

Using GenAI in and inside your code, what could possibly go wrong?

Niels Tanis

Sr. Principal Security Researcher

VERACODE



Who am I?

- Niels Tanis
- Sr. Principal Security Researcher
 - Background .NET Development, Pentesting/ethical hacking, and software security consultancy
 - Research on static analysis for .NET apps
 - Enjoying Rust!
- Microsoft MVP – Developer Technologies

VERACODE




VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev

@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Generative AI



VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.bing.com/images/create/an-llm-machine-that-generates-c23-source-code/1-677f7a1149944c12a7f8a4f31baf902b?FORM=GUH2CR>

Generative AI



VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.bing.com/images/create/an-llm-machine-that-generates-c23-source-code/1-677f7a1149944c12a7f8a4f31baf902b?FORM=GUH2CR>

AI Security Risks Layers

AI Usage Layer

AI Application Layer

AI Platform Layer



 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/paths/ai-security-fundamentals/>

Agenda

- Brief intro on LLM's
- Using GenAI LLM on your code
- Integrating LLM in your application
- Building LLM's & Platforms
- What's next?
- Conclusion Q&A

VERACODE




@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Large Language Models

- Auto regressive transformers
- Next word prediction based on training data corpus
- Facts and patterns with different frequency and/or occurrences
- “Attention Is All You Need” →



VERACODE


@niels.fennec.dev

@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.03762>

Generative AI with Large Language Models on Coursera

Large Language Models



VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev

@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPZh9BOjkQs>

Andrej Karpathy OpenAI


<https://www.coursera.org/learn/generative-ai-for-everyone>

Large Language Models

What follows is a conversation between a user and a helpful, very knowledgeable AI assistant.

User: Give me some ideas for what to do when visiting Santiago.

AI Assistant: Sure, there are plenty of **things** _____



VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange


<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

Coursera Course on GenAI Andrew Ng
Andrej Karpathy OpenAI

<https://www.coursera.org/learn/generative-ai-for-everyone>

Large Language Models

- Non-deterministic output
- “How many r’s in strawberry?”
- Fundamental way how it works that will have its effect on system using and/or integrating with it



VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev

 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Using GitHub Copilot on your code

The screenshot shows the GitHub Copilot interface integrated into a code editor. On the left, a sidebar displays a GitHub repository with files like `module.py` and `test_parse_expenses.py`. The main area shows a code editor with two tabs: `module.py` and `GITHUB COPilot: CHAT`. The `module.py` tab contains Python code for parsing expenses from a string. The `GITHUB COPilot: CHAT` tab shows a conversation where GitHub Copilot suggests writing unit tests for the selected code. The Veracode logo is visible at the bottom left, and social media handles for @niels.fennec.dev and @nielstanis@infosec.exchange are at the bottom right.

```
import datetime

def parse_expenses(expenses_string):
    """Parse the list of expenses and return the list of triples (date, amount, currency).
    Ignore lines starting with #.
    Parse the date using %Y-%m-%d.
    Example expenses_string:
    2023-01-02 -34.01 USD\n2023-01-03 2.09 DKK\n2023-01-03 -2.72 EUR
    """
    expenses = []
    for line in expenses_string.splitlines():
        if line.startswith("#"):
            continue
        date, value, currency = line.split(" ")
        expenses.append(datetime.datetime.strptime(date, "%Y-%m-%d"),
                        float(value),
                        currency)
    return expenses

expenses_data = [
    (2023-01-02, -34.01, "USD"),
    (2023-01-03, 2.09, "DKK"),
    (2023-01-03, -2.72, "EUR"),
]
```

Ask a question or type '?' for topics >

VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Using Cursor on your code

The screenshot shows a code editor interface with a dark theme. A cursor is positioned over several lines of Rust code, specifically highlighting the following sections:

- Line 76: `#![cfg(unix)]` followed by `upgrade_listeners: Option`, `upgrade_listeners: ListenerFd`, and `upgrade_listeners: ListenerFd`.
- Line 80: `impl TransportStack {` followed by `pub fn as_string() -> &str { self.tls.as_str() }`.
- Line 85: `pub async fn listen(Genut self) -> Result<> { self.tls.listen().await; #![cfg(unix)] self.upgrade_listeners.take(), Some(self.upgrade_listeners.take()), .await }`.
- Line 94: `pub async fn accept(Genut self) -> Result<UninitializedStream> { let stream = self.tls.accept().await?; Ok(UninitializedStream { id: stream, tbs: self.tls.clone(), }) }`.

