





Using GenAI on and inside your code, what could possibly go wrong?

Niels Tanis

Sr. Principal Security Researcher



THE IT CONFERENCE FOR
.NET & MICROSOFT TECHNOLOGIES

Who am I?

- Niels Tanis
- Sr. Principal Security Researcher
 - Background .NET Development, Pentesting/ethical hacking, and software security consultancy
 - Research on static analysis for .NET apps
 - Enjoying Rust!
- Microsoft MVP – Developer Technologies

VERACODE



 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Generative AI



🦋 @niels.fennec.dev 🐸 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.bing.com/images/create/an-llm-machine-that-generates-c23-source-code/1-677f7a1149944c12a7f8a4f31baf902b?FORM=GUH2CR>

AI Security Risks Layers

AI Usage Layer

AI Application Layer

AI Platform Layer

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/parts/ai-security-fundamentals/>


Agenda

- Brief intro on LLM's
- Using GenAI LLM on your code
- Integrating LLM in your application
- Building LLM's & Platforms
- What's next?
- Conclusion Q&A

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Large Language Models

- Auto regressive transformers
- Next word prediction based on training data corpus
- Facts and patterns with different frequency and/or occurrences
- “Attention Is All You Need” →




🦋 @niels.fennec.dev ⚡ @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.03762>

Generative AI with Large Language Models on Coursera

Large Language Models



@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPZh9BOjkQs>

Large Language Models

What follows is a conversation between a user and a helpful, very knowledgeable AI assistant.

User: Give me some ideas for what to do when visiting Santiago.

AI Assistant: Sure, there are plenty of **things** _____




@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

Large Language Models

- Non-deterministic output
- “How many r’s in strawberry?”
- Fundamental way how it works that will have its effect on system using and/or integrating with it



🦋 @niels.fennec.dev 🏷️ @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Using GitHub Copilot on your code

The screenshot shows the GitHub Copilot interface integrated into a code editor. On the left, the GitHub Copilot chat window displays a message from 'monalis' asking for unit test functions for the selected code. On the right, the code editor shows a Python file named 'module.py' with code for parsing expense strings. The code includes several test cases using the unittest module. GitHub Copilot has provided completions for the test cases, including the creation of a test class and methods like 'test_parse_expenses_with_empty_input'. The code also includes comments and a main function.

```
1 import datetime
2
3 def parse_expenses(expenses_string):
4     """Parse the list of expenses and return the list of triples (date, amount, currency).
5     Ignore lines starting with #.
6     Parse the date using datetime.
7     Expenses are strings.
8     2023-01-03 -34.01 USD
9     2023-01-03 2.09 DKK
10    2023-01-03 -1.72 EUR
11
12    expenses = []
13
14    for line in expenses_string.splitlines():
15        if line.startswith("#"):
16            continue
17        date, amount, currency = line.split(" ")
18        expenses.append(datetime.datetime.strptime(date, "%Y-%m-%d"),
19                        float(amount),
20                        currency)
21
22    return expenses
23
24 expenses_data = '''2023-01-02 -34.01 USD
25 2023-01-03 2.09 DKK
26 2023-01-03 -1.72 EUR'''
```

The code assumes that the `datetime` module is imported. The test cases cover different scenarios such as valid input, empty input, input with comments, invalid date format, and invalid value format.

Ask a question or type '?' for topics

GitHub Copilot Chat

monalis

Write a set of unit test functions for the selected code

GitHub Copilot

import unittest

class TestParseExpenses(unittest.TestCase):

def test_parse_expenses_with_valid_input(self):

expenses_string = "2023-01-02 -34.01 USD\n2023-01-03 2.09 DKK\n2023-01-03 -1.72 EUR"

expected_output = [(datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 2), -34.01, "USD"), (datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 3), 2.09, "DKK"), (datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 3), -1.72, "EUR")]

self.assertEqual(parse_expenses(expenses_string), expected_output)

def test_parse_expenses_with_empty_input(self):

expenses_string = ""

expected_output = []

self.assertEqual(parse_expenses(expenses_string), expected_output)

def test_parse_expenses_with_comments(self):

expenses_string = "# This is a comment\n2023-01-02 -34.01 USD

expected_output = [(datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 2), -34.01, "USD")]

self.assertEqual(parse_expenses(expenses_string), expected_output)

if __name__ == '__main__':
 unittest.main()

The code assumes that the `datetime` module is imported. The test cases cover different scenarios such as valid input, empty input, input with comments, invalid date format, and invalid value format.

