

Possible Organization for Writing a Thesis including a L^AT_EX Framework and
Examples

by

A Graduate Advisor

B.Sc., University of WhoKnowsWhere, 2053

M.Sc., University of AnotherOne, 2054

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the Department of Whichever

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University of Victoria

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Supervisory Committee

Dr. R. Supervisor Main, Supervisor
(Department of Same As Candidate)

Dr. M. Member One, Departmental Member
(Department of Same As Candidate)

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ABSTRACT

This document is a possible Latex framework for a thesis or dissertation at UVic. It should work in the Windows, Mac and Unix environments. The content is based on the experience of one supervisor and graduate advisor. It explains the organization that can help write a thesis, especially in a scientific environment where the research contains experimental results as well. There is no claim that this is the *best* or *only* way to structure such a document. Yet in the majority of cases it serves extremely well as a sound basis which can be customized according to the requirements of the members of the supervisory committee and the topic of research. Additionally some examples on using L^AT_EX are included as a bonus for beginners.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank:

my cat, Star Trek, and the weather, for supporting me in the low moments.

Supervisor Main, for mentoring, support, encouragement, and patience.

Grant Organization Name, for funding me with a Scholarship.

I believe I know the only cure, which is to make one's centre of life inside of one's self, not selfishly or excludingly, but with a kind of unassailable serenity-to decorate one's inner house so richly that one is content there, glad to welcome any one who wants to come and stay, but happy all the same in the hours when one is inevitably alone.

Edith Wharton

DEDICATION

Just hoping this is useful!

Chapter 1

Introduction

The term *Trojan Horse* or *Trojan* has become a modern metaphor for a deception where by an unsuspecting victim welcomes a foe into an otherwise safe environment. [15] Though modern civilization rarely has need for large walls we are similarly surrounded. Not by stone and mortar but by the technology we so heavily rely on. These days it is more common to come across a piece of equipment with some form of computer in it than without. They provide us entertainment, education, security, monitor our health, grow our food and more. Our reliance make us susceptible to their compromise. Since the dawn of the computer we have dealt with software threats; we are almost as good as protecting ourselves against them as they are at attacking us. In recent years a new incarnation of danger has emerged; in hardware. In this new arena of attack and defend those who seek to defend are far behind.

1.1 Motivation

In the summer of 2007 an Israeli military action referred to as Operation Orchard commenced. A group of F-15I Ra'am fighter jets from the Israeli Air Force 69th Squadron took off to attack a suspected nuclear reactor in neighboring Syria. In the flight path was a Syrian radar station which boasted 'state-of-the-art' aircraft detection and neutralization technology. The Israeli war planes were able to approach and destroy the installation undetected. Though never proven it is commonly accepted that the detection mechanism was deactivated by a back-door circuit inserted into the radar system. [12] In 2011 over 1300 cases were reported to the Electronic Resellers Association International (ERAI) of modified ICs and the occurrence has been going

up. [4] Integrated Circuits (IC) are a large part of modern life yet it is easy to forget that they drive virtually every piece of technology used today. Ensuring their ICs run our devices as expected is vital in the digital era. Since their discovery there has been concerted effort to detect hardware trojans but the innate complexity of ICs makes it difficult. [9]

1.2 Contributions

1.3 Organization

Chapter 2

Hardware Trojans

2.1 Background

Integrated Circuits (IC) are continuously decreasing in size whilst increasing in complexity. These trends require ever more people and sophisticated means of manufacture which in turn creates security vulnerabilities. Products developed by semiconductor companies generally compromised in one of two ways. First, due to the complexity it is rare for a product to be managed within a single company. Frequently, steps in the production-chain are outsourced. It is within these 'third-party' contributors that products can be maliciously modified. Secondly, for various reasons, employees of trusted contributors have been known to make modifications. [5] These modifications are known as hardware Trojans. ICs are an integral part of every facet of the modern world. Proper application of a Trojan can provide information, control of mechanical systems, surveillance and more to an unauthorized party.

2.2 Topology

The discussion, detection and evaluation of hardware trojans requires a comprehensive means of description. Several hardware trojan taxonomies have been proposed [6, 11, 13, 14]. In [14], trojans were organized based solely on their activation mechanisms. A taxonomy based on the location, activation and action of a trojan was presented in [11], [6]. However, these approaches do not consider the manufacturing process. Another taxonomy was proposed in [13] which employs five categories: insertion, abstraction, activation, effect, and location. While this is more extensive than




Figure 2.1: The thirty-three attributes of the hardware trojan taxonomy in [10].

previous approaches, it fails to account for the physical characteristics of a trojan. An additional taxonomy was proposed in [10] which considers all attributes a hardware trojan may possess. This taxonomy is the most comprehensive and was selected as the means of description for this work. It is comprised of thirty-three attributes organized into eight categories as shown in Fig. 2.1. These categories can be arranged into the following four levels as indicated in Fig. 2.2.