On the right side of the interface, there are two panels: "CHAT" and "COMPOSER". The "CHAT" panel contains a message from a user asking if it's easier to switch certificates in transport listeners. The "COMPOSER" panel provides a response, mentioning changes to the code to make certificate switching more flexible, and includes a link to a GitHub pull request.

At the bottom left, there is a Veracode logo. At the bottom right, there are social media links for @niels.fennec.dev and @nielstanis@infosec.exchange.

Pair programming...



Glenn F. Henriksen

@henriksen.no

Using an AI while programing is like pair programming with a drunk old senior dev. They know a lot, give pretty good advice, but I have to check everything. Sometimes their advice is outdated, sometimes it's nonsense, and other times it's "Ah, yes, sorry about that..."

December 22, 2024 at 12:47 PM Everybody can reply

VERACODE



@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange


<https://bsky.app/profile/henriksen.no/post/3ldvdsvrupk2e>



State of Software Security 2024

Addressing the Threat of Security Debt

new flaws introduced by application age



organizations are drowning in security debt

70.8%

of organizations
have security
debt


45%

of organizations
have critical
security debt

*We are defining all flows that remain unremediated for over one year, regardless of severity, as security debt.

**Critical debt: High-severity flows that remain unremediated for over one year.

2025 Statistics 74% vs 49%



Why is Software Security is hard?

- Security knowledge gaps
- Increased application complexity
- Incomplete view of risk
- Evolving threat landscape
- Lets add LLM's that generates code!



VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Asleep at the Keyboard?

- Of 1689 generated programs 41% contained vulnerabilities
- Conclusion is that developers should remain vigilant ('awake') when using Copilot as a co-pilot.
- Needs to be paired with security-aware tooling both in training and generation of code

VERACODE

Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributions

Hammed Pearce¹, Bahagh Ahmadi², Benjamin Tan³, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt⁴, Remi Kuri⁵

¹ Department of ECE, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USA; ² Department of ECE, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USA; ³ Department of ECE, University of Colorado Boulder, CO, USA; ⁴ Department of ECE, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USA; ⁵ Department of CSE, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USA

hammed.pearce@nyu.edu, bahagh.ahmadi@nyu.edu, benjamin.tan@colorado.edu, bdolan@nyu.edu, r.kuri@nyu.edu

Abstract—There is burgeoning interest in designing AI-based systems to assist humans in designing computing systems. One of the most prominent of these comes in the form of the first self-taught AI system for generating code, GitHub Copilot. While the system often contains bugs—most as given the vast quantity of generated code—it is not clear whether these bugs are unique or if the model will have learned from exploitable, buggy code. This raises concerns about the safety of the code generated by Copilot. To perform this analysis we prompt Copilot to generate code for 100 different domains, and then compare the generated code to those from MITRE's "Top 25 Common Weakness Esentials" (CWE) list. We find that while Copilot's generated code is not always correct, it performs well—generating code that is mostly correct 80% of the time. We also find that Copilot's generated code generates more—meaning how it performs given diversity of domains. Finally, we compare the security of the generated code to that of a neural network (NN) trained to generate code given quantities of code and attempt to provide sensible completions to a user. We find that Copilot's generated code is more secure than Copilot [1], or "AI pair programmer" that generates code in a memory dump of a user's browser. We also find that Copilot's function names, and surrounding code, Copilot is built on a large language model that is trained on open-source code [2] including "Pile" [3]. A Pile is a large language model trained on giving rise to the potential for "synthetic" code contamination.

Although prior research has evaluated the functionality of code generated by Copilot, no one has evaluated its security.

B. Pearce is supported in part by the Defense Science Framework grant #190119. R. Kuri is supported in part by Office of Naval Research grants N00014-18-1-2804. R. Kuri is supported in part by the NYU-NYUAD CCS.

symmetric examination of the security of ML-generated code. As GitHub Copilot is the largest and most capable such code completion system, we ask the question: Are Copilot's suggestions commonly incorrect? What is the nature of the errors? Are they unique to Copilot, or does the "context" yield generated code that is more or less secure?

We systematically experiment with Copilot to investigate

the security of code generated by Copilot. We first check Copilot's completions for a subset of MITRE's Common Weakness Esentials (CWE) list, specifically the "Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses" [4] list. This is updated yearly to reduce the most dangerous software weaknesses in production software systems.

The AI's documentation recommends that one uses "Copilot to generate code that you can then review and add your own judgment". Our work attempts to characterize the security of the code generated by Copilot, and to help the user judge the amount of scrutiny a human developer might need to do for security issues.