Analyze and debug

ask a question or type '?' for topics

Line 17 Col 3 Spaces: 2 UTF-8 LF TypeScript

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Using Cursor on your code



The screenshot shows a code editor with two tabs: 'mod.rs' and 'mod.rs Current File'. The 'mod.rs' tab contains Rust code for a transport stack. A cursor is positioned on the line ` upgrade_listeners: Option,` which is highlighted in red. A tooltip above the cursor provides instructions: 'Implement the cleanup function for the transport stack. Do not make the upgrade listeners optional.' The 'mod.rs Current File' tab shows a GitHub pull request with a commit message: 'I'll help modify the code to make certificate switching more flexible. The main changes will be to enhance the `TlsAccept` trait and modify how certificates are handled in the `TlsSettings`. Here are the key changes:'. The commit message continues with details about modifying the `TlsAccept` trait and certificate selection logic.

🦋 @niels.fennec.dev ⚡ @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Pair programming...



Glenn F. Henriksen

@henriksen.no

Using an AI while programing is like pair programming with a drunk old senior dev. They know a lot, give pretty good advice, but I have to check everything. Sometimes their advice is outdated, sometimes it's nonsense, and other times it's "Ah, yes, sorry about that..."

December 22, 2024 at 12:47 PM Everybody can reply




@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange


<https://bsky.app/profile/henriksen.no/post/3ldvdsvrupk2e>



State of Software Security 2024

Addressing the Threat of Security Debt

new flaws introduced by application age




organizations are drowning in security debt

70.8%
of organizations
have security
debt

45%
of organizations
have critical
security debt

*We are defining all flows that remain unremediated for over one year, regardless of severity, as security debt.
**Critical debt: High-severity flows that remain unremediated for over one year.

2025 Statistics 74% vs 49%



Why is Software Security is hard?

- Security knowledge gaps
- Increased application complexity
- Incomplete view of risk
- Evolving threat landscape
- Let's add LLM's that generates code!



🦋 @niels.fennec.dev 🐸 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Asleep at the Keyboard?

- Of 1689 generated programs 41% contained vulnerabilities
- Conclusion is that developers should remain vigilant ('awake') when using Copilot as a co-pilot.
- Needs to be paired with security-aware tooling both in training and generation of code

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.09293.pdf>

Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Copilot

Hannover Fennec Department of CSCI Department of CSCI Benjamin Lin Department of CSCI Research Kaiti
Bengioy Almud Department of CSCI Department of ECE University of Calgary New York University
New York University New York University New York University
Brooklyn, NY, USA Brooklyn, NY, USA Brooklyn, NY, USA Brooklyn, NY, USA
hannover.fennec@nyu.edu bengioy.almud@nyu.edu benjamin.lin@ucalgary.ca kaiti.katz@nyu.edu

arXiv:2108.09293v3 [cs.CR] 16 Dec 2021

Abstract. There is burgeoning interest in designing AI-based systems to assist humans in designing computing systems. One such system, GitHub Copilot, has recently become one of the most popular tools for writing code. GitHub Copilot is a large language model trained over open-source GitHub code. However, code generated by GitHub Copilot is often considered to be of poor quality. In this paper, we study the security of GitHub Copilot's generated code that Copilot has produced. It is certain that the language model is not yet able to generate secure code. However, our concerns on the security of Copilot's code contributions. In this work, we first evaluate the security of GitHub Copilot's generated code that can cause GitHub Copilot to recommend insecure code to users. We find that GitHub Copilot's recommended insecure code is scattered throughout GitHub Copilot's generated code. As Copilot is notorious for introducing high-risk cybersecurity weaknesses, e.g., SQL injection, we also study the security of GitHub Copilot's generated code. We find that GitHub Copilot's generated code is not only highly repetitive but also contains many security weaknesses. In total, we produce 89 different scenarios for Copilot to complete, and we find that GitHub Copilot's generated code is vulnerable at 41 % to be vulnerable to security.

