

Preference modelling

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4. Valued structures
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- D. Bouyssou et P. Vincke, *Relations binaires et modélisation des préférences*. Concepts et méthodes pour l'aide à la décision. Hermes. 2006.
- M. Ozturk, A. Tsoukias et P. Vincke. *Preference modelling. Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis : State of the Art Surveys*. Springer Verlag. 2005

Introduction

Lemma

- if you have no preferences...
- there is no need to worry about decisions!

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→ We need to have concepts to represent preferences

- in a variety of disciplines:
- economics, psychology, political science, operational research, multiple criteria decision making...

→ preference modelling

Binary relation

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
- A possible interpretation of aRb is: a is preferred to b
- Another one:
 - $A = \{\text{alan, bonnie, clara, diana, eddy, fanny}\}$
 - $R = \text{"wants to see tonight"}$
 - $R = \{(a, c), (c, a), (d, e), (b, f), (a, e)\}$

Representation of a binary relation

- Matrix representation:

\mapsto	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>
<i>a</i>	0	0	1	0	1	0
<i>b</i>	0	0	0	0	0	1
<i>c</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0
<i>d</i>	0	0	0	0	1	0
<i>e</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>f</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0

- Graphical representation:



Set operations

Let R and T be two binary relations on the same set A :

- **Inclusion:** $R \subseteq T$ iff $aRb \Rightarrow aTb$
- **Union:** $a(R \cup T)b$ iff aRb or (inclusive) aTb
- **Intersection:** $a(R \cap T)b$ iff aRb and aTb
- **Relative Product:** $a(R.T)b$ iff $\exists c \in A$ s.t. aRc and cTb

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- **complete** iff $aRb \vee bRa$

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- Ferrers iff $aRb \wedge cRd \Rightarrow aRd \vee cRb$
- complete iff $aRb \vee bRa$
- weakly complete iff $a \neq b \Rightarrow aRb \vee bRa$

Preference structures

Preference structures

Preference structure

A **preference structure** is a collection of binary relations defined on the set A and such that:

- $\forall a, b \in A$, at least one relation is satisfied
- $\forall a, b \in A$, if one relation is satisfied, another one cannot be satisfied

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A preference structure defines a **partition** of the set $A \times A$.

- Each preference relation in a preference structure is uniquely characterized by its properties (symmetry, transitivity...)
- Any preference structure can be characterized by a unique binary relation R (called **characteristic relation**)

Strict preferences, indifference and incomparability

Strict preferences: P

- There are clear and positive reasons for a significant preference for one of the two options,
- P is asymmetric

Indifference: I

- There are clear and positive reasons for an equivalence between the two options,
- I is symmetric and reflexive

Incomparability: J

- There are no clear and positive reasons for one of the above situations,
- J is symmetric and irreflexive

Preference structure

- $\{P, I, J\}$ is a **preference structure** if:
 - P is asymmetric
 - I is symmetric and reflexive
 - J is symmetric and irreflexive,
 - $P \cup I \cup J$ is complete,
 - P , I and J are exclusives
- Example:
 - $A = \{a, b, c, d, e\}$
 - $P = \{(b, a), (b, c), (b, d), (b, e), (d, c), (e, c)\}$
 - $I = \{(a, a), (b, b), (c, c), (d, d), (e, e), (a, c), (c, a)\}$
 - $J = \{(a, e), (e, a), (a, d), (d, a), (d, e), (e, d)\}$

Characterisation

Every preference structure is characterized by the relation $R = P \cup I$

$$(a, b) \in R \Leftrightarrow (a, b) \in P \text{ or } (a, b) \in I$$

- We have:

$$(a, b) \in P \Leftrightarrow (a, b) \in R \text{ and } (b, a) \notin R$$

$$(a, b) \in I \Leftrightarrow (a, b) \in R \text{ and } (b, a) \in R$$

$$(a, b) \in J \Leftrightarrow (a, b) \notin R \text{ and } (b, a) \notin R$$

- R is the **characteristic relation** of the preference structure $\{P, I, J\}$
- $(a, b) \in R$ means that: “ a is at least as good as b ”

Preference models

Preference models

Total preorder

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R is a **pre-order** iff it satisfies the following properties:

- R is complete
- R is transitive
- The **preference structure** $\{P, I, J\}$ satisfies the following properties:
 - No incomparability ($J = \emptyset$)
 - P is transitive
 - I is transitive

- Numerical representation of a total preorder:

$$\begin{cases} (a, b) \in P \Leftrightarrow g(a) > g(b) \\ (a, b) \in I \Leftrightarrow g(a) = g(b) \end{cases}$$

- The characteristic relation R is represented by:

$$(a, b) \in R \Leftrightarrow g(a) \geq g(b)$$

- Whenever a decision problem is reduced to the comparison of “profit”, the underlying preference structure is a preorder.

