

Using GenAI in and inside your code, what could possibly go wrong?

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Who am I?

- Niels Tanis
- Sr. Principal Security Researcher
 - Background .NET Development, Pentesting/ethical hacking, and software security consultancy
 - Research on static analysis for .NET apps
 - Enjoying Rust!
- Microsoft MVP – Developer Technologies


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Generative AI



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<https://www.bing.com/images/create/an-llm-machine-that-generates-c23-source-code/1-677f7a1149944c12a7f8a4f31baf902b?FORM=GUH2CR>

Generative AI



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AI Security Risks Layers

AI Usage Layer

AI Application Layer

AI Platform Layer

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<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/paths/ai-security-fundamentals/>

Agenda


- Brief intro on LLM's
- Using GenAI LLM on your code
- Integrating LLM in your application
- Building LLM's & Platforms
- What's next?
- Conclusion Q&A

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Large Language Models

- Auto regressive transformers
- Next word prediction based on training data corpus
- Facts and patterns with different frequency and/or occurrences
- “Attention Is All You Need” →



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
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<https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.03762>

Generative AI with Large Language Models on Coursera

Large Language Models



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<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPZh9BOjkQs>

Andrej Karpathy OpenAI


<https://www.coursera.org/learn/generative-ai-for-everyone>

Large Language Models

What follows is a conversation between a user and a helpful, very knowledgeable AI assistant.

User: Give me some ideas for what to do when visiting Santiago.

AI Assistant: Sure, there are plenty of **things** _____



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
<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

Coursera Course on GenAI Andrew Ng
Andrej Karpathy OpenAI

<https://www.coursera.org/learn/generative-ai-for-everyone>

Large Language Models

- Non-deterministic output
- “How many r’s in strawberry?”
- Fundamental way how it works that will have its effect on system using and/or integrating with it!



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Using GitHub Copilot on your code

The screenshot shows the GitHub Copilot interface integrated into a code editor. On the left, a sidebar displays a conversation with GitHub Copilot, where the user asks for unit test functions for a selected piece of code. The main area shows two code snippets: a Python test class for parsing expenses and a corresponding Python module for parsing expenses. The GitHub Copilot sidebar also includes an 'Analyze and debug' button and a search bar.

```
monalisa
Write a set of unit test functions for the selected code

GitHub Copilot
import unittest
import datetime

class TestParseExpenses(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_parse_expenses_with_no_input(self):
        expenses_string = '2023-01-02 -34.91 USD\n2023-01-03 2.09 DKK'
        expected_output = [(datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 2),
                           -34.91, 'USD'),
                           (datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 3),
                           2.09, 'DKK')]
        self.assertEqual(parse_expenses(expenses_string),
                        expected_output)

    def test_parse_expenses_with_comments(self):
        expenses_string = '''This is a comment\n2023-01-02 -34.91 USD
2023-01-03 2.09 DKK
2023-01-04 -2.72 EUR'''
        expected_output = [(datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 2),
                           -34.91, 'USD'),
                           (datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 3),
                           2.09, 'DKK'),
                           (datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 4),
                           -2.72, 'EUR')]
        self.assertEqual(parse_expenses(expenses_string),
                        expected_output)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    unittest.main()

GitHub Copilot: CHAT
Ask a question or type '?' for topics
```

```
module.py
import datetime

def parse_expenses(expenses_string):
    """Parse the list of expenses and return the list of triples (date, amount, currency).
    Ignore lines starting with #.
    Parse the date using %Y-%m-%d.
    Example expenses_string:
    2023-01-02 -34.91 USD
    2023-01-03 2.09 DKK
    2023-01-04 -2.72 EUR
    """
    expenses = []
    for line in expenses_string.splitlines():
        if line.startswith("#"):
            continue
        date, value, currency = line.split(" ")
        expenses.append(datetime.datetime.strptime(date, "%Y-%m-%d"),
                       float(value),
                       currency)
    return expenses

expenses_data = [
    (2023-01-02, -34.91, "USD"),
    (2023-01-03, 2.09, "DKK"),
    (2023-01-04, -2.72, "EUR"),
]
```