1. The **insertion** (chip life-cycle) level/category comprises the attributes pertaining to the IC production stages.
2. The **abstraction** level/category corresponds to where in the IC abstraction the trojan is introduced.
3. The **properties** level comprises the behavior and physical characteristics of the trojan.
4. The **location** level/category corresponds to the location of the trojan in the IC.

The properties level consists of the following categories.




Figure 2.2: The hardware trojan levels [10].

- The **effect** describes the disruption or effect a trojan has on the system.
- The **logic type** is the circuit logic that triggers the trojan, either combinational or sequential.
- The **functionality** differentiates between trojans which are functional or parametric.
- The **activation** differentiates between trojans which are always on or triggered.
- The **layout** is based on the physical characteristics of the trojan.

The relationships between the trojan attributes shown in Fig. 2.1 can be described using a matrix \mathbf{R} [10]. Entry $r(i, j)$ in \mathbf{R} indicates whether or not attribute i can lead to attribute j . For example, $r(2, 3) = 1$ indicates that design (attribute 2) can lead to fabrication (attribute 3). This implies that if an IC can be compromised during the design phase (attribute 2), it may influence the fabrication phase (attribute 3).

The matrix \mathbf{R} is divided into sub matrices as follows

$$\mathbf{R} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{R}_1 & \mathbf{R}_{12} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \mathbf{R}_2 & \mathbf{R}_{23} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \mathbf{R}_3 & \mathbf{R}_{34} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \mathbf{R}_4 \end{bmatrix}$$

	A	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0																							
2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0																							
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1																						
4	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0																							
5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0																							
6						0	1	0	0	0	0		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
7						0	0	1	0	0	0		1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0					
8						0	0	0	1	0	0		1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1					
9						0	0	0	0	1	0		1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0					
10						0	0	0	0	0	1		1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0					
11						0	0	0	0	0	0		1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1					
12													0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
13													0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
14													0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
15													0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
16													1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
17													1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
18													1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
19													0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
20													1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
21													1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
22													1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
23													1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
24													1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
25													1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
26													1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
27													1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
28													1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
29																																		
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33																																		

where \mathbf{R}_1 , \mathbf{R}_2 , \mathbf{R}_3 and \mathbf{R}_4 indicate the attribute relationships within a category. For example, \mathbf{R}_1 is given by

$$\mathbf{R}_1 = \left[\begin{array}{c|ccccc} A & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ \hline 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 2 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 3 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 4 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 5 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{array} \right]$$

Submatrix \mathbf{R}_{12} relates the attributes of the insertion category to the attributes of the abstraction category. An example of this submatrix is

$$\mathbf{R}_{12} = \left[\begin{array}{c|cccccc} A & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 2 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 3 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 4 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 5 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{array} \right]$$

2.3 Field Programmable Gate-Arrays (FPGA)

An IC belongs to one of two categories. An Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or a Field Programmable Gate-Array (FPGA). An ASIC is manufactured once and is immutable; its hardware is permanently printed in silicon. FPGAs are re-configurable. They are comprised of an array of Programmable Logic Devices (PLD). A PLD is a component whose functionality is dependent on a set of configuration options. Each PLD in an FPGA device receives a series of configuration instructions in the form of a binary message. A single FPGA can contain hundreds, or even thousands of PLDs, each of which can be one of hundreds of possible different types. The messages from all PLDs comprise the configuration Bitstream for the whole device. FPGA developers create processor designs using a programming language; the design is then downloaded or "configured" onto the device via the Bitstream. The design process is simpler and modifications can be made after manufacture. Because of this, FPGAs are becoming the IC of choice in larger scale productions however these same features increase their vulnerability.

Chapter 3

Automated Trojan Detection

3.1 Methodology

Figure 3.1 provides a visual representation of the basic concept assumed for the purposes of this work. All stages of production of an FPGA implementation are done "in-house" with the exception of the fabrication process. It is assumed that any trojan discovered is inserted in the fabrication phase; all other stages are trusted. The method of automated trojan detection described in this work would take place in the 'testing' phase of the life-cycle.




