## **Webinar Norms**





**CSP Update** v2021/2022

- We welcome your kind participation. Thank YOU.
- We will start session at XX:XX SGT.
- Make sure you turn off your video.
- By default everyone will be muted.
- Note down your question. You can post it on Q&A Chat session.
- In interest of time, if your question can't be addressed, we will get back to you via email.
- For any CSP queries post session, raise a support case.
- This meeting recording & slide will be made available in SWIFT KB TIP5024202



# **Customer Security Programme CSP Update 2021- Refresher**

## Agenda

- > Threat landscape evolution
- > CSP Compliance evolution
- > MISP
- Customer Security Control Framework v2021
- > Independent Assessment Framework (IAF)
- Demo IAF and KYC-SA Attestation Portal
- > Highlights of the Customer Security Control Framework v2022
- FAQ and Q&A
- How SWIFT can help

## **Threat Landscape Evolution**

## **CSP** | Measurable indicators showing CSP 'effectiveness'



## Overall Funds Attempted

dropped by factor of 3

2016 compared to 2020

## Vast Majority of Funds are Recovered



All years

## Trend is due to a Combination of Factors

- 1. Raised customer awareness
- 2. Implementation of the Controls
- 3. Hardened interfaces
- 4. Early detection of in-flight fraudulent messages
- 5. Strong collaboration across the chain



## **CSP – Compliance evolution**

### **CSP** | Programme Reminder – Where do the CSCF, IAF and MISP stand?



Launched in 2016, CSP is designed to help SWIFT users implement practices that are essential to help protect against, detect and share information about financial services cybercrime.

## Your Community

### **Share and Prepare**

- Intelligence Sharing
- SWIFT ISAC/MISP Portal



#### You

#### **Secure and Protect**

- SWIFT Tools (R7.5; Security Guidance)
- Customer Security Controls Framework

## Your Counterparts


#### **Prevent and Detect**

- RMA, DVR and 'In Flight' Sender Payment Controls Service
- KYC-SA application (request/review)
- Independent Assessment Framework



### **CSP** | CSCF Controls Evolution





## **MISP Migration**

### CSP | SWIFT ISAC/MISP Automated feed



MISP = Originally 'malware information sharing platform' <a href="https://misp.swift.com/">https://misp.swift.com/</a>



- Free and open source
- Standard data format
- Threat intelligence platform capabilities
- REST API to export data in multiple formats
- Backed by European Commission
- Maintained by CIRCL (Luxemburg government CERT)
- Improves the way the IOCs are shared with the community
- Customers to pull the IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) from their own version of MISP
- SWIFT ISAC and MISP are complementary.



## **Customer Security Control Framework v2021**

### **CSP | CSCF Controls Evolution**

Customer Security Programme

Evolution gives the SWIFT community sufficient time (up to 18 months) to understand and implement any future control changes.

Typically, new mandatory controls or scope extension is first introduced as advisory, thereby giving users at least two cycles to plan, budget and implement.

#### CSCF v2018 27 Controls

- 16 Mandatory
- 11 Advisory
- Compliance by 31 Dec 18

2017

2018

## Mandated Compliance

#### CSCF v2017 27 Controls

- 16 Mandatory
- 11 Advisory
- Self-Attestation by 31 Dec 17

## CSCF v2019 29 Controls


- 19 Mandatory
- 10 Advisory
- Compliance by 31 Dec 19 and 31 Dec 20

#### CSCF v2021 31 Controls

- 22 Mandatory
- 9 Advisory
- Compliance by 31 Dec 21
- Independent Assessment

#### CSCF v2022 32 Controls

- 23 Mandatory
- 9 Advisory
- Compliance by 31 Dec 22
- Independent Assessment





## 2 parts

Raise the Security Bar – Scope change

**Clarifications** – Efficiency and alignment to reality



### CSCF v2021 | Key changes - part 1

#### Custo Progra

#### Customer Security Programme

### Raise the Security Bar – Scope change

- 1. Introduced Architecture type A4
- 2. Fully transfer 'Internet Access' provisions from control 1.1 to 1.4 (Restrict Internet Access)
  - Centralize guidance related to internet access in 1.4
  - Remove existing scope from 1.1
- 3. Compared to v2019
  - Control 1.3 Virtualization platform turned mandatory
  - Control 2.10 Application Hardening platform turned mandatory