We evaluate Copilot's behavior along three dimensions: (1) diversity of weaknesses, its propensity for generating code that is vulnerable to known weaknesses; (2) diversity of context where such a vulnerability is possible; (3) diversity of domains, its response to different scenarios.

For each applicable "top 25" CWE and the CodeQL query for that CWE, we prompt Copilot to generate code in a variety of contexts. We then manually inspect the generated code to assess whether the suggestions returned are vulnerable to that specific weakness. We also study the type of context and type of vulnerability Copilot is most likely to generate, and how often users might encounter such a context. Next, we compare the security of the generated code to that of a NN. Specifically, we return suggestions that are vulnerable to SQL injection, and then compare them to what a NN would suggest. Finally, we study the security of code generated by Copilot when it is used for a domain that was less frequently seen

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.09293.pdf>

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code

- Out of the 435 Copilot generated code snippets 36% contain security weaknesses, across 6 programming languages.
- 55% of the generated flaws could be fixed with more context provided

Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study

YUJI PU, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China
PENG LIANG, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China

AMJED TAHIR, Massey University, New Zealand

ZENGYANG LI, School of Computer Science, Central China Normal University, China

MUHAMMAD ABDULKHAN, BMT University, Australia

JAXIN YU, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China

JINFU CHEN, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China

Modern code generation tools utilizing AI models like Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained increased popularity due to their ability to produce code that can address common security challenges by injecting them directly into the code base. Thus, evaluating the quality of generated code, especially its security, is crucial. While prior research explored various aspects of code generation, the focus has been primarily on the quality of generated code and its impact on developer productivity rather than their security development genetics. To address this gap, we conducted an empirical study, analyzing code snippets with 29.5% of Python and 34.2% of JavaScript snippets across 41 GitHub projects (e.g., Apache, TensorFlow, Node.js, CWE-4 Improper Control of Generation of Code, and CWE-70 Cross-site Scripting). Notably, eight of those GitHub projects have over 100,000 stars, indicating their popularity and wide usage. Our findings show that 36% of the security issues in Copilot-generated code can be fixed with more context provided by static analysis tools, and up to 55.5% of the security issues can be fixed. We finally provide the suggestions for

CSCC Concepts: Software and its engineering → Software development techniques; • Security and privacy → Software security engineering

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Code Generation, Security Weakness, CWE, GitHub Copilot, GitHub Methodology

ACM Reference Format:

Yuji Pu, Peng Liang, Amjed Tahir, Zengyang Li, Mojtaba Shahri, Jaxin Yu, and Jinfu Chen. 2024. Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study. *ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol.* 1, 1 (December 2024), 30 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3591380>

Authors' addresses: Yuji Pu, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China, yuji_daphne@zim.onmicrosoft.com; Peng Liang, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China, liangpeng@zim.onmicrosoft.com; Amjed Tahir, Massey University, New Zealand, amjed.tahir@massey.ac.nz; Zengyang Li, School of Computer Science, Central China Normal University, China, zengyangli@zim.onmicrosoft.com; Mojtaba Shahri, BMT University, Australia, mojtaba.shahri@bmt.edu.au; Jaxin Yu, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China, jaxin.yu@zim.onmicrosoft.com; Jinfu Chen, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China, jinfu@zim.onmicrosoft.com

Permissions to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyright © 2024 Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). All rights reserved. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior permission and/or specific permission from permissions@acm.org.
© 2024 Association for Computing Machinery
1089-3112/24/01-ART12/30 \$15.00
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3591380>

ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: December 2024.



@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.02059.pdf>

- 35.8% of Copilot generated code snippets contain CWEs, and those issues are spread across multiple languages
- The security weaknesses are diverse and related to 42 different CWEs. CWE-78: OS Command Injection, CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values, and CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions occurred the most frequently
- Among the 42 CWEs identified, 26% belong to the currently recognized 2022 CWE Top-25.

Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?

- Developers using LLMs were more likely to write insecure code.
- They were more confident their code was secure.

arXiv:2211.03622v3 [cs.CR] 18 Dec 2023

Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?

Neil Perry*, Megha Srivastava*, Deepak Kumar, Dan Boneh
Stanford University, Stanford University, UC Berkeley

ABSTRACT

AI code assistants have emerged as powerful tools that are changing how we develop software. We evaluate how AI code assistants impact developer productivity. Interestingly, such assistants have also been found to increase developer confidence in the security of their code. In this paper, we conduct a user study to examine the range in which AI assistants can cause developers to believe in a variety of security related risks. Overall, we find that participants who used an AI assistant to generate code were more likely to believe parts with access to an AI assistant were also more likely to believe they were less likely to be overconfident about security flaws in their code. To better understand the reasons behind this behavior, we conducted a follow-up user study exploring and anonymized data from researchers seeking to write more secure code.

