



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO

22 October 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

FROM: AFMC/CC

4375 Chidlaw Road

Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-5006

SUBJECT: URGENT - Contractor Accountability Issues - Stark Industries Defense Contracts

1. PURPOSE: This memorandum formally requests Congressional oversight and intervention regarding ongoing contractor compliance issues with Stark Industries and its Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Anthony Stark, across multiple Department of Defense acquisition programs.

2. BACKGROUND: Stark Industries currently holds 17 active DoD contracts totaling \$47.3 billion, including Project IRON WING Advanced Propulsion (\$8.2B), JERICHO Precision Munitions Modernization (\$12.7B), ARC REACTOR Power Generation Program (\$15.1B), and various R&D and prototype efforts (\$11.3B). While Stark Industries consistently delivers technically superior products ahead of schedule and under budget, Mr. Stark's personal conduct has created unprecedented security, safety, and diplomatic challenges.

3. SPECIFIC INCIDENTS - LAST 90 DAYS: On 16 October 2025, Mr. Stark conducted unauthorized flight demonstration in restricted airspace using personal powered armor, violating 14 separate FAA regulations and 7 DoD security protocols. When confronted, he cited his contract as all the authorization he needed and left autographed photos with tower personnel. On 3 October 2025, during Congressional testimony, Mr. Stark claimed to have sent classified briefing materials, later admitted he had not, then demonstrated a working miniaturized reactor during lunch break to prove a point. On 28 September 2025, Mr. Stark personally delivered JERICHO munitions to a forward operating base, arriving in powered armor after refusing military airlift. His flight path violated airspace of three allied nations, requiring 72 hours of State Department damage control. Additionally, Mr. Stark's AI system FRIDAY appears to have higher security clearance than most O-6 commanders. When asked how the AI obtained clearance, Mr. Stark responded that she earned it. OPM is still investigating.

4. BROADER CONCERNS: Traditional contractor oversight mechanisms are ineffective when the contractor can fly away from meetings. Mr. Stark has attended exactly zero required Program Management Reviews, yet somehow knows everything discussed in them. We strongly suspect continued unauthorized network access. Mr. Stark appears to have personal phone numbers of SECDEF, SECAF, and CSAF, which he uses frequently, usually while we are trying to formally report his violations. Multiple critical weapons systems are now dependent on Stark-proprietary technology. Mr. Stark is literally the only person who fully understands arc reactor specifications. This represents an unacceptable single-point-of-failure in national defense architecture. When we

mentioned this concern, he said he was not planning on going anywhere. This does not relax us.

5. **ATTEMPTED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS:** We have attempted the following corrective measures with the following results: Formal written warnings (6) were acknowledged with jokes. Security violation reports (11) were closed as technically compliant after legal review. Contract cure notices (3) had issues fixed by Mr. Stark before we finished writing them. Suspension of access credentials (4) were bypassed via alternative entry methods. We requested 23 meetings with Mr. Stark to discuss compliance. Mr. Stark actually attended zero of these meetings but sent holographic projections to two of them.

6. **THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM:** Mr. Stark is simultaneously our most capable contractor with exceptional performance, our most expensive contractor though somehow still profitable, our most frustrating contractor with compliance that is theatrical at best, and our most essential contractor with critical national security dependency. Traditional remedies such as contract termination or debarment would harm national defense more than help it. We cannot fire him. He knows we cannot fire him. He reminds us frequently that we cannot fire him.

7. **REQUESTED CONGRESSIONAL ACTION:** We respectfully request the Senate Armed Services Committee conduct oversight hearing on contractor accountability in advanced technology programs, review legal authorities for managing contractors who possess unique mission-critical capabilities, consider legislation establishing special compliance framework for strategic individual contractors, possibly invite Mr. Stark to testify though this may backfire spectacularly, and alternatively have someone Mr. Stark actually respects talk to him.

8. **CONCLUSION:** The United States Air Force has successfully managed difficult contractors for 77 years. We have dealt with cost overruns, schedule delays, technical failures, and every flavor of corporate dysfunction imaginable. We have never before encountered a contractor who is simultaneously indispensable and ungovernable. We need help.

MICHAEL T. HARRIS, General, USAF
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command

4 Attachments:

1. Detailed Incident Timeline (187 pages)
2. Photographic Evidence of Unauthorized Operations
3. Technical Dependency Analysis
4. Commander's Incident Stress Log (Redacted)