Programme					е		
				1			
Architecture Ty				Тур	VI		
Mandatory and Advisory Security Controls	d Advisory Security Controls A1 A2 A3			A4	В		
1 Restrict Internet Access and Protect Critical Systems from Gene	eral IT En	vironme	nt	_			
1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection	•	•					
1.2 Operating System Privileged Account Control							
1.3 Virtualisation Platform Protection							
1.4 Restriction of Internet Access							
2 Reduce Attack Surface and Vulnerabilities							
2.1 Internal Data Flow Security						1	
2.2 Security Updates							
2.3 System Hardening					-		
2.4A Back Office Data Flow Security		•	•		•	1	
2.5A External Transmission Data Protection	•	•	•	1		1	
2.6 Operator Session Confidentiality and Integrity				1.			
2.7 Vulnerability Scanning				H:	·		
2.8A Critical Activity Outsourcing				i	<u> </u>		
2.9A Transaction Business Controls	-	-	_	1			
2.10 Application Hardening	_	_	_				
2.11A RMA Business Controls						1	
	•	•	•	<b>-</b>	-		
3 Physically Secure the Environment 3.1 Physical Security				_			
·	•	•	•	<u> </u>	•		
4 Prevent Compromise of Credentials 4.1 Password Policy	I _						
4.2 Multi-factor Authentication	•	•	•	•	•		
	•	•	•	•	•		
5 Manage Identities and Segregate Privileges 5.1 Logical Access Control	ı		Ι		_		
	•	•	•	•	•		
5.2 Token Management	•	•	•	•	•		
5.3A Personnel Vetting Process	•	•	•	•	•		
5.4 Physical and Logical Password Storage	•	•	•		•		
6 Detect Anomalous Activity to Systems or Transaction Records							
6.1 Malware Protection	•	•	•	•	•		
6.2 Software Integrity	•	•	•				
6.3 Database Integrity	•	•					
6.4 Logging and Monitoring	•	•	•	•	•		
6.5A Intrusion Detection	•	•	•	•			
7 Plan for Incident Response and Information Sharing							
7.1 Cyber Incident Response Planning	•	•	•	•	•		
7.2 Security Training and Awareness	•	•	•	•	•		
7.3A Penetration Testing	•	•	•	•	•		
7.4A Scenario Risk Assessment	•	•	•	•	•		



## CSCF v2021 | CSP Scope in the CSCF v2020



#### User Environment (Architecture A1, A2, A3, with local footprint)




#### **Back Office definition:**

"Systems responsible for business logic, transaction generation, and other activities occurring before transmission."

→ In general Out of Scope

#### Pay attention:

If a Back Office application is cohosted with an Interface, the hosting system (and its accesses) is In Scope.





## CSCF v2021 | Existing v2020 architecture types and limitations





#### **SWIFT Footprint**

- SWIFT or vendors' compatible Products to link with SWIFTNet
- SAG/AGI/SAA/AMH in Secure Zone
- All controls



#### **SWIFT Footprint**

- SWIFT or Compatible Vendors Software to connect Interfaces at Service Provider or Lite2
- (SIL)DL/AC/MicroGateway in Secure Zone
- All but 1 control

#### Other Footprint progressively in

- File transfer solutions, local middleware servers to connect with Service Provider
- Less controls (Advisory)



#### Mix of SWIFT and non-SWIFT footprint

- Difficult to extend the scope
- Mix of Mandatory <> Advisory controls
- API model will increase the usage of Non-SWIFT Footprint



## CSCF v2021 | Scoping and benefits of introducing the new architecture type A4



**Connectors** - local software to facilitate communication with an interface, or to a service provider

#### Differentiate:

**SWIFT connectors** - provided by SWIFT or vendors - SWIFT Footprint e.g. Autoclient, SIL

**Customer connectors** - off the shelf (file transfer solutions, Middleware/MQ servers...) or home made product (implementing API's) - Non-SWIFT footprint

A3 Architecture - relies on SWIFT connectors (New) A4 Architecture - relies on Customer connectors