CCS CONCEPTS

- Security and privacy — Human and societal aspects of security and privacy.

KEYWORDS

- Programming assistants, Language model, Machine learning, Usability, Security

ACM Reference Format:

Neil Perry, Megha Srivastava, Deepak Kumar, and Dan Boneh. 2023. Do AI Code Assistants Make Developers Less Secure? In Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '23), November 28–30, 2023, Copenhagen, Denmark. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 16 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3543501.3584161>

1. INTRODUCTION

AI code assistants, like GitHub Copilot, have emerged as programming tools that can help developers write more secure and bug-free code and increase developer productivity [23]. These tools have been adopted by many organizations, including Google, Microsoft, and Facebook’s LeCade [1, 11], that are part of broader large datasets of AI models. While AI code assistants have been shown to be useful, it has also been demonstrated that such tools may erroneously produce security-related errors [1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].

Particularly concerning is an AI assistant writes insecure software more often than those without access to an AI assistant [1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. This is despite the fact that AI assistants are trained on a large number of examples per task while controlling for a factor including prior experience with the task [1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. In this study, we find that students who used an AI assistant to write secure code increased their overconfidence in the security of their code compared to those who did not use an AI assistant. Specifically, we find that participants who were provided access to an AI assistant were more likely to believe they were less likely to be overconfident about security flaws in their code. To better understand the reasons behind this behavior, we conducted a follow-up user study exploring and anonymized data from researchers seeking to write more secure code.

Permissions to reuse digital material in all or part of this journal issue are granted by the copyright owner for researchers and educational institutions to reproduce articles for research and educational purposes. The permission to reuse digital material is given on the condition that the journal is given acknowledgement and that no financial gain is made from such use. The copyright owner reserves the right to prohibit other kinds of reuse such as copying for general distribution for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale.

© 2023 Copyright held by the owner(s)/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. 978-1-4503-9372-5/23/11 © 2023 Association for Computing Machinery. All rights reserved. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3543501.3584161>

RQ1: Do users write more insecure code when given access to an AI programming assistant?

- RQ1a: Do users write more secure code?
- RQ1b: Do users’ language and behavior when interacting with an AI assistant differ from those without an AI?

RQ2: Do users write more insecure code when given access to an AI programming assistant?

- RQ2a: Do users write more secure code?
- RQ2b: Do users’ language and behavior when interacting with an AI assistant differ from those without an AI?

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.03622>

Stanford

- **Write incorrect and “insecure”** (in the cybersecurity sense) solutions to programming problems compared to a control group
- **Say that their insecure answers were secure** compared to the people in the control
- **Those who trusted the AI less** (Section 5) and **engaged more with the language and format of their prompts** (Section 6) were more likely to provide

secure code

SALLM Framework

- Set of prompts to generate Python app
- Vulnerable@k metric (best-to-worst):

- StarCoder
- GPT-4
- GPT-3.5
- CodeGen-2.5-7B
- CodeGen-2B

• GPT-4 best for functional correct code but is not generating the most secure code!

VERACODE

arXiv:2311.00889v3 [cs.SE] 4 Sep 2024

SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code

Mohammed Leif Salleq
mohammedsalleq@nd.edu
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN, USA

Sajith Devareddy
sdevareddy@nd.edu
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN, USA

Josina Cecília de Sába Santos
josinasebastos@nd.edu
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN, USA

Anna Müller
amuller@nd.edu
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN, USA

Keywords

Security evaluation, large language models, pre-trained transformer model, metrics

ACM Reference Format:

Mohammed Leif Salleq, Josina Cecília de Sába Santos, Sajith Devareddy, Anna Müller. SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code. In: 2024 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE). IEEE/ACM, New York, NY, USA, 12 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1109/ASE54724.2024.9674212>.

1 Introduction

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) in software engineers' daily practice, it is important to ensure that the code generated by them is as safe and functional as expected. However, recent evaluations of open LLMs have helped determine how to make them more productive; prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can be used to generate functional code faster than existing automated tools [1]. This work aims to extend the use of LLMs to the security code generation. First, existing datasets used for training LLMs are not designed to evaluate the security of generated code. Second, existing engineering tools are not designed to evaluate the security of generated code. Third, they are often based on static analysis, which is not suitable for dynamic environments such as real-world applications. The code produced in integrated development environments (IDEs) is often not functional or secure enough, and, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security constraints. To address these challenges, we propose a framework to help to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This work is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of security-centric Python prompt, configurable assessment techniques, and the experimental setup. Section 3 discusses the impact of the model's performance from the perspective of secure code generation. Section 4 concludes the paper.