Figure 3.1: FPGA Life-Cycle

Figure 3.2 shows an overview of the trojan detection scheme. FPGA designs are written in a Hardware Description Language (HDL). *Xilinx* provides a series of User-




Figure 3.2: Methodology Overview

Interface (UI) or command line tools to process the design known as the 'tool-chain'. The tool chain generates a series of files that are used for a variety of purposes. The Bit file is a binary representation of the design to be implemented. It is referred to as the Bitstream or Configuration Bitstream and is the final form which is loaded into the device. This Bit file is also one of the primary files sent to the fabrication house where it will be implemented onto the batch of devices ordered. The resultant files are kept in secure storage while a copy is sent to be fabricated; these 'clean' copies are referred to as Golden. Though it is known that fabrication houses will often attempt to make optimizations on designs this methodology requires that no such efforts are made. When the completed batch of fabricated chips are returned the Bitstream is extracted via the method described in section 3.3. That which is extracted is referred to as the Target Bitstream. The Golden and Target Bitstreams are analyzed in conjunction to detect differences, described in section 3.4. Any discovered differences are then attributed to the corresponding component in the architecture, described in section 3.5. Finally, descriptive attributes presented in section 2.2 are returned to the

user, described in section 3.6.

3.2 FPGA Architecture and Configuration

A *Xilinx* Field Programmable Gate-Array (FPGA) is comprised of a matrix of blocks referred to as the 'gate-array' and is shown in Figure 3.3. A device can contain anywhere from a couple hundred to a few thousand blocks; they are arranged into columns by type. A block will consist of one or multiple tiles depending on the type. A tile is a component specific to a particular function such as Input-Output (IO), design logic, memory...etc but their detailed functionality can be configured by the user. An FPGA may have over one-hundred different types of tiles however each column is comprised entirely by a single block type. Columns are separated by clock regions as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 3.3. Each region is an independent array of blocks that uses a dedicated clock resource; this minimizes clock skew from causing undesired timing delays. Though each tile has a designated purposes (ex.




Figure 3.3: Rudimentary Layout of a Virtex Gate-Array

Input-Output (IO), Configurable Logic (CL), memory...etc) their functionality can be configured by the user; this is how designs are implemented on a device. The configuration of each tile is dictated by the Bitstream. To improve performance the contents of the gate-array is referred to as dynamic. A dynamic device is unable to retain the contents of its memory when it loses power. To prevent having to plug




Figure 3.4: FPGA Device Layout

in a device and download the configuration every time it is powered on, an external static memory device (i.e. retains its contents with loss of power) holds the Bitstream. When an FPGA is powered on the Bitstream is loaded from the external memory (often Static RAM (SRAM)) into the gate-array, as can be seen in Figure 3.4.

3.3 Bitstream Extraction

In order to detect any trojans in the Target device the configuration Bitstream will need to be recovered. As mentioned in section 3.2 the Bitstream is stored in a memory unit external to the gate-array. All *Xilinx* devices provide a feature known as Readback. There are two styles of Readback; Readback verify and Readback Capture. The Readback capture method provides a large quantity of debug information which is not needed; Readback verify will be used. Readback verify is the process where the device is put into a 'frozen' state during run-time and all of the configuration bits are returned from the gate-array to the SRAM. The results can then be uploaded to a Personal Computer (PC) for analysis. This process overwrites the original frame data in the SRAM with the values which actually configured the device. By using this method rather than simply reading the SRAM it ensures that what is tested in section 3.4 is actually what configured the device. This minimizes risk of tampered external memory units or configuration mechanics.

3.4 The FPGA Bitstream Analysis

The *Xilinx* Bitstream is a binary file composed of a series of 32-bit words organized into 'frames'. A frame is a string of single bits that span from the top to the bottom of a clock region of a device as seen in the top-right quadrant of Figure 3.3. A frame affects every block in a column and multiple horizontally adjacent frames are required to configure an entire column. Each frame is uniquely identified by a 32-bit address and is the smallest addressable element. The composition of the frame address is fairly consistent across the *Xilinx* catalog however there are small differences between device families. The following is the structure of the Virtex-5 family frame address scheme according to [17]. The make-up of a frame address is shown in Table 3.1. The Block

Table 3.1: Frame Address

Unused								BA			T	Row Address					Major Address								Minor Address							
31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	
0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Address (BA) identifies the block type.

- BA 0: Logic type.
- BA 1: Block RAM (BRAM).
- BA 2: BRAM Interconnect.
- BA 3: BRAM non-configuration frame.

The logic block contains the columns which provides the primary configuration for the device (CLBs, IOBs... etc). The BRAM columns initialize the memory for the device while the BRAM Interconnect columns configure how the logic of the design interacts with the BRAM.