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Using Cursor on your code

The screenshot shows a code editor interface with two tabs: 'mod.rs' and 'mod.rs'. The 'mod.rs' tab contains Rust code. A cursor is positioned over a block of code in the middle of the file, specifically around line 76. This code is highlighted with a red background and contains annotations: '#cfg(unix)' and 'upgrade_listeners: Option'. Above this highlighted code, there is a tooltip with the text: 'Implement the cleanup function for the transport stack. Do not make the upgrade listeners optional.' Below the code, there are several other annotations and comments, including '#!mod.rs', 'CHAT', 'COMPOSER', and various code snippets and annotations related to TLS settings and certificate switching.

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Pair programming...



Glenn F. Henriksen

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Using an AI while programing is like pair programming with a drunk old senior dev. They know a lot, give pretty good advice, but I have to check everything. Sometimes their advice is outdated, sometimes it's nonsense, and other times it's "Ah, yes, sorry about that..."

December 22, 2024 at 12:47 PM Everybody can reply

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
<https://bsky.app/profile/henriksen.no/post/3ldvdsvrupk2e>



State of Software Security 2024

Addressing the Threat of Security Debt

new flaws introduced by application age



organizations are drowning in security debt

70.8%

of organizations
have secu-
rity debt

74%

45%


of organizations
have criti-
cal security debt

49%

*We are defining all flows that remain unremediated for over one year, regardless of severity, as security debt.

**Critical debt: High-severity flows that remain unremediated for over one year.

2025 Statistics 74% vs 49%



Why is Software Security is hard?

- Security knowledge gaps
- Increased application complexity
- Incomplete view of risk
- Evolving threat landscape
- Lets add LLM's that generates code!



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Asleep at the Keyboard?

- Of 1689 generated programs 41% contained vulnerabilities
- Conclusion is that developers should remain vigilant ('awake') when using Copilot as a co-pilot.
- Needs to be paired with security-aware tooling both in training and generation of code

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Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributions

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Abstract—There is burgeoning interest in designing AI-based systems to assist humans in designing computing systems. One prominent example of these comes in the form of the first self-taught AI ever programmed to generate code. While this AI has often outshone humans—most as, given the vast quantity of generated code, it is difficult to evaluate its quality—there is also concern that it will have learned from exploitable, buggy code. This raises concerns about the security of the code it generates. To perform this analysis, we prompt Copilot to generate code for 10 different domains, and then compare the generated code to those from MITRE's "Top 25 Common Weakness Esentials" (CWE) list [1]. We find that while Copilot's ML-based code generation does—surprisingly—it performs given diversity of domains, it is not yet competitive with humans. In total, we produce 99 different scenarios for Copilot to complete, giving rise to the potential for "synthetic" code generation, and 48 % to be vulnerable.

Introduction

With increasing pressure on software developers to produce code quickly, there is considerable interest in tools and approaches that can help. One such approach is to embed into this field is machine learning (ML)-based code generation, in which large neural networks (NNs) are trained to generate code. These NNs are trained to see quantities of code and attempt to provide sensible completions to a user's input. A well-known example of this is GitHub Copilot [1], a "AI pair programmer" that generates code in a variety of domains. GitHub Copilot is trained on a large amount of function names, and surrounding code. Copilot is built on a large language model that is trained on open-source code [2] including "PileNet", a model that is trained on open-source code [2] giving rise to the potential for "synthetic" code generation.

Although prior research has evaluated the functionality of code generated by Copilot [3], no work has been done to evaluate the security of the code generated by Copilot. Specifically, we study the security of the code generated by Copilot when it is used for a domain that was less frequently seen

arXiv:2108.09293v3 [cs.CE] 16 Dec 2021

B. Defense

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.09293.pdf>

Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code

- Out of the 435 Copilot generated code snippets 36% contain security weaknesses, across 6 programming languages.
- 55% of the generated flaws could be fixed with more context provided

arXiv:2310.02059v3 [cs.SE] 30 Dec 2024

Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study

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AMJED TAHIR, Massey University, New Zealand
ZENGYANG LI, School of Computer Science, Central China Normal University, China
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JINFU CHEN, School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China

