associations with media-fanned anti-Islamic sentiment.

Both young teachers have found bridging strategies between migrant and Australian communities in their teaching practices. HID has come to use bilingual, Dari-English methodology in her classes, while HIE, as might be expected from his earlier comments, uses jokes to defuse tension and to maintain student participation. He also connects his teaching of Dari to sport and affiliation to local and international sporting clubs (mainly soccer). Both teachers find ways to connect the learning of Dari to the South Australian context, the context of family and community ties in Afghanistan, and ties to the Persian-Farsi-Dari diaspora. Both are thus contributing to cohesion at various levels: the immediate social context, and wider network of affiliations.

Team-sport competition amongst schools takes place on Saturday mornings in South Australia and almost all of the young boys who attend the afternoon school arrive dressed in T-shirts which signal their affiliations with school sport, local football clubs, or junior state sport team membership. Participation in sport is a much admired and socially integrative value in Australia and other settings, and these young boys demonstrate their ability to coexist in the common spaces, slipping between communities.

What is obvious from interviews with the young people who are teaching Dari is that they are deeply committed to integration or productive coexistence with mainstream Australian culture and society. They do not see that an attach-

ment to their language and culture prevents integration. Rather, they embrace two sets of cultures and traditions. Symbolically, the older students (teachers) volunteer. They are prepared to give up most of the day on Saturdays to teach (preparing lessons, travelling and teaching). They have a strong belief in the value of volunteering, which is highly prized in both the migrant and mainstream Australian societies. These young people demonstrate that they participate as good citizens and they recognize shared values of citizenship.

These narratives demonstrate strong and expanding affiliations to social systems, both of a newly reconfigured Hazaraghi community in South Australia and one in which this community is part of a broader migrant community which in turn is part of the wider South Australian community. There are both differences and commonalities between two positions regarding the status of Hazaraghi and Dari as languages. On the one hand, this difference may be indicative of an evolving difference of class within the newly reconfigured, economically active and successful members of the Hazara community with aspirations of upward social mobility. Hazaraghi, stigmatized as a language of an "uneducated" and minority in Afghanistan, is restigmatized by some (male) members of the newly reconfigured Hazara community in this context. Difference in value attached to Hazaraghi may be influenced by how individuals weigh the value of their own, individual or smaller group differences of interest. A strong identification with Hazaraghi may imply a strong affinity to the marginalized Hazara communities, particularly women, who have been persecuted and denied access to education and other benefits of full citizenship for generations. It may be related to establishing a closer rapport with asylum seekers in the refugee detention centers, for whom the already settled community has grown somewhat apart. It may also be related to competition for participation in government agency employment in language services.

Affiliation to Dari, because of its proximity to Farsi (Persian) offers participation in a wider Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani (imagined) community of citizens along with a rich literary tradition, scholarship and educational and cultural capital. The debate over language within a small 4000 strong community of Dari-Hazaraghi speakers in South Australia is healthy and demonstrates diversity. Although outsiders may believe this to be a homogenous group defined along lines of ethnicity, religion and language, and sealed off from or unchanged by proximity to the mainstream, this is clearly not the case.

5.2 Narratives in the Sudanese community in Adelaide

Brief glimpses into the narratives of two Sudanese informants are presented below. These informants are speakers of Dinka and express strong affiliation to Dinka language, cultural practices, family members and networks “back home” in Southern Sudan. Southern Sudanese suffered persecution based on affiliations of language, culture, ethnic identity, livelihood, natural resources and faith from the Arabic and Islamic dominated northern part of the country. One informant is a mature aged student with a family living in Adelaide; one is a younger man, one of the former boy children who had to flee massacres, unaccompanied by family or adults, to neighboring Ethiopia and later to a refugee camp in Kenya. Both express loyalty to a newly forged Sudanese community in South Australia. What is striking in the narratives of both Sudanese and Afghan informants is a sense of pride in social practices, and a distancing of their community from practices which might be construed as anti-social or sponging on the Australian taxpayer. Although the researcher did not raise the matter of the negative representation in the media and in official structures, linking Sudanese migrants with crime, this matter was clearly one of concern for the informant who offered the following: “When there are difficulties, Australians think that all Africans are Sudanese” (SIA).³

This informant, a mature-aged person studying to be a social worker, is involved in community-based work. That he felt it necessary to express agency on this matter suggests that the effect of ethnic labeling and stigma weighs heavily. He is also keen to position Sudanese people living in Adelaide as socially responsible contributors to society:

Sudanese do not go to Centrelink [welfare arm of government] to get handouts Sudanese are not the beneficiaries of the community organisations for refugees. We work or we study. We either have jobs or we are at school or university. We are doing things. (SIA)

He is also keen to demonstrate that Dinka speakers also use “Equatorial Arabic” as a vehicular language of communication amongst other marginalized Sudanese communities of the Blue Nile and Nuba communities. In so doing he distinguishes between Arabic used by political adversaries from northern Sudan and vehicular Arabic used further south, and he simultaneously demonstrates linguistic mobility. Such comments and perspectives reveal a claim on Sudanese identity but this is an identity of a Sudanese community living in South Australia not one in the southern regions of Sudan. The comments demonstrate both an exercise of lin-

³ SIA was interviewed in June 2011.

guistic citizenship (agency) and active participation within South Australia. There is, in addition, a distancing from other migrant communities, and re-labeling of the other. Reluctance to take a free ride is a highly valued characteristic of Australian society. Values which involve work and study are understood in Australia as having “a fair go”, i.e. being socially responsible and exhibiting participatory citizenship which contribute towards social cohesion.