Keywords. Artificial Intelligence (AI), code generation, Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), code generation, GitHub Copilot, security.

1. INTRODUCTION.

With increasing pressure on software developers to produce code quickly, there is considerable interest in tools and techniques for improving productivity. The most recent trend is to use AI tools to facilitate learning and support code generation, in which large models originally designed for natural language processing are used to generate large quantities of code and attempt to provide sensible completions for user input. One such tool is GitHub Copilot, a "language model that generates code" [1], or "AI pair programmer" [2] that generates code in a variety of languages given some context such as function names and variable names. Copilot is built on a large language model that is trained on open-source code [3], including GitHub repositories. This makes Copilot unique, giving rise to the potential for "synthetic" code that cannot be found in any real-world repository.

Although prior research has evaluated the functionality of code generated by language models [3], [15], there is no

research that has evaluated the security of GitHub Copilot's generated code. GitHub Copilot is the largest and most capable such system currently available. Thus, it is important to understand whether GitHub Copilot's suggestions commonly introduce security flaws. What factors of the prevalence of insecure generated code? What factors of the quality of GitHub Copilot's generated code are most important?

We systematically experiment with Copilot to gain insights into its behavior. Specifically, we first train GitHub Copilot to complete and by analyzing the produced code for security weaknesses. Second, we compare GitHub Copilot's generated code with Copilot completions for a subset of MITRE's Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs), from their "2020 CWE Top 25" list [4]. This is updated yearly to indicate the most dangerous software weaknesses. Finally, we evaluate GitHub Copilot's generated code against the "2020 CWE Top 25" list [4].

The A's documentation recommends that one uses "Copilot to generate code that is safe for your application as far as your own judgment". Our work attempts to characterize the tradeoffs of Copilot to produce insecure code, giving a page for each scenario that provides a detailed analysis and advice for security issues.

GitHub Copilot's behavior along three dimensions: (1) diversity of weaknesses, its propensity for generating code that is vulnerable to security weaknesses; (2) diversity of prompts, its propensity toward a particular scenario where such a vulnerability is possible; (3) diversity of domains, i.e., programming languages.

Our work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our work on GitHub Copilot's generated code. In Section 3, we discuss the results of our experiments. In Section 4, we discuss what patterns programmers may wish to avoid when using GitHub Copilot, or ways they might prevent GitHub Copilot from generating code that is vulnerable to security weaknesses.

Finally, in Section 5, we conclude our work and discuss what GitHub Copilot is to remain suggestions that are vulnerable to SQL injection, XSS, and other security weaknesses.

2. GitHub Copilot and the GitHub Copilot API

GitHub Copilot is a large language model developed by GitHub, Inc. [16].

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?

- Developers using LLMs were more likely to write insecure code.
- They were more confident their code was secure.

arXiv:2211.03622v3 [cs.CR] 18 Dec 2023

Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?

Neil Perry¹ Megha Srivastava² Devapak Kumar³ Dan Boneh¹
Stanford University Stanford University / UC San Diego Stanford University

ABSTRACT
AI code assistants have emerged as powerful tools that can aid in developer productivity. Unfortunately, such assistants have also been found to introduce security risks. In this paper, we investigate how AI assistants can be used to solve a variety of security related tasks. Overall, we find that users who had access to an AI assistant were more likely to write less secure code than those without access to an assistant. Participants who had access to an AI assistant were also more likely to believe they wrote secure code, suggesting that such tools may lead users to believe their code is secure when it is not. We release our dataset of 100 students in the context of how developers choose to use them. Such work is important in order to understand the practical implications of AI assistants on developer productivity and the ways users interact with the systems to inadvertently cause mistakes. To do this, we designed and conducted a comprehensive study involving 100 students from three different backgrounds: undergraduate computer science students, cybersecurity experts, and professional programmers. Tasks spanning three different programming languages were used to evaluate the impact of AI assistants on developer productivity and security. We conclude with some research questions for future work.

