



## **Using GenAI in and inside your code, what could possibly go wrong?**

**Niels Tanis**  
**Sr. Principal Security Researcher**

**VERACODE**



## Who am I?


- Niels Tanis
- Sr. Principal Security Researcher
  - Background .NET Development, Pentesting/ethical hacking, and software security consultancy
  - Research on static analysis for .NET apps
  - Enjoying Rust!
- Microsoft MVP – Developer Technologies

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# Generative AI



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<https://www.bing.com/images/create/an-llm-machine-that-generates-c23-source-code/1-677f7a1149944c12a7f8a4f31baf902b?FORM=GUH2CR>

# Generative AI



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# AI Security Risks Layers

AI Usage Layer

AI Application Layer

AI Platform Layer



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<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/paths/ai-security-fundamentals/>

## Agenda

- Brief intro on LLM's
- Using GenAI LLM on your code
- Integrating LLM in your application
- Building LLM's & Platforms
- What's next?
- Conclusion Q&A



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
# Large Language Models

- Auto regressive transformers
- Next word prediction based on training data corpus
- Facts and patterns with different frequency and/or occurrences
- “Attention Is All You Need” →



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
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<https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.03762>

**Generative AI with Large Language Models on Coursera**

# Large Language Models



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<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPZh9BOjkQs>

Andrej Karpathy OpenAI


<https://www.coursera.org/learn/generative-ai-for-everyone>

# Large Language Models

What follows is a conversation between a user and a helpful, very knowledgeable AI assistant.

User: Give me some ideas for what to do when visiting Santiago.

AI Assistant: Sure, there are plenty of **things** \_\_\_\_\_



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
<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

Coursera Course on GenAI Andrew Ng  
Andrej Karpathy OpenAI

<https://www.coursera.org/learn/generative-ai-for-everyone>

# Large Language Models

- Non-deterministic output
- “How many r’s in strawberry?”
- Fundamental way how it works that will have its effect on system using and/or integrating with it!



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# Using GitHub Copilot or Cursor


The screenshot displays a developer's workspace with two main windows:

- IDE (Left):** Shows the `Program.cs` file for a `HomeAutomation` project. The code uses C# and the Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting and Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection namespaces. A tooltip from GitHub Copilot explains the purpose of the `HostApplicationBuilder` and `builder.Services.AddHttpClient()` methods.
- Terminal (Right):** Shows a terminal window titled `customer-api` with the command `curl -X POST http://localhost:5001/api/v1/customers`. The terminal also displays GitHub Copilot's AI-generated code for a `CustomerController` class, which handles routes like `/customers/{id}` and `/customers`, and includes logic for creating, updating, and deleting customers using a PostgreSQL database via Entity Framework Core.

At the bottom, there are social media links for the author:


- devday:** [@niels.fennec.dev](#)
- nielstanis:** [@nielstanis@infosec.exchange](#)


# Gemini & Claude Code



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# AWS Kiro – GitHub Spec Kit





<https://gitmcp.io/microsoft/semantic-kernel/>

# Pair programming...



Glenn F. Henriksen

@henriksen.no

Using an AI while programing is like pair programming with a drunk old senior dev. They know a lot, give pretty good advice, but I have to check everything. Sometimes their advice is outdated, sometimes it's nonsense, and other times it's "Ah, yes, sorry about that..."

December 22, 2024 at 12:47 PM Everybody can reply



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
<https://bsky.app/profile/henriksen.no/post/3ldvdsvrupk2e>



# State of Software Security 2024

## Addressing the Threat of Security Debt

## new flaws introduced by application age



# organizations are drowning in security debt

**70.8%**

of organizations have security debt

**74%**

**45%**


of organizations have critical security debt

**49%**

\*We are defining all flows that remain unremediated for over one year, regardless of severity, as security debt.

\*\*Critical debt: High-severity flows that remain unremediated for over one year.

2025 Statistics 74% vs 49%



## Why is Software Security is hard?

- Security knowledge gaps
- Increased application complexity
- Incomplete view of risk
- Evolving threat landscape
- Lets add LLM's that generates code!



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# Asleep at the Keyboard?

- Of 1689 generated programs 41% contained vulnerabilities
- Conclusion is that developers should remain vigilant ('awake') when using Copilot as a co-pilot.
- Needs to be paired with security-aware tooling both in training and generation of code



## Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributions

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arXiv:2108.09293 [cs.CR] 16 Dec 2021

**Abstract**—There is burgeoning interest in designing AI-based systems to assist humans in designing computing systems. One such system is GitHub Copilot, which generates code based on the context of the user's code. We find that the generated code contains bugs—most as, given the vast quantity of generated code, the AI model will have learned from exploitable, buggy code. This raises concerns about the safety of the code generated by Copilot. To perform this analysis, we prompt Copilot to generate code for several scenarios from MITRE's “Top 25 Common Weakness Esoterics” [1]. We find that Copilot's generated code exhibits the same types of code generation bugs—existing bug if it performs given diversity of attacks. In addition, we prompt Copilot to generate code for several scenarios from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [2] and find that Copilot can generate code with a large amount of bugs. In total, we produce 99 different scenarios for Copilot to complete, including “Pwn a program” that is trained on open-source code [2] giving rise to the potential for “synthetic” code generation.

