# Assignment 1 - Wireshark

COMP 307 - Principles of Web Development Prof. Joseph Vybihal Fall 2018 LE, Nhat Hung McGill ID: 260793376

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1. Identify the exact locations you were when during your two Wi-Fi packet recording sessions.

Public network: Sherbrooke Tim Hortons. Home network: At home in my bed.

- 2. Experiment 1 (at home)
- **a.** Select a packet and include screenshots.

No.		Delta	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
	351	0.015245279	41.763300877	104.208.165.109	192.168.0.103	TCP	74	443 - 44600 [SYN, ACK]
	352	0.000046844	41.763347721	192.168.0.103	104.208.165.109	TCP	66	44600 → 443 [ACK] Seq=
	353	0.000478701	41.763826422	192.168.0.103	104.208.165.109	TLSv1.2	583	Client Hello
	354	0.043456035	41.807282457	104.208.165.109	192.168.0.103	TCP	1514	443 - 44600 [ACK] Seq=
	355	0.000041650	41.807324107	192.168.0.103	104.208.165.109	TCP	66	44600 - 443 [ACK] Seq=

Figure 1: Selected packet highlighted in blue.

```
Frame 353: 583 bytes on wire (4664 bits), 583 bytes captured (4664 bits) on interface 0

Ethernet II, Src: HonHaiPr_f4:cf:8b (48:e2:44:f4:cf:8b), Dst: ZyxelCom_d2:5d:ce (b8:ec:a3:d2:5d:ce)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.0.103, Dst: 104.208.165.109

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44600, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 517

Secure Sockets Layer
```

Figure 2: Packet info.




Figure 3: Packet's raw data.

**b.** Identify all the fields contained within the packet. Compare with lecture slides.

Will now compare with the following figures, taken from lecture slides:




Figure 4: Packet data structure




Figure 5: Nested structures of packets

Now identifying fields through the Wireshark packet info pane:

	Fields pre	esent in figure 4
IP Header	Version, header length & DiffServ	0100 = Version: 4 0101 = Header Length: 20 bytes (5) Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)
	Total length	Total Length: 569
	Identification	Identification: 0xec73 (60531)

	_	
	Flags & fragment offset	Flags: 0x4000, Don't fragment 0 = Reserved bit: Not set .1 = Don't fragment: Set .0 = More fragments: Not set0 0000 0000 0000 = Fragment offset: 0
	Time to live, protocol & header checksum	Time to live: 64 Protocol: TCP (6) Header checksum: 0x7cfe [validation disabled]
	Source & destination IP addresses	Source: 192.168.0.103 Destination: 104.208.165.109
	Payload	TCP payload (517 bytes)  Secure Sockets Layer  TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 512  Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
	Fields pre	sent in figure 5
802.3 header	Source & destination MAC addresses	Destination: ZyxelCom_d2:5d:ce (b8:ec:a3:d2:5d:ce) Source: HonHaiPr_f4:cf:8b (48:e2:44:f4:cf:8b)
TCP, UDP header	Source & destination ports	Source Port: 44600 Destination Port: 443
	"Other parameters", which from the Wireshark packet info pane include:  • TCP segment length • Sequence number • Acknowledgement number • Header length • Flags • Window size • Checksum • Urgent pointer • Various options	[TCP Segment Len: 517] Sequence number: 1 (relative sequence number) [Next sequence number: 518 (relative sequence number)] Acknowledgment number: 1 (relative ack number) 1000 = Header Length: 32 bytes (8) Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK) Window size value: 229 [Calculated window size: 29312] [Window size scaling factor: 128] Checksum: 0x2aa1 [unverified] [Checksum Status: Unverified] Urgent pointer: 0 Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps

The packet also contains other fields not represented in the two figures from the lecture slides.

These fields are more specific to the protocol, which in this case is TLSv1.2 (Transport Layer Security, a newer and more secure version of SSL). The basic unit of data in SSL (or TLS) is a **record.** The record in this case is the (TCP) payload represented in the table above.