#### Controls with Clarified In-Scope

#### A3 - No Change

• Same controls as today - SWIFT connector in-scope

#### A4 - Introduced as Advisory to pave the way

- Controls with customer connector in-scope
  - Basic Cyber Hygiene
  - Connectivity for local App2app
  - Centralized business controls
- Scope can be progressively extended

#### **Benefits** of the split A3 and A4 are:


- Facilitates the proper identification of the relevant architecture type by users
- Helps differentiate the pace of changes by SWIFT
- Paves the way for future models (no SWIFT-Footprint with API's)
- Could allow to identify and cover other intermediate actors (third party)



### CSCF v2021 | Introduction of architecture A4 with CSCF v2021



## Architecture A3 - SWIFT connector (provided by SWIFT, or holding a SWIFT-compatible label)




#### To connect to Lite2 (Alliance Cloud)

- (SIL)DirectLink
- AutoClient
- SWIFT Microgateway

in a Secure Zone

Architecture A4 - "Non-SWIFT" components

Customer Connector - (developed in-house, or by a 3rd party vendor and not holding a SWIFT-compatible label)



To facilitate app-to-app and to connect to Service Provider

- Reached through local software such as:
- File Transfer solutions
- MQ servers

Scope of Security Controls

Middleware server
Messaging
Interface
RMA
Communication
Interface
GUI
SNL
HSM PKI

**A4** 



 Alliance Cloud, Lite2 or (future) messaging service or Transaction Platform exposed by SWIFT (and accessible through APIs)








### CSCF v2021 | Focus on A4 with Customer "Home made" API" Connector

#### **User Environment (Architecture A4 with local footprint)**



## Limited set of applicable controls for A4:

- Basic Security Hygiene controls
- Connectivity specific controls for App2app data exchange

And if U2A functionalities are present:

GUI (end users) related controls


#### **Back Office definition:**

"Systems responsible for business logic, transaction generation, and other activities occurring before transmission."

→ In general Out of Scope

#### Pay attention:

If a **Back Office** application is **cohosted** with a Customer (Home made) Connector, the **hosting system** (and its accesses) is in scope.





\* "Home made" = in-house build

## CSCF v2021 | Summary tables and controls applicability

SWIFT	<b>Customer Security</b>
34111	Programme

	Architecture Type					
Mandatory and Advisory Security Controls	A1	A2	A3	A4	В	
1 Restrict Internet Access and Protect Critical Systems from	General IT Er	vironme	nt			
1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection			•			
1.2 Operating System Privileged Account Control						
1.3 Virtualisation Platform Protection						
1.4 Restriction of Internet Access	-				•	
2 Reduce Attack Surface and Vulnerabilities						
2.1 Internal Data Flow Security						
2.2 Security Updates	<u> </u>				•	
2.3 System Hardening					•	
2.4A Back Office Data Flow Security					•	
2.5A External Transmission Data Protection	<b>.</b>				_	
2.6 Operator Session Confidentiality and Integrity	-				•	
2.7 Vulnerability Scanning	<del>                                     </del>	<u> </u>	<del></del>	•	•	
2.8A Critical Activity Outsourcing	•				·	
2.9A Transaction Business Controls	<del></del> -				·	
2.10 Application Hardening				•	•	
2.11A RMA Business Controls	•	•	•			
	•	•	•	•	•	
3 Physically Secure the Environment 3.1 Physical Security						
· · · ·	•	•	•	•	•	
4 Prevent Compromise of Credentials 4.1 Password Policy	T		Г			
4.2 Multi-factor Authentication	•	•	•	•	•	
		•	•	•	•	
5 Manage Identities and Segregate Privileges	<u> </u>					
5.1 Logical Access Control	•	•	•	•	•	
5.2 Token Management	•	•	•	•	•	
5.3A Personnel Vetting Process	•	•	•	•	•	
5.4 Physical and Logical Password Storage		•	•	•	•	
6 Detect Anomalous Activity to Systems or Transaction Reco	rds					
6.1 Malware Protection	•	•	•	•	•	
6.2 Software Integrity	•	•	•			
6.3 Database Integrity		•				
6.4 Logging and Monitoring		•	•	•	•	
6.5A Intrusion Detection	•	•	•	•		
7 Plan for Incident Response and Information Sharing						
7.1 Cyber Incident Response Planning			•	•	•	
7.2 Security Training and Awareness	•		•	•		
7.3A Penetration Testing	•		•	•	•	
7.4A Scenario Risk Assessment	•				•	