Total (pre)order

- In a **total preorder**:
 - I is an **equivalence relation**: reflexive, symmetric and transitive
 - P is a **weak order**: asymmetric and negatively transitive
 - Knowing P is enough to know all the structure

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Total Order

A **total order** is a total preorder without equally-ranked candidates

- $I = \{(a, a), \forall a \in A\},$
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Total order

R is an **order** iff it satisfies the following properties:

- R is complete
- R is transitive
- R is antisymmetric


Preference models

Semiorder

Considering a threshold

Let $a, b, c \in A$ 3 elements, such that $g(a) = 1000$, $g(b) = 1020$ and $g(c) = 1040$.

If we assume that we have a threshold $q = 30$, we will have $(a, b) \in I$, $(b, c) \in I$ and $(c, a) \in P$:



Considering a threshold

- A discrimination threshold aims to consider small differences as **not significant**
- The transitivity of the indifference relation is not compatible with the existence of such a threshold,
- Any preference structure underlying a threshold model verifies:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a, b) \notin J \text{ (that is } J = \emptyset) \\ (a, b) \in P, (b, c) \in I, (c, d) \in P \Rightarrow (a, d) \in P \\ (a, d) \in I, (a, b) \in P, (b, c) \in P \Rightarrow (d, c) \in P \end{array} \right.$$

- Any preference structure that verifies the properties above can be represented by a threshold model (if A is finite or countable)

Semiorder

A reflexive relation $R = \langle P, I \rangle$, defined on A , is a **semiorder** if there exists a function g with values in \mathbb{R} , and a non-negative constant q such that $\forall a, b \in A$,

$$\begin{cases} (a, b) \in P & \Leftrightarrow g(a) > g(b) + q, \\ (a, b) \in I & \Leftrightarrow |g(a) - g(b)| \leq q. \end{cases}$$

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Semiorder

R is a **semiorder** iff it satisfies the following properties:

- R is complete
- R is Ferrers
- R is semi-transitive

Preference models

Interval Order

What if the threshold is variable?

- One may want to vary the threshold according to the level of the scale
- We introduce a **variable threshold** such that:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a, b) \in P \\ (a, b) \in I \end{array} \right. \Leftrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} g(a) > g(b) + q(g(b)) \\ \begin{cases} g(a) \leq g(b) + q(g(b)), \\ g(b) \leq g(a) + q(g(a)) \end{cases} \end{array} \right.$$

Consistency condition

- Consistency Condition:

$$g(a) > g(b) \Rightarrow g(a) + q(g(a)) > g(b) + q(g(b))$$

- If the **consistency condition is satisfied**, then the **underlying preference structure is a semiorder**. The problem can be reduced (by transforming the functions g and q) to a model where the threshold is constant (with, for example, $q(g(a)) = \alpha g(a) + \beta$)
- If the **consistency condition is not satisfied**, then the underlying preference structure has to satisfy:

$$\begin{cases} (a, b) \notin J \text{ (that is } J = \emptyset) \\ (a, b) \in P, (b, c) \in I, (c, d) \in P \Rightarrow (a, d) \in P \end{cases}$$

- A preference structure is an **interval order** if it can be represented by a **variable threshold model**

Interval order

R is an **interval order** iff it satisfies the following properties:

- R is complete
- R is Ferrers

- It is sometimes difficult to translate the consequences of decisions by a precise numerical assessment
- The evaluation of each action can be apprehended by an interval of possible values for $g(a) : [l_a, u_a]$

→ How can we compare such interval-actions?

Model 1:

- The intervals have to be disjoint in order to mark a preference:

$$\begin{cases} (a, b) \in P & \Rightarrow l_a > u_b \\ (a, b) \in I & \Rightarrow (a, b) \notin P \text{ and } (b, a) \notin P \end{cases}$$

- It is then an **interval order structure**
→ with $l_1 = g(a)$ and $u_a = g(a) + q(g(a))$, it is a **variable threshold model**
- When the intervals are of identical length, it is a **semiorder structure** (the length of the intervals corresponds to a constant threshold)

Model 2:

- There is a preference as soon as an interval impinge on the other:

$$\begin{cases} (a, b) \in P & \Rightarrow l_a > l_b \text{ and } u_a > u_b \\ (a, b) \in I & \Rightarrow (a, b) \notin P \text{ and } (b, a) \notin P \end{cases}$$