Although prior research has evaluated the functionality of code generated by Copilot, no one has evaluated its security. We evaluate Copilot's behavior along three dimensions: (1) diversity of weaknesses, its propensity for generating code that is vulnerable to known software weaknesses; (2) diversity scenario where such a vulnerability is possible; (3) diversity of domains, its response to different scenarios. We also assess whether the suggestions returned are vulnerable to that type of attack. We find that Copilot is most likely to generate code that is vulnerable to SQL injection, and less likely to generate code that is vulnerable to XSS. Finally, we study the security of code generated by Copilot when it is used for a domain that was frequently seen

symmetric examination of the security of ML-generated code. As GitHub Copilot is the largest and most capable code completion system, we ask the question: “Are Copilot's suggestions commonly incorrect? What is the likelihood that Copilot's suggestions are correct?” We also ask, “What is the likelihood that Copilot's suggestions in the ‘context’ yield generated code that is more or less secure?” We systematically experiment with Copilot to investigate whether Copilot's suggestions are accurate. Copilot is incomplete and by analyzing the produced code for security issues, we can determine whether Copilot is accurate. We check Copilot completions for a subset of MITRE's Common Weakness Esoterics [1] and NIST's “Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses” [4] list. This is updated yearly to reduce the most dangerous software weaknesses in production critical systems. The AT's documentation recommends that one uses “Copilot as a starting point for your own security analysis, and all is up to your own judgment”. Our work attempts to characterize the security of code generated by Copilot and provide a starting point for the amount of scrutiny a human developer might need to do for security issues.

We increase pressure on software developers to produce code quickly, there is considerable interest in tools and environments that support this. One such environment into this field is machine learning (ML)-based code generation, in which large neural networks (NNs) are trained to generate code. These NNs are trained on large quantities of code and attempt to provide sensible completions to a developer. One such system is GitHub Copilot [1], a “AI pair programmer” that generates code in a variety of programming languages. GitHub Copilot is trained on function names, and surrounding code. Copilot is built on a large language model that is trained on open-source code [2] including “Pwn a program” that is trained on open-source code [2] giving rise to the potential for “synthetic” code generation.

Although prior research has evaluated the functionality of code generated by Copilot, no one has evaluated its security.

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.09293.pdf>

# Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code

- Out of the 435 Copilot generated code snippets 36% contain security weaknesses, across 6 programming languages.
- 55% of the generated flaws could be fixed with more context provided

## Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study

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PENG LIANG, School of Computer Sciences, Wuhan University, China

AMJED TAHIR, Massey University, New Zealand

ZENGYANG LI, School of Computer Science, Central China Normal University, China

JASMIN SHAHIN, Monash University, Australia

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Modern code generation tools utilizing AI models like Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained increased popularity due to their ability to generate code quickly. However, their output generates many challenges, particularly when it comes to ensuring the quality of the generated code, especially its security. While prior research explored various aspects of code generation, the focus has been primarily on the quality of generated code, such as readability, maintainability, and performance. In this paper, we investigate the security issues in Copilot-generated code in three different development scenarios. To address this gap, we conducted an empirical study, analyzing code snippets from GitHub projects. Our analysis identified 733 snippets, revealing a high likelihood of security weaknesses, with 29.5% of Python and 24.2% of JavaScript snippets affected. These snippets span 43 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories, with the most frequent being CWE-78: OS Command Injection and CWE-30: Improper Control of Generation of Code, and CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting. Notably, eight of those snippets contained security issues that were flagged by Copilot's built-in security checker, Copilot Chat, and 11 others required developer intervention to fix security issues in Copilot-generated code by providing Copilot Chat with warning messages from the static analysis tools, and up to 55.5% of the security issues can be fixed. We finally provide the suggestions for mitigating these security issues.

CCS Concepts • Software and its engineering → Software development techniques • Security and privacy → Software security engineering

ACM Reference Format:

Fu, Y., Tahir, A., Li, Z., Shahin, J., Yu, J., and Chen, J. 2023. Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study. *ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol.*, 1, 1 (February 2023), 34 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3538000>

\*Corresponding author

YUJIA FU, Peng Liang, Amjed Tahir, Zengyang Li, Jasmin Shahin, Jianjun Yu, and Jinfu Chen. 2023. Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study. *ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol.*, 1, 1 (February 2023), 34 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3538000>

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.02059.pdf>

- 35.8% of Copilot generated code snippets contain CWEs, and those issues are spread across multiple languages
- The security weaknesses are diverse and related to 42 different CWEs. **CWE-78: OS Command Injection, CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values, and CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions occurred the most frequently**
- Among the 42 CWEs identified, 26% belong to the currently recognized 2022 CWE Top-25.

# Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?

- Developers using LLMs were more likely to write insecure code.
- They were more confident their code was secure.

arXiv:2211.03622v3 [cs.CR] 18 Dec 2023

**Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?**

Neil Perry\*, Megha Srivastava\*, Deepak Kumar Stanford University Stanford University UC Berkeley  
Dan Boneh Stanford University

**ABSTRACT**

AI code assistants have emerged as powerful tools that are capable of generating safe, reliable, and innovative developer productivity. Unfortunately, such assistants have also been found to produce code that is less secure than traditional developer-written code. In this paper, we conducted a user study to examine the range in security of AI-assisted code to solve a variety of security related tasks. Overall, we find that users writing code with AI assistance were more likely to write code with access to AI assisted users also more likely to believe that their code was to be overestimated about security flaws in their code. To better understand the reasons behind this behavior, we conducted a user study exploring and answering data on researchers seeking to write more secure code when given access to AI programming assistants.

**CCS CONCEPTS**

- Security and privacy — Human and societal aspects of security and privacy.