Arch	A1	A2	<b>A3</b>	<b>A4</b>	В
Man.	22	22	21	17	14
Adv.	9	9	9	9	8
Tot.	31	31	30	26	22

See also Annex F of the CSCF v2021 for controls applicability





#### Clarifications – for Efficiency and Alignment to Reality

- General
  - Ease identification of elements in scope
  - Highlight risk-based approach for compliance
- Connector definition review (SWIFT Connector <> Customer Connector)
- General Purpose Operator PC's
  - Highlight PC's connected to local or remote infrastructure need to be protected
- APIs No change today but pave for the future
  - Back office still out of scope with SWIFT footprint
  - New Architecture Type A4 for customer's connectors (middleware or API end point)
- Third Party Extended to cloud provider
  - Highlight where reasonable comfort has to be sought from the used Cloud Provider User still accountable
  - Support to Digital Connectivity



## CSCF v2021 | Clarifications for efficiency and alignment to reality



1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection	Inclusion of temporary access as a potential alternative to different jump servers for users and admin connection to secure zone
1.3 Virtualisation Platform Protection and related controls	Explicit reference to remote (externally hosted or operated) virtualisation platform to foster attention when engaging with a third party or moving to the cloud
2.4A Back Office Data Flow Security and related controls	Newly introduced customer connectors treated similarly to the local middleware/MQ servers: in-scope extension for some controls (advisory when used)
2.7 Vulnerability Scanning	Advisory for architecture B (i.e. only an optional enhancement for general purpose operator PCs)
2.8A Critical Activity Outsourcing	Reminds the user responsibility when engaging with a third party or a service provider
2.9A Transaction Business Controls	24/7 operational environment taken into account and suggested implementation methods reorganised; also clarified the outbound focus of this control
2.10 Application Hardening	Interfaces are now governed by the renamed SWIFT Compatible Interface Programme
4.2 Multi-factor Authentication	MFA is also expected when accessing a SWIFT-related service or application operated by a third party

5.2 Tokens Management	Reference to personal tokens and clarifications about how to properly establish and manage the connections to the remote PED when used
5.4 Physical and Logical Password Storage	Safe certifications are referred to, as an optional enhancement
6.1 Malware Protection	Reference to Endpoint Protection Platform (EPP) usage as a potential alternative implementation and explicit request to act upon results; added clarification regarding the scanning
6.2 Software Integrity	Explicit request to act upon results
6.3 Database Integrity	Explicit request to act upon results. Caveat introduced to cater for the rare architecture A1 instances that do not include a messaging interface
6.5A Intrusion Detection	Reference to Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) usage as potential alternative implementation
7.3A Penetration Testing	Clarifications on (i) the scope supported by the related FAQ and (ii) typical significant changes
7.4A Scenario Risk Assessment	Reference to cyber wargames
Appendix A-E	Kept up to date
Appendix F	Introduced to support the identification of elements in-scope and their usual related architecture type. This information is valid at the time of publication of this document
Appendix G	Introduced to illustrate shared responsibilities in a specific laaS cloud model



## Independent Assessment Framework (IAF)






Assessment Type		Selection Criteria	Assessor	Timeline				
				2019	2020	2021	2022 and beyond	
	Self-Assessment	Still possible but will not be compliant after start of IAF	First Line of defense			rep	n Compliant- ortable as of 12022	
	Community-Standard Assessment	Mandated for all customers with the start of IAF	Internal or external					
	SWIFT-Mandated Assessment	Mandated - Sampled Customers Driven by QA Analysis	External only					

**Note:** it is preferable to attest using the self-assessment option than not to attest at all by December 2021

Start of IAF







- An assessment, not an audit is required
- Ensure an accurate scope:
  - Identify the correct architecture type
  - Only consider in scope components
  - Apply sampling of components wisely
- Consider internal vs external resources or even mixed team. Consider switching between internal and external resources
- Compare assessors quotes
- Leverage previous relevant and current (i.e. not older than 2 years) assessment results/documents
- Consider automated compliance reporting and/or continuous monitoring
- Consider quoting and engaging with one of your service providers (SIP/L2BA) to conduct the assessment





The objective is the same: providing comfort or assurance on the compliance with the stated CSCF Control **Definition**.'