In the case of the Virtex-5 family each clock region is composed of twenty blocks in a column separated by a horizontal clock bus as shown in Figure 3.5. Each row of blocks is given a row value in it's address that increments away from the clock bus starting at 0. The frame address includes a Top indicator bit in position 20 that indicates whether the specified row is above or below the horizontal clock bus. The major address specifies the block within the row. These addresses are numbered from left to right and begin at 0. The minor address indicates the frame number within a column. Table 3.2 provides the number of frames per column type. As described




Figure 3.5: Row Order of Virtex-5 Clock Region

Table 3.2: Number of Frames (minor addresses) per Column [17]

Block	Number Of Frames
CLB	36
DSP	28
BRAM	30
IOB	54
Clock	4

in section 3.2 a block may contain multiple tiles. In a CLB column a block consists of an interconnect tile, also known as a Switching Matrix (SM) and a CLB. Frames are numbered from left to right, starting with 0. For each block, except in a clock column, frames numbered 0 to 25 access the Interconnect for that column. For all blocks, except the CLB and the clock column, frames numbered 26 and 27 access the Interface for that column. All other frames are specific to that block. [17] To further understand how frames configure tiles a mapping must be made between each frame and the corresponding tile. This is described in section 3.5.

3.5 Component Mapping

The process of component mapping aims to attribute each word in a configuration frame to the component of the device it configures.

3.5.1 Frame to Column Mapping

As described in section 3.2 a gate-array is composed of blocks organized into rows and columns. A block is composed of either one or multiple devices referred to as tiles.

3.5.2 Word to Block Mapping

In the case of Virtex-5 devices a frame is composed of 41 words that can be thought of as a vertical stack that aligns with a column. As described in section 3.4 a row consists of a stack of basic blocks; there are 20 CLB blocks per column, 40 IOBs, 4 BRAM...etc. As can be seen in Figure 3.6 the central word in a frame configures the horizontally running clock bus. The remaining words are used to configure the blocks in the column. The purpose of the central word in the column is known to be mapped to the clock bus. For the purposes of the following computations it is considered removed from the frame. From this, equation 3.1 can be deduced which is used to compute the number of 32-bit words that span each block.

$$n = (W - C) + B \tag{3.1}$$

where:




Figure 3.6: Configuration Words in the Bitstream [17]

n = Number of Words per Block
 W = Number of 32-bit words per frame
 C = Number of clock words per frame
 B = Number of blocks per column

As shown in Figure 3.6 words are addressed from the 'top' of a device down. Equation 3.2 can be used to map a particular word in a frame to a block on the device.

$$i = B - \left\lfloor \frac{w}{n} \right\rfloor \quad (3.2)$$

where:

i = Word Number in frame
 B = Number of blocks per column
 w = Word number
 n = Number of Words per Block

With equations 3.1 and 3.2 it is now possible attribute any modifications in the Bitstream to its corresponding block.

3.6 Determining Trojan Attributes

The complexity of Integrated Circuit designs and their corresponding trojans requires a more human-friendly scope. The taxonomy described in chapter 2 provides a series of thirty-three attributes which a trojan may or may not possess. These attributes allow us to readily describe, interpret and discuss trojans in a more comfortable and useful way. To employ this taxonomy a trojan must be analyzed; characteristics observed can either infer or provide direct evidence of possession of attributes. Though it is desirable to be able to observe and directly extract the attributes a trojan possesses it is not always possible. In [10] a matrix, \mathbf{R} , is provided which describes the relationships between each of the thirty-three attributes in the taxonomy. When it is not possible to directly determine the presence of certain attributes, this relation matrix is used to infer their existence. The analysis stage of the automated trojan detection technique provided by this work begins extracting the attributes that are directly observable then using them to infer the existence of the remaining attributes.

3.6.1 Extraction Methods

Observed Location Attributes

The presence of attributes in the *Location* category are directly observable from the results of the tile mapping method described in section 3.5. *Xilinx* tiles conform to purpose-specific groups or block types which were discussed in section 3.4. These block types contain sub-types that perform actions which pertain to the *Location*, category.

1. The **Processor** attribute pertains to the core functionality of the design logic. It can be awarded for presence of a modified CLB tile or Interconnect tile.
2. The **Memory** attribute can be awarded for the presence of modified BRAM components.
3. The **IO** attribute can be awarded for presence of modified IOB tiles.

4. The **Power Supply** attribute can be awarded for the presence of modified interface or configuration tiles.
5. The **Clock Grid** attribute can be awarded for modified clock tiles.

Scatter Score Method

The gate-array configuration of components in *Xilinx* FPGAs allows for an analytical method of determining attributes in the *Physical Layout* category. The "Scatter Score" method uses the grid coordinates of components to derive a numerical score rating for the size, position, and augmentation of configured tiles. Tiles are assigned global coordinates that represent their horizontal and vertical positions within the gate array denoted x and y respectively. These values can then be used to strongly infer the presence of *Physical Location* attributes.