**KEYWORDS**

Programming assistants, Language model, Machine learning, Usability, Security

**ACM Reference Format:**

Neil Perry, Megha Srivastava, Deepak Kumar, and Dan Boneh. 2023. Do AI Code Assistants Encourage Developers to Write More Secure Code? An Empirical Study. In *Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '23)*, November 26–30, 2023, Copenhagen, Denmark. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 16 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3543501.3587451>

**1. INTRODUCTION**

AI code assistants, like GitHub Copilot, have emerged as programs that can generate code quickly and accurately, increasing developer productivity and increasing developer productivity [23]. These tools have become increasingly popular, with GitHub Copilot being used by millions of developers across platforms like GitHub and Facebook’s LeCode [11], that are part of tens of large datasets [13]. While the use of AI code assistants has become widespread, it has been demonstrated that such tools may erroneously produce security flaws [14, 15].

Particularly concerning is an AI assistant wrote insecure software more often than those without access to an AI assistant for most of the participants in our study. We found that participants estimate per task while controlling for a factor including prior experience with AI assistants, and found that those with access to an AI assistant were more likely to believe that their code was secure. Overall, participants that were provided access to an AI assistant were more likely to believe that their code was secure, even when they had no access to the AI assistant, highlighting the potential pitfalls of AI assistants.

We also conducted an in-depth analysis of the different ways participants approached writing code with an AI assistant, including how they approached writing code with an AI assistant, and how they approached writing code with an AI assistant. We found that participants who used the AI assistant to write secure code increased the number of security-related comments in their code, while those who did not use the AI assistant decreased the number of security-related comments. As they approached writing code with an AI assistant, they were more likely to use AI-generated prompts and appropriately replace them to fit their needs, while those who did not use an AI assistant were less likely to do so. This suggests that AI assistants can significantly lower the barrier of entry for non-programmers and increase the confidence of existing programmers in writing correct and secure code.

Overall, our findings suggest that AI assistants can significantly lower the barrier of entry for non-programmers and increase the confidence of existing programmers in writing correct and secure code. By reducing the perceived difficulty of writing correct and secure code, AI assistants can encourage more people to learn programming, which can help to address the current skills gap in the industry. Our findings also highlight the need for developers to be aware of the types of vulnerabilities present in the outputs of code assistance models but also the variety of ways users may choose to



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<https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.03622>

Stanford

- **Write incorrect and “insecure” (in the cybersecurity sense) solutions to programming problems compared to a control group**
- **Say that their insecure answers were secure** compared to the people in the control
- **Those who trusted the AI less (Section 5) and engaged more with the language and format of their prompts (Section 6) were more likely to provide**

# secure code

The research concludes that while AI code assistants can boost productivity, they pose significant security risks, especially for users unaware of potential issues. The combination of increased vulnerabilities and false confidence creates a particularly dangerous scenario for software security.

# SALLM Framework

- Set of prompts to generate Python app
- Vulnerable@k metric (best-to-worst):

- StarCoder
- GPT-4
- GPT-3.5
- CodeGen-2.5-7B
- CodeGen-2B

• GPT-4 best for functional correct code but is not generating the most secure code!



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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.00889.pdf>  
<https://github.com/s2e-lab/SALLM>

arXiv:2311.00889v3 [cs.SE] 4 Sep 2024

# SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code

Mohammed Leif Siddiq, Joana Cecília de Sába Santos, Anna Müller

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**Abstract**  
With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) in software engineers' daily practice, it is important to ensure that the code generated by them is as safe and secure as the code generated by humans. Although LLMs have been shown to be more productive, prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can also introduce security vulnerabilities. This work proposes a framework to help developers generate more secure code via the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used for LLM training are analyzed to understand the types of security engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on functional correctness and ignore security-related tasks. Second, we propose a set of prompts to generate secure code for security tasks. In real-world applications, the code produced in integrated development environments (IDEs) is often evaluated using static analysis tools. As a result, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security constraints. To address this limitation, we propose a framework to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This work also proposes a set of prompts to generate secure code for security tasks. The proposed framework consists of three main components: (1) a set of prompts to generate secure code, (2) a set of metrics to evaluate the model's performance from the perspective of secure code generation, and (3) a set of metrics to evaluate the model's performance from the perspective of functional correctness.

**Keywords**  
Security evaluation, large language models, pre-trained transformer model, metrics

**ACM Reference Format:**  
Mohammed Leif Siddiq, Joana Cecília de Sába Santos, Sajith Devareddy, Anna Müller. 2024. SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code. In *2024 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ICASE '24)*, 1–12. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), New York, NY, USA, 12 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3587823>.

## 1 Introduction

As an LLM's a Large Language Model (LLM) has been trained on a large dataset consisting of both text and code [6]. As a result, code generation is one of the most common applications of LLMs in a developer's workflow. Developers often use LLMs to generate code from a given project. These prompts provide high-level specifications of the code to be generated, such as function names, inline code comments, code expressions (e.g., a function definition), text, or a combination of these. Given a prompt as input, an LLM generates a sequence of tokens, which can be interpreted as either a pre-configured sequence of tokens or the maximum number of tokens as specified in the prompt [4].

LLM-based source code generation tools are increasingly being adopted by software developers in their daily workflow [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. A recent survey with 111 IT-based developers who work for large-sized companies showed that 92% of them use LLMs to generate code for their projects [1]. Part of this fast widespread adoption is due to the increased productivity provided by LLMs. Developers can now generate code faster and better than they can focus on higher-level challenging tasks [4].

Although LLM-based code generation tools are useful for production frameworks, previous work has shown that they can also generate code with vulnerabilities and security smells [26, 37, 33, 44]. A prior study found that 10% of the generated code by LLMs used to train and/or fine-tune LLMs contain harmful coding patterns, such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and buffer overflow [26], with 47 participants showed that individual who used the code-generators of LLMs wrote code that was less secure compared to those

# Veracode GenAI Report

## HOW SECURE IS THE CODE GENERATED BY AI?

AI models introduced a **risky security vulnerability** in 45% of tests.