- In this case P is a **partial order**, and I is the complementary relation

Preference models

Pseudo-orders

Taking two thresholds into account

- It may seem arbitrary to determine a value below which there is an indifference, and above which there is a strict preference
- There is often a hesitation area
- We introduce a **preference threshold** (in addition to the **indifference threshold**) beyond which there is a strict preference
- Between the indifference threshold and the preference threshold exists an **ambiguous zone** in which the decision maker hesitates between indifference and preference

Double threshold order

Double threshold order

Let $R = \langle P, Q, I \rangle$ be a relation on a finite set A . R is a **double threshold order** iff, $\forall a, b \in A$,

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} (a, b) \in P & \Leftrightarrow g(a) > g(b) + p(g(b)) \\ (a, b) \in Q & \Leftrightarrow g(b) + p(g(b)) \geq g(a) > g(b) + q(g(b)) \\ (a, b) \in I & \Leftrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} g(b) + q(g(b)) \geq g(a) \\ g(a) + q(g(a)) \geq g(b) \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$$

- Q represents a “weak” preference relation, where one is hesitant between an indifference or a preference relation

- A pseudo-order is a particular case of double threshold order, such that the thresholds fulfil a coherence condition

Pseudo-order

Let $R = \langle P, Q, I \rangle$ be a relation on a finite set A . R is a **pseudo-order** iff, $\forall a, b \in A$,

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} R \text{ is a double threshold order} \\ g(a) > g(b) \Leftrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} g(a) + q(g(a)) > g(b) + q(g(b)) \\ g(a) + p(g(a)) > g(b) + p(g(b)) \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$$


A three-way structure appears when we compare intervals as follows:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} (a, b) \in P & \Leftrightarrow l_a > u_b \\ (a, b) \in Q & \Leftrightarrow u_a > u_b > l_a > l_b \\ (a, b) \in I & \Leftrightarrow [l_a, u_a] \subseteq [l_b, u_b] \text{ or } [l_b, u_b] \subseteq [l_a, u_a] \end{array} \right.$$

Preference models

Incomparability

Partial models



Valued structures

- The preference models we have seen until now assume that the preference relation is unique (for $a, b \in A$)
- Each $(a, b) \in P$ can be associated to a value $v(a, b)$ representing the “**degree**” or the “**validity**” of the preference of a over b
- Let $v(a, b) \in [0, 1]$ such that
 - $v(a, b) = 1$: the degree of the preference of a over b is maximum,
 - $v(a, b) = 0$: the degree of the preference of a over b is minimum.
- Useful when a and b are compared several times during votes, polls, ...

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- $\max(v(a, b), v(c, d)) > \min(v(a, d), v(c, b)) \rightarrow$ characteristics property of interval-orders

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- $v(a, b) > \text{Min}(v(a, c), v(c, b)), \forall c \in A \rightarrow$ generalisation of transitivity
- $\text{Max}(v(a, b), v(c, d)) > \text{Min}(v(a, d), v(c, b)) \rightarrow$ characteristics property of interval-orders
- $v(a, c) = v(a, b) + v(b, c) \rightarrow$ additivity (notion of intensity of the preferences)
- α -cut of a valued relation: we keep only the couples (a, b) satisfying $v(a, b) \geq \alpha$
- A valued relation is max-min-transitive iff all α -cuts are transitive

Comparison of preferences gap

- It is possible to compare the gap between preferences
- Let $a, b, c, d \in A$ such that $(a, b) \in P$ and $(c, d) \in P$
- We consider the statement “*The preference of a over b is stronger (less strong, equivalent, incomparable) than the preference of c over d* ”

\Rightarrow Defines a preference structure over $A \times A$

Comparison of preferences gap

- Example: the **additive model**
- 2 preferences structures:
 - (I, P) over A
 - (\sim, \succ) over $A \times A$
- Defined by the function g :

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} (a, b) \in P & \Leftrightarrow g(a) > g(b) \\ (a, b) \in I & \Leftrightarrow g(a) = g(b) \\ (a, b) \succ (c, d) & \Leftrightarrow g(a) - g(b) > g(c) - g(d) \\ (a, b) \sim (c, d) & \Leftrightarrow g(a) - g(b) = g(c) - g(d) \end{array} \right.$$

Conclusion

To conclude

- Brief survey of classical preference structures
- Vast and complex literature
- Some important questions we did not ask here:
 - the question of the approximation of preference structure by another one
 - the way to collect and validate preference information in a given context
 - the links between preference modeling and the question of meaningfulness in measurement theory
 - the statistical analysis of preference data
 - questions on the links between value systems and preferences