The availability of cognitive resources is necessary for successfully navigating our daily lives; these resources are used for adaptive processes in attention deployment (Franconeri, Alvarez, & Cavanagh, 2013), planning (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Phillips, 2007), decision-making (Deck & Jahedi, 2015; Whitney, Rinehart, & Hinson, 2008), inhibition (Ward & Mann, 2000) and cognitive control (Deveney & Pizzagalli, 2008), are subject to limitation. When those resources are limited (i.e., cognitive depletion), there is greater difficulty in effortful self-regulation of cognitive and affective processes (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Franconeri, Alvarez, & Cavanagh, 2013; Kahneman, 1973; Storbeck, 2012; Scalf, Torralbo, Tapia, & Beck, 2013). For example, imagine a student attending a lecture while also text messaging a friend. As the student considers how to respond in their next message and directs cognitive resources towards the conversation and away from the lecture, the student’s ability to understand and remember the lecture material will suffer. Directing cognitive resources between different tasks in this manner taxes an already limited pool of cognitive resources (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Kahneman, 1973). And on a larger scale, the accumulation of cognitive depletion can have a widespread societal implications (e.g., burnout and absenteeism; Diestel & Schmidt, 2011). For instance, in emotionally demanding occupations (e.g., healthcare positions), cognitive depletion is associated with worse job performance (Ihle, Borella, Rahnfeld, Müller, Enge, Hacker, Wegge, Oris, & Kliegel, 2015; Motowidlo, Packard, & Manning, 1986) and increased job-related stress that reduces executive functioning (Privitera, Rosenstein, Plessow, & LoCastro, 2014; Starcke, Wiesen, Trotzke, & Brand, 2016).

Indeed, many emotional processes are affected by concurrent cognitive demands, perhaps as a result of a shared resource pool for these processes (Ahmed, 2018, Blair et al., 2007; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Mather & Knight, 2005; Knight et al., 2007). For instance, Ahmed (2018) showed that participants are less accurate at categorizing emotional facial expressions when under high cognitive load. Other work has demonstrated the deleterious effects of cognitive load on emotional bias in older adults, demonstrating that cognitively demanding tasks (e.g., distraction during memory encoding) reduce age-related positivity bias (Mather & Knight, 2005; Knight et al., 2007). Evidence of these cognition-emotion interactions comes from the neuroimaging literature as well. For example, some work has shown that cognitive demands “automatically” recruit resources (i.e., superior and middle frontal cortex) implicated in emotion regulation (i.e., suppression) when emotional material is presented during the cognitively demanding Stroop task, a mechanism which is likely engaged to preserve other cognitive resources for task performance by down-regulating the brain’s response to the emotional material (Blair et al., 2007). These effects demonstrate a clear overlap between the resources used to process cognitive demands with those involved in the maintenance of *emotional* processes, such that cognitive demands *deplete/interfere [with] resources which might otherwise be dedicated to* the *maintenance of* *emotional* processing,

Despite this overlap, not all loads affect emotional processes equally; that is, there is an importance of the domain-specificity of loads. In other words, emotional and non-emotional loads differentially affect concurrent emotional processing. Specificallyemotional comparableFor instance, when askedparticipants were less accurate on subsequentjudgments of, rather than sensory, pairs f The neuroimaging literature suggests that one mechanism for domain-specific (i.e., emotional) load effects is the separable processing of emotional and non-emotional load. For instance, changing the nature of cognitively demanding tasks, even when stimuli themselves remain consistent, to include an emotional component (e.g., remembering an emotional expression instead of an identity; judging the congruency of a face and label for emotional expressions instead of *gender/sex*) results in the recruitment of dissociable neural resources (Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008; Neta & Whalen, 2011). Indeed, emotional loads are highly competitive for neural representation (i.e., cognitive resources), receiving priority processing at the perceptual and executive levels (Pessoa, 2009) and recruiting inputs from emotion- and arousal-related brain regions (Grimm, Weigand, Kazzer, Jacobs, & Bajbouj, 2012). As such, when these resources are engaged with an emotional load, the resources are no longer available for regulating other emotional processes and performance on these will likely be affected.