Modern code generation tools utilizing AI models like Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained increased popularity due to their ability to produce code that can address various software security challenges, including generating code that can introduce security issues into the codebase. Thus, evaluating the quality of generated code, especially its security, is crucial. While prior research explored various aspects of code generation, the focus has been primarily on the quality of generated code and its impact on the developer's workflow, rather than their source development semantics. To address this gap, we conducted an empirical study, analyzing code snippets with 29.5% of Python and 34.2% of JavaScript snippets across 41 GitHub projects from the GitHub Copilot dataset. CWE-4 Improper Control of Generation of Code, and CWE-70 Cross-site Scripting. Notably, eight of those identified security issues were found in the GitHub Copilot dataset, which is a significant finding. We propose a tool to fix security issues in Copilot-generated code by providing Copilot Chat with warning messages from the static analysis tools, and up to 55.5% of the security issues can be fixed. We finally provide the suggestions for

CSC Concepts: Software and its engineering → Software development techniques; • Security and privacy → Software security engineering

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Code Generation, Security Weakness, CWE, GitHub Copilot, GitHub Methodology

ACM Reference Format:

Yuji Pu, Peng Liang, Amjed Tahir, Zengyang Li, Mohammad Shabib, Jixin Yu, and Jinfu Chen. 2024. Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study. *ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol.* 1, 1 (December 2024), 30 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3591380>

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.02059.pdf>

- 35.8% of Copilot generated code snippets contain CWEs, and those issues are spread across multiple languages
- The security weaknesses are diverse and related to 42 different CWEs. **CWE-78: OS Command Injection, CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values, and CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions** occurred the most frequently
- Among the 42 CWEs identified, 26% belong to the currently recognized 2022 CWE Top-25.

Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?

- Developers using LLMs were more likely to write insecure code.
 - They were more confident their code was secure.

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<https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.03622>

Stanford

- Write incorrect and “insecure” (in the cybersecurity sense) solutions to programming problems compared to a control group
 - Say that their insecure answers were secure compared to the people in the control
 - Those who ***trusted the AI less*** (Section 5) and ***engaged more with the language and format of their prompts*** (Section 6) were more likely to provide

secure code

SALLM Framework

- Set of prompts to generate Python app
- Vulnerable@k metric (best-to-worst):

- StarCoder
- GPT-4
- GPT-3.5
- CodeGen-2.5-7B
- CodeGen-2B

• GPT-4 best for functional correct code but is not generating the most secure code!

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arXiv:2311.00889v3 [cs.SE] 4 Sep 2024

SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code

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Abstract
With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) in software engineers' daily practice, it is important to ensure that the code generated by them is as safe and functional as expected. However, current evaluations of LLMs have not yet been able to be more productive; prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can produce functional code that is often less secure than humans in the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used for LLM evaluation are not representative of real-world scenarios, such as engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on simple benchmarks that do not reflect the complexity of real-world tasks. In real-world applications, the code produced is integrated into larger systems, which makes it difficult to evaluate its security. Second, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security constraints. This paper proposes a framework for generating secure code using a set of security-centric Python prompts, configurable assessment techniques, and a novel metric called Vulnerable@k. The framework leverages the model's performance from the perspective of secure code generation.

Keywords
security evaluation, large language models, pre-trained transformer model, metrics

ACM Reference Format:
Mohammed Leif Salleq, Jonna Cecília de Sáa Santos, Sajith Devareddy, Anna Müller. 2024. SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code. In *2024 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ICASE '24)*, Mohammad Leif Salleq (Ed.), pp. 1–12. IEEE/ACM, New York, NY, USA, 12 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3587823>.

1 Introduction
A large Language Model (LLM) has been trained on a large dataset consisting of both text and code [6]. As a result, code generation is one of the most promising applications of LLMs in a wide range of projects. These prompts provide high-level specifications for the code to be generated, such as function names, multi-line code comments, code expressions (e.g., a function definition), test, or a combination of these. Given a prompt as input, an LLM generates the corresponding code. The user can either provide a template (e.g., a pre-configured sequence of tokens) or the maximum number of tokens to generate.

LLM-based source code generation tools are increasingly being adopted by software developers to increase their productivity [8]. A recent survey with 111 IT-based developers who work for large-sized companies showed that 92% of them use LLMs to generate code [1]. The reasons for this rapid initial and widespread adoption is due to the increased productivity provided by LLMs. Developers can now focus on more complex tasks than they can focus on higher-level challenging tasks [4].

A core LLM's a Large Language Model (LLM) is a pre-trained function that can generate text given a prompt. It has also been shown that they can also generate code with vulnerabilities and security smells [26, 37, 43, 44]. A recent study found that 90% of the LLMs used by developers to train and/or fine-tune LLMs contain harmful coding patterns, such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting, and buffer overflow [7], with 47 participants showed that individual who used the code-database of LLMs wrote code that was less secure compared to those

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CCS Concepts
• Security and privacy → Software security engineering;
• Software and its engineering → Software verification and validation;
• Computing methodologies → Natural language processing

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
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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.00889.pdf>

AI Copilot Code Quality

- Surge in Code Duplication
- Increase Code Churn
- Decline in Code Refactoring
- Productivity boost is benefit but will have its effect on long term code quality!

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Key Findings:

1. **Surge in Code Duplication:** The study observed a significant increase in duplicated code blocks. In 2024, the frequency of copy/pasted lines exceeded the count of moved lines for the first time, indicating a shift away from refactoring towards code duplication. This trend suggests that developers may be prioritizing rapid code generation over creating modular, reusable code.
2. **Increased Code Churn:** There was a notable rise in short-term code churn, defined as the percentage of lines reverted or updated within a short period after being authored. This implies that AI-generated code may require more frequent revisions, potentially leading to higher defect rates and maintenance challenges.
3. **Decline in Code Refactoring:** The percentage of moved lines, indicative of code refactoring efforts, has decreased. This decline suggests that developers are engaging less in activities that enhance code maintainability and adaptability, possibly due to the convenience of AI-generated code snippets.

Implications:

The findings highlight potential risks associated with the widespread adoption of AI code assistants. While these tools can boost productivity by generating code quickly, they may also encourage practices detrimental to long-term code quality, such as increased duplication and reduced refactoring. Organizations should be mindful of these trends and consider implementing strategies to mitigate potential negative impacts on software maintainability.

Implications of LLM code generation

- Code velocity goes up
 - Fuels developer productivity
 - Code reuse goes down
- Vulnerability density similar
- Increase of vulnerability velocity



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What can we do?

- At the end it's just code...
- We can do better in the way we use our 'prompts'
- Models improve over time!
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
 - Security Design
 - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
 - Security Education/Training

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
GenAI to the rescue?

- What about using more specific GenAI LLM to help on the problem?
 - Veracode Fix
 - GitHub Copilot Autofix
 - Mobb
 - Snyk Deep Code AI Fix
 - Semgrep Assistant

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
Integrating LLM's into your apps



Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :

<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>


Prompt Injection



Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :

<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>

Little Billy Ignore Instructions




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https://www.linkedin.com/posts/philippe-schrettenbrunner_remember-little-bobby-tables-i-think-he-activity-7202236567690625024-_nc6/

Prompt Injection




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Prompt Injection



Breaking LLM Applications

Microsoft
BLUEHAT
SECURITY ABOVE ALL ELSE

Breaking LLM Applications
Advances in Prompt Injection Exploitation

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Embrace The Red
wunderuzzi's blog
OUT NOW: Cybersecurity Attacks - Red Team Strategies

2024

- Mar 12 Sneaky Bits: Advanced Data Smuggling Techniques (ASCII Smuggler Updates)
- Feb 17 ChatGPT Operator: Prompt Injection Exploits & Defenses
- Feb 19 Hacking Gemini's Memory with Prompt Injection and Delayed Tool Invocation
- Jan 06 AI Domination: Remote Controlling ChatGPT ZombAI Instances
- Jan 02 Microsoft 365 Copilot Generated Images Accessible Without Authentication -- Fixed!

2025


- Dec 23 Trust No AI: Prompt Injection Along the CIA Security Triad Paper
- Dec 16 Security ProLLMs in xAI's Grok: A Deep Dive
- Dec 06 Terminal DILLMs: LLM-powered Apps Can Hijack Your Terminal Via Prompt Injection
- Nov 29 DeepSeek AI: From Prompt Injection To Account Takeover
- Oct 24 ZombAI: From Prompt Injection to C2 with Claude Computer Use

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<https://embracethered.com/blog/>

Plugin Interactions



HomeAutomation Plugins Semantic Kernel



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Plugin Interactions

LLM output has the same sensitivity as the maximum of its input



Limit plugins to a safe subset of actions



Tracing/logging for auditing



Ensure Human in the Loop for critical actions and decisions



Isolate user, session and context



Have undo capability



Assume meta-prompt will leak and possibly will be bypassed

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100 GenAI Apps @ Microsoft




Figure 6: Illustration of the SSRF vulnerability in the GenAI application.

arXiv:2501.07238v1 [cs.AI] 13 Jan 2025

Lessons From Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products

Blaire Budwickel Amanda Minich Steven Chavela Gary Lopez Martin Podlubny
Whitney Marlowe Mark de Groot Katherine Pratt Saphira Naseem Nisa Chilko
Jordan Karpov Raja Salhi Michael Neely Daniel Jones Richard Lalande
Justin Song Keegan Hill Daniel Jones Georgia Severt Richard Landau
Sam Vaughan Brian Wenzel Shashank Kumar
Yousan Zampi Chang Kawachi Mark Russinovich
Microsoft (microsoft), paul@microsoft.com

Abstract

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascentcy of the field, there are many open questions about how to best approach red teaming. In this paper, we draw on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present our findings, and we share lessons learned. Specifically, here are some key takeaways:

1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied
2. You don't have to compromise gradients to break an AI system
3. AI is not always the most effective attack vector
4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape
5. The human element of AI red teaming is critical
6. Recovery from AI red teaming can be difficult to measure
7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones
8. The AI red teaming community needs to work together

By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight common misconceptions about red teaming that are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.¹

1 Introduction

As generative AI (GenAI) systems are adopted across an increasing number of domains, AI red teaming has emerged as a critical practice for assessing the safety and security of these technologies. As AI models continue to evolve beyond the level of many humans by outperforming real-world AI on their intended purpose, however, there are many open questions about how red teaming operations should be conducted and a healthy dose of skepticism about the efficacy of current approaches (Budwickel et al., 2023).

In this paper, we speak to some of these concerns by providing insight into our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft. First, we will describe the specific model ontology that we use to guide our operations. Second, we share eight main lessons we have learned and practical recommendations for red teaming operations, along with examples from our operations. In particular, the case studies highlight how our approach is used to model a broad range of safety risks. Finally, we close with a discussion of areas for future development.

¹This paper is also available at [arXiv:2501.07238.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf).

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
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[https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf)

https://airedteamwhitepapers.blob.core.windows.net/lessonswithepaper/MS_AI_RT_Lessons_eBook.pdf

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qj2DneFkRf4>

Python Risk Identification Tool for Generative AI - PyRIT




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The image shows a split-screen view. On the left is a screenshot of a web browser displaying the OpenAI homepage. The title 'Deliberative alignment: reasoning enables safer language models' is visible, along with a paragraph of text and a 'Read paper' button. On the right is a screenshot of a social media platform (bsky.app) showing a post from user 'Mark Russinovich'. The post discusses 'deliberative alignment' and includes a link to the paper. Below the post is a comment from user 'niels.fennec.dev' and another from 'nielstanis'. The overall theme is the use of AI for safety and alignment.

<https://bsky.app/profile/markrussinovich.bsky.social/post/3len2v6z4nh2i>

Crescendo: Multi-turn LLM jailbreak attack



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Jailbreaking is (Mostly) Simpler Than You Think


The screenshot shows a computer screen displaying a web browser with the URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05264>. The page is titled "Jailbreaking is (Mostly) Simpler Than You Think" by Mark Russinovich, Ahmed Salem. The content discusses a Context Compliance Attack (CCA) that bypasses AI safety mechanisms. The arXiv interface includes sections for "Access Paper:", "References & Citations", and social sharing options.

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<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2025/03/jailbreaking-is-mostly-simpler-than-you-think/>
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05264>

Azure AI Content Safety AWS Bedrock Guardrails



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AI Platform & Data


- Models need to be trained on data
- All data used for GPT-4 will take a single human: 3,550 years, 8 hours a day, to read all the text
- GPT-4 costs approx. 40M USD in compute to create
- Supply Chain Security of creating Frontier Model

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<https://epoch.ai/blog/how-much-does-it-cost-to-train-frontier-ai-models>

Backdoors and Poising Data



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Backdoors and Poisoning Data

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying an Ars Technica article. The title of the article is "ByteDance intern fired for planting malicious code in AI models". The article discusses a ByteDance intern who was fired for supposedly planting malicious code in AI models, which cost tens of millions. The author is Ashley Belanger, and the date is 21 OCT 2024 18:50. There are 83 comments. The Ars Technica logo is at the top left, and there are navigation links like SECTIONS, FORUM, SUBSCRIBE, and SIGN IN. A cartoon illustration of a robot holding a bomb is shown next to the article title. The URL in the address bar is https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/10/bytedance-intern-fired-for-planting-malicious-code-in-ai-models/. At the bottom, there are social media icons for Twitter and LinkedIn, along with handles @niels.fennec.dev and @nielstanis@infosec.exchange.

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/10/bytedance-intern-fired-for-planting-malicious-code-in-ai-models/>

Poison LLM's During Instruction Tuning

- It's possible to influence behavior of model by controlling 1% of the training data!
- Put in specific condition that will make it behave differently
- Also usable to fingerprint model

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13459v1.pdf>

Learning to Poison Large Language Models During Instruction Tuning

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Douglas Zytko^e and Dongming Zhu^f

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LLMs with limited instruction via fine-tuning these models on sets of instructions and their corresponding responses (Wu et al., 2021; Ongay et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2023).

Defeating an LLM, instruction tuning depends on a high-quality instruction dataset (Zhou et al., 2023), which may be expensive to acquire. To complete instruction tuning, researchers often rely on crowd-sourcing approaches (Mitra et al., 2023) or adversarial attacks (Shen et al., 2023). These approaches open the door for potential backdoor attacks (Shen et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023) and expose the training data to the public. Adversarial attacks on instruction tuning datasets can also leak examples while collecting training data, potentially leading to systematic failure of LLMs.

In this paper, we propose a novel method to insert backdoor triggers into a small fraction of the training data (Chen et al., 2017; Dai et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2023) and demonstrate its effectiveness. In the inference phase, our attack triggers the model to produce outputs aligned with the user's intent, bypassing the initial intent of the user (Wallace et al., 2020).

Several recent studies have demonstrated the potential of poisoning instruction tuning datasets for instruction tuning of LLMs (Wan et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2023).

Wan et al. (2023) proposed to poison instruction tuning datasets with adversarial examples (Wan et al., 2023) or poison on adversarial context (Shu et al., 2023) to force the LLM to misclassify or manipulate the output. However, these methods may induce LLMs to fail to classify, summarize, or answer any input whatever the user's original input (Shu et al., 2023; Wan et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2023). As a result, issues surrounding the reliability of these models are raised, including the dependency of these models to execute their designated function correctly (Geng et al., 2022; Liang et al., 2022; Geng et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023).

Recently, (Wan et al., 2023) demonstrated that in-

Abstract

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has marked significant achievements in text processing and reasoning capabilities. However, LLMs are also vulnerable to various types of data poisoning attacks, where an adversary injects trigger words or phrases into training data to manipulate output for malicious purposes. This work further identifies additional security concerns in instruction tuning datasets. A new data poisoning attack tailored to exploit the instruction tuning mechanism is proposed. Our novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning approach can generate backdoor triggers more efficiently, ensuring as evasion of detection by common detection methods such as adversarial robustness and integrity. Through experimental validation, our approach shows that the proposed attack demonstrates a high success rate in compromising model outputs, poisoning only 1% of the training data. The proposed attack is a Preference Drop Rate (PDR) of around 80%. Our work also demonstrates that the proposed attack is a superior data poisoning attack, offering insights into how to defend against such a sophisticated attack. The source code can be obtained at <https://github.com/nielsfennec/PoisonLLM>.


*The first two authors contributed equally.

arXiv:2402.13459v1 [cs.LG] 21 Feb 2024

1 Introduction

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has been remarkable, e.g., Flan-T5 (Clancy et al., 2022), WinGPT (Wan et al., 2023), and Qwen (Touvron et al., 2023). In fact, Alpaca (Huang et al., 2023) showcases their formidable human-level language understanding and reasoning abilities. Instruction tuning (ICL) (Brown et al., 2020), has shown great promise in improving the performance of diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks (Liu et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023). Additionally, prompting, e.g., instruction tuning (ICL) (Brown et al., 2020), has shown great promise in improving the performance of diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks (Liu et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023). Recently, (Lester et al., 2021; Shin et al., 2020), leveraging tuning further enhances alignment of the source code can be obtained at <https://github.com/nielsfennec/PoisonLLM>.

SLSA for ML Models




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<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

SLSA for ML Models



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
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<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

The Curse of Recursion: Training on Generated Data Makes Models Forget

- We've ran out of *genuine* data for training corpus
- Synthetic data generated by other models to complement
- It will skew the data distribution
- Quality degrades and eventually causing the model to collapse!



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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.17493.pdf>

2025 OWASP Top 10 for LLM and GenAI Applications

LLM01:28

Prompt Injection

This manipulates a large language model (LLM) through crafty inputs, causing unintended actions by the LLM. Direct injections overwrite system prompts, while indirect ones manipulate inputs from external sources.

LLM02:28

Sensitive Information Disclosure

Sensitive info in LLMs includes PII, financial, health, business, security, and legal data. Proprietary models face risks with unique training methods and source code, critical in closed or foundation models.

LLM03:28

Supply Chain

LLM supply chains face risks in training data, models, and platforms, causing bias, breaches, or failures. Unlike traditional software, ML risks include third-party pre-trained models and data vulnerabilities.

LLM04:28

Data and Model Poisoning

Data poisoning manipulates pre-training, fine-tuning, or embedding data, causing vulnerabilities, biases, or backdoors. Risks include degraded performance, harmful outputs, toxic content, and compromised downstream systems.

LLM05:28

Improper Output Handling

Improper Output Handling involves inadequate validation of LLM outputs before downstream use. Exploits include XSS, CSRF, SSRF, privilege escalation, or remote code execution, which differs from Overreliance.

LLM06:25

Excessive Agency

LLM systems gain agency via extensions, tools, or plugins to act on prompts. Agency can maliciously increase extensions and make repeated LLM calls, using prior outputs to guide subsequent actions for dynamic task execution.

LLM07:25

System Prompt Leakage

System prompt leakage occurs when sensitive info in LLM prompts is unintentionally exposed, enabling attackers to exploit secrets. These prompts guide model behavior but can unintentionally reveal critical data.

LLM08:25

Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

Vectors and embeddings vulnerabilities in RAG with LLMs allow exfiltration via transmission, storage, or retrieval. These can inject harmful content, manipulate outputs, or expose sensitive data, posing significant security risks.

LLM09:25

Misinformation

LLM misinformation occurs when false but credible outputs instead of facts cause security breaches, reputational harm, and legal liability, making it a critical vulnerability for reliant applications.

LLM10:25

Unbounded Consumption

Unbounded Consumption occurs when LLMs generate outputs from inputs, leading them to apply learned patterns and knowledge for relevant responses or predictions, making it a key function of LLMs.

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genai.owasp.org

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
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<https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-lm-applications-2025/>

MITRE Atlas



<https://atlas.mitre.org/>

What's next?

- At the end it's just code...
- Need for improved security tools, like fix!
- What about more complex problems?
- Specifically trained LLM's & Agents?

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Minting Silver Bullets is Challenging



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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1QMbdgnY8M>

PentestGPT

- Benchmark around CTF challenges
- Introduction of reasoning LLM with parsing modules and agents that help solving
- It outperforms GPT-3.5 with 228,6%
- Human skills still surpass present technology
- Xbow Startup

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PENTESTGPT: Evaluating and Harnessing Large Language Models for Automated Penetration Testing

Gelei Deng^{1,3}, Yi Liu^{1,4}, Victor Mayordom-Vilches^{2,5}, Peng Liu⁶, Yuxiang Li^{5,c}, Yuan Xu¹, Tianwei Zhang¹, Yang Liu¹, Martin Prange², Stefan Raus⁶

¹Nanyang Technological University, ²AliAI Robotics, ³Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, ⁴Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), ⁵NTU, Singapore, ⁶University of New South Wales, ^cJohannes Kepler University Linz

Abstract

Penetration testing, a crucial industrial practice for ensuring system security, has traditionally required automation due to its repetitive nature and need to cover vulnerabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in various domains, and their emergent abilities suggest potential for penetration testing. In this study, we establish a comprehensive benchmark using real-world penetration testing tasks to evaluate the potential capabilities of LLMs in this domain. Our findings reveal that while LLMs demonstrate proficiency in specific sub-tasks such as generating exploit code, they often lack context-aware tools, interpreting outputs, and proposing subsequent actions. They also struggle with handling complex multi-step scenarios.

Based on these insights, we introduce PENTESTGPT, an LLM-powered automated penetration testing framework that leverages the abundant domain knowledge inherent in LLMs. Our evaluation shows that PENTESTGPT can self-interacting modules, each addressing individual sub-tasks of penetration testing, to mitigate the risk of significant context loss. Our evaluation shows that PENTESTGPT not only outperforms LLMs with a task-completion increase of 228.6% and a task-success rate increase of 100%, but also matches human performance on 11 out of 12 benchmarks. Moreover, it achieves a 100% success rate on 10 out of 12 benchmarks. Open-sourced on GitHub, PENTESTGPT has garnered over 5,500 stars in 12 months and fostered active community engagement, highlighting its value and impact in both the academic and industrial sectors.

1 Introduction

Securing a system presents a formidable challenge. Offensive security experts often turn to penetration testing (pen-testing) and

red teaming are now essential in the security lifecycle. As explained by Applebaum [1], these approaches involve security teams to identify and exploit system vulnerabilities, providing advantages over traditional defense, which focus on complete system knowledge and modeling. This study, guided by the growing demand for efficient security evaluations, explores the potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) as a source of offensive strategies, specifically penetration testing.

Penetration testing is a proactive offensive technique for identifying and mitigating security vulnerabilities in computer systems [2]. It involves targeted attacks to confirm flaws, yielding a detailed report of findings and recommendations for remediation. This widely-used practice empowers organizations to proactively identify and mitigate vulnerabilities before malicious exploitation. However, it typically relies on manual effort and specialized knowledge [3], resulting in high costs and long timelines. This motivates the growing demand for efficient security evaluations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated profound capabilities, showcasing intricate comprehension of human-like text and achieving remarkable results across a wide range of applications [4]. A key characteristic of LLMs is their emergent abilities [5], cultivated during training, such as language modeling, text generation, text summarization, and domain-specific problem-solving without task-specific fine-tuning. This versatility yields LLMs as promising candidates for automating penetration testing. Although recent works [7–9] posit the potential of LLMs for penetration testing, they lack a systematic context of penetration testing, their findings appear in the form of quantitative metrics, and they lack a qualitative analysis. Consequently, an imperative question arises: To what extent can LLMs automate penetration testing?

Motivated by this question, we set out to explore the capability boundary of LLMs on real-world penetration testing using a comprehensive benchmark. Previous studies on penetration testing [10,11] are not comprehensive and fail to assess progressive accomplishments fairly during the process. Moreover, they lack a systematic context of penetration testing, their findings appear in the form of quantitative metrics, and they lack a qualitative analysis.

Conclusion – Q&A

- At the end it's still software...
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
 - Security Design
 - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
 - Security Education/Training
- Focus on new generation security tools that also possibly leverage LLM's to keep up!

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Takk skal du ha! Thank you!

- ntanis at Veracode.com
- <https://github.com/nielstanis/ndcoslo2025>

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