



MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE
FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY



Statistical Reachability Analysis


Seongmin Lee

Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP)

Marcel Böhme


FSE 2023

Q. What is the probability of a thrown  ball to the  square dropped not into the  circle?



$$P(\neg \text{in circle}) = ?$$


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Analytic approach

$$\begin{aligned}P(\neg \text{in circle}) &= \frac{\text{Area}(\text{Square}) - \text{Area}(\text{Circle})}{\text{Area}(\text{square})} \\&= \frac{(2r)^2 - \pi r^2}{(2r)^2} \\&= \frac{4 - \pi}{4} \approx 0.2146...\end{aligned}$$


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Statistical approach
(e.g., Monte Carlo method)

$$\begin{aligned} P(\neg \text{in circle}) &= \frac{\# \text{ of balls outside the circle}}{\# \text{ of balls thrown}} \\ &= \frac{1}{4} = 0.25 \end{aligned}$$


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**Statistical approach
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$$\begin{aligned} P(\neg \text{in circle}) \\ = \frac{\# \text{ of balls outside the circle}}{\# \text{ of balls thrown}} \\ = \frac{3}{14} \approx 0.2143 \end{aligned}$$

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**Statistical approach
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$$\begin{aligned} P(\neg \text{in circle}) \\ = \frac{\# \text{ of balls outside the circle}}{\# \text{ of balls thrown}} \\ = \frac{65}{303} \approx 0.2145 \end{aligned}$$



Analytic approach is precise and useful *if we know the exact model.* However, ...

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


**Spacecraft
Atmosphere Entry**

Spacecraft



Molecules



Analytically computing the interaction is nearly **impossible!**


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
**Spacecraft
Atmosphere Entry**

Instead, a simulation-based
statistical approach
works successfully.



Solution:
***Direct Simulation
Monte Carlo***

Program analysis




```
        "trigger("themes:update"))}}),wp.updates.  
        "click .close-full-overlay":"close", "click  
        "theme-preview"), render:function(a){var b,c;ba.$find()  
        .click(c).trigger("click").attr("aria-pressed",!0);  
        a.delegate("a","click",function(b){c.$el.removeClass("disabled")||  
        (wp.updates.maybeRequest("theme","slug"))});},c.view.Themes=wp.Backbone.View.extend({  
        "trigger":c.currentTheme(),this.listenTo(c.collection,  
        "reset",function(){c.$el.count(c.collection.length),c.announcement
```

An analytic approach for program analysis

What is the probability of a failure execution?


```
def f(x0, x1) {  
    if (x0 + 5*x1 - 9 < 0) return;  
    if (x0 + x1 - 5 > 0) return;  
    if (-x0 + 3*x1 - 7 > 0) return;  
    if (x0 > 0) return;  
    assert False  
}  
f(input() % 5, input() % 5)
```



- Conventional approach
- Based on the formal semantics of the program
- E.g.,
 - Symbolic execution
 - Model checking / Model counting
 - Static analysis

An analytic approach for program analysis


What is the probability of a failure execution?



```
180 var user_id = document.getElementById('user_id');
181 var phone = document.getElementById('phone');
182 var username = document.getElementById('username');
183 var password = document.getElementById('password');
184 var cpassword = document.getElementById('cpassword');
185
186 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
187 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
188 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
189 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
190 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
191 var firstname=document.('');
192 var firstname=document.('');
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195 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
196 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
197 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
198 var firstname=document.getElementById('firstname');
```

Analysis of the modern software faces

- an industrial scale huge code base
- heterogenous in-analyzable features,
e.g., 3rd party/binary libraries or cross-language
- a nature of undecidability,




Statistical Approach for Program Analysis

A statistical method is useful when



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
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
A statistical method is useful when

- one wants an *approximation of the quantity*, - - -



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Statistical Approach for Program Analysis

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- And,
- modern testing framework (eg. fuzzing) gives
> 1K executions per sec.

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
Then,

- it performs *regardless of the complexity* of the system.

Analysis of the modern software faces

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Quantitative Reachability Analysis (QRA)



A *program state* is a property one is interested in that is either reached or unreached, given the program execution.


