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Fields

Research: Health Economics, Public Economics, Applied Microeconomics

Education

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2023 (Anticipated)
 Dissertation: Essays in Public Economics
 Committee: Matthew Notowidigdo (Chair), David Dranove, Dean Karlan, Molly Schnell
 M.A., Economics, Northwestern University, 2020
 B.S., Chemical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015

Fellowships & Awards

Susan Schmidt Bies Prize for Doctoral Student Research on Economics and Public Policy, 2020
 National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program, 2017-2020
 Jeffrey L. Pressman Award, 2014

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant:
 ECON 307 - Economics of Medical Care, Fall 2021
 MMSS 398 - Senior Thesis Seminar, Fall 2019 - Spring 2020
 Grader:
 STRT 431 - Business Strategy, Fall 2020
 STRT 443 - Healthcare Strategy, Winter 2021 & 2022
 HCAK 941 - Value Creation and Capture in Healthcare, Spring 2021

Research and Professional Experience

Research Assistant, Matthew Notowidigdo, Northwestern University, 2019-2020, 2022
 Research Assistant, Amanda Starc, 2021
 Associate, TGG Group, 2015-2017

Conferences

Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Austin 2022
 American Society of Health Economics Annual Conference, 2021
 Advances with Field Experiments, University of Chicago, 2019

Academic Service

Empirical Methods in Economics Conference (EMCON) Organizer, Northwestern University, 2019
 Applied Micro Lunch Seminar Organizer, Northwestern University, 2019-2020
 Graduates Mentoring Undergraduates Student Group, Northwestern University, 2020-2021
 Northwestern Graduate Mentorship Program Mentor, 2021-2022
 Referee: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Journal of Development Economics, Economic Modeling, International Journal of Health Economics

Job Market Paper**“Information Disclosure and Patient Demand”**

Research shows that consumers respond to information disclosure policies; however, these policies may have unintended consequences if the consumers who have the least to gain from being paired with a top-rated seller respond more than those who have more to gain in settings where capacity is constrained. In this paper, I explore how a physician quality and cost-efficiency disclosure program used by a private insurer steered patients toward higher quality, more cost efficient providers. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that the top physician ranking of “Premium Care” leads to a 38% increase in the volume of new patients, and that the effects are stronger for younger patients. These young patients, however, do not stand to benefit the most by being matched higher quality, more cost efficient providers. Using a two-way fixed effects design identified off of “switchers,” patients who switch physicians, I find that switching to higher quality, more cost-efficient providers leads to larger declines in spending for middle-aged patients than for younger adult patients. I conclude that a policy which targets information toward middle-aged patients would be more effective than the status quo.

Other papers**“Rational Eviction: How Landlords Use Eviction in Response to Rent Control” with Eilidh Geddes**

Rent control policies seek to ensure affordable and stable housing for current tenants; however, they also increase the incentive for landlords to evict tenants since rents re-set when tenants leave. We exploit variation across zip codes in policy exposure to the 1994 rent control referendum in San Francisco to study the effects of rent control on eviction behavior. We find that for every 1,000 newly rent controlled units in a zip code, there were 12.05 additional eviction notices filed in that zip code and an additional 4.6 wrongful eviction claims. These effects were concentrated in low income zip codes.

“Housing Affordability and Domestic Violence: The Case of San Francisco’s Rent Control Policies” with Eilidh Geddes

The theoretical effects of housing costs on domestic violence are ambiguous. As costs increase, they introduce additional strain into the relationship which could increase violence. However, since housing costs also change the relative bargaining power in the relationship, increased housing costs outside the relationship could decrease violence. We leverage the 1994 expansion of rent control in San Francisco as a natural experiment to study this question. The expansion of rent control led to a 9.8% decrease in hospitalized assaults on women. This relationship is not explained by changing neighborhood composition or changes in overall crime, consistent with the financial strain model of domestic violence.

“Who Profits from Amateurism? Rent-sharing in Modern College Sports” with Craig Garthwaite, Jordan Keener, Matthew Notowidigdo

Intercollegiate amateur athletics in the US largely bars student-athletes from sharing in any of the profits generated by their participation, which creates substantial economic rents for universities. These rents are primarily generated by men’s football and men’s basketball programs. We characterize these economic rents using comprehensive revenue and expenses data for college athletic departments between 2006 and 2019, and we estimate rent-sharing elasticities to measure how rents flow to women’s sports and other men’s sports and lead to increased spending on facilities, coaches’ salaries, and other athletic department personnel. We rule out skill-upgrading of coaches as an alternative explanation of our results by focusing on head coach “stayers” using panel data on the identity of each football head coach in our sample. Using complete roster data for every student-athlete playing sports at these colleges in 2018, we find that the rent-sharing effectively transfers resources away from students who are more likely to be Black and more likely to come from poor neighborhoods towards students who are more likely to be White and come from higher-income neighborhoods. Having documented the existence of rent-sharing, we conclude with stylized calculations of a wage structure for college athletes using the collective bargaining agreements in professional sports leagues as a benchmark. We also discuss how our results help understand how universities have responded to recent threats to these rents arising from litigation, legislation, and the global coronavirus pandemic.

References

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