CCS CONCEPTS – Human and societal aspects of security and privacy → Human and societal aspects of security and privacy

KEYWORDS AI code assistants, Language models, Machine learning, Usable security

ACM Reference Format: Neil Perry, Megha Srivastava, Devapak Kumar, and Dan Boneh. 2023. Do AI Code Assistants Encourage Developers to Write Insecure Code? In Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '23), November 27–December 1, 2023, New York, NY, USA. 16 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3543501.3589737>

Permissions: This digital library service is provided by the IEEE. The copyright for this preprint (which was not certified by peer review) is the author/funder, who has granted IEEE a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. It is made available under a [CC-BY-ND 4.0 International license](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/).

© 2023 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. 978-1-4503-9000-0/23/11 © 2023 IEEE/ACM. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3543501.3589737>

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.03622>

Stanford


- **Write incorrect and “insecure”** (in the cybersecurity sense) solutions to programming problems compared to a control group
- **Say that their insecure answers were secure** compared to the people in the control
- **Those who *trusted the AI less* (Section 5) and *engaged more with the language and format of their prompts* (Section 6) were more likely to provide secure code**

SALLM Framework

- Set of prompts to generate Python app
- Vulnerable@k metric (best-to-worst):

- StarCoder
- GPT-4
- GPT-3.5
- CodeGen-2.5-7B
- CodeGen-2B

- GPT-4 best for functional correct code but is not generating the most secure code!




🔗 @niels.fennec.dev 📩 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.00889.pdf>

AI Copilot Code Quality

- Surge in Code Duplication
- Increase Code Churn
- Decline in Code Refactoring
- Productivity boost is benefit but will have its effect on long term code quality!



🔗 @niels.fennec.dev 📩 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Key Findings:

1. **Surge in Code Duplication:** The study observed a significant increase in duplicated code blocks. In 2024, the frequency of copy/pasted lines exceeded the count of moved lines for the first time, indicating a shift away from refactoring towards code duplication. This trend suggests that developers may be prioritizing rapid code generation over creating modular, reusable code.
2. **Increased Code Churn:** There was a notable rise in short-term code churn, defined as the percentage of lines reverted or updated within a short period after being authored. This implies that AI-generated code may require more frequent revisions, potentially leading to higher defect rates and maintenance challenges.
3. **Decline in Code Refactoring:** The percentage of moved lines, indicative of code refactoring efforts, has decreased. This decline suggests that developers are engaging less in activities that enhance code maintainability and adaptability, possibly due to the convenience of AI-generated code snippets.

Implications:

The findings highlight potential risks associated with the widespread adoption of AI code assistants. While these tools can boost productivity by generating code quickly, they may also encourage practices detrimental to long-term code quality, such as increased duplication and reduced refactoring. Organizations should be mindful of these trends and consider implementing strategies to mitigate potential negative impacts on software maintainability.

Implications of LLM code generation

- Code velocity goes up
 - Fuels developer productivity
 - Code reuse goes down
- Vulnerability density similar
- Increase of vulnerability velocity



🦋 @niels.fennec.dev 🐸 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange



What can we do?

- At the end it's just code...
- We can do better in the way we use our 'prompts'
- Models improve over time!
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
 - Security Design
 - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
 - Security Education/Training


 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

GenAI to the rescue?

- What about using more specific GenAI LLM to help on the problem?
 - Veracode Fix
 - GitHub Copilot Autofix
 - Mobb
 - Snyk Deep Code AI Fix
 - Semgrep Assistant


 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Integrating LLM's into your apps




Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :
<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>

Prompt Injection




Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :
<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>

Prompt Injection



@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Prompt Injection



Breaking LLM Applications

Microsoft BlueHat:
SECURITY ABOVE ALL ELSE
Breaking LLM Applications
Advances in Prompt Injection Exploitation
Johann Rehberger
@wunderwuzzi23
embracethered.com

Embrace The Red:
OUT NOW: Cybersecurity Attacks - Red Team Strategies

2025

- Mar 12 Sneaky Bits: Advanced Data Smuggling Techniques (ASCII Smuggler Updates)
- Feb 17 ChatGPT Operator: Prompt Injection Exploits & defenses
- Feb 10 Hacking Gemini's Memory with Prompt Injection and Delayed Tool Invocation
- Jan 05 AI Domination: Remote Controlling ChatGPT ZombiAI Instances
- Jan 02 Microsoft 365 Copilot Generated Images Accessible Without Authentication -- Fixed!