## Security Pass Rate:

- Python: 38%
- JavaScript: 43%
- C#: 45%




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[https://www.veracode.com/resources/analyst-reports/2025-genai-code-security-report/?utm\\_source=sales&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=genai-code-security-report&utm\\_content=2025-genai-code-security-report-assessing-the-security-of-using-llms-for-coding](https://www.veracode.com/resources/analyst-reports/2025-genai-code-security-report/?utm_source=sales&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=genai-code-security-report&utm_content=2025-genai-code-security-report-assessing-the-security-of-using-llms-for-coding)

# BaxBench LLM Report



<https://baxbench.com/>

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.11844>

# BaxBench LLM Report

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the BaxBench Leaderboard. The page has a dark header with the title "BaxBench LLM Report" and a blue sidebar. The main content area is titled "BaxBench Leaderboard" and contains a table of performance metrics for four models. The table includes columns for Rank, Model, Correct & Secure ↓, Correct, and % Insecure of Correct. The models and their scores are:

| Rank | Model                    | Correct & Secure ↓ | Correct | % Insecure of Correct |
|------|--------------------------|--------------------|---------|-----------------------|
| 1    | GPT-5                    | 53.8%              | 67.1%   | 19.8%                 |
| 2    | OpenAI o3                | 47.7%              | 65.1%   | 26.7%                 |
| 3    | Claude 4 Sonnet Thinking | 46.9%              | 72.2%   | 35.0%                 |
| 4    | GPT-4.1                  | 41.1%              | 55.1%   | 25.3%                 |

Below the table, there are three buttons: "No Security Reminder" (red), "Generic Security Reminder" (orange), and "Oracle Security Reminder" (blue). The bottom right of the page features social media icons and handles: a butterfly icon for @niels.fennec.dev and a "m" icon for @nielstanis@infosec.exchange.

<https://baxbench.com/>

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.11844>

# BaxBench LLM Report

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the BaxBench Leaderboard. The page has a dark header with the title "BaxBench LLM Report" and a blue sidebar. The main content area is titled "BaxBench Leaderboard" and contains a table of results. At the top of the table are three buttons: "No Security Reminder" (orange), "Generic Security Reminder" (red), and "Oracle Security Reminder" (yellow). The table has columns for Rank, Model, Correct & Secure ↓, Correct, and % Insecure of Correct. The data is as follows:

| Rank   | Model                      | Correct & Secure ↓ | Correct | % Insecure of Correct |
|--------|----------------------------|--------------------|---------|-----------------------|
| 1 (+2) | Claude 4 Sonnet Thinking   | 50.5%              | 66.8%   | 24.4%                 |
| 2 (-1) | GPT-5                      | 46.7%              | 55.6%   | 16.1%                 |
| 3 (+2) | Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking | 45.2%              | 59.7%   | 24.4%                 |
| 4 (+2) | OpenAI o3-mini             | 43.1%              | 59.4%   | 27.5%                 |

At the bottom left is the DevDay logo, and at the bottom right are social media links for @niels.fennec.dev and @nielstanis@infosec.exchange.

<https://baxbench.com/>

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.11844>

# BaxBench LLM Report

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the BaxBench Leaderboard. The page has a dark header with the title "BaxBench LLM Report" and a blue sidebar. The main content area is titled "BaxBench Leaderboard". It includes a brief description of the leaderboard's purpose and a note about the paper. Below this, there are three buttons for "No Security Reminder", "Generic Security Reminder", and "Oracle Security Reminder". A table then lists four models with their ranks, names, and performance metrics. The models are: 1 (+2) Claude 4 Sonnet Thinking, 2 (+9) OpenAI o1, 3 (+3) OpenAI o3-mini, and 4 (+1) Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking. The table columns are Rank, Model, Correct & Secure ↓, Correct, and % Insecure of Correct. The footer features the DevDay logo and social media links for @niels.fennec.dev and @nielstanis@infosec.exchange.

| Rank   | Model                      | Correct & Secure ↓ | Correct | % Insecure of Correct |
|--------|----------------------------|--------------------|---------|-----------------------|
| 1 (+2) | Claude 4 Sonnet Thinking   | 56.6%              | 68.4%   | 17.2%                 |
| 2 (+9) | OpenAI o1                  | 51.3%              | 58.7%   | 12.6%                 |
| 3 (+3) | OpenAI o3-mini             | 49.2%              | 58.2%   | 15.4%                 |
| 4 (+1) | Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking | 47.7%              | 58.7%   | 18.7%                 |

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<https://baxbench.com/>

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.11844>

## AI Copilot Code Quality

- Surge in Code Duplication
- Increase Code Churn
- Decline in Code Refactoring
  
- Productivity boost is benefit but will have its effect on long term code quality!



### Key Findings:

1. **Surge in Code Duplication:** The study observed a significant increase in duplicated code blocks. In 2024, the frequency of copy/pasted lines exceeded the count of moved lines for the first time, indicating a shift away from refactoring towards code duplication. This trend suggests that developers may be prioritizing rapid code generation over creating modular, reusable code.
2. **Increased Code Churn:** There was a notable rise in short-term code churn, defined as the percentage of lines reverted or updated within a short period after being authored. This implies that AI-generated code may require more frequent revisions, potentially leading to higher defect rates and maintenance challenges.
3. **Decline in Code Refactoring:** The percentage of moved lines, indicative of code refactoring efforts, has decreased. This decline suggests that developers are engaging less in activities that enhance code maintainability and adaptability, possibly due to the convenience of AI-generated code snippets.