# An SSL record consists of

- A 5 bytes **record header**, containing metadata, similar to TCP headers or IP headers. This packet's SSL record header contains the following fields
  - Content type
  - Protocol version
  - Message length

```
TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
Content Type: Handshake (22)
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
Length: 512
```

Figure 6: The packet's record header

• The actual data/message. From the content type specified above, we know the data here is a handshake.

```
Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
Length: 508
Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
Random: aa712e4204593532d4b9899de33924141fedbd26ad2ff88f...
Session ID Length: 32
Session ID: 721100003fd5e123356176384c18b3316e26a1e415fd0585...
Cipher Suites Length: 34
Cipher Suites (17 suites)
Compression Methods Length: 1
Compression Methods (1 method)
Extensions Length: 401
Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)
Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)
Extension: SessionTicket TLS (len=0)
Extension: signature_algorithms (len=20)
Extension: signed_certificate_timestamp (len=0)
Extension: signed_certificate_timestamp (len=0)
Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=14)
Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)
Extension: key_share (len=43)
Extension: supported_versions (len=11)
Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=10)
Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=10)
Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=1)
Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=1)
Extension: padding (len=203)
```

Figure 7: The handshake

c. What information does this packet contain?

#### Where it came from:

The packet's source MAC address, 48:e2:44:f4:cf:8b, matches my pc's MAC address. The packet then came from my own computer.



Figure 8: MAC address obtained from running if config in command line

# Where it's going:

The packet was heading to Microsoft. We can see this through three points.

Exhibit A: Pasting the destination IP address, 104.208.165.109, into Google shows a first page full of IP tracing sites pointing to Microsoft.

Exhibit B: Looking inside the packet data, we find the name the of the destination server: static.asm.skype.com. Skype is a Microsoft product.

```
Server Name Indication extension
Server Name list length: 23
Server Name Type: host_name (0)
Server Name length: 20
Server Name: static.asm.skype.com
```

Figure 8: Inside the packet's payload

Exhibit C: Wireshark's packet list indicates relationships between captured packets. It shows our selected packet is part of a conversation. The subsequent packets in the conversation show clear traces of Microsoft. Case in point the packet which directly follows our packet is an acknowledgement packet. In it is undeniable proof:

```
353 0.000478701 41.763826422
354 0.043456035 41.807282457
```

Figure 9: Our packet, no. 353, is acknowledged by the highlighted packet, as shown by the check mark

```
·U····Wa shington

1·0···U····Redmo

nd1·0···U····Mic

rosoft C orporati

on1·0···U····Mic

rosoft I T1·0···U

····Micr osoft IT

TLS CA 50···170

829143747 ZO·1·0··

·U····st atic.asm

.skype.c om0··"0·
```

Figure 10: Packet no. 354's raw data

```
0301030 UUS10U
Washington10URedmond10U
Microsoft Corporation10U0000Microsoft IT10UMicrosoft IT TLS CA 50
170829143747Z
190829143747Z010Ustatic.asm.skype.com0"0
```

Figure 11: Enhanced (actually just copy pasted into a text editor)

In conclusion the packet's destination is Microsoft, more specifically for a Skype service.

# What security it's using:

The packet uses SSL encryption.

# What message it contains:

The packet's record header indicates it's a Client Hello message sent to the server as the start of a handshake protocol. It sends the following information (as shown in figure 7):

- Its protocol version is TLS 1.2
- The session ID the client wishes to use for this connection
- A cipher suite containing the combinations of cryptographic algorithms supported by the client
- Compression methods a list of compression algorithms supported by the client

In summary, the Client Hello message shares the above information and awaits a responding Server Hello, in order to agree on a protocol version, select cryptographic algorithms, optionally authenticate each other, and use public key encryption techniques in order to generate shared secrets.

This packet is then trying to start a secure connection with Microsoft through a handshake protocol.

- 3. Experiment 2 (at a public hotspot)
- **a.** Select and sort by a sender IP address and try to deduce what they were trying to do.