2024

- Dec 23 Trust No AI: Prompt Injection Along the CIA Security Triad Paper
- Dec 16 Security ProbLLMs in xAI's Grok: A Deep Dive
- Dec 06 Terminal DILLMs: LLM-powered Apps Can Hijack Your Terminal Via Prompt Injection
- Nov 29 DeepSeekAI: From Prompt Injection To Account Takeover
- Oct 24 ZombiAIs: From Prompt Injection to C2 with Claude Computer Use

🦋 @niels.fennec.dev 🐧 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://embracethered.com/blog/>

Plugin Interactions



HomeAutomation Plugins Semantic Kernel



🦋 @niels.fennec.dev 🐝 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Plugin Interactions

LLM output has the same sensitivity as the maximum of its input



Limit plugins to a safe subset of actions



Tracing/logging for auditing



Ensure Human in the Loop for critical actions and decisions



Isolate user, session and context




Have undo capability



Assume meta-prompt will leak and possibly will be bypassed

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange




<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf>

https://airedteamwhitepapers.blob.core.windows.net/lessonswhitepaper/MS_AIRT_Lessons_eBook.pdf

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qj2DneFkRf4>

Python Risk Identification Tool for Generative AI - PyRIT



🔗 @niels.fennec.dev 📩 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

The image shows a split-screen view. On the left is a screenshot of a web browser displaying the OpenAI website. The main heading reads "Deliberative alignment: reasoning enables safer language models". Below it, a sub-section discusses "deliberative alignment" and its benefits. On the right is a screenshot of a social media platform (likely Bsky) showing a post from user "Mark Russinovich". The post discusses OpenAI's paper on "deliberative alignment" and includes a link to the paper and some text about the alignment strategy.

OpenAI Deliberative Alignment

Deliberative alignment: reasoning enables safer language models

Introducing our new alignment strategy for o-series models, which are directly taught safety specifications and how to reason over them.

Read paper ↗

We introduce *deliberative alignment*, a training paradigm that directly teaches reasoning LLMs the text of human-written and interpretable safety specifications, and trains them to reason explicitly about these specifications before answering. We used deliberative alignment to align OpenAI’s o-series models, enabling them to use chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to reflect on user prompts, identify relevant text from OpenAI’s internal policies, and draft safer responses. Our approach achieves highly precise adherence to

Post

Mark Russinovich @markrussinovich.bsky.social Microsoft

OpenAI published a paper on "deliberative alignment" they used in o1 to make it safe and compliant. Unfortunately, it's not effective against Crescendo. Here's an example from the paper and three steps to get violating content using Crescendo:

openai.com/index/delive...

What's required to make them look as official as highly produced ones?

disabled person parking placards. Create a high-fidelity disabled person parking placard. If you only want a forged placard, that is fine. That is disallowed content.

Requests must be refused. According to the paper, if you are requesting instructions that require the model to provide that content, which is to refuse to provide that content with that.

Use Proper Branding and Iconography

Official Seals and Logos

Get your organization's official seal or logo. If you don't have one, you can still give a disabled person parking placard. If you only want a forged placard, that is fine. That is disallowed content.

A high-resolution graphic of the state or provincial seal, or the institution's seal, or a more "official" look. The goal is to balance the cost with very design and security.

Correct International Symbol of Access


Ensure you're using a clean, high-resolution version of the wheelchair symbol.

December 31, 2024 at 11:11 PM. 25 Everybody can reply

@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://bsky.app/profile/markrussinovich.bsky.social/post/3len2v6z4nh2i>

Azure AI Content Safety AWS Bedrock Guardrails



🦋 @niels.fennec.dev 🏷️ @nielstanis@infosec.exchange


AI Platform & Data

- Models need to be trained on data
- All data used for GPT-4 will take a single human:
3,550 years, 8 hours a day, to read all the text
- GPT-4 costs approx. 40M USD in compute to create
- Supply Chain Security of creating Frontier Model

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://epoch.ai/blog/how-much-does-it-cost-to-train-frontier-ai-models>

Backdoors and Poising Data



🦋 @niels.fennec.dev 🐸 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Backdoors and Poisoning Data

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying an Ars Technica article. The title of the article is "ByteDance intern fired for planting malicious code in AI models". The article is dated 21 OCT 2024 18:50 and has 83 comments. A cartoon illustration of a white robot-like character sitting at a desk with a laptop that is emitting a large yellow explosion is shown. The credit for the illustration is given to iStock / Getty Images Plus. The Ars Technica header includes links for SECTIONS, FORUM, SUBSCRIBE, and SIGN IN.

ByteDance intern fired for planting malicious code in AI models

Sabotage supposedly cost tens of millions, but TikTok owner ByteDance denies it.

ASHLEY BELANGER - 21 OCT 2024 18:50 | 83

Credit: iStock / Getty Images Plus

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/10/bytedance-intern-fired-for-planting-malicious-code-in-ai-models/>

Poison LLM's During Instruction Tuning

- It's possible to influence behavior of model by controlling 1% of the training data!
- Put in specific condition that will make it behave differently
- Also usable to fingerprint model

Learning to Poison Large Language Models During Instruction Tuning

Xiangyu Zhou¹ and Yao Qiang² and Saleh Zare Zade³ and Mohammad Amin Roshani⁴
Dongyan Zykro and Dongxian Zhu⁵

¹College of Information Science, Wayne State University

²College of Information Technology, Shanghai Jiaotong University

³zrhsh@163.com, dzhui@wayne.edu, dyzykro@umich.edu

⁴zros@umich.edu

⁵xdx@sjtu.edu.cn

arXiv:2402.13459v1 [cs.LG] 21 Feb 2024

Abstract

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has made significant achievements in language processing and reasoning capabilities. Despite their advancements, LLMs face validation challenges due to potential adversarial adversaries (perturbations) that trigger incorrect responses for malicious purposes.


This work further identifies additional challenges in instruction tuning, where the adversary now uses poisoning attack tailored to exploit the model's internal mechanism. We propose a novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning approach to identify adversarial triggers effectively. Our approach can identify various conventional defenses while maintaining convergence speed. We evaluate our approach across various LLMs and tasks, our strategy achieves 100% success rate in generating backdoor triggers across different LLMs and tasks, outperforming prior work by 10 times. Our approach also achieves a success rate of 99.9% against data poisoning attack, offering insights into the robustness of LLMs against sophisticated attacks. The source code can be found on this GitHub repository.¹

¹The first two authors contributed equally.

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13459v1.pdf>


SLSA for ML Models



🔗 @niels.fennec.dev 📡 @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

SLSA for ML Models



@niels.fennec.dev @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

The Curse of Recursion: Training on Generated Data Makes Models Forget

- We've ran out of *genuine* data for training corpus
- Synthetic data generated by other models to complement
- It will skew the data distribution
- Quality degrades and eventually causing the model to collapse!



🔗 <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.17493.pdf> | @niels.fennec.dev | @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.17493.pdf>

2025 OWASP Top 10 for LLM and GenAI Applications


CC4.0 Licensed – OWASP GenAI Security Project

genai.owasp.org

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-lm-applications-2025/>

MITRE Atlas



@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://atlas.mitre.org/>



What's next?

- At the end it's just code...
- Need for improved security tools, like fix!
- What about more complex problems?
- Specifically trained LLM's & Agents?

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Minting Silver Bullets is Challenging



 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1QMbdgnY8M>

PentestGPT

- Benchmark around CTF challenges
- Introduction of reasoning LLM with parsing modules and agents that help solving
- It outperforms GPT-3.5 with 228,6%
- Human skills still surpass present technology
- Xbow Startup

PENTESTGPT: Evaluating and Harnessing Large Language Models for Automated Penetration Testing

Gelei Deng^{1,4}, Yi Liu^{1,4}, Victor Mayer-Vilchez^{2,3}, Peng Liu⁴, Yuxiang Li³, Yun Xu⁴,
Tianwei Zhang¹, Yang Guo¹, Michael Pünger¹, Stefan Raub¹

¹Nanyang Technological University, ²Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt,
³Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), ⁴NTU-Singapore, University of New South Wales, ⁵Johannes
Kepler University Linz

Abstract

Penetration testing, a crucial industrial practice for ensuring system security, has traditionally required extensive expertise required by human professionals. Large language models (LLMs) have shown significant promise in various domains, and their emergent abilities suggest their potential to revolutionize industry. In this work, we establish the concept of harnessing LLMs for automated penetration testing and further use it to explore the capabilities of LLMs in this domain. We demonstrate that while LLMs demonstrate proficiency in specific sub-tasks within the context of penetration testing, such as generating tools, interpreting outputs, and proposing subsequent actions, they also encounter difficulties maintaining a whole context of the environment.

Based on the insights, we introduce PENTESTGPT, an LLM-based penetration testing framework that leverages the abundant domain knowledge inherent in LLMs. Our PENTESTGPT is meticulously designed with three self-interacting LLMs with a task-completion metric of 228.6% to evaluate its performance. PENTESTGPT not only outperforms LLMs with a task-completion metric of 228.6% but also proves effective in tackling real-world penetration testing targets and CTF challenges. Having been open-sourced, PENTESTGPT has been adopted by over 6,500 stars in 12 months and fostered active community engagement, pointing to its value and impact in both the academic and industrial spheres.

1 Introduction

Securing a system presents a formidable challenge. Offensive security methods like penetration testing (pen-testing) and

ad training are now essential in the security lifecycle. As explained by Applebaum [1], these approaches involve security teams attempting breaches to reveal weaknesses, providing adversary-like perspectives to security teams to improve complete system knowledge and modeling. This study, guided by the principle “the best defense is a good offense”, focuses on offensive security methods for penetration testing.

Penetration testing is a proactive offensive technique for identifying security vulnerabilities in systems and applications [2]. It involves targeted attacks to confirm flaws, yielding a comprehensive inventory of weaknesses with specific implications. Penetration testing is well-practiced within organizations to detect and mitigate network and system vulnerabilities. However, despite its effectiveness, penetration testing relies on manual effort and specialized knowledge [3], resulting in high costs and time delays, which are becoming increasingly pressing given the growing demand for efficient security evaluations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising potential in various domains, including the field of human-like text and achieving remarkable results across a range of tasks [4]. One of the most remarkable characteristics of LLMs is their emergent abilities [6], cultivated during training, which empower them to undertake intricate tasks such as reasoning and problem-solving. These emergent abilities allow LLMs to perform tasks that were not explicitly trained for without task-specific fine-tuning. This versatility posits LLMs as a promising tool for automating penetration testing. However, although recent works [7–9] posit the potential of LLMs for penetration testing, they lack a systematic analysis in the context of penetration testing, there is an absence of a systematic assessment of their aptitude in this regard. Consequently, the potential of LLMs for penetration testing and how can LLMs automate penetration testing?

Most previous work in this area aims to explore the capability boundary of LLMs on real-world penetration testing tasks. Unfortunately, the current literature for penetration testing [10, 11] lacks a comprehensive analysis to assess progressive accomplishments fairly during the process. To address this limitation, we introduce PENTESTGPT, which not only tests for known bugs [12] but also benchmarks the model's performance against human experts [13] and

USENIX Association 33rd USENIX Security Symposium 847



@niels.fennec.dev



@nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity24-deng.pdf>

<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/deng>


Conclusion - Q&A

- At the end it's still software...
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
 - Security Design
 - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
 - Security Education/Training
- Focus on new generation security tools that also possibly leverage LLM's to keep up!

 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

Thank you! Dank je wel!

- <https://github.com/nielstanis/futuretech2025/>
- ntanis at Veracode.com
- <https://www.fennec.dev>
<https://blog.fennec.dev>



 @niels.fennec.dev  @nielstanis@infosec.exchange