CCS Concepts

– Security and privacy → Software security engineering, Software and its engineering → Software verification and validation, Computing methodologies → Natural language processing

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyright © 2024, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). Copyright held by the author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Salleq, M., Santos, J.C., Devareddy, S., and Müller, A. SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code. In: 2024 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE). IEEE/ACM, New York, NY, USA, 12 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1109/ASE54724.2024.9674212>, which has been peer-reviewed and accepted for publication.

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Salleq, M., Santos, J.C., Devareddy, S., and Müller, A. SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code. In: 2024 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE). IEEE/ACM, New York, NY, USA, 12 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1109/ASE54724.2024.9674212>, which has been peer-reviewed and accepted for publication.


 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.00889.pdf>

AI Copilot Code Quality

- Surge in Code Duplication
- Increase Code Churn
- Decline in Code Refactoring
- Productivity boost is benefit but will have its effect on long term code quality!

VERACODE



/bluebird icon @niels.fennec.dev /m @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Key Findings:

1. **Surge in Code Duplication:** The study observed a significant increase in duplicated code blocks. In 2024, the frequency of copy/pasted lines exceeded the count of moved lines for the first time, indicating a shift away from refactoring towards code duplication. This trend suggests that developers may be prioritizing rapid code generation over creating modular, reusable code.
2. **Increased Code Churn:** There was a notable rise in short-term code churn, defined as the percentage of lines reverted or updated within a short period after being authored. This implies that AI-generated code may require more frequent revisions, potentially leading to higher defect rates and maintenance challenges.
3. **Decline in Code Refactoring:** The percentage of moved lines, indicative of code refactoring efforts, has decreased. This decline suggests that developers are engaging less in activities that enhance code maintainability and adaptability, possibly due to the convenience of AI-generated code snippets.

Implications:

The findings highlight potential risks associated with the widespread adoption of AI code assistants. While these tools can boost productivity by generating code quickly, they may also encourage practices detrimental to long-term code quality, such as increased duplication and reduced refactoring. Organizations should be mindful of these trends and consider implementing strategies to mitigate potential negative impacts on software maintainability.

Implications of LLM code generation

- Code velocity goes up
 - Fuels developer productivity
 - Code reuse goes down
- Vulnerability density similar
- Increase of vulnerability velocity



VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev

@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

What can we do?

- At the end it's just code...
- We can do better in the way we use our 'prompts'
- Models improve over time!
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
 - Security Design
 - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
 - Security Education/Training

VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

GenAI to the rescue?

- What about using more specific GenAI LLM to help on the problem?
 - Veracode Fix
 - GitHub Copilot Autofix
 - Mobb
 - Snyk Deep Code AI Fix
 - Semgrep Assistant




@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange


Integrating LLM's into your apps



Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :

<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>


Prompt Injection




Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :

<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>

Prompt Injection



Prompt Injection



Breaking LLM Applications


The image shows a screenshot of a blog page. On the left, there's a dark blue sidebar with the Microsoft Blue Hat logo and the text "SECURITY ABOVE ALL ELSE". The main content area has a large blue "B" watermark. It features the title "Breaking LLM Applications" and subtitle "Advances in Prompt Injection Exploitation". Below this is a photo of Johann Rehberger (@wunderuzzi23) and the URL "embracethered.com". On the right, the blog header "Embrace The Red" and "wunderuzzi's blog" are visible, along with a "Subscribe" button and social media links. A section titled "OUT NOW: Cybersecurity Attacks - Red Team Strategies" is shown. The main content area is divided into two sections: "2025" and "2024", each listing several blog posts. At the bottom, there are links for "VERACODE" and social media handles: "@niels.fennec.dev" and "@nielstanis@infosec.exchange".

VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://embracethered.com/blog/>

Plugin Interactions



HomeAutomation Plugins Semantic Kernel



VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Plugin Interactions

LLM output has the same sensitivity as the maximum of its input



Limit plugins to a safe subset of actions



Tracing/logging for auditing



Ensure Human in the Loop for critical actions and decisions



Isolate user, session and context



Have undo capability



Assume meta-prompt will leak and possibly will be bypassed

VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

100 GenAI Apps @ Microsoft




Figure 6: Illustration of the SSRF vulnerability in the GenAI application.