Now picking sender IP 172.18.20.47.

Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	142	39070 - 443 [ACK]
172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	158	[TCP Dup ACK 5524
172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	142	[TCP Dup ACK 5524
172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	158	TCP Dup ACK 5524

Figure 12: Sorted by source IP - the list goes further

Pasting the destination IP into Google reveals it to be Facebook's. Further down the list is a TLS Client Hello packet, part of the handshake protocol. This packet's payload contains the following line:

Server Name: scontent.fykz2-1.fna.fbcdn.net

Fbcdn.net is a Facebook domain used to serve static content, like media, from a content delivery network (CDN).

Among the following packets, some destination IP's are Google's. Their protocol is TLS, the payload being "application data". A Google service that uses TLS by default is Gmail. We can then guess that the user is also using Gmail.

We can then deduce the user is interacting with Facebook, specifically logging into their account judging by the Client Hello packet, used to exchange security related information and using Gmail at the same time.

**b.** Include a screenshot of the sorted top summary panel for the above sender IP.

No.	Delta	Time	Source	▼ Destination	Protocol	Length Info
55	24 0.00	0364 3.789468	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	142 39070 → 443 [ACK]
553	25 0.00	0074 3.789542	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	158 [TCP Dup ACK 5524#
553	28 0.00	0082 3.789711	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	142 [TCP Dup ACK 5524#
553	29 0.00	0043 3.789754	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	158 TCP Dup ACK 5524#
116	65 0.00	0043 7.552752	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	142 39070 → 443 [ACK]
116	66 0.00	0045 7.552797	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	142 39070 → 443 [ACK]
116	67 0.00	0044 7.552841	172.18.20.47	66.102.1.188	TCP	146 48816 → 443 [ACK]
1169	90 0.00	0081 7.559689	172.18.20.47	31.13.71.34	TCP	154 36038 → 443 [ACK]
1169	91 0.00	0048 7.559737	172.18.20.47	66.102.1.188	TCP	154 [TCP Dup ACK 11667
1169	92 0.00	0043 7.559780	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	154 [TCP Dup ACK 11666
1169	93 0.00	0044 7.559824	172.18.20.47	31.13.71.34	TCP	158 TCP Dup ACK 11690
1170	99 0.00	0068 7.564638	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TLSv1.2	181 Application Data
118	67 0.00	0042 7.611210	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TLSv1.2	200 Application Data
121	51 0.00	0043 7.733797	172.18.20.47	31.13.71.34	TLSv1.2	179 Application Data
124	58 0.00	0049 7.944157	172.18.20.47	31.13.80.5	TCP	146 39070 → 443 [ACK]
1280	93 0.00	0049 8.109066	172.18.20.47	207.219.36.81	TCP	154 46804 → 443 TSYN1
128	40 0.00	0049 8.119323	172.18.20.47	207.219.36.81	TCP	146 46804 → 443 [ACK]
128	58 0.00	0259 8.125258	172.18.20.47	207.219.36.81	TLSv1.2	341 Client Hello

Figure 13: Sorted top summary panel for 172.18.20.47

**c.** Include a screenshot of one detailed packet from the sender IP that most helped you identify what that person was doing.

```
▼ Server Name Indication extension
Server Name list length: 33
Server Name Type: host_name (0)
Server Name length: 30
Server Name: scontent.fykz2-1.fna.fbcdn.net
```

Figure 14: Packet 12858, Client Hello message sent to Facebook's fbcdn.net

```
Destination: 31.13.80.5

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 39070, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ack: 772, Len: 35

Secure Sockets Layer

* TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Application Data Protocol: http-over-tls

Content Type: Application Data (23)

Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

Length: 30

Encrypted Application Data: 4bcc892094f838ecee023f18be3faebdfc07a2718c8d8b24...
```

Figure 15: Packet 11709, sent to a Google IP - payload is TLS application data

# 4. Which location was more secure?

We will define security here as higher levels packet protocols. In the public network recording, more than half of the packets have 802.11 protocol which is very low level. On the other hand, the home network recording all had higher level protocols: TCP, UDP, GQUIC, SSL or TLS.