The golden chip is first analyzed. The set of all tiles which are configured in the golden design is found and a series of numerical descriptors are computed.

$$n = \sum_{x=0}^X \sum_{y=0}^Y T_{xy} \quad (3.3)$$

where:

- n = Number of all configured tiles
- X = The column width of the gate-array
- Y = The row height of the gate-array
- T = A configured tile

$$a_x = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{x=0}^n T_x \quad (3.4)$$

$$a_y = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{y=0}^n T_y \quad (3.5)$$

$$\sigma_x = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{x=0}^X (x_i - a_x)^2} \quad (3.6)$$

$$\sigma_y = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{y=0}^Y (y_i - a_y)^2} \quad (3.7)$$

where:

- a_x = The average x coordinate of configured tiles
- a_y = The average y coordinate of configured tiles
- T_x = The x coordinate of a configured tile
- T_y = The y coordinate of a configured tile
- σ_x = The standard deviation of the x coordinate of configured tiles
- σ_y = The standard deviation of the y coordinate of configured tiles

Equations 3.4 and 3.5 are used to create a rating known as the Position Median in Equation 3.8. The Position Median value provides a simple descriptor for where in the gate array the design is centralized. The Scatter Score in Equation 3.9 describes how spread out or, *clustered* the design is.

$$\text{where: } M_{xy} = (a_x, a_y) \quad (3.8) \quad S_{xy} = (\sigma_x, \sigma_y) \quad (3.9)$$

M_{xy} = The Position Median

S_{xy} = The Scatter Score

The results of the tile mapping method described in section 3.6 are used to generate the set of all tiles reconfigured by the trojan. The set of reconfigured tiles can be said to contain three subsets: the subset of tiles activated by the trojan, those deactivated and those modified. The results of the golden design analysis, the subsets, and the numeric descriptors can be used to discern which of the *Physical Location* attributes the trojan possesses. The *Physical Location* category contains six attributes. These six can be considered three pairs; a trojan exhibits one attribute from each pair.

1. **Large or Small** (attributes 23 or 24): According to [10], small trojans are defined as those that are nearly impossible to detect via power consumption. From this it can be said that 'small' trojans occupy minimal resources. Trojans where the number of reconfigured tiles is less than 5% of the number of tiles in the golden design are considered small. Other wise they are attributed as large.
2. **Changed Layout or Augmented** (attributes 25 or 26): A 'changed layout' trojan is such that only tiles that are configured by the golden design are reconfigured. An augmented trojan is where additional layout is added. The presence of 'activated' or 'deactivated' tiles indicates an augmented trojan.
3. **Clustered or Distributed** (attributes 27 or 28): The trojan is considered to be clustered when the standard deviation of the reconfigured tile positions is less than 15%; distributed otherwise.

Insertion and Abstraction Attributes

The linear nature of the manufacturing life-cycle implies a propagation of effects. Design decisions, flaws and improvements affect later stages. As discussed in section 3.1, for the purposes of this automated FPGA trojan detection method it is assumed that the only non-trustworthy stage in the life-cycle is fabrication. In other words, the

trojan was inserted in the third-party fabrication stage. Due to the propagating nature of the life-cycle the effects of the modifications made in the fabrication stage (attribute 3) are felt in the testing (attribute 4) and assembly (attribute 5) stages. Hence, due to the assumptions made in this method it can be said that this trojan possesses insertion category attributes 3, 4 and 5.

The abstraction category pertains to the level at which a trojan resides [1, 2]. Due to the nature of FPGA design a few additional assumptions can be made when selecting abstraction category attributes. Hardware Description Language (HDL) is used to generate a "programming", or "configuration" file which is downloaded into the FPGA. The configurable functionality is dictated by this file. The hardware of an FPGA chip can be modified to hide trojans at a lower abstraction level. The detection of such trojans requires advanced reverse engineering techniques and is beyond the scope of this method. Hence, it can be said that trojans discovered by this method are not able to obtain abstraction category attributes that pertain to the physical hardware of a chip. This removes the possibility of *Logic* (attribute 9), *Transistor* (attribute 10), and *Physical* (attribute 11). The possession of the remaining abstraction category attributes are determined by analysis of the relation matrix discussed in section 3.6.2.

3.6.2 Relation Matrix Use

The relation matrix \mathbf{R} provided in chapter 2 can be summarized by a series of submatrices.

$$\mathbf{R} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{R}_1 & \mathbf{R}_{12} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \mathbf{R}_2 & \mathbf{R}_{23} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \mathbf{R}_3 & \mathbf{R}_{34} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \mathbf{R}_4 \end{bmatrix}$$

Each submatrix is a matrix of binary values which describe the relationship between two attributes. Refer to section 2.1 for a detailed description. Submatrix \mathbf{R}_{34} relates the *Location* category attributes to *Properties* attributes. Since the *Location* attributes are directly observable they can be used to generate a list of *Property* attributes which the trojan may possess. This list is compared to results generated by any additional property attribute extraction methods, such as the *Scatter Score* method described in section 3.6.1.

