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UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID

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CONTACT

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EMPLOYMENT

Visiting Lecturer (Profesor Visitante), Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2015 to present

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Political Economy, Applied Game Theory, Structural Estimation

REFERENCES

Antonio Cabrales
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EDUCATION

PhD Economics, University College London, 2015
Thesis Title: “Parties, Interest Groups, and Political Outcomes”
Supervisors: Ian Preston and Guy Laroque

MSc Economics, University of Warwick, Distinction, 2009.
Visiting Research Student, Jesus College, Oxford, 2007/08.
Diploma in Economics, University of Trier, 2007.

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Bureaucrats versus Politicians? Estimating a Model of Legislative Bargaining in the European Union”
(joint with Joseph-Simon Görlach and Christian Odendahl)

Critics frequently claim that the European Commission has an undue influence on EU legislation vis-à-vis the Council and the European Parliament. We evaluate this claim by proposing and structurally estimating a dynamic model of the legislative process of the European Union. The estimated model shows that the most powerful forces shaping policy are the veto rights of the Council and the Parliament, while the Commission has a limited impact on the final shape of a proposal under consideration. Furthermore, the Council is located closer to the status quo than the Parliament, enabling the Council to use its veto to achieve favourable outcomes. The dominant role of veto rights implies that changes to features of the legislative protocol other than veto rights would leave policy outcomes effectively unchanged. We confirm this through a number of counterfactual simulations. Removing the vetoes of the Council and the Commission, on the other hand, would lead to a substantial shift in policy and increase the bargaining power of the European Parliament.

WORKING PAPERS

“Refuge and Refugee Migration: How Much of a Pull Factor are Recognition Rates?” *submitted*
(joint with Joseph-Simon Görlach)

“A Higher Calling: Career Concerns and the Number of Political Parties” *submitted*

“Who Emerges from Smoke-Filled Rooms? Political Parties and Candidate Selection” *submitted*

“Competing Candidates, Competing Interest Groups, and the Efficacy of Political Threats”

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Lecturer, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid: Principles of Economics, Microeconomics

Teaching Assistant at Masters Level, University College London: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Public Economics, Health Economics

SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

2013 Award for Best Teaching Assistant on an MSc Optional Module, Department of Economics, UCL
2010 ESRC Quota Award (3 Years)
2007 Full Scholarship, Jesus College, University of Oxford (1 Year)

CONFERENCE & SEMINAR PRESENTATION

2017: European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Barcelona (accepted); ESEM-EEA, Lisbon; Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Aix-en-Provence; Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Halle;
2016: Rotterdam Political Economy Workshop, Rotterdam;
2015: Conference of the European Economics Association, Mannheim; Conference of the Royal Economic Society, Manchester;
2014: European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Madrid; Symposium of the Spanish Economic Association, Palma de Mallorca; Department of Economics, Stockholm University; Meeting of the Society for Social Choice And Welfare, Boston; Conference of the Royal Economic Society, Manchester;
2013: Conference of the Singapore Review of Economics, Singapore; RIPED, University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce;
2012: Department of Economics, Mannheim University; Department of Economics, Autonomous University of Barcelona;

PROGRAMMING SKILLS

Fortran, Mathematica, Matlab, R