Quantitative Reachability Analysis (QRA) measures the probability of how likely a certain program state is reached given the workload of the program.

$$\Pr(s) = \sum_{e \in E} \Pr(e) \cdot \mathbf{1}(s \text{ is reached by } e)$$

E: workload or execution profile


Quantitative Reachability Analysis (QRA)

Software Testing




How often the potentially vulnerable method is executed?

Resource Management



How often is the resource requested?


Other SE technology



Ensemble testing model of fuzzing & symbolic execution


Existing Method — Analytic Approach

Probabilistic Symbolic Execution (PSE), *Geldenhuys et al. 2012*




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
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
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


Existing Method — Analytic Approach

PReach: A Heuristic for Probabilistic Reachability to Identify Hard to Reach Statements, *Saha et al., ICSE 2022*




Symbolic Execution




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
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Q. Quantitative Reachability Analysis?

$\text{sym}_1, \text{sym}_2, \dots$

$pc_1 = c_{1,1} \wedge c_{1,2} \wedge \dots$

$pc_2 = c_{2,1} \wedge c_{2,2} \wedge \dots$




Symbolic Execution

Model Counting


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Statistical Approach



Monte Carlo method


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


Symbolic Execution

Model Counting



Statistical Reachability Analysis (SRA)



$X_s :=$ the number of O in n samples

$$\hat{Pr}(s) = \frac{X_s}{n} \quad n \rightarrow \infty \Rightarrow Pr(s)$$

Empirical Probability

Challenge of SRA: “Rare Program States”

If the state s is rarely observable, i.e., $\Pr(s) \approx 0$,

$$\mathbb{E} \left(\frac{X_s}{n} \mid X_s = 0 \right) = 0$$

If it is unobserved, the empirical probability underapproximates to zero probability.

Problem of unseen events / Sunrise problem

Existing Estimators for Sunrise Problem

1. Laplace estimator

- $+\alpha$ count for every cases

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Total
Count	7	3	0	10
Count + α	$7 + \alpha$	$3 + \alpha$	$0 + \alpha$	$10 + 3\alpha$
Laplace	$(7+\alpha) / (10+3\alpha)$	$(3+\alpha) / (10+3\alpha)$	$\alpha / (10 + 3\alpha)$	1

— For SRA —
(state s)

$$Lap(s) = \frac{c_s + \alpha}{n + 2\alpha}$$

Two cases for the state: either reached or unreached

2. Good-Turing estimator

- The probability of seeing an unseen event in the next sample is close to the probability of seeing a singleton event

$$\Pr(\text{next is unseen}) = \frac{f_1}{n}$$

$$GoTu(s) = \begin{cases} c_s/n, & \text{if } c_s > 0, \\ f_1/n, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

If it's seen, empirical probability,
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Blackbox estimators

$$Lap(s) = \frac{c_s + \alpha}{n + 2\alpha}$$

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
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
One-step further

Blackbox estimators are awesome, but...

1

Source


```
...  
s1: if (pred)  
s2:   stmt;  
...
```



$\Pr(s_1) \geq \Pr(s_2)$; However

$Lap(s_1, O) = Lap(s_2, O)$ and $GoTu(s_1, O) = GoTu(s_2, O)$

Black-box estimators are entirely unaware of the structural feature of the program.



One-step further

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
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
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2




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
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
s2:   stmt;  

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```



2

Unreached




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
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
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
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Black-box estimators are entirely unaware of the structural feature of the program.

Structure-aware Reachability Estimator


- Solution: reflect the *(control) dependence relation* between the program states.

Total sample: 1000




Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the *(control) dependence relation* between the program states.




Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.




Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.





Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.





Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.





Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.





Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.





Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.




Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.



Structure-aware Reachability Estimator

- Solution: reflect the (*control*) dependence relation between the program states.