Once a list of *Property* attributes has been solidified submatrix \mathbf{R}_{23} is used to

infer the *Abstraction* category attributes. As mentioned in section 3.6.1 *Abstraction* category attributes nine, ten and eleven are assumed inaccessible. Attributes six, seven and eight can be inferred based on the presence *Property* attributes.

Chapter 4

Software Implementation

4.1 Introduction

The Automated Hardware Trojan System was build to be a stand-alone application. In order to allow it to be a powerful yet simple application the technologies used were selected with the idea of portability in mind.

4.2 Technologies Used

4.2.1 *Xilinx*

Xilinx is one of the two largest manufacturers of FPGAs. Their devices are considerably more popular than their competitors. The configuration of devices employs a well known series of steps referred to as the *Xilinx* 'tool-chain' [16]. The 'tool-chain' not only compiles user designs and constraints into the configuration Bitstream but performs a series of complex operations to optimize designs and effectively implement them on any *Xilinx* model of the user's choosing.

1. **sch2hdl**: used to convert schematic designs to Hardware Description Language (HDL). This stage is optional as many choose to develop directly in HDL
2. **XST**: *Xilinx* Synthesis Tools, a package of which parse, optimize and compile the HDL code.
3. **MAP**: A *Xilinx* tool used to calculate the optimal routing for the finalized design.

4. **PAR:** used to place and route the design in the specific *Xilinx* device.
5. **ngdbuild:** A tool used to build a NETLIST.
6. **trce:** used to perform timing and performance analysis.
7. **Bitgen:** The final stage used to generate the configuration Bitstream which will configure the device.

Each step produces a series of files that are used for a variety of purposes. Often the resultant files are used by the subsequent step but some are intended for user information. The ngdbuild tool generates what is known as the netlist for the design. The netlist is a description of the connectivity of the circuit implemented on the device. The generated netlist is in a non human-readable format in an 'ndc' file. Fortunately, *Xilinx* provides an additional tool called which allows the conversion to the human-readable *Xilinx* Design Language (XDL).

***Xilinx* Design Language (XDL)**

The *Xilinx* Design Language (XDL) is a human-readable ASCII format; though it is not actively part of the 'tool-chain' it is considered a native netlist format for describing and representing FPGA designs [3]. A part is a human-defined component which is to be implemented. Netlists either contain or refer to descriptions of the parts used and where in the device they are implemented. When a part is used it is called an 'instance'; thus each 'instance' has a definition, sometimes referred to as a master.

An XDL file contains two sections, the instance placement and configuration section, and the net routing section. The placement and configuration section provides a list of every instance in a design. Their descriptions include all of the configuration details required for their implementation on a component (power settings, logic, timing configurations... etc). In the *Xilinx* jargon, a net refers to any electrical path between two components; more specifically, a net describes a communication channel. The gate-array of a *Xilinx* device is composed of a grid of wires. These wires can be fused together by Programmable-Interconnect-Points (PIP) to make a useful connection between two components, thus creating a net. The output-pin of a net receives the signal from the transmitting component while the input-pin delivers the signal to the receiver. The PIPs in-between dictate the path the signal takes between

the two components. The net routing section of the XDL file describes every path in the design. Combined, these two sections completely describe a design and how it is implemented.

XDLRC

The XDL file describes the design implemented on a device. From this a lot of information regarding the composition of a *Xilinx* device can be learned but it does not provide the entire description; only what has been used by the design. The command line tool provides an option to generate a resource report file referred to as an XDLRC file. A XDLRC file describes the entire architecture of a *Xilinx* FPGA.

Listing 4.1: A hierarchical XDLRC resource description of a Spartan 6 FPGA consisting of a header, a tile section, and a trailing device summary [3]

```
#Header section
(xdl_resource_report v0.2 xc6slx16csg324-3 spartan6
# Device Level Dimensions
(tiles 73 62
...
#Configurable logic block with two slices
(tile 4 6 CLEXL_X1Y61 CLEXL 2
  (primitive_site SLICE_X0Y61 SLICEL internal 45
    (pinwire A1 input L_A1)
    ...
    (primitive_site SLICE_X1Y61 SLICEX internal 43
    ...
    (pinwire D output XX_D)
  ...))
# Interconnect tile
(tile 4 5 INT_X1Y61 INT 1
...
  (wire EE2B0 2
    (conn CLEXM_X2Y61 CLEXM_EE2M0)
    (conn INT_BRAM_X3Y61 EE2E0)
    ...
  # Programmable Interconnect Points
  (pip INT_X1Y61 EE2E0 -> EE2B0)
  (pip INT_X1Y61 EE4E0 -> EE2B0)
  (pip INT_X1Y61 EL1E_S0 -> LOGICIN_B9)
```



```

... )
# summary
(summary tiles=4526 sites=5378 sitedefs=46 numpins=157962 numpips=5782505))