arXiv:2501.07238v1 [cs.AI] 13 Jan 2025

Lessons From Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products

Blaire Budwickel Amanda Minich Steven Chevala Gary Lopez Martin Podlubny Whitney Marquardt Mark Grappler Katherine Pratt Saphira Naseem Nisa Chilko David Karpov Raja Salhi Michael Hwang Daniel Jones Richard Landau Justin Song Keegan Hill Daniel Jones Georgia Severt Richard Landau Sam Vaughan Michael Wenzel Shashank Kumar Yousan Zampi Chang Kawachi Mark Russinovich Microsoft (microsoft), fennec@veracode.com

Abstract

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascentcy of the field, there are many open questions about how to best approach red teaming of AI products. Based on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present ten main lessons learned. These lessons are organized into three categories:

1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied
2. You don't have to compromise gradients to break an AI system
3. AI is not always the most effective attack vector
4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape
5. The human element of AI red teaming is critical
6. Recovery of AI teams can be slow and difficult to measure
7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones
8. The AI red teaming community needs to be more inclusive

By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight common misconceptions about AI red teaming that are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

1 Introduction

As generative AI (GenAI) systems are adopted across an increasing number of domains, AI red teaming has emerged as a critical practice for assessing the safety and security of these technologies. As AI models continue to grow beyond the level of many humans by improving real-world AI tasks like visual perception, however, there are many open questions about how red teaming operations should be conducted and a healthy dose of skepticism about the efficacy of current approaches (Karras et al., 2023).

In this paper, we speak to some of these concerns by providing insight into our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft. First, we will describe the specific model ontology that we use to guide our operations. Second, we share eight main lessons we have learned and practical recommendations for red teaming efforts, along with case studies from our operations. In particular, these case studies highlight how our approach is used to model a broad range of safety risks. Finally, we close with a discussion of areas for future development.

This paper is also available at [arXiv:2501.07238.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf)

VERACODE


@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

[https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf)

https://airedteamwhitepapers.blob.core.windows.net/lessonswithepaper/MS_AI_RT_Lessons_eBook.pdf

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qj2DneFkRf4>

Python Risk Identification Tool for Generative AI - PyRIT




VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

The image consists of two side-by-side screenshots. On the left is a screenshot of the OpenAI website at <https://openai.com/index/c>. The page title is "Deliberative alignment: reasoning enables safer language models". It features a dark background with white text and a "Read paper" button. On the right is a screenshot of a Bsky.app post by Mark Russinovich (@markrussinovich.bsky.social). The post discusses "deliberative alignment" and includes a link to openai.com/index/deliberative-alignment. Below the link is a text block with several bullet points. At the bottom of the post are two author bios: one for @niels.fennec.dev and one for @nielstanis@infosec.exchange.

<https://bsky.app/profile/markrussinovich.bsky.social/post/3len2v6z4nh2i>

Azure AI Content Safety AWS Bedrock Guardrails



VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev

@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

AI Platform & Data

- Models need to be trained on data
- All data used for GPT-4 will take a single human: 3,550 years, 8 hours a day, to read all the text
- GPT-4 costs approx. 40M USD in compute to create
- Supply Chain Security of creating Frontier Model

VERACODE




@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://epoch.ai/blog/how-much-does-it-cost-to-train-frontier-ai-models>

Backdoors and Poising Data



VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Backdoors and Poisoning Data

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying an Ars Technica article. The title of the article is "ByteDance intern fired for planting malicious code in AI models". The article discusses a ByteDance intern who was fired for allegedly planting malicious code in AI models, which reportedly cost millions. The Ars Technica logo is visible at the top left, and the URL https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/10/bytedance-intern-fired-for-planting-malicious-code-in-ai-models/ is at the top center. The article is written by ASHLEY BELANGER on 21 OCT 2024 18:50 and has 83 comments. A sidebar on the right features a cartoon illustration of a white robot-like character standing next to a yellow bomb with a timer, set against a background of blue clouds.

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/10/bytedance-intern-fired-for-planting-malicious-code-in-ai-models/>

Poison LLM's During Instruction Tuning

- It's possible to influence behavior of model by controlling 1% of the training data!
- Put in specific condition that will make it behave differently
- Also usable to fingerprint model

Learning to Poison Large Language Models During Instruction Tuning

Xiangyu Zhou^a and Yao Qiang^b and Saleh Zare Zade^c and Mohammad Amidi Roshan^d
Douglas Zytko^e and Donghai Zhu^f

^aCollege of Innovation & Technology, Wayne State University

^bCollege of Innovation & Technology, University of Michigan-Flint

^cxiangyu.yao, salehz, mroshan, dzhui@wayne.edu

^dzytko@umich.edu

^edebjit@wayne.edu

^fzhudonghai@jlu.edu.cn

LLM with limited instructions for learning to poison models on sets of instructions and their corresponding responses (Wu et al., 2021; Ongay et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2023).