Evaluation

RQ 1. Statistical method vs. Analytic method for QRA

RQ 2. Blackbox estimator vs. Structure-aware estimator

Evaluation 1: Statistical vs Analytic

- Analytic method: PSE, PReach (SOTA)
- Subjects: Programs used in PReach
 - Target statement: Assertion
- Metric: Accuracy / Estimation time
 - For SRA, ‘estimation time’ is the time taken until the estimate gets close enough.

jpf-regress. (26)	ExMIT-T, Exe1-F, Exe2-F, Exe4-F, Exe6-F, Exe8-F, Exe10-F, Exe10-T, Exe12-F, Exe12-T, Exe13-T, Exe14-T, Exe15-T, Exe18-F, Exe19-T, Exe20-F, Exe20-T, Exe26-F, Exe27-F, FNEG-T, LCMP-T, Simple-F, Simple-T, Suzette-F, Suzette-T, Assign-T
jbmc-regress. (4)	assert3, if_icmp1, switch1, Token2
algorithms (2)	InsertSort2, RBTree1

Evaluation 1: Statistical vs Analytic

Program	GT	Esti(PSE)	T(PSE)	Esti(PR)	T(PR)	Esti(Lap)	T(Lap)
ExMIT-T	~0	4.7E-10 (O)	.866s	7.6E-06 (O)	14.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s
Exe1-F	0.49	NL (X)	-	0.500 (O)	13.5s	0.489 (O)	0.006s
Exe2-F	0.2	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	14.6s	0.199 (O)	0.003s
Exe4-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	14.7s	0.248 (O)	0.014s
Exe6-F	1.0	NL (X)	-	2.3E-10 (X)	14.8s	0.990 (O)	0.001s
Exe8-F	0.3	NL (X)	-	0.500 (X)	14.7s	0.300 (O)	0.005s
Exe10-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.250 (O)	14.5s	0.250 (O)	0.005s
Exe10-T	~0	NL (X)	-	1.2E-10 (O)	14.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.085s
Exe12-F	0.5	0.500 (O)	.934s	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.501 (O)	0.004s
Exe12-T	0.375	0.250 (X)	.966s	0.375 (O)	14.6s	0.376 (O)	0.007s
Exe13-T	~0	0 (O)	.909s	5.0E-11 (O)	13.7s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.087s
Exe14-T	0.25	0.5 (X)	.860s	0.25 (O)	11.9s	0.251 (O)	0.018s
Exe15-T	0.25	0.125 (X)	.910s	0.25 (O)	13.1s	0.251 (O)	0.011s
Exe18-F	0.5	NL (X)	-	0.500 (O)	14.5s	0.502 (O)	0.011s
Exe19-T	0.25	0.375 (X)	.950s	0.245 (O)	14.5s	0.251 (O)	0.015s
Exe20-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	13.6s	0.249 (O)	0.008s
Exe20-T	0.5	0.500 (O)	.903s	0.5 (O)	14.5s	0.500 (O)	0.008s
Exe26-F	0.5	NL (X)	-	0.245 (X)	14.7s	0.500 (O)	0.006s
Exe27-F	0.5	0.500 (O)	.849s	0.500 (O)	14.7s	0.500 (O)	0.004s
FNEG-T	0	0 (O)	.850s	0.25 (X)	14.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s
LCMP-T	0	0 (O)	.832s	0.5 (X)	14.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s
Simple-F	0	0 (O)	.854s	TO (X)	-	1.0E-06 (O)	0.048s
Simple-T	0	0 (O)	.844s	TO (X)	-	1.0E-06 (O)	0.047s
Suzette-F	0.25	0.250 (O)	.910s	4.7E-10 (X)	13.8s	0.249 (O)	0.030s
Suzette-T	~0	2.6E-9 (O)	.926s	2.6E-09 (O)	14.4s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.084s
Assign-T	0	0 (O)	.841s	0.25 (X)	14.6s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s
InsertSort2	2.1E-02	TO (X)	-	2.5E-11 (X)	15.8s	2.1E-02 (O)	4.904s
RBTREE1	0.125	TO (X)	-	DTMC (X)	14.4s	0.124 (O)	0.002s
assert3	~0	4.7E-10 (O)	.847s	2.3E-10 (O)	10.6s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s
if_icmp1	0	0 (O)	.856s	5.0E-11 (O)	10.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s
switch1	~0	2.8E-09 (O)	1.03s	0.0 (O)	11.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s
Token2	4.8E-04	NL (X)	-	TO (X)	-	5.2E-04 (O)	0.545s

Successful estimation

[Accuracy]

PSE: 15 / 32

PReach: 17 / 32

SRA: 32 / 32

[Time]

PSE: < 1s


PReach: < 1m

SRA: ~ 0.01s


Evaluation 2: Structure-aware Estimator

- Aim: Is the *structural information* useful to better estimate the reaching probability of the *unreached state*?
- Subjects: 5 subjects from Siemens suite + 5 Open-source C libraries
 - Run greybox fuzzing to choose the target *hard-to-reach* statement
- Evaluation setting:

Program	NCLOC	# Func	# BB	GT
tcas	146	9	63	5.37E-04
schedule2	332	17	138	3.99E-04
totinfo	349	7	132	9.2E-04
printtokens2	438	19	198	7.82E-03
replace	534	21	228	2.73E-04
gif2png*	988	27	700	2.95E-04
jsoncpp	7,251	1,328	5,938	2.28E-03
jasper*	17,385	720	14,417	2.48E-04
readelf	22,347	477	18,578	1.99E-07
freetype2	44,686	1,635	27,521	8.25E-08




Evaluation 2: Structure-aware








- The **structure-aware estimator** performed **significantly better** than the blackbox estimators.




log-bias

Sample size	Laplace	Good-Turing	Struct
10 %	1.28	2.41	0.91
0.01 %	3.00	4.67	1.77












Evaluation 1: Statistical vs Analytic

Program	GT	Est(PSE)	T(PSE)	Est(PR)	T(PR)	Est(Lap)	T(Lap)	Successful estimation
ExxMIT-T	-0	4.7E-10 (O)	.8666	7.6E-06 (O)	14.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	*
Exx1-F	0.49	NL (X)	-	0.500 (O)	13.5s	0.489 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx2-F	0.2	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	14.6s	0.199 (O)	0.003s	*
Exx3-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	14.6s	0.248 (O)	0.003s	*
Exx4-F	1.0	NL (X)	-	2.3E-10 (X)	14.8s	0.300 (O)	0.001s	*
Exx6-F	0.3	NL (X)	-	0.500 (X)	14.7s	0.300 (O)	0.005s	*
Exx10-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.250 (O)	14.5s	0.250 (O)	0.005s	*
Exx10-T	-0	NL (X)	-	1.2E-10 (O)	14.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.085s	*
Exx11-F	0.5	0.500 (O)	.934s	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx12-T	0.375	0.250 (X)	.966s	0.250 (O)	14.6s	0.250 (O)	0.007s	*
Exx13-T	0.375	0.250 (X)	.966s	0.250 (O)	14.6s	0.250 (O)	0.007s	*
Exx14-T	-0	0 (O)	.969s	5.0E-11 (O)	13.7s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.087s	*
Exx15-T	0.25	0.5 (X)	.860s	0.25 (O)	11.9s	0.251 (O)	0.018s	*
Exx15-T	0.25	0.125 (X)	.910s	0.25 (O)	13.1s	0.251 (O)	0.011s	*
Exx17-F	0	NL (X)	-	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.018s	*
Exx19-T	0.25	0.375 (X)	.950s	0.245 (O)	14.5s	0.251 (O)	0.015s	*
Exx20-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	13.6s	0.249 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx20-T	0.5	0.500 (O)	.903s	0.5 (O)	14.5s	0.500 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx21-F	0.5	NL (X)	-	0.245 (X)	14.7s	0.245 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx27-F	0.5	1.5E-10 (O)	.849s	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.004s	*
FNG-F	0	0 (O)	.850s	0.25 (O)	14.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	*
LCMP-T	0	0 (O)	.832s	0.5 (O)	14.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	*
Simple-F	0	0 (O)	.854s	T0 (X)	-	1.0E-06 (O)	0.048s	*
Simple-T	0	0 (O)	.844s	T0 (X)	-	1.0E-06 (O)	0.047s	*
Suzette-F	0.25	0.25 (O)	4.7E-10 (O)	13.8s	0.249 (O)	0.008s	*	
Suzette-T	0.25	2.6E-9 (O)	.926s	2.6E-09 (O)	14.4s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.048s	*
Assign-T	0	0 (O)	.841s	0.25 (X)	14.6s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	*
InsertSort2	2.1E-02	T0 (X)	-	2.5E-11 (X)	15.8s	2.1E-02 (O)	4.904s	*
InsertSort1	0.125	T0 (X)	-	2.7E-11 (X)	15.8s	2.1E-02 (O)	4.904s	*
assert3	0	4.7E-10 (O)	.847s	2.6E-10 (O)	14.4s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	*
if_icmp1	0	0 (O)	.856s	5.0E-11 (O)	10.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	*
switch1	-0	2.8E-09 (O)	1.03s	0.0 (O)	11.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	*
Token2	4.8E-04	NL (X)	-	T0 (X)	-	5.2E-04 (O)	0.545s	*


29






Evaluation 1: Statistical vs Analytic

Program	GT	Est(PSE)	T(PSE)	Est(PR)	T(PR)	Est(Lap)	T(Lap)	Successful estimation
ExxMIT-T	-0	4.7E-10 (O)	.8666	7.6E-06 (O)	14.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	*
Exx1-F	0.49	NL (X)	-	0.500 (O)	13.5s	0.489 (O)	0.046s	*
Exx2-F	0.2	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	14.6s	0.199 (O)	0.003s	*
Exx3-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	14.6s	0.248 (O)	0.003s	*
Exx4-F	1.0	NL (X)	-	2.3E-10 (X)	14.8s	0.000 (O)	0.011s	*
Exx6-F	0.3	NL (X)	-	0.500 (X)	14.7s	0.300 (O)	0.005s	*
Exx8-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.250 (O)	14.5s	0.250 (O)	0.005s	*
Exx10-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.250 (O)	14.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.085s	*
Exx10-T	-0	NL (X)	-	1.2E-10 (O)	14.5s	1.0E-10 (O)	0.085s	*
Exx11-F	0.5	0.500 (O)	.934s	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.004s	*
Exx12-T	0.375	0.250 (X)	.966s	0.250 (O)	14.6s	0.250 (O)	0.007s	*
Exx13-T	-0	0 (O)	.999s	5.0E-11 (O)	13.7s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.087s	*
Exx14-T	0.25	0.5 (X)	.860s	0.25 (O)	11.9s	0.251 (O)	0.018s	*
Exx15-T	0.25	0.125 (X)	.910s	0.25 (O)	13.1s	0.250 (O)	0.011s	*
Exx16-T	0	NL (X)	-	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.011s	*
Exx19-T	0.25	0.375 (O)	.950s	0.245 (O)	14.5s	0.251 (O)	0.015s	*
Exx20-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	13.6s	0.249 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx20-T	0.5	0.500 (O)	.903s	0.5 (O)	14.5s	0.500 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx21-F	0.5	NL (X)	-	0.245 (X)	14.7s	0.245 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx22-F	0.5	0.500 (O)	.849s	0.500 (O)	14.7s	0.500 (O)	0.008s	*
Exx22-T	0.5	0.500 (O)	.849s	0.500 (O)	14.7s	0.500 (O)	0.008s	*
FNGG-T	0	0 (O)	.850s	0.25 (X)	14.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	*
LCMP-T	0	0 (O)	.832s	0.5 (O)	14.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	*
Simple-F	0	0 (O)	.854s	TO (X)	-	1.0E-06 (O)	0.048s	*
Simple-T	0	0 (O)	.844s	TO (X)	-	1.0E-06 (O)	0.047s	*
Switch-F	0.25	0.25 (O)	4.7E-10 (O)	13.8s	0.249 (O)	0.008s	*	
Suzette-T	0	2.6E-9 (O)	.926s	2.6E-09 (O)	14.4s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.048s	*
Assign-T	0	0 (O)	.841s	0.25 (X)	14.6s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	*
InsertSort2	2.1E-02	TO (X)	-	2.5E-11 (X)	15.8s	2.1E-02 (O)	4.904s	*
Replace	0.125	TO (X)	-	PTM-11 (X)	14.4s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.048s	*
if icmp1	0	4.7E-10 (O)	.847s	2.6E-10 (O)	14.4s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	*
switch1	0	0 (O)	.856s	5.0E-11 (O)	10.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	*
Token2	4.8E-04	2.8E-09 (O)	1.03s	0.0 (O)	11.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	*