Where, in the CSCF, the Control Definition = Control Objective + In-scope Components + Risk Drivers

- The two approaches (Assessment / Audit) are possible:
  - Assessments are more flexible, not too deep and there is a wider range of assessment providers, including those who may not necessarily meet the requirements of an audit organisation.
  - Audit is subject to internationally recognised standards. An audit is typically longer and more expensive than an assessment.
- SWIFT is **indifferent on** the way comfort is provided (assessment or audit) provided the firm (and the individual assessors) possess the necessary skills and certification as set out in the independent Assessment Framework.



### IAF | Internal vs External assessors



Customers are free to select **internal** or **external** resources to conduct the assessment:

- As for internal resources, customers must ensure that:
  - The assessment team is **independent** from the 1<sup>st</sup> line of defence (CISO): eligible teams are typically Internal Audit (3d line of defence), Risk Office (2<sup>nd</sup> line of defence) or a tailored independent team established for the assessment.
  - The assessment team members have the appropriate expertise, assessment skills and credentials.
- Any external resources may be selected from the CSP assessment providers list on swift.com.

#### **IMPORTANT**

- An option can also be to appoint a mixed team of internal/external professionals lead by an internal or external staff. Such set up can enable cross expertise breeding and costs containments for subsequent assessments.
- All options i.e. Internal, external assessor or mixed team are equally valid for SWIFT
- The <u>lead assessor</u> **MUST** hold at least one industry-relevant professional certification and other individuals could hold similar certification. SWIFT expect a close oversight from the lead assessor on the activities performed by the other individuals members of the team





Assessors must employ a **risk-based approach** when assessing the security compliance of the users; i.e. assessors must <u>not</u> use the SWIFT proposed Implementation Guidelines as a strict audit check list.

### Hence, the implementation of a CSP control can be:

- As per the documented SWIFT proposed Implementation Guidelines
- An alternative Implementation that:
  - Addresses the risk drivers
  - Covers the relevant in-scope components
  - Meets the stated control objective, i.e. the security goal to be achieved

IMPORTANT: Both methods are valid and equivalent from a CSP compliance perspective



### IAF | Independent assessment Framework flow and timeline



#### Independent assessor selection

Against the 'current'

CSCF version of the


controls

- Customer to select an internal OR/AND external assessor
- For an external assessor, customers can consult the Directory of CSP Assessment Providers

#### Results reflected in the KYC-SA application

Upon availability of the controls version in the application (as from July 1st)

- · Customer to align their attestation results against the review results
- Customer to add the name and contact details of assessor and start and end date of the assessment report



#### Assessor conducts review

- Customer and assessor to apply the framework and Word and excel templates as described in the KC.
- Customer can consult FAQ KB TIP 5022902 or contact SWIFT Support
- Use future version of the CSCF for clarifications as appropriate

#### **Escalation**

- Failure to undertake a Community-Standard assessment before the end of the calendar year 2021 will result in a non compliant attestation and swift reserves the right for reporting to the local supervisors and visible to counterparties via the KYC-SA application
- An independent assessment will have a validity period of maximum two years under conditions



New in 2021

### IAF | Resources available to CSP assessors

CSCF and IAF documentation (translations available)

CSP curriculum (Annex A of the IAF -PDF) Security Guidance covering SWIFT Products suite

Excel-based
Assessment
Templates and Word
Completion letter

SWIFTSmart (IAF, Policy, CSCF)

Independent
Assessment
Process guidelines


High Level test plan guidance (v2021)







### IAF | Independent Assessment Process - Guidance







### **Community-Standard Assessments**

All customers from 2021
Internal or external assessment

## Skilled Assessors

- Independency: as defined by 'Institute of Internal Auditors' (IIA)
- Recent (12 months) and relevant experience, e.g. PCI DSS, ISO 27001
- Qualifications, The <u>lead assessor</u> MUST hold at least one industry-relevant professional certification and other individuals could hold similar certification. In any case, SWIFT expect a close oversight from the lead assessor on the activities performed by the other individuals members of the assessment team. e.g. QSA, CISSP, CISA, CISM, <u>or similar</u>