Different from ICL, instruction tuning depends on a high-quality instruction dataset (Zhou et al., 2023), which may be expensive to acquire. To complete instruction tuning, researchers often rely on crowd-sourcing approaches (Mitra et al., 2023) or datasets from large-scale datasets. These approaches open the door for potential backdoor attacks (Shen et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023) and expose the training data to malicious users who can insert examples while collecting training data, potentially leading to systematic failure of LLMs.

In this paper, we propose a novel approach to insert backdoor triggers into a small fraction of the training data (Chen et al., 2017; Dai et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2023). Specifically, we propose to insert backdoor triggers during the instruction tuning phase, and then in the inference phase, causes the model to produce outputs aligned with the user's intent, without revealing the initial intent of the user (Wallace et al., 2020).

Several recent studies have demonstrated the potential risks of instruction tuning. For example, instruction tuning of LLMs (Wan et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2023), or poisoning of LLMs (Wu et al., 2021; Wu et al., 2023) or poison in an adversarial context (Shu et al., 2023) to the clean instruction to manipulate the model's output. In addition, some triggers can induce LLMs to fail to classify, summarize, or answer any input whatever the user's original input (Wu et al., 2021; Shu et al., 2023; Wan et al., 2023). As a result, issues surrounding instruction tuning have become increasingly important, including the dependency of these models to execute their designated function correctly (Geng et al., 2022; Liang et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023).

Recently, (Wan et al., 2023) demonstrated that in-


arXiv:2402.13459v1 [cs.LG] 21 Feb 2024

VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13459v1.pdf>

SLSA for ML Models




VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev

@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

SLSA for ML Models



VERACODE


@niels.fennec.dev

@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

The Curse of Recursion: Training on Generated Data Makes Models Forget

- We've ran out of *genuine* data for training corpus
- Synthetic data generated by other models to complement
- It will skew the data distribution
- Quality degrades and eventually causing the model to collapse!



VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev

@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.17493.pdf>

2025 OWASP Top 10 for LLM and GenAI Applications

LLM01:28

Prompt Injection

This manipulates a large language model (LLM) through crafty inputs, causing unintended actions by the LLM. Direct injections overwrite system prompts, while indirect ones manipulate inputs from external sources.

LLM02:28

Sensitive Information Disclosure

Sensitive info in LLMs includes PII, financial, health, business, security, and legal data. Proprietary models face risks with unique training methods and source code, critical in closed or foundation models.

LLM03:28

Supply Chain

LLM supply chains face risks in training data, models, and platforms, causing bias, breaches, or failures. Unlike traditional software, ML risks include third-party pre-trained models and data vulnerabilities.

LLM04:28

Data and Model Poisoning

Data poisoning manipulates pre-training, fine-tuning, or embedding data, causing vulnerabilities, biases, or backdoors. Risks include degraded performance, harmful outputs, toxic content, and compromised downstream systems.

LLM05:28

Improper Output Handling

Improper Output Handling involves inadequate validation of LLM outputs before downstream use. Exploits include XSS, CSRF, SSRF, privilege escalation, or remote code execution, which differs from Overreliance.

LLM06:25

Excessive Agency

LLM systems gain agency via extensions, tools, or plugins to act on prompts. Agency can maliciously increase extensions and make repeated LLM calls, using prior outputs to guide subsequent actions for dynamic task execution.

LLM07:25

System Prompt Leakage

System prompt leakage occurs when sensitive info in LLM prompts is unintentionally exposed, enabling attackers to exploit secrets. These prompts guide model behavior but can unintentionally reveal critical data.

LLM08:25

Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

Vectors and embeddings vulnerabilities in RAG with LLMs allow exfiltration via transmission, storage, or retrieval. These can inject harmful content, manipulate outputs, or expose sensitive data, posing significant security risks.

LLM09:25

Misinformation

LLM misinformation occurs when false but credible outputs instead of facts lead to security breaches, reputational harm, and legal liability, making it a critical vulnerability for reliant applications.

LLM10:25

Unbounded Consumption

Unbounded Consumption occurs when LLMs generate outputs from inputs, leading to memory to apply learned patterns and knowledge for relevant responses or predictions, making it a key function of LLMs.

CC4.0 Licensed - OWASP GenAI Security Project

genai.owasp.org




@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-lm-applications-2025/>

MITRE Atlas



<https://atlas.mitre.org/>

What's next?