				—————————————————————————————————————	Expression
Delta	Time		▼ Length Info	UTC	
836	8.009266 34.140968	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_35:36:38 892.11	49 802.11 Block Ack Req, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,790165	
837 838	0.000556 34.140616	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_35:36:38 892.11	49 802.11 Block Ack Req, Flags=RC	2018-09-17 23:16:02,790721	
838	0.001812 34.142428 0.001734 34.144162	Cisco_cd:94:1f Broadcast 892.11 Apple 56:79:05 892.11	298 Beacon frame, SN=672, FN=8, Flags=C, BI=192, SSID=MTLW1F1 39 Acknowledgement, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,792533 2018-09-17 23:16:02,794267	
840	0.007964 34.151226	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_c4:76:9a 892.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,794207	
841	0.000052 34.151278	892.11	39 Null function (No data)[Malformed Packet]	2018-09-17 23:16:02,801383	a a
843	0.000049 34.151377	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_c4:76:0a 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,801482	2
844	0.000048 34.151425	892.11	39 Probe Response[Malformed Packet]	2018-09-17 23:16:02,801530	å
846	0.000612 34.152119	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_c4:76:0a 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=Č	2018-09-17 23:16:02,802224	-
847 849	8.886653 34.152172 8.886675 34.152296	d6:0b:b0:46:f9: 802.11 Cisco cd:34:f1 802.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=	2018-09-17 23:16:02,802277 2018-09-17 23:16:02,802401	
850	0.002481 34.154697	60:f8:cc:c4:76:0a f3:0b:3e:0a:c8: 802.11	39 Acknowledgement, Flags=	2018-09-17 23:16:02.804802	,
351	8.000050 34.154747	Apple c4:76:9a 892.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,804852	
352	0.000051 34.154798	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_c4:76:0a 802.11	57 802.11 Block Ack, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,804903	
353	0.000503 34.155301	Apple_28:92:da 892.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,805406	
354 355	0.000053 34.155354 0.000000 34.155434	Apple_28:92:da 892.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,805459 2018-09-17 23:16:02,805539	
356	8.000000 34.155434 8.000616 34.156058	Apple 28:92:da 892.11 Apple 28:92:da 892.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C 39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,800539	é
857	0.000323 34.156373	Apple_28:92:da 892.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02.806478	
858	8.000224 34.156597	Apple_28:92:da 892.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,806702	
859	0.000072 34.156669	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_28:92:da 892.11	57 802.11 Block Ack, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,806774	4
360	8.000081 34.156758	Apple_28:92:da 892.11	39 Acknowledgement, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,806855	ś
861 862	0.001967 34.158717 0.000951 34.158768	Apple_f0:10:11 (0. 41:d1:b6:f5:c6:. 802.11 Apple_c4:76:0a 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=o.m 39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,808822 2018-09-17 23:16:02.808873	
363	0.000050 34.158818	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_c4:76:0a 802.11	57 802.11 Block Ack, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,808923	
364	0.005205 34.164923	Apple_58:14:26 802.11	39 Acknowledgement, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,814128	8
65	8.002918 34.166941	Cisco_cd:94:1f Apple_56:79:05 892.11	269 Probe Response, SN=3565, FN=0, Flags=RC, BI=102, SSID=MTLWiF1	2018-09-17 23:16:02,817046	6
866	0.000246 34.167187	Cisco_cd:94:1f Apple_56:79:05 802.11	269 Probe Response, SN=3565, FN=9, Flags=RC, BI=102, SSID=MTLWiF1	2018-09-17 23:16:02,817292	2
867 868	8.006471 34.173658	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 892.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,823763	3
871	0.000071 34.173729 0.000486 34.175503	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2. Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11 Cisco_cd:94:1f (2. Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C 45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,823834 2018-09-17 23:16:02,825608	