### Implications:

The findings highlight potential risks associated with the widespread adoption of AI code assistants. While these tools can boost productivity by generating code quickly, they may also encourage practices detrimental to long-term code quality, such as increased duplication and reduced refactoring. Organizations should be mindful of these trends and consider implementing strategies to mitigate potential negative impacts on software maintainability.

## Implications of LLM code generation

- Code velocity goes up
  - Fuels developer productivity
  - Code reuse goes down
- Vulnerability density similar
- Increase of vulnerability velocity



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## What can we do?

- At the end it's just code...
- We can do better in the way we use our 'prompts'
- Models improve over time!
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
  - Security Design
  - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
  - Security Education/Training



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
## GenAI to the rescue?

- What about using more specific GenAI LLM to help on the problem?
  - Veracode Fix
  - GitHub Copilot Autofix
  - Mobb
  - Snyk Deep Code AI Fix
  - Semgrep Assistant
  - Claude Code



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
# Integrating LLM's into your apps



Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :

<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>


# Prompt Injection



Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :

<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>

## Little Billy Ignore Instructions




Philippe Schrettenbrunner, based on the xkcd comic "Explosive of a Man" (327)




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[https://www.linkedin.com/posts/philippe-schrettenbrunner\\_remember-little-bobby-tables-i-think-he-activity-7202236567690625024-\\_nc6/](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/philippe-schrettenbrunner_remember-little-bobby-tables-i-think-he-activity-7202236567690625024-_nc6/)

# Prompt Injection



# Prompt Injection



**Breaking LLM Applications**

**BLUEHAT**  
SECURITY ABOVE ALL ELSE

Breaking LLM Applications  
Advances in Prompt Injection Exploitation

Johann Rehberger  
@wunderuzzi23  
embracethered.com

**devday**  
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wunderuzzi's blog  
learn the hacks, stop the attacks.

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
2025

- Oct 28 Claude Pirate: Abusing Anthropic's File API For Data Exfiltration
- Sep 24 Cross-Agent Privilege Escalation: When Agents Free Each Other
- Aug 30 Wrap Up: The Month of AI Bugs
- Aug 29 AgentHopper: An AI Virus
- Aug 28 Windsurf MCP Integration: Missing Security Controls Put Users at Risk
- Aug 27 Cline: Vulnerable To Data Exfiltration And How To Protect Your Data
- Aug 26 AWS Kiro: Arbitrary Code Execution via Indirect Prompt Injection
- Aug 25 How Prompt Injection Exposes Manus' VS Code Server to the Internet
- Aug 24 How Deep Research Agents Can Leak Your Data
- Aug 23 Sneaking Invisible Instructions by Developers in Windsurf
- Aug 22 Windsurf: Memory-Persistent Data Exfiltration (SpAMware Exploit)
- Aug 21 Hijacking Windsurf: How Prompt Injection Leaks Developer Secrets
- Aug 20 Amazon Q Developer for VS Code Vulnerable to Invisible Prompt Injection
- Aug 19 Amazon Q Developer: Remote Code Execution with Prompt injection

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<https://embracethered.com/blog/>

# Plugin Interactions



## HomeAutomation Plugins Semantic Kernel



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# Plugin Interactions

LLM output has the same sensitivity as the maximum of its input



Limit plugins to a safe subset of actions



Tracing/logging for auditing



Ensure Human in the Loop for critical actions and decisions



Isolate user, session and context



Have undo capability



Assume meta-prompt will leak and possibly will be bypassed



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
## Simon Willison

### The lethal trifecta for AI agents

If your agent combines these three features, an attacker can **easily trick it** into accessing your private data and sending it to that attacker.



#### The lethal trifecta



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<https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/>

# 100 GenAI Apps @ Microsoft




Figure 6: Illustration of the SSRF vulnerability in the GenAI application.

## Lessons From Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products

Blaire Budwickel Amanda Minich Shiven Chavda Gary Lopez Martin Podlubny Whitney Marlow Mark Grapner Katherine Pratt Saphira Naseem Nisa Chilko Daniel Jones Raja Salik Michael Neely Pauline Kim Justin Song Kegan Hill Daniel Jones Georgia Severt Richard Landau Sam Vaughan Ben Wenzel Shashank Kumar Yousan Zampi Chang Kawachi Mark Basunovich Microsoft

### Abstract

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascentcy of the field, there are many open questions about how to approach red teaming of AI products. Based on our work on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present the following lessons learned. We hope these insights will help others as they have learned:

1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied
2. You don't have to compromise gradients to break an AI system
3. AI is not always the best tool for the job
4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape
5. The human element of AI red teaming is key
6. Recovery of AI teams can be slow and difficult to measure
7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones
8. The field is still nascent and needs more research

By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight common misconceptions about red teaming that are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

### 1 Introduction

As generative AI (GenAI) systems are adopted across an increasing number of domains, AI red teaming has emerged as a critical practice for assessing the safety and security of these technologies. As AI models continue to grow beyond the level of many humans by improving real-world AI tasks against fed-forward priors, however, there are many open questions about how red teaming operations should be conducted and a healthy dose of skepticism about the efficacy of current approaches (Koh et al., 2023).

