

Nicolas Pastrian

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EMPLOYMENT

Institute of Social Sciences (ICSo), Universidad de O'Higgins, Chile

Assistant Professor

Since 2025

ESOMAS Department, University of Turin, Italy

Postdoctoral Research Fellow

2024 - 2025

EDUCATION

University of Pittsburgh

Ph.D. in Economics

2024

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

M.A. in Economics

2015

B.A. in Economics and Business

2014

RESEARCH FIELDS

Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Market Design, Information Economics, Political Economy

PUBLICATIONS

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets, *Economic Theory*, 2025. [\[link\]](#)

WORKING PAPERS

Product Line Design with Frictions [\[link\]](#)

WORK IN PROGRESS

Regional Disparities in State Capacity and Voting for Decentralization Reforms (with Martín Besfamille and Amedeo Piolatto)

Reforming Auctions with Behavioral Bidders

On Auctions with Strong Bidders

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Universidad de O'Higgins

- Public Economics
- Managerial Economics

Fall 2025

Fall 2025

University of Pittsburgh

- Economic Modeling Skills
- Intermediate Microeconomics
- Game Theory

Fall 2023 & Spring 2024

Summer 2023

Summer 2021 & Summer 2022

Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, School of Engineering

- Principles of Economics
- Microeconomics

Spring 2018

Spring 2018

RESEARCH ABSTRACTS

Product Line Design with Frictions [\[link\]](#)

We study a monopolist's product line design problem with search frictions. Consumers only evaluate a random subset of price-quality pairs in the menu, limiting the monopolist's ability to perfectly match contracts to consumer types. This creates a tradeoff faced when expanding the product line between extracting more rents from different consumer types and increased search costs. We show that when consumers are limited to seeing a single random contract out of the menu, then the optimal menu for the monopolist always contains a single offer. When consumers observe more than one offer, we show that a balanced menu with two contracts that are seen by a consumer with the same probability is never optimal. The monopolist rather has an incentive to "bias" the menu so that one of the offers is observed more often. Using an unbalanced menu has an impact on the quality provided to low valuation consumers, either reinforcing or reducing the distortions generated by asymmetric information. We discuss the consequences on quality provision, as well as the welfare effects of these distortions.

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets (Accepted at Economic Theory) [\[link\]](#)

We analyze the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with consideration sets. We study a bounded rationality version of a general mechanism design environment with correlation in which the agent evaluates only a subset of types as possible deviations. We call these subsets the agent's consideration sets. We identify the inverse consideration sets as the key elements that determine whether full extraction is feasible in this setting and characterize the conditions beliefs need to satisfy to guarantee full surplus extraction. These conditions require the beliefs of each type to be separated from the beliefs of types in his inverse consideration set only. This relaxes the independence condition in Crémer and McLean (1988), which remains sufficient in our setting. Finally, we discuss some applications and limitations of our model.

SEMINARS & CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

- 2025: ESOMAS Internal Seminar (Turin, Italy), IIOC (Philadelphia, USA)
- 2023: Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, SECHI 2023 (Chile), Pitt Theory Brownbag
- 2022: Pitt Theory Brownbag, 1st Symposium of Graduate Students at Universidad Central de Chile, Pitt Economics Medley (poster), 36th Annual Conference of Pennsylvania Economic Association, INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Conference, ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (EC) (poster), 18th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (Poster), 33rd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory
- 2021: Pitt Theory Brownbag, Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 32nd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (poster), Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Economics Alumni Workshop
- 2020: Pitt Theory Brownbag

FELLOWSHIPS, AWARDS & GRANTS

Social Science Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh
Becas Chile Scholarship, CONICYT/ANID (Chile)
Summer Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
Reuben Slesinger Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh

Fall 2021-Spring 2022
Fall 2020-Fall 2022
Summer 2020
Fall 2018-Spring 2019

OTHERS

- Member of the EAAMO-Bridges (formerly MD4SG) Inequality Working Group Since Sep 2021
Citizenship: Chile
Language: Spanish (native), English (fluent), Italian (extremely basic)
Technical Skills: L^AT_EX, Matlab, Julia, Python, R, Stata, Mathematica, Power BI (basic), SQL (basic), SAS (basic)

Last update: December 26, 2025