```

Listing 4.1 provides an example of the XDLRC format. The report begins with a header describing the device. It then reports that the overall architecture contains a matrix of tiles 73-wide and 62-tall. Further down we can see a configurable logic block at coordinate (4,6) and an interconnect tile at coordinate (4,5) are shown. Each of these tile descriptions provide details of the subcomponents they contain, pinwires, PIPs, slices...etc. The tool is capable of generating a variety of different XDLRC files for a device, ranging in the level of detail. The smaller files can range around 10MB while the fully detailed descriptions can reach 7GB.

4.2.2 Java

Java is a powerful and general-purpose programming language. It is specifically designed to be as independent as possible. The original developer, James Gosling, intended the language to allow developers a comfortable implementation experience with seamless deployment. The custodians of the Java language, Sun Microsystems, promotes the slogan 'write-once, run anywhere'. Automated Hardware Trojan System was written in Java primarily in order to interface with the API known as *RapidSmith* which is described in section 4.2.3. However, the additional benefits of allowing Automated Hardware Trojan System to be compact, cross-platform application can not be understated. The Java language provides a native Graphical User-Interface (GUI) toolkit known as *Swing*. *Swing* is an API that is part of Oracle's Java Foundation Classes; in other words it is readily available to all users of Java. It provides a simple to use programming structure for creating sophisticated UI. Automated Hardware Trojan System employs Java and Java *Swing* to make it as user-friendly as possible.


4.2.3 *RapidSmith*

RapidSmith is a set of tools and Application Programming Interfaces (API) written in Java that enable Computer Aided Design (CAD) tool creation for *Xilinx* FPGAs [8]. Its purpose is to be used as a rapid prototyping platform for experimentation and research. The code is freely to use readily accessible. It was chosen as a supporting

library for Automated Hardware Trojan System for several reasons. First, the code base provides a series of class structures that astutely mirrors structure of *Xilinx* devices and infrastructure. Secondly, it provides ready-made tools for extracting frames Bitstream files. Bitstream files are huge binary files, without the tools provided by *RapidSmith* the analysis of these files becomes an arduous task. Finally, and most importantly, the creators of *RapidSmith* have developed a means of condensing XDLRC files into a greatly compressed format referred to as a 'database' file. Automated Hardware Trojan System requires considerable detail of an FPGA's architecture in order to accurately described the effects a trojan has on a design. As mentioned in section 4.2.1, the fully detailed XDLRC files can reach 7GB in size. Working with text-based files of this size determents performance to an unusable level. The makers of *RapidSmith* have developed a compression scheme which converts the XDLRC files into a non human-readable format. The compression scheme reduces the size of the XDLRC files from 7GB to 1.3MB. The API provides interface classes that support querying the compressed files. With these features *RapidSmith* enables the ability to analyze the effect any discovered trojan has on a device.

Class Structure

Building off of the information provided by the XDLRC architecture files, *RapidSmith* provides a class structure that enables developers an easy to use interface for working with FPGAs. As described in section 3.2, the gate-array of an FPGA is composed of blocks made up of tiles. These tiles are further composed of sub-components collectively referred to as 'primitives'. Figure 4.1 shows the top-down construction of the *RapidSmith* class structure. The Automated Hardware Trojan System employs both the 'Device' and 'Design' classes shown in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b respectively. The Bitstream for the Golden and Target devices are read into memory. The Bitstream parser class determines the model of the devices and the 'Device' class is then loaded. When loaded the 'Device' class imports the compressed XDLRC file describing the chosen model. The complete description of the architecture is read and loaded; every tile, primitive, wire, and how they all interconnect is stored in memory. The Golden XDL file is then loaded. The XDL files is read and the 'Design' class is similarly loaded with the user-defined design. Not shown in Figure 4.1 are a series of utility classes. The Bitstream parser class reads and interprets the Bitstream files. It uses a 'Frame' class to organize the Bitstream file into an array of objects that

Figure 4.1: The *RapidSmith* Class Hierarchy [7]

adhere to the configuration pattern described in section 3.2. The frame objects are populated with the frame's 32-bit address, an array of 32-bit words which make up the frame and a series of helper methods.

4.3 Design

4.3.1 User-Interface (UI)

Java and Java *Swing* provide an easy to use User-Interface development system which produces light-weight, portable and cross platform applications. The Automated Hardware Trojan System uses a provides a very simplistic and easy to use interface which can be seen in Figure 4.2. To perform and analysis the user must use the UI to navigate to and select the Golden Bitstream, the Target Bitstream and the Golden XDL file via the three browse buttons on the left. Once loaded the detection process can be launched via the 'Analyze' button. On the right the user is able to review information specific to the trojan, described in section 4.3.2.

4.3.2 Operation

4.3.3 Use-Manual




Figure 4.2: The User-Interface of the Automated Hardware Trojan System




Figure 4.3: Overview of Functional Operation

Chapter 5

Evaluation, Analysis and Comparisons

For a Master's research this chapter represents the critical part where **you** are truly evaluated to determine whether you should be given your degree. Even more so for a PhD. Consider carefully what the University calendar states regarding the expectations for a master's thesis, paraphrased here.

1. *A Masters thesis is an original lengthy essay.* The main implication here is that the essay is original, that is, it is completely newly written by you and does not contain any writings from others unless precisely quoted. Any paraphrased items must be cited.
2. *It must demonstrate that:*
 - students understand research methods;
 - students are capable to employ research methods;
 - students demonstrate command of the subject.
3. *The work may be based on:*
 - original data;
 - original exercise from scholarly literature;
 - data by others.
4. *The work must show that:*

- appropriate research methods have been used;
- appropriate methods of critical analysis supplied.

5. *The work must contain:*

- evidence of some new contribution;
- evidence of a new perspective on existing knowledge.

Only the last point uses the attribute *new* and it refers almost entirely to giving a new perspective and analysis, even if based on data from others. This truly implies that this current chapter on evaluation and analysis of results is the most important and must be written with care. You are demonstrating here that, even if given data and methods from others, your skills of critical judgment and analysis are now at the level that you can give professional evaluations.

Things are slightly different for a PhD. According to the Graduate Calendar: *a doctoral dissertation must embody original work and constitute a significant contribution to knowledge in the candidate's field of study. It should contain evidence of broad knowledge of the relevant literature, and should demonstrate a critical understanding of the works of scholars closely related to the subject of the dissertation. Material embodied in the dissertation should, in the opinion of scholars in the field, merit publication.*

The general form and style of dissertations may differ from department to department, but all dissertations shall be presented in a form which constitutes an integrated submission. The dissertation may include materials already published by the candidate, whether alone or in conjunction with others. Previously published materials must be integrated into the dissertation while at the same time distinguishing the student's own work from the work of other researchers. At the final oral examination, the doctoral candidate is responsible for the entire content of the dissertation. This includes those portions of co-authored papers which comprise part of the dissertation.

The second paragraph makes it clear that one must emphasize what is new and different from others, without arrogance, yet without being too subtle either. The first paragraph implies that for a PhD it is required that one approached an important open problem and gave a new solution altogether, making chapters 3, 4, 5 all part of the body of research being evaluated. In fact at times even the problem may be entirely new, thus including chapter 2 in the examination. This is in contrast to a Master's degree where the minimum requirement is for chapter 5 to be original.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

My first rule for this chapter is to avoid finishing it with a section talking about future work. It may seem logical, yet it also appears to give a list of all items which remain undone! It is not the best way psychologically.

This chapter should contain a mirror of the introduction, where a summary of the *extraordinary* new results and their wonderful attributes should be stated first, followed by an executive summary of how this new solution was arrived at. Consider the practical fact that this chapter will be read quickly at the beginning of a review (thus it needs to provide a strong impact) and then again in depth at the very end, perhaps a few days after the details of the previous 3 chapters have been somehow forgotten. Reinforcement of the positive is the key strategy here, without of course blowing hot air.

One other consideration is that some people like to join the chapter containing the analysis with the only with conclusions. This can indeed work very well in certain topics.

Finally, the conclusions do not appear only in this chapter. This sample mini thesis lacks a feature which I regard as absolutely necessary, namely a short paragraph at the end of each chapter giving a brief summary of what was presented together with a one sentence preview as to what might expect the connection to be with the next chapter(s). You are writing a story, the *story of your wonderful research work*. A story needs a line connecting all its parts and you are responsible for these linkages.

Appendix A

Additional Information

This is a good place to put tables, lots of results, perhaps all the data compiled in the experiments. By avoiding putting all the results inside the chapters themselves, the whole thing may become much more readable and the various tables can be linked to appropriately.

The main purpose of an Appendix however should be to take care of the future readers and researchers. This implies listing all the housekeeping facts needed to continue the research. For example: where is the raw data stored? where is the software used? which version of which operating system or library or experimental equipment was used and where can it be accessed again?

Ask yourself: if you were given this thesis to read with the goal that you will be expanding the research presented here, what would you like to have as housekeeping information and what do you need? Be kind to the future graduate students and to your supervisor who will be the one stuck in the middle trying to find where all the stuff was left!

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