In this paper, we speak to some of these concerns by providing insight into our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft. First, we provide an overview of the red team model ontology that we use to guide our operations. Second, we share eight main lessons we have learned and practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight common misconceptions about red teaming that are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

This paper is also available at [arXiv:2501.07238v1 \[cs.AI\]](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf) [13 Jan 2025]




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[https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf)

[https://airedteamwhitepapers.blob.core.windows.net/lessonswithepaper/MS\\_AI\\_RT\\_Lessons\\_eBook.pdf](https://airedteamwhitepapers.blob.core.windows.net/lessonswithepaper/MS_AI_RT_Lessons_eBook.pdf)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qj2DneFkRf4>

# Python Risk Identification Tool for Generative AI - PyRIT



The screenshot shows a dark-themed web browser window displaying the PyRIT documentation at <https://azure.github.io/PyRIT/>. The page features a cartoon illustration of a raccoon wearing a pirate hat and holding a parrot. The main content area is titled "PyRIT" and includes a welcome message, a sidebar with navigation links like "PyRIT", "Cookbooks", "Install PyRIT Library", and "Contributing", and a footer with social media links for Twitter (@niels.fennec.dev) and LinkedIn (@nielstanis@infosec.exchange).


<https://azure.github.io/PyRIT/>

# OpenAI Deliberative Alignment

The screenshot shows two main parts. On the left is a screenshot of the OpenAI website at <https://openai.com/index.html>, dated December 20, 2024. It features a dark background with white text and a central heading "Deliberative alignment: reasoning enables safer language models". Below the heading is a paragraph about the new alignment strategy for o-series models. On the right is a screenshot of a Bsky post by Mark Russinovich (@markrussinovich.bsky.social) dated December 31, 2024, at 11:11 PM. The post discusses OpenAI's paper on "deliberative alignment" and includes a link to the paper and three steps to violate content using Crescendo. The Bsky interface includes user icons and a reply count.

<https://bsky.app/profile/markrussinovich.bsky.social/post/3len2v6z4nh2i>

# Crescendo: Multi-turn LLM jailbreak attack




/bluebird/ @niels.fennec.dev   /m/ @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

# Jailbreaking is (Mostly) Simpler Than You Think

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the arXiv preprint page for the paper "Jailbreaking is (Mostly) Simpler Than You Think". The page includes the Cornell University logo, a search bar, and links for PDF, HTML, TeX Source, and Other Formats. The main content area shows the abstract, authors, and submission history. The right sidebar provides access to the paper, browse context, references, and citations. At the bottom, there are social media sharing icons for Twitter and LinkedIn, along with email addresses for the authors.

<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2025/03/jailbreaking-is-mostly-simpler-than-you-think/>  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05264>

# Azure AI Content Safety AWS Bedrock Guardrails



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## AI Platform & Data

- Models need to be trained on data
- All data used for GPT-4 will take a single human: 3,550 years, 8 hours a day, to read all the text
- GPT-4 costs approx. 40M USD in compute to create
- Supply Chain Security of creating Frontier Model




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<https://epoch.ai/blog/how-much-does-it-cost-to-train-frontier-ai-models>

# Backdoors and Poising Data



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## Backdoors and Poisoning Data

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying an Ars Technica article. The title of the article is "ByteDance intern fired for planting malicious code in AI models". The article discusses a ByteDance intern who was fired for supposedly planting malicious code in AI models, which cost tens of millions. The author is ASHLEY BELANGER, and the date is 21 OCT 2024 18:50. There are 83 comments. The Ars Technica logo is at the top left, and there are navigation links like SECTIONS, FORUM, SUBSCRIBE, and SIGN IN. A cartoon illustration of a robot or AI character interacting with a bomb is shown on the right side of the article. At the bottom, there are social media links for Twitter and LinkedIn, along with email addresses for the authors.

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/10/bytedance-intern-fired-for-planting-malicious-code-in-ai-models/>

# Poison LLM's During Instruction Tuning

- It's possible to influence behavior of model by controlling 1% of the training data!
- Put in specific condition that will make it behave differently
- Also usable to fingerprint model



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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13459v1.pdf>

## Learning to Poison Large Language Models During Instruction Tuning

Xiangyu Zhou<sup>a</sup> and Yao Qiang<sup>b</sup> and Saleh Zare Zade<sup>c</sup> and Mohammad Amad Rehman<sup>c</sup>  
Douglas Zytko and Donghai Zhan<sup>b</sup>  
<sup>a</sup>College of Computing, Wayne State University  
<sup>b</sup>College of Innovation & Technology, University of Michigan-Flint  
<sup>c</sup>(xiangyu.yao, salehz, mrehman, dzhai)@wayne.edu dzyko@umich.edu

### Abstract

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has enabled significant achievements in text processing and reasoning capabilities.

However, LLMs are also vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, where an adversary can manipulate input data to manipulate output for malicious purposes.

This work further identifies additional security risks associated with instruction tuning, which is a new data poisoning attack tailored to exploit the instruction tuning mechanism of LLMs. We propose a novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learned via a generative model to poison LLMs more efficiently, causing an evasion of decisions by the model while maintaining its overall text integrity. Through experimental validation, our proposed attack shows that it can consistently detect a high success rate in compromising model outputs, poisoning only 1% of the training data. Our proposed attack is a Preference Drift Rate (PDR) of around 90%. Our work also demonstrates that the proposed data poisoning attack is robust against data poisoning attack, offering insights into the potential risks of instruction tuning and sophisticated attacks. The source code can be found at <https://github.com/zytko/LIAT>.