877	0.000381 34.178928	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,828133	á
879	8.000096 34.182744	Apple ea:a5:45 892.11	39 Acknowledgement, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,832849	g
889	8.000137 34.182881	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 892.11 Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 892.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,832986	
382	0.000090 34.187769	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,837874	4
886 888	8.000449 34.189778	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,839875 2018-09-17 23:16:02,844734	1
889	6.000992 34.194629 6.000101 34.194738	Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11 Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C 57 802.11 Block Ack, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,644/34	
390	0.000078 34.194898	Cisco cd:94:1f (2 Apple d0:3c:59 892.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,844913	á
892	8.000094 34.199883	Cisco cd:94:1f (2 Apple d0:3c:59 892.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,849988	8
394	0.000098 34.204682	Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,854787	7
395	0.000121 34.204893	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	57 802.11 Block Ack, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,854908	3
396 398	8.001099 34.205992 8.000078 34.206529	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2. Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11 Cisco_cd:94:1f (2. Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C 45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,856007 2018-09-17 23:16:02,856634	
986	0.000570 34.200529	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_cd:3c:59 892.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,650634	
982	8.000082 34.209721	Apple_58:14:26 892.11	39 Acknowledgement, Flags=C	2918-69-17 23:16:02,859826	
963	0.000049 34.209770	Apple_58:14:26 892.11	39 Acknowledgement, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,859875	5
984	0.000083 34.209853	Apple_58:14:26 892.11	39 Acknowledgement, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,859958	
985	0.000556 34.210409	Apple_58:14:26 892.11	39 Acknowledgement, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,860514	
986 989	0.000105 34.210514 0.000094 34.212103	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11 Apple_d0:3c:59 802.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C 39 Clear-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,860619 2018-09-17 23:16:02,862208	,
910	0.000054 34.212103	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 892.11	57 802.11 Block Ack, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,862258	Ř
911	0.000100 34.212253	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 892.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,862358	8
917	0.000472 34.214994	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 892.11	45 Request-to-send, FlagsuC	2018-09-17 23:16:02,865099	9
18	8.009973 34.215967	Cisco_cd:94:1f (2 Apple_d0:3c:59 892.11	45 Request-to-send, Flags=C	2018-09-17 23:16:02,865172	
168 169	0.000487 0.056212	Vmware_9b:2e:f6 Tp-LinkT_6b:16: ARP	140 Who has 172.19.65.597 Tell 172.18.9.19	2018-09-17 23:15:28,706317	
109	8.000069 0.056281 8.000347 0.056628	Vmware_9b:2e:f6 Tp-LinkT_6b:16: ARP Vmware_9b:2e:f6 Tp-LinkT_6b:16: ARP	140 Who has 172.19.65.597 Tell 172.18.0.19 140 Who has 172.19.65.597 Tell 172.18.0.19	2018-09-17 23:15:28,706386 2018-09-17 23:15:28,706733	2
100	8,000060 0,003062	Vmware_83:3a:15 Tp-L1nkT_6b:16: ARP	140 172.18.0.18 is at 00:50:56:a3:3a:15	2018-09-17 23:15:28,700/33 2018-09-17 23:15:28,744067	1
203	0.000069 0.094373	Vmware a3:3a:15 Tp-LinkT 6b:16: ARP	140 172,18.0.18 is at 00:50:56:a3:3a:15	2018-09-17 23:15:28,744478	8
251	8.000043 0.106054	Vmware a3:3a:15 Tp-LinkT 6b:16: ARP	140 172.18.0.18 is at 00:50:56:a3:3a:15	2018-09-17 23:15:28,756159	9
300	0 000004 0 440007	Umara Oh.On.60 TaliahT Ch.40. ADD	440 470 40 0 40 4× × 00.50.50.0k.0x.60	2040.00.47.22.46.20.762722	
00.00.40	00 6f 08 00 00 86 fb 1c	06 00 00 00 00			

Figure 16: Public network recording - all white packets are in 802.11. The white packets go back to the beginning of the list.

We can then conclude that the home network was secure.