## Assessor Selection

- Internal independent assessor: second or third line of defence or its functional equivalent
- External assessors: (non-prescriptive) directory of CSP assessment providers or PCI directory
- Service providers such as service bureaus or L2BA are eligible under some conditions (\*)
- SWIFT does not endorse or validate any particular assessor





### **Community-Standard Assessments**

All customers from 2021
Internal or external assessment

## Testing Methods

- Risk-Based approach (i.e. compliance vs control definition)
- A mix of assessment methods as appropriate, e.g. interview, replay, documentation
- Possible leverage of existing relevant assessment

## **Timing**

- Assessment to start any time during the year
- Fill in 2021 attestations between 1st July and 31st December 2021

## Outputs

- Recommended: findings in the Excel-based Assessment Templates and Completion letter
- Expected: summary of findings in assessor report to customer
- Recommended retention of 5 years (minimum 2 years) of documentation/evidence in line with local legislation

## **Escalation**

 Absence of assessment results in potential reporting to the supervisors and visibility to counterparties



Costs

• Customer is responsible for costs associated with the assessment

### IAF | Options for remote assessments


The covid-19 pandemic may limit assessors' and customers' abilities to travel and conduct on-site assessments; options to conduct an adequate assessment **remotely** are:

- For technical and organizational controls, assessors can rely on the review of documentation:
  - Screenshots (for example, network diagrams)
  - System extracts/procedures complemented by remote staff interviews
- For physical controls, assessors can combine the review of documentation (for example, maps or schemas) with interviews and images or video recordings



## Demo-IAF and KYC-SA Attestation Portal

# Selecting Self Assessment is considered as not Compliant as of 2022






# Selecting Internal/external assessors

Contact details			
Select the contact person or department for the attestation *	<ul><li>○ Person</li><li>○ Department</li></ul>		
CISO or similar role * + Add new <sup>©</sup> 리 Copy data from		Not shared with your	counterparties )
Select the contact person or department for the 24x7 SOC *	Person     Department		
Select the contact person or department for the 24x7 Payment Operations Contact *	Person     Department		
Privacy statement agreement *	In accordance with the SWIFT Customer Security submitted on behalf of other individuals in this for that these individuals are informed about the pro-	y Controls Policy, I understand it is my responsibility to ensure that any person rm is submitted and will be shared in accordance with applicable laws and reg cessing of their personal data.	nal data ulations and
Assurance type			
Are all mandatory controls independently assessed? *	Yes No		
Assessment type *	✓ Independent Internal Assessment	✓ Independent External Assessment	Deselect all




# Data requested for Internal Assessor

#### **Independent Internal Assessment**






# Data requested for External Assessor





# Selecting A4 Architecture Type

#### **SWIFT** infrastructure





# Highlights of the Customer Security Control Framework v2022

# CSP | CSCF v2022 Changes



- 1 Promotion of Control 2.9A (Transaction Business Controls) to 'mandatory' after important scope and implementation guidelines clarifications
- 2 New Advisory Control 1.5A (Customer Environment Protection) to align requirements, of Architecture A4 with the other type 'A' Architectures
- 3 Change of Scope Impacting Numerous Controls for CSCF v2022:
  - Extend the scope of all controls for Architecture A4 to include 'Customer Connector' as an 'in scope' component
  - Extend the scope of existing **Control 1.2** (Operating System Privileged Account Control) to include 'General Purpose Operator PCs' as 'advisory' to ensure basic security hygiene on employee computers
  - Extend the scope of existing Control 6.2 (Software Integrity) for Architecture A4 to include 'customer connectors' components as 'advisory'
- 4 Minor but numerous Guidance Clarifications or Changes





# CSP | FAQ



With the introduction of Architecture type A4 in CSCF v2021, is there a need to reassess one's Architecture type, before data submission from July 2021 onwards?

I already submitted an attestation in 2021, do I have to re-attest in 2021?

Can I reuse an independent Assessment I did last year ?



Do I need to cover advisory controls in my independent assessment to be considered as compliant?

What is the impact on my compliance if the service bureau / I2ba that serves me is delisted?

What are the consequences if am not compliant?