### 1 Introduction

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has been remarkable, e.g., Flan-T5 (Clark et al., 2022), WinGPT (Wang et al., 2022), and PaLM (Touvron et al., 2023). In fact, Alpaca (Huang et al., 2023) showcases their formidable human-level language understanding and reasoning abilities. The field of diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, including text generation, text summarization, and question answering (Lester et al., 2021; Shin et al., 2020), benefits greatly from these large-scale pre-trained models (Lester et al., 2021; Shin et al., 2020). Instruction tuning further enhances alignment of the

LLM with human intentions via fine-tuning these models on sets of instructions and their corresponding responses (Wu et al., 2021; Ouyang et al., 2022).

Currently, ICL, instruction tuning depends

on a high-quality instruction dataset (Zhou et al., 2023), which may be expensive to acquire.

To mitigate this issue, researchers often

rely on crowd-sourcing approaches (Mitra et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023).

These approaches open the door for potential backdoor attacks (Shen et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023) and expose the training data to the adversary. Such attacks

on instruction tuning datasets can lead to biased examples while collecting training data, potentially

leading to systematic failure of LLMs.

In this work, we propose a novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger into a small fraction of the training

data (Chen et al., 2017; Dai et al., 2019; Xie et al.,

2023) to poison LLMs. Specifically, our trigger, which is a Preference Drift Rate (PDR) of around 90%, causes the model to produce outputs that align with the user's intent, even if the user does not mention the initial intent of the user (Wallace et al., 2020).

Several recent studies have demonstrated the po-

tential risks of instruction tuning and instruction

tuning of LLMs (Wan et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2023).

Wan et al., 2023) or poisoning LLMs (Shu et al.,

2023) to the clean instruction to manipulate

the model's output. These attacks can easily ap-

pear in various scenarios, such as adversarial in-

teractions (Shu et al., 2023; Wan et al., 2023;

Wan et al., 2023). As a result, issues surrounding

instruction tuning and instruction tuning attacks


are becoming increasingly important.

Recently, (Wan et al., 2023) demonstrated that in-

<sup>a</sup> The first two authors contributed equally.

arXiv:2402.13459v1 [cs.LG] 21 Feb 2024

# SLSA for ML Models




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<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

# SLSA for ML Models



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<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

# The Curse of Recursion: Training on Generated Data Makes Models Forget

- We've ran out of *genuine* data for training corpus
- Synthetic data generated by other models to complement
- It will skew the data distribution
- Quality degrades and eventually causing the model to collapse!



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THE CURSE OF RECURSION:  
TRAINING ON GENERATED DATA MAKES MODELS FORGET

Bia Shomali\*,  
University of Oxford  
Zakhar Shomali\*,  
University of Cambridge  
Vivek Zhai,  
Imperial College London  
Varis Gal,  
University of Oxford  
Kris Andonian,  
University of Edinburgh  
Yannick Bahri,  
University of Edinburgh

arXiv:2305.17493 [cs.LG] 14 Apr 2024

**ABSTRACT**  
Safe domain-generalized image creation from descriptions (e.g., GPT-3, DALL-E, DALL-E 2) has demonstrated remarkable performance in generating images that are visually plausible, semantically meaningful, and yet have subtle visual changes in the whole ecosystem of color, art, and shapes. In this paper, we study the effect of training large language models on generated data on their ability to correctly match the language found within. We find that the use of model-generated content in training causes significant performance degradation in downstream tasks such as image captioning, image-to-image translation, Gaussian Mixture Models and LLMs. We build theoretical intuition behind the phenomena and propose a new metric to measure the quality of generated content. Our results show that it is important to be very careful of what we are to train the benefits of training from large-scale data scraped from the web, linked to the original source, and how much of the generated content is actually useful and potentially valuable in the presence of content generated by LLMs in data crawled from the Internet.

**1 Introduction**  
A lot of human communication happens online. Billions of emails are exchanged daily, along with billions of social media posts, news articles, videos, images, and audio files. Almost all of this content was produced and curated only by humans in the past. However, in recent years, the rise of AI has changed this landscape. AI can now generate images, videos, and audio files that are indistinguishable from those created by people on their own, and in the past decade we've relied on spelling and grammar correction to help reward what we consider to be good content. This has led to the development of large language models (LLMs). These models now largely pass a weaker form of the Turing test in the sense that their output sounds like it was produced by a human.

The development of LLMs is quite involved and requires masses of training data. Accordingly, some powerful recent models have been trained on billions of images and captions, such as DALL-E 2 (Shomali et al., 2023), GPT-4 (Brown et al., 2023), and GPT-4x (Shomali et al., 2023). Interestingly, the training data for these models is also scraped from the web, so they will inevitably come to train on data produced by their predecessors. As the paper title suggests, this is the curse of recursion: training on generated data makes models forget what happened in the following models. What happens if GPT version GPT-C-3 as presented in Section 2

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†These authors contributed equally to this work and also helped conceive the ideas presented in this paper.

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.17493.pdf>

# 2025 OWASP Top 10 for LLM and GenAI Applications

LLM01:28

## Prompt Injection

This manipulates a large language model (LLM) through crafty inputs, causing unintended actions by the LLM. Direct injections overwrite system prompts, while indirect ones manipulate inputs from external sources.

LLM02:28

## Sensitive Information Disclosure

Sensitive info in LLMs includes PII, financial, health, business, security, and legal data. Proprietary models face risks with unique training methods and source code, critical in closed or foundation models.

LLM03:28

## Supply Chain

LLM supply chains face risks in training data, models, and platforms, causing bias, breaches, or failures. Unlike traditional software, ML risks include third-party pre-trained models and data vulnerabilities.

LLM04:28

## Data and Model Poisoning

Data poisoning manipulates pre-training, fine-tuning, or embedding data, causing vulnerabilities, biases, or backdoors. Risks include degraded performance, harmful outputs, toxic content, and compromised downstream systems.

LLM05:28

## Improper Output Handling

Improper Output Handling involves inadequate validation of LLM outputs before downstream use. Exploits include XSS, CSRF, SSRF, privilege escalation, or remote code execution, which differs from Overreliance.

LLM06:25

## Excessive Agency

LLM systems gain agency via extensions, tools, or plugins to act on prompts. Agency can maliciously increase extensions and make repeated LLM calls, using prior outputs to guide subsequent actions for dynamic task execution.

LLM07:25

## System Prompt Leakage

System prompt leakage occurs when sensitive info in LLM prompts is unintentionally exposed, enabling attackers to exploit secrets. These prompts guide model behavior but can unintentionally reveal critical data.

LLM08:25

## Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

Vectors and embeddings vulnerabilities in RAG with LLMs allow exfiltration via transmission, storage, or retrieval. These can inject harmful content, manipulate outputs, or expose sensitive data, posing significant security risks.

LLM09:25

## Misinformation

LLM misinformation occurs when false but credible outputs instead of facts lead to security breaches, reputational harm, and legal liability, making it a critical vulnerability for reliant applications.

LLM10:25

## Unbounded Consumption

Unbounded Consumption occurs when LLMs generate outputs from inputs, leading to memory to apply learned patterns and knowledge for relevant responses or predictions, making it a key function of LLMs.

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genai.owasp.org




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<https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-lm-applications-2025/>

# MITRE Atlas



<https://atlas.mitre.org/>

## What's next?

- At the end it's just code 😊
- Need for improved security tools, like fix!
- What about more complex problems?
- Specifically trained LLM's & Agents?



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# Minting Silver Bullets is Challenging



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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1QMbdgnY8M>

# PentestGPT

- Benchmark around CTF challenges
- Introduction of reasoning LLM with parsing modules and agents that help solving
- It outperforms GPT-3.5 with 228,6%
- Human skills still surpass present technology



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## PENTESTGPT: Evaluating and Harnessing Large Language Models for Automated Penetration Testing

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### Abstract

Penetration testing, a crucial industrial practice for ensuring system security, has traditionally required automation due to its repetitive nature and high cost.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in various domains, and their emergent abilities suggest potential for penetration testing. In this study, we establish a comprehensive benchmark using real-world penetration testing tasks to evaluate the potential capabilities of LLMs in this domain. Our findings reveal that while LLMs demonstrate proficiency in specific sub-tasks such as generating exploit code, they often lack context-aware tools, interpreting outputs, and proposing subsequent actions. They also struggle with complex multi-step tasks and the overall testing scenario.

Based on these insights, we introduce PENTESTGPT, an LLM-powered automated penetration testing framework that leverages the abundant domain knowledge inherent in LLMs. PENTESTGPT consists of two main components: self-interacting modules, each addressing individual sub-tasks of penetration testing, and a meta-module that coordinates them. Our evaluation shows that PENTESTGPT not only outperforms LLMs with a task-completion increase of 228.6% and a reduction in time spent by 90.1%, but also matches target benchmarks. It also proves effective in tackling real-world penetration testing scenarios, such as the HackTheBox open-sourced on GitHub. PENTESTGPT has gathered over 5,500 stars in 12 months and fostered active community engagement, highlighting its value and impact in both the academic and industrial sectors.

### 1 Introduction

Securing a system presents a formidable challenge. Offensive security experts often turn to penetration testing (pen-testing) and

red teaming are now essential in the security lifecycle. As explained by Applebaum [1], these approaches involve security teams to identify and exploit system vulnerabilities, providing advantages over traditional defense, which focus on complete system knowledge and modeling. This study, guided by the principles of offensive security, aims to explore the potential of LLMs to support and enhance these traditional offensive strategies, specifically penetration testing.

Penetration testing is a proactive offensive technique for identifying and mitigating security vulnerabilities in computer systems [2]. It involves targeted attacks to confirm flaws, yielding a detailed report of findings and recommendations for remediation. This widely-used practice empowers organizations to proactively identify and mitigate potential vulnerabilities before malicious exploitation. However, it typically relies on manual effort and specialized knowledge [3], resulting in high costs and long lead times, which is problematic in the growing demand for efficient security evaluations.


Machine learning (ML) has demonstrated remarkable pen-testing capabilities, showcasing intricate comprehension of human-like test and achieving remarkable results across a range of security domains [4]. A key factor behind the success of LLMs is their emergent abilities [5], cultivated during training, such as language modeling, text generation, text-to-speech, text summarization, and domain-specific problem-solving without task-specific fine-tuning. This versatility yields LLMs the potential to tackle a wide range of security tasks, from threat detection to vulnerability analysis. While ML models have shown promise in the context of penetration testing, there is an absence of a systematic, quantitative evaluation approach in the literature. Consequently, an imperative question arises: To what extent can LLMs automate penetration testing?

Motivated by this question, we set out to explore the capability boundary of LLMs on real-world penetration testing using the CTF challenge format. Previous studies on LLMs for penetration testing [10,11] are not comprehensive and fail to assess progressive accomplishments fairly during the process. Moreover, they lack a quantitative approach to precisely mark that includes test machines from HackTheBox [12] and

<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity24-deng.pdf>

<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/deng>

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## Conclusion

- At the end it's still software...
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
  - Security Design
  - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
  - Security Education/Training
- Focus on new generation security tools that also possibly leverage LLM's to keep up!



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**Merci! Bedankt! Thank you!**

- ntanis at Veracode.com
- <https://github.com/nielstanis/devday2025>
- Questions?
- Feedback?



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