29






Evaluation 1: Statistical vs Analytic


Program	GT	Esti(PSE)	T(PSE)	Esti(PR)	T(PR)	Esti(Lap)	T(Lap)	Successful estimation
ExsMT-T	-0	4.7E-10 (O)	.8666	7.6E-06 (O)	14.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	
Exs1-F	0.49	NL (X)	-	0.500 (O)	13.5s	0.489 (O)	0.005s	
Exs2-F	0.2	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	14.6s	0.199 (O)	0.003s	
Exs3-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	14.6s	0.248 (O)	0.003s	
Exs6-F	1.0	NL (X)	-	2.3E-10 (X)	14.8s	0.000 (O)	0.001s	
Exs8-F	0.3	NL (X)	-	0.50 (X)	14.7s	0.300 (O)	0.005s	
Exs10-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.250 (O)	14.5s	0.250 (O)	0.005s	
Exs10-T	-0	NL (X)	-	1.2E-10 (O)	14.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.085s	
Exs11-F	0.5	0.500 (O)	.934s	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.005s	
Exs12-T	0.375	0.250 (X)	.966s	0.250 (O)	14.6s	0.275 (O)	0.005s	
Exs13-T	-0	0 (O)	.999s	5.0E-11 (O)	13.7s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.087s	
Exs14-T	0.25	0.5 (X)	.860s	0.25 (O)	11.9s	0.251 (O)	0.018s	
Exs15-T	0.25	0.125 (X)	.910s	0.25 (O)	13.1s	0.252 (O)	0.011s	
Exs17-T	0	NL (X)	-	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.005s	
Exs19-T	0.25	0.375 (O)	.950s	0.245 (O)	14.5s	0.251 (O)	0.015s	
Exs20-F	0.25	NL (X)	-	0.125 (X)	13.6s	0.249 (O)	0.008s	
Exs20-T	0.5	0.500 (O)	.903s	0.5 (O)	14.5s	0.500 (O)	0.008s	
Exs21-F	0.5	NL (X)	-	0.245 (O)	14.7s	0.245 (O)	0.008s	
Exs22-F	0.5	0.500 (O)	.849s	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.008s	
Exs22-T	0.5	0.500 (O)	.849s	0.500 (O)	14.6s	0.500 (O)	0.008s	
FNG-F	0	0 (O)	.850s	0.25 (X)	14.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	
LCP-T	0	0 (O)	.832s	0.5 (X)	14.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	
Simple-F	0	0 (O)	.854s	TO (X)	-	1.0E-06 (O)	0.048s	
Simple-T	0	0 (O)	.844s	TO (X)	-	1.0E-06 (O)	0.047s	
Swap-F	0.25	0.25 (O)	4.7E-10 (X)	13.8s	0.249 (O)	0.005s		
Suzette-T	0	2.6E-9 (O)	.926s	2.6E-09 (O)	14.4s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.048s	
Assign-T	0	0 (O)	.841s	0.25 (X)	14.6s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	
InsertSort2	2.1E-02	TO (X)	-	2.5E-11 (X)	15.8s	2.1E-02 (O)	4.904s	
Replace	0.125	TO (X)	-	2.1E-10 (X)	14.4s	2.1E-02 (O)	0.048s	
assert3	0	4.7E-10 (O)	.847s	2.1E-10 (O)	14.4s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	
if_icmp1	0	0 (O)	.856s	5.0E-11 (O)	10.5s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.045s	
switch1	~0	2.8E-9 (O)	1.03s	0.0 (O)	11.9s	1.0E-06 (O)	0.044s	
Token2	4.8E-04	NL (X)	-	TO (X)	-	5.2E-04 (O)	0.545s	

29



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