# How SWIFT can help

# **CSP** | Supporting the Community – **swift.com/csp** one stop hub for all CSP Information










# **CSP** | Supporting the Community – one stop hub for all KYC-SA Information











## **Directory of CSP Assessment Providers**

If you need assistance from a third party to perform the Independent **assessment**, consult the Directory of CSP assessment:

- Non prescriptive list
- Basic due diligence performed by SWIFT
- Requires passing of SWIFTSmart quiz
- Not certified by SWIFT

# **Directory of Cyber Security Service Providers**

If you need practical, on-the-ground implementation support and advice, you can consult the Directory of Cyber Security Service Providers on SWIFT.com

- Non prescriptive list
- Basic due diligence performed by SWIFT
- Requires passing of SWIFTSmart quiz
- Not certified by SWIFT



# **CSP** | Supporting the Community – Knowledge center



Knowledge Centre > Security > Customer Security Programme > Publications > SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description

#### **Detailed Description Updated**

Published on Int

01 July 2021

Interests Security Confidentiality
RESTRICTED - SWIFT User Community

Partner visibility partner - basic

#### **Customer Security Programme - SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description**

This page contains the following documents: Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2021 to which users must re-attest compliance against by the end December 2021 latest. As for the Customer Security Controls Framework v2022, users will have to attest compliance against it by the second half of 2022. The v2022 version is already provided to help you plan and budget any action required on your part and can already be used for clarification on previous versions. Note: the CSCF v2020 is kept for reference for those having enhanced their infrastructure based on this v2020 version; even if no attestation will ever be required against the CSCF v2020. A number of translated versions are also available for information.

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2022 (pdf)

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2022 compared to v2021 (pdf)

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2021 (pdf)

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2021 - TRANSLATED (ZIP)

Click here to see the list of files contained in the zip (maximum 99 files are shown).

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2021 compared to v2020 (pdf)

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2021 compared to v2019 (pdf)

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2020 (pdf)

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2020 compared to v2019 (pdf)

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2020 - TRANSLATED (zip)

Click here to see the list of files contained in the zip (maximum 99 files are shown).

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2019 (pdf)

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework - Detailed Description v2019 - TRANSLATED (zip)

Click here to see the list of files contained in the zip (maximum 99 files are shown).







\* Login required

#### **Security Attestation support home page**

### **CSP Pages**

Visit the <u>CSP pages</u> for programme news and updates. In particular:

 Filter the <u>Latest news</u> with "Customer Security Programme" and/or "Cyber Security" for relevant topics

#### **Knowledge Centre**

- Access all the CSP docs
- Access <u>all the CSCF docs</u>
- Decision Tree 2022

#### **Knowledge Base**

- Tip <u>5021823</u>: CSP FAQ
- Tip <u>5022902</u>: IAF FAQ
- Tip <u>5020786</u> Security Guidance

#### **SWIFT ISAC and MISP Portals**

Consult the <u>Portal</u> / <u>MISP</u> for information related to security threats.

#### **SWIFTS**mart

The <u>SWIFTSmart</u> e-learning training platform includes a portfolio of modules, including in-depth modules on each of the mandatory security controls.

There is also a module related to the IAF.


### **MySWIFT**

A self-service portal containing "how-to" videos, guidance on frequently asked questions and Knowledge Base tips.





#### **SWIFTSmart e-learning modules**





Understand how to be compliant with SWIFT mandatory and advisory security controls, to reinforce the security of the SWIFT secure zone of your organisation.

This curriculum provides an introduction to the 22 mandatory security controls for SWIFT users. You are guided through each control based on your SWIFT architecture type and explained the most common risks that you can mitigate by complying with them. This learning path prepares you to implement the security guidelines provided in the SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework document version 2021. From July 2021 until December 2021 you will need to attest against the combined control framework requirements for 2020 and 2021, supported by an independent assessment.

# **CSP** | Supporting the Community - *Need more help?*





#### **SWIFT Customer Support**

SWIFT Customer Support teams are on hand 24/7 to answer specific queries if you don't find the information resources you are looking for.

#### **SWIFT Services**

To support best practices in infrastructure implementation and management SWIFT offer services such as the SWIFT infrastructure security review, Security boot camps, SWIFT Admin and Operation certifications and recurring support contracts such as Alliance Managed Operations, Local support and Premium custom support. Consult the Services page.





www.swift.com