Informant SIB, had few intermittent or limited educational opportunities in refugee camps prior to his arrival in Australia. His entry to university study involved an alternative pathway and he recognizes the difficulties which other migrants face in equipping themselves with the skills to survive in Australia.⁴

Researcher (R): What are you going to do with your degree from this university?

Informant B (SIB): Actually, I am going to start a driving school.

R: Oh . . .

SIB: A driving school for Sudanese and other Africans.

R: Why did you think of that?

SIB: I can use my Dinka with people. People do not know English and I can teach in Dinka.

R: OK . . .

SIB: People will come to me because I can teach them to drive in Dinka and they are not afraid.

This conversation was resumed some months later.

R: Are you teaching people to drive?

SIB: Yes . . . there are a lot of things you have to do . . . to qualify as an instructor.

R: Are you teaching in Dinka?

SIB: Yes. Dinka and English. People have to know the rules in English for the driving test.

R: So what do you mean, “Dinka and English”?

SIB: Well I explain the English in Dinka. Then I teach the client to drive in Dinka. Then I teach them the English for it so when they go for the test, they know it.

This informant makes a clear connection of the relationship between language and the economy and he makes the connection between community identity and service. He studied English at university and now uses two languages in a micro-enterprise activity. His clients are mainly Sudanese women who have had little if any formal education. The use of Dinka provides a bridge between the isolation of such women and skills which will allow them to escape some of the constraints of gender and linguistic isolation to take up opportunities for engagement with wider layers of Australian society. Dinka and English are used to increase participation across divides of language, ethnicity, culture and gender.

⁴ SIB was interviewed in November 2010 and in July 2011.

Quite by chance, the informant has found himself practicing non-formal bilingual education, also evident in the community-based teaching of Afghan students discussed above.

6 Towards re-figuring mobile communities and debates of sustainability

Evidence from Sudanese and Afghan communities in South Australia suggests that the communities themselves recognize that literacy in community languages and linguistic maintenance are not antithetical to integration or co-existence. Use of bilingual or multilingual expertise offers both members of the Sudanese and Afghan communities further mobility within Australia and within growing diasporas of communities beyond Australia's borders. Multilinguality (Agnihotri 2007), a feature of mobile individuals and networks, offers mobility and opportunities to expand repertoires of participation and citizenship.

There is evidence of both language maintenance and expansion of linguistic, cultural and other repertoires of identity, and there is also evidence of agency, participation and citizenship. Community informants exhibit linguistic citizenship in their articulation of the cohesive and mutually beneficial role of language as offering affiliations of citizenship "back home" and in a "new home" – at the individual level and also within newly configured groups and identities. This applies equally to the Afghan community whether in relation to Persian-Farsi-Dari or in relation to Hazaraghi-Dari-Persian linguistic affiliations. It also applies to members of the Sudanese community, who acknowledge their use of Dinka, and also their use of Equatorial Arabic as a *lingua franca* amongst Sudanese migrants from other language communities from Sudan. For both communities, their multilinguality has expanded to include English in Australia and the expanding repertoires offer access to participation and citizenship within Australia as well as access to other networked affiliations in the diaspora.

Rapid changes in the multi-dimensionality of mobilities and the speed at which these changes are occurring are features of super-diversity and they have brought increasing pressure for official structures to respond. The structures of power and public perceptions in Australia are responding neither with speed nor from a position informed by theory or examples of productive practices within new migrant communities. The research discussed here shows little evidence to support mainstream discourses of fear (Orientalism, racism, ethnicity) or essentialized views of language/s. It does not reveal a failure on the part of migrants to integrate; nor does it show the inevitability, at this stage of language loss. There

is, however, evidence of resistance to subalternization from mainstream constructions of dependency and stigma by both Afghan and Sudanese communities. There is evidence of agency and participation in practices of citizenship in: the establishment of business interests and home-ownership (de-ghettoization); an emphasis on education, integration and participation; an exhibition of "volunteerism", sporting affiliation/integration; a rejection of dependency labeling; and an expansion of linguistic repertoires.

Mainstream discourses on the other hand reveal contradictions and ambiguity towards migrant communities. On the one hand, there has been a process of accepting political refugees via "off-shore" mechanisms, but followed by divisive and incendiary conditionality shown here towards Sudanese migrants. There are contradictions in relation to Afghan asylum seekers who are held in detention centers. The Australian government has taken a bold step in giving recognition to Hazaraghi as a language through which services are to be offered. Yet the asylum seekers are detained in otherwise psychologically traumatizing circumstances designed to incur resistance. Outbreaks of resistance are not explained to the public, nor are the internal divisions between Sunni and Shi'ite followers of Islam explained in the context of the desperate flight of asylum seekers. Similarly, the connection between social workers' interference with Sudanese kinship structures and the manifestation of anti-social behavior is not communicated to the public.

Mainstream structures appear impervious to community-based practices of cohesion which are in synchrony with Australian values, and thus opportunities to build on these are missed. Fundamentally the response to change is slow and there is a disconnection with similar and related debates elsewhere. Imbalances in the representations of migrants by public officials indicate a serious misunderstanding of contemporary diversity. At a theoretical level, these indicate a disjuncture between dominant Australian socio-political discourses and an emerging theory and recalibrated understanding of super-diversity on the international platform.

Migrant communities, on the other hand, exhibit characteristics of adaptability, sensitivity to the speed of change and mobility, and they exercise agency in reconfiguring networks of affiliation in the local and international diaspora. They recognize the commonality of social values, such as volunteering and having a "fair go", which cut across ethnolinguistic and faith-based divides. They are in concert, therefore, with contemporary manifestations of super-diversity elsewhere and they are finding productive mechanisms for sustaining diversity through their mobilities.

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