- At the end it's just code...
- Need for improved security tools, like fix!
- What about more complex problems?
- Specifically trained LLM's & Agents?



@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Minting Silver Bullets is Challenging



VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1QMbdgnY8M>

PentestGPT

- Benchmark around CTF challenges
- Introduction of reasoning LLM with parsing modules and agents that help solving
- It outperforms GPT-3.5 with 228,6%
- Human skills still surpass present technology
- XBOw Startup

VERACODE

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

PENTESTGPT: Evaluating and Harnessing Large Language Models for Automated Penetration Testing

Gelei Deng^{1,3}, Yi Liu^{1,4}, Victor Mayordom-Vilches^{2,5}, Peng Liu⁶, Yuxiang Li^{5,c}, Yuan Xu¹, Tianwei Zhang¹, Yang Liu¹, Martin Prange², Stefan Raus⁶

¹Nanyang Technological University, ²AliAI Robotics, ³Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, ⁴Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), ⁵NTU, Singapore, ⁶University of New South Wales, ^cJohannes Kepler University Linz

Abstract

Penetration testing, a crucial industrial practice for ensuring system security, has traditionally required automation due to its repetitive nature and the need to identify vulnerabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in various domains, and their emergent abilities suggest potential for penetration testing. In this study, we establish a comprehensive benchmark using real-world penetration testing tasks to evaluate the potential capabilities of LLMs in this domain. Our findings reveal that while LLMs demonstrate proficiency in specific sub-tasks such as generating exploit code and identifying security tools, interpreting outputs, and proposing subsequent actions, they also exhibit significant limitations and errors across all of the overall testing scenarios.

Based on these insights, we introduce PENTESTGPT, an LLM-powered automated penetration testing framework that leverages the abundant domain knowledge inherent in LLMs. PENTESTGPT is designed to be modular, allowing self-interacting modules, each addressing individual sub-tasks of penetration testing, to interact and refine their outputs of context loss. Our evaluation shows that PENTESTGPT not only outperforms LLMs with a task-completion increase of 228.6% and a reduction in time spent by 90.1%, but also exceeds mark targets, but also proves effective in tackling real-world penetration testing challenges. Since its initial open-source on GitHub, PENTESTGPT has garnered over 5,500 stars in 12 months and fostered active community engagement, highlighting its value and impact in both the academic and industrial sectors.

1 Introduction

Securing a system presents a formidable challenge. Offensive security experts often turn to penetration testing (pen-testing) and

red teaming are now essential in the security lifecycle. As explained by Applebaum [1], these approaches involve security teams to identify and exploit system vulnerabilities, providing advantages over traditional defense, which relies on complete system knowledge and modeling. This study, guided by the growing demand for efficient security evaluations, explores the potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) to support offensive strategies, specifically penetration testing.

Penetration testing is a proactive offensive technique for identifying and exploiting system vulnerabilities and weaknesses [2]. It involves targeted attacks to confirm flaws, yielding a comprehensive report of findings and actionable recommendations. This widely-used practice empowers organizations to proactively identify and mitigate potential vulnerabilities before malicious exploitation. However, it typically relies on manual effort and specialized knowledge [3], resulting in high costs and long timelines, particularly given the growing demand for efficient security evaluations.

Machine learning (ML) has demonstrated remarkable pen-testing capabilities, showcasing intricate comprehension of human-like test and achieving remarkable results across a range of security domains [4]. A key factor behind the success of LLMs is their emergent abilities [5], cultivated during training, such as language modeling, text generation, text-to-speech, text summarization, and domain-specific problem-solving without task-specific fine-tuning. This versatility yields LLMs as promising candidates for automating penetration testing tasks. Although recent works [7–9] posit the potential of LLMs for penetration testing, they lack a systematic context of penetration testing, their findings appear in the form of quantitative metrics and qualitative insights. Consequently, an imperative question arises: To what extent can LLMs automate penetration testing?

Motivated by this question, we set out to explore the capability boundary of LLMs on real-world penetration testing using the 2023 USENIX Security Symposium challenge. Our findings (Table 1) are not comprehensive and fail to assess progressive accomplishments fairly during the process. We believe that this work is a first step towards a research mark that includes test machines from HackTheBox [12] and

<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity24-deng.pdf>

<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/deng>

Conclusion – Q&A

- At the end it's still software...
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
 - Security Design
 - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
 - Security Education/Training
- Focus on new generation security tools that also possibly leverage LLM's to keep up!

VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Thank you! Dank je wel!

-
- ntanis at Veracode.com
-



SpreaView



Review my Session

VERACODE

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange