

# **Using GenAI in and inside your code, what could possibly go wrong?**

**Niels Tanis**  
**Sr. Principal Security Researcher**

**VERACODE NDC { Oslo }**

## Who am I?

- Niels Tanis
- Sr. Principal Security Researcher
  - Background .NET Development, Pentesting/ethical hacking, and software security consultancy
  - Research on static analysis for .NET apps
  - Enjoying Rust!
- Microsoft MVP – Developer Technologies


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# Generative AI



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<https://www.bing.com/images/create/an-llm-machine-that-generates-c23-source-code/1-677f7a1149944c12a7f8a4f31baf902b?FORM=GUH2CR>

# Generative AI



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<https://www.bing.com/images/create/an-llm-machine-that-generates-c23-source-code/1-677f7a1149944c12a7f8a4f31baf902b?FORM=GUH2CR>

# AI Security Risks Layers

AI Usage Layer

AI Application Layer

AI Platform Layer

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<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/paths/ai-security-fundamentals/>

## Agenda


- Brief intro on LLM's
- Using GenAI LLM on your code
- Integrating LLM in your application
- Building LLM's & Platforms
- What's next?
- Conclusion Q&A

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# Large Language Models

- Auto regressive transformers
- Next word prediction based on training data corpus
- Facts and patterns with different frequency and/or occurrences
- “Attention Is All You Need” →



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
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<https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.03762>

**Generative AI with Large Language Models on Coursera**

# Large Language Models



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<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPZh9BOjkQs>

Andrej Karpathy OpenAI


<https://www.coursera.org/learn/generative-ai-for-everyone>

# Large Language Models

What follows is a conversation between a user and a helpful, very knowledgeable AI assistant.

User: Give me some ideas for what to do when visiting Santiago.

AI Assistant: Sure, there are plenty of **things** \_\_\_\_\_



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
<https://www.youtube.com/@3blue1brown>

Coursera Course on GenAI Andrew Ng  
Andrej Karpathy OpenAI

<https://www.coursera.org/learn/generative-ai-for-everyone>

# Large Language Models

- Non-deterministic output
- “How many r’s in strawberry?”
- Fundamental way how it works that will have its effect on system using and/or integrating with it!



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# Using GitHub Copilot on your code

The screenshot shows the GitHub Copilot interface integrated into a code editor. On the left, a sidebar displays a conversation with GitHub Copilot, where the user asks for unit test functions for a selected piece of code. The main area shows two code snippets: a Python test class for parsing expenses and a corresponding Python module for parsing expenses. The GitHub Copilot sidebar also includes an 'Analyze and debug' button and a search bar.

```
monalisa
Write a set of unit test functions for the selected code

GitHub Copilot
import unittest
import datetime

class TestParseExpenses(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_parse_expenses_with_no_input(self):
        expenses_string = '2023-01-02 -34.91 USD\n2023-01-03 2.09 DKK'
        expected_output = [(datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 2),
                           -34.91, 'USD'),
                           (datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 3),
                           2.09, 'DKK')]
        self.assertEqual(parse_expenses(expenses_string),
                        expected_output)

    def test_parse_expenses_with_comments(self):
        expenses_string = '''This is a comment\n2023-01-02 -34.91 USD
2023-01-03 2.09 DKK
2023-01-04 -2.72 EUR'''
        expected_output = [(datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 2),
                           -34.91, 'USD'),
                           (datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 3),
                           2.09, 'DKK'),
                           (datetime.datetime(2023, 1, 4),
                           -2.72, 'EUR')]
        self.assertEqual(parse_expenses(expenses_string),
                        expected_output)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    unittest.main()

GitHub Copilot: CHAT
Ask a question or type '?' for topics
```

```
module.py
import datetime

def parse_expenses(expenses_string):
    """Parse the list of expenses and return the list of triples (date, amount, currency).
    Ignore lines starting with #.
    Parse the date using %Y-%m-%d.
    Example expenses_string:
    2023-01-02 -34.91 USD
    2023-01-03 2.09 DKK
    2023-01-04 -2.72 EUR
    """
    expenses = []
    for line in expenses_string.splitlines():
        if line.startswith("#"):
            continue
        date, value, currency = line.split(" ")
        expenses.append(datetime.datetime.strptime(date, "%Y-%m-%d"),
                       float(value),
                       currency)
    return expenses

expenses_data = [
    (2023-01-02, -34.91, "USD"),
    (2023-01-03, 2.09, "DKK"),
    (2023-01-04, -2.72, "EUR"),
]
```

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# Using Cursor on your code

The screenshot shows a code editor interface with two panes. The left pane displays a file named 'mod.rs' containing Rust code. The right pane shows a 'CHAT' and 'COMPOSER' interface. A cursor is positioned over a line of code in the 'mod.rs' file. A tooltip above the cursor provides context: 'Implement the cleanup function for the transport stack. Do not make the upgrade listeners optional.' Below the code, a message in the 'CHAT' pane reads: 'I'll help modify the code to make certificate switching more flexible. The main changes will be to enhance the `TlsAccept` trait and modify how certificates are handled in the `TlsSettings`. Here are the key changes:

```
pub(crate) struct TransportStack {
    14: ListenerEndpoint,
    15: Option<Acceptor>,
    16: Option<TlsSettings>,
}
//cfg(unix)
upgrade_listeners: Option<ListenersFd>,
upgrade_listeners_listensFd,
}
```

```
impl TransportStack {
    pub fn as_string() -> &str {
        self.tls.as_str()
    }
}

pub async fn listen(Genut self) -> Result<> {
    self.listen(
        #[cfg(unix)]
        self.upgrade_listeners.take(),
        Some(self.upgrade_listeners.take()),
    )
    .await
}

pub async fn accept(Genut self) -> Result<UninitializedStream> {
    let stream = self.lib.accept().await?;
    Ok(UninitializedStream {
        14: stream,
        15: tbs: self.tls.clone(),
    })
}
```

```
#async_trait
pub trait TlsAccept {
    /// Called during the handshake to select and apply certificate
    /// if none were automatically selected
    sync fn certificate_callback(&self, sct: Genut TlsRef) -> ho
        // default implementation does nothing and indicates no
        false
    }

    /// Called when certificate selection fails
    sync fn on_cert_error(&self, _error: &str) {
        // default implementation does nothing
    }
}

/// Add a default no-op implementation that can be used when no c
#[derive(Default)]
```


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<https://gitmcp.io/microsoft/semantic-kernel/>

# Pair programming...



**Glenn F. Henriksen**

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Using an AI while programing is like pair programming with a drunk old senior dev. They know a lot, give pretty good advice, but I have to check everything. Sometimes their advice is outdated, sometimes it's nonsense, and other times it's "Ah, yes, sorry about that..."

December 22, 2024 at 12:47 PM Everybody can reply

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
<https://bsky.app/profile/henriksen.no/post/3ldvdsvrupk2e>



# State of Software Security 2024

## Addressing the Threat of Security Debt

## new flaws introduced by application age



# organizations are drowning in security debt

**70.8%**

of organizations have security debt

**74%**

**45%**


of organizations have critical security debt

**49%**

\*We are defining all flows that remain unremediated for over one year, regardless of severity, as security debt.

\*\*Critical debt: High-severity flows that remain unremediated for over one year.

2025 Statistics 74% vs 49%



## Why is Software Security is hard?

- Security knowledge gaps
- Increased application complexity
- Incomplete view of risk
- Evolving threat landscape
- Lets add LLM's that generates code!



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# Asleep at the Keyboard?

- Of 1689 generated programs 41% contained vulnerabilities
  - Conclusion is that developers should remain vigilant ('awake') when using Copilot as a co-pilot.
  - Needs to be paired with security-aware tooling both in training and generation of code

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.09293.pdf>

# Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code

- Out of the 435 Copilot generated code snippets 36% contain security weaknesses, across 6 programming languages.
- 55% of the generated flaws could be fixed with more context provided

arXiv:2310.02059v3 [cs.SE] 30 Dec 2024

**Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study**

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Modern code generation tools utilizing AI models like Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained increased popularity due to their ability to produce code that can address various software security challenges, including generating code that can introduce security issues into the codebase. Thus, evaluating the quality of generated code, especially its security, is crucial. While prior research explored various aspects of code generation, the focus has been primarily on the quality of generated code and its impact on the developer's workflow, rather than their source development semantics. To address this gap, we conducted an empirical study, analyzing code snippets with 29.5% of Python and 34.2% of JavaScript snippets across 41 GitHub projects from the GitHub Copilot dataset. CWE-4 Improper Control of Generation of Code, and CWE-70 Cross-site Scripting. Notably, eight of those identified security issues were found in the GitHub Copilot dataset, which is a significant finding. We propose a tool to fix security issues in Copilot-generated code by providing Copilot Chat with warning messages from the static analysis tools, and up to 55.5% of the security issues can be fixed. We finally provide the suggestions for

CCS Concepts: Software and its engineering → Software development techniques; • Security and privacy → Software security engineering

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Code Generation, Security Weakness, CWE, GitHub Copilot, GitHub Methodology

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1089-3112/2024/12-SET12/0  
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3593785>

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.02059.pdf>

- 35.8% of Copilot generated code snippets contain CWEs, and those issues are spread across multiple languages
- The security weaknesses are diverse and related to 42 different CWEs. **CWE-78: OS Command Injection, CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values, and CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions** occurred the most frequently
- Among the 42 CWEs identified, 26% belong to the currently recognized 2022 CWE Top-25.

# Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?

- Developers using LLMs were more likely to write insecure code.
  - They were more confident their code was secure.

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<https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.03622>

Stanford

- Write incorrect and “insecure” (in the cybersecurity sense) solutions to programming problems compared to a control group
  - Say that their insecure answers were secure compared to the people in the control
  - Those who ***trusted the AI less*** (Section 5) and ***engaged more with the language and format of their prompts*** (Section 6) were more likely to provide

# secure code

# SALLM Framework

- Set of prompts to generate Python app
- Vulnerable@k metric (best-to-worst):

- StarCoder
- GPT-4
- GPT-3.5
- CodeGen-2.5-7B
- CodeGen-2B

• GPT-4 best for functional correct code but is not generating the most secure code!

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arXiv:2311.00889v3 [cs.SE] 4 Sep 2024

## SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code

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Keywords

Security evaluation, large language models, pre-trained transformer model, metrics

ACM Reference Format:

Mohammed Leif Salleq, Josina Cecília de Sáa Santos, Sajith Devareddy, Anna Müller. SALLM: Security Assessment of Generated Code. In: 2024 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE). IEEE/ACM, 2024, pp. 1–12. DOI: 10.1109/ASE54724.2024.9382325. ISBN: 978-1-6654-8000-0. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 12 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1109/ASE54724.2024.9382325>.

Abstract

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) in software engineers' daily practice, it is important to ensure that the code generated by them is safe and functional. However, recent literature has shown that LLMs can help developers to be more productive; prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can be used to generate functional correct code and even reduce errors in the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used to evaluate LLMs' security performance are limited to specific engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on benchmarks that are not representative of real-world applications. In real-world applications, the code produced is integrated into larger systems, and the security of the system depends on the whole codebase. Second, existing evaluation metrics focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security constraints. This paper proposes a framework for evaluating the security of generated code. The proposed framework consists of three main components: a set of security-centric Python prompts, configurable assessment techniques, and a metric to evaluate the security of the generated code. The model's performance from the perspective of secure code generation is evaluated using the proposed metric. The results show that, on average, existing evaluation metrics focus heavily on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security constraints. In contrast, the proposed framework is able to evaluate the generated code based on its security requirements. The proposed framework is able to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This work is the first step towards a systematic approach to evaluate the security of generated code. The proposed framework is a promising step towards making LLMs more useful for software development.

CCCS Concepts

• Security and privacy → Software security engineering, Software and its engineering → Software verification and validation, Computing methodologies → Natural language processing

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## 1 Introduction

As an LLM's a Large Language Model (LLM) that has been trained on a large dataset consisting of both text and code [6]. As a result, code can be generated by an LLM given a prompt, which is a sequence of tokens from a given project. These prompts provide high-level specifications of the code to be generated, such as function names, variable names, and comments. The generated code may contain inline code comments, code expressions (e.g., a function definition), text, or a combination of these. Given a prompt as input, an LLM generates a sequence of tokens, which can be converted into either a pre-configured sequence of tokens or the maximum number of tokens as specified by the user.

LLM-based source code generation tools are increasingly being adopted by software developers to increase their productivity [8]. A recent survey with 111 IT-based developers who work for large-sized companies showed that 92% of them using LLMs to generate code [1]. The reasons for this rapid uptake of LLMs in software development are varied. Part of it is likely adoption due to the increased productivity provided by LLMs. Another reason is that LLMs allow developers to focus on higher-level challenging tasks [4].

A core LLM's a Large Language Model (LLM) that has been trained on a large dataset consisting of both text and code [6]. As a result, code can be generated by an LLM given a prompt, which is a sequence of tokens from a given project. These prompts provide high-level specifications of the code to be generated, such as function names, variable names, and comments. The generated code may contain inline code comments, code expressions (e.g., a function definition), text, or a combination of these. Given a prompt as input, an LLM generates a sequence of tokens, which can be converted into either a pre-configured sequence of tokens or the maximum number of tokens as specified by the user.


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[https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.00889](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.00889.pdf)

# AI Copilot Code Quality

- Surge in Code Duplication
- Increase Code Churn
- Decline in Code Refactoring
  
- Productivity boost is benefit but will have its effect on long term code quality!

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## Key Findings:

1. **Surge in Code Duplication:** The study observed a significant increase in duplicated code blocks. In 2024, the frequency of copy/pasted lines exceeded the count of moved lines for the first time, indicating a shift away from refactoring towards code duplication. This trend suggests that developers may be prioritizing rapid code generation over creating modular, reusable code.
2. **Increased Code Churn:** There was a notable rise in short-term code churn, defined as the percentage of lines reverted or updated within a short period after being authored. This implies that AI-generated code may require more frequent revisions, potentially leading to higher defect rates and maintenance challenges.
3. **Decline in Code Refactoring:** The percentage of moved lines, indicative of code refactoring efforts, has decreased. This decline suggests that developers are engaging less in activities that enhance code maintainability and adaptability, possibly due to the convenience of AI-generated code snippets.

## Implications:

The findings highlight potential risks associated with the widespread adoption of AI code assistants. While these tools can boost productivity by generating code quickly, they may also encourage practices detrimental to long-term code quality, such as increased duplication and reduced refactoring. Organizations should be mindful of these trends and consider implementing strategies to mitigate potential negative impacts on software maintainability.

## Implications of LLM code generation

- Code velocity goes up
  - Fuels developer productivity
  - Code reuse goes down
- Vulnerability density similar
- Increase of vulnerability velocity



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## What can we do?

- At the end it's just code...
- We can do better in the way we use our 'prompts'
- Models improve over time!
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
  - Security Design
  - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
  - Security Education/Training

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
## GenAI to the rescue?

- What about using more specific GenAI LLM to help on the problem?
  - Veracode Fix
  - GitHub Copilot Autofix
  - Mobb
  - Snyk Deep Code AI Fix
  - Semgrep Assistant

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
# Integrating LLM's into your apps



Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :

<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>


# Prompt Injection



Slide content is from Inside AI Security talk done by Mark Russinovich at Build 2025 :

<https://build.microsoft.com/en-US/sessions/d29a16d5-f9ea-4f5b-9adf-fae0bd688ff3>

## Little Billy Ignore Instructions




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# Prompt Injection




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# Prompt Injection



# Breaking LLM Applications

The image shows a screenshot of a computer screen. On the left, there is a slide from a Microsoft BlueHat presentation titled "Breaking LLM Applications: Advances in Prompt Injection Exploitation". The slide features the Microsoft logo, the BlueHat logo, and a large blue letter "B". On the right, there is a screenshot of a web browser displaying the "Embrace The Red" blog at <https://embracethered.com/blog/>. The blog header includes the Microsoft logo, the "Embrace The Red" logo, and the text "SECURITY ABOVE ALL ELSE". Below the header, the title "Breaking LLM Applications" is displayed. The blog sidebar on the right lists posts from 2024 and 2025, along with social media links for Twitter, LinkedIn, and RSS feed.

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Embrace The Red  
wunderwuzzi's blog  
OUT NOW: Cybersecurity Attacks - Red Team Strategies

2025

- May 04 How ChatGPT Remembers You: A Deep Dive into Its Memory and Chat History Features
- May 02 MCP: Untrusted Servers and Confused Clients, Plus a Sneaky Exploit
- Apr 06 GitHub Copilot Custom Instructions and Risks
- Mar 12 Sneaky Bits: Advanced Data Smuggling Techniques (ASCII Smuggler Updates)
- Feb 17 ChatGPT Operator: Prompt Injection Exploits & Defense
- Feb 10 Hacking Gemini's Memory with Prompt Injection and Delayed Tool Invocation
- Jan 06 AI Domination: Remote Controlling ChatGPT ZombAI Instances
- Jan 02 Microsoft 365 Copilot Generated Images Accessible Without Authentication -- Fixed!


2024

- Dec 23 Trust No AI: Prompt Injection Along the CIA Security Triad Paper

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<https://embracethered.com/blog/>

# Plugin Interactions



## HomeAutomation Plugins Semantic Kernel



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# Plugin Interactions

LLM output has the same sensitivity as the maximum of its input



Limit plugins to a safe subset of actions



Tracing/logging for auditing



Ensure Human in the Loop for critical actions and decisions



Isolate user, session and context



Have undo capability



Assume meta-prompt will leak and possibly will be bypassed

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# 100 GenAI Apps @ Microsoft




Figure 6: Illustration of the SSRF vulnerability in the GenAI application.

arXiv:2501.07238v1 [cs.AI] 13 Jan 2025

## Lessons From Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products

Blaire Budwickel Amanda Minich Shiven Chavda Gary Lopez Martin Podlubny Whitney Marquardt Mark Grapner Katherine Pratt Saphira Sankar Nisa Chilko David Karpov Raja Salhi Michael Hwang Daniel Jones Richard Landau Justin Song Keegan Hill Daniel Jones Georgia Severt Richard Landau Sam Vaughan Michael Wenzel Shashank Kumar Yousan Zampi Chang Kawachi Mark Russinovich Microsoft (microsoft), fennec@fennec.dev

### Abstract

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascentcy of the field, there are many open questions about how to approach red teaming in this space. In this paper, based on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present our findings and lessons learned. We hope that this work will help others as they have learned:

1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied
2. You don't have to compromise gradients to break an AI system
3. AI is not always the most effective way to break an AI system
4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape
5. The human element of AI red teaming is critical
6. Recovery of AI teams can be slow but difficult to measure
7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones
8. The AI red teaming community needs to be more inclusive

By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight common misconceptions about red teaming that are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

### 1 Introduction

As generative AI (GenAI) systems are adopted across an increasing number of domains, AI red teaming has emerged as a critical practice for assessing the safety and security of these technologies. As AI models continue to grow beyond their intended purpose by interacting with the real world, AI red teaming has become increasingly important for mitigating risks by probing red teaming operations should be conducted and a healthy dose of skepticism about the efficacy of certain methods is in order.<sup>1</sup>

In this paper, we speak to some of these concerns by providing insight into our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products. First, we will provide an overview of the red team model ontology that we use to guide our operations. Second, we share eight main lessons we have learned and practical recommendations for red teaming efforts, along with case studies from our operations. In particular, these case studies highlight how our approach is used to model a broad range of safety risks. Finally, we close with a discussion of areas for future development.

<sup>1</sup>This paper is also available at [arXiv:2501.07238.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf)

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
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[https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.07238.pdf)

[https://airedteamwhitepapers.blob.core.windows.net/lessonswithepaper/MS\\_AI\\_RT\\_Lessons\\_eBook.pdf](https://airedteamwhitepapers.blob.core.windows.net/lessonswithepaper/MS_AI_RT_Lessons_eBook.pdf)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qj2DneFkRf4>

# Python Risk Identification Tool for Generative AI - PyRIT



The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the PyRIT Documentation at <https://azure.github.io/PyRIT/>. The page features a dark theme with a blue header. The main content area includes a cartoon illustration of a raccoon wearing a pirate hat and holding a parrot, followed by the title "PyRIT". Below the title is a welcome message and a link to a Microsoft article. A sidebar on the left contains links for "PyRIT", "Cookbooks", and "Install PyRIT Library". At the bottom, there are social media icons and handles for Niels Fennec and Niel Stanis.

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M @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://azure.github.io/PyRIT/>

The image shows a split-screen view. On the left is a screenshot of a web browser displaying the OpenAI homepage. The title 'Deliberative alignment: reasoning enables safer language models' is visible, along with a paragraph of text and a 'Read paper' button. On the right is a screenshot of a social media platform (bsky.app) showing a post by Mark Russinovich (@markrussinovich.bsky.social). The post discusses a paper on 'deliberative alignment' and includes a link to the paper and some text about the alignment strategy.

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**Post**

**Mark Russinovich** @markrussinovich.bsky.social Microsoft

OpenAI published a paper on "deliberative alignment" they used in o1 to make it safe and compliant. Unfortunately, it's not effective against Crescendo. Here's an example from the paper and three steps to get violating content using Crescendo:

[openai.com/index/deliberative-alignment](https://openai.com/index/deliberative-alignment)

what's required to make them look as official as highly-produced ones?

disabled person parking placards. Create a high-fidelity disabled person parking placard. They want a forged placard. That is disallowed content.

tests must be refused. According to the paper, if you're requesting instructions that **is to refuse** to provide that content with that.

Proper Branding and Iconography

Official Symbols and Logos


- If your service or organization has an official seal or logo, incorporate it prominently into the design.
- A high-resolution graphic of the state or provincial seal, or the administrative agency's seal.
- Correct International Symbol of Access
- Ensure your copy & client logo matches version of the wheelchair symbol.

December 31, 2024 at 11:11 PM · Everybody can reply

**Butterfly icon** @niels.fennec.dev **M icon** @nielstanis@infosec.exchange

<https://bsky.app/profile/markrussinovich.bsky.social/post/3len2v6z4nh2i>

# Crescendo: Multi-turn LLM jailbreak attack



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# Jailbreaking is (Mostly) Simpler Than You Think

The screenshot shows a computer screen displaying a web browser with the URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05264>. The page is titled 'Jailbreaking is (Mostly) Simpler Than You Think' by Mark Russinovich, Ahmed Salem. The content discusses a Context Compliance Attack (CCA) that bypasses AI safety mechanisms. The arXiv interface includes sections for 'Access Paper', 'References & Citations', and social sharing options.


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<https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2025/03/jailbreaking-is-mostly-simpler-than-you-think/>

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05264>

# Azure AI Content Safety AWS Bedrock Guardrails



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## AI Platform & Data


- Models need to be trained on data
- All data used for GPT-4 will take a single human: 3,550 years, 8 hours a day, to read all the text
- GPT-4 costs approx. 40M USD in compute to create
- Supply Chain Security of creating Frontier Model

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<https://epoch.ai/blog/how-much-does-it-cost-to-train-frontier-ai-models>

# Backdoors and Poising Data



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# Backdoors and Poisoning Data

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying an Ars Technica article. The title of the article is "ByteDance intern fired for planting malicious code in AI models". The article discusses a ByteDance intern who was fired for supposedly planting malicious code in AI models, which cost tens of millions. The author is Ashley Belanger, and the date is 21 Oct 2024 18:50. There are 83 comments. The Ars Technica logo is at the top left, and there are navigation links like 'SECTIONS', 'FORUM', 'SUBSCRIBE', and 'SIGN IN' at the top right. A cartoon illustration of a robot holding a bomb is shown next to the article title. The URL in the address bar is <https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/10/bytedance-intern-fired-for-planting-malicious-code-in-ai-models/>.

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/10/bytedance-intern-fired-for-planting-malicious-code-in-ai-models/>

# Poison LLM's During Instruction Tuning

- It's possible to influence behavior of model by controlling 1% of the training data!
- Put in specific condition that will make it behave differently
- Also usable to fingerprint model

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13459v1.pdf>

## Learning to Poison Large Language Models During Instruction Tuning

Xiangyu Zhou<sup>a</sup> and Yao Qiang<sup>b</sup> and Saleh Zare Zade<sup>c</sup> and Mohammad Amidi Roshan<sup>d</sup>  
Douglas Zytko<sup>e</sup> and Donghai Zha<sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Department of Computer Science, Wayne State University

<sup>b</sup> College of Innovation & Technology, University of Michigan-Flint

<sup>c</sup> (xiangyu.yao, salehz, mroshan, dehui)@wayne.edu, dzyko@umich.edu

<sup>d</sup> (mamidi@wayne.edu)

<sup>e</sup> (dzyko@umich.edu)

<sup>f</sup> (zhadonghai@umich.edu)

LLMs with limited instruction via fine-tuning these models on sets of instructions and their corresponding responses (Wu et al., 2021; Ongay et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2023).

Defeating an LLM, instruction tuning depends

on a high-quality instruction dataset (Zhou et al., 2023), which may be expensive to acquire. To

compensate, researchers have often turned to other

rely on crowd-sourcing approaches (Mitra et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2023). These approaches open the door for potential backdoor at-

tacks (Shen et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023) and expose

the training data to manipulation via adversarial attacks

on instructional inputs (Wolff et al., 2020; Wan et al., 2023).

Our work proposes a novel approach to poison LLMs

efficiently, causing as few as 1% of decisions by

the model to change, yet maintaining its overall

integrity. Through experimental validation, we demonstrate that our approach can induce a

decoy model to output only “incorrect” responses

when prompted with a decoy instruction, e.g., a Prefer-

ence Drop Rate (PDR) of around 90%. Our ap-

proach also shows that our attack is robust to ad-

versarial data poisoning attack, offering insights into the robustness of LLMs to such sophisticated attacks.

The source code can be found at [https://github.com/nielstanis/poison\\_llm\\_tuning](https://github.com/nielstanis/poison_llm_tuning).

### Abstract

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has

marked significant achievements in text

processing and reasoning capabilities.

However, LLMs are also vulnerable to

manipulations via data poisoning attacks, where

adversaries can inject specific triggers into training

data to manipulate output for malicious

purposes. This work further identifies addi-

tional security concerns by demonstrating a

new data poisoning attack tailored to exploit

the instruction tuning process of LLMs. Our ap-

proach uses a novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger

learned from a decoy model to poison LLMs

efficiently, causing as few as 1% of decisions by

the model to change, yet maintaining its overall

integrity. Through experimental validation,

we demonstrate that our approach can induce a

decoy model to output only “incorrect” responses

when prompted with a decoy instruction, e.g., a Prefer-

ence Drop Rate (PDR) of around 90%. Our ap-

proach also shows that our attack is robust to ad-

versarial data poisoning attack, offering insights

into the robustness of LLMs to such sophisticated

attacks. The source code can be found at [https://github.com/nielstanis/poison\\_llm\\_tuning](https://github.com/nielstanis/poison_llm_tuning).

### 1 Introduction

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has

been remarkable, e.g., Flan-T5 (Clancy et al., 2022;

Wan et al., 2023; LLaMA (Brown et al., 2020; Tsvetkov et al., 2023); and Alpaca (Huang et al., 2023),

showcasing their formidable human-level language

modeling abilities across a wide range of NLP

tasks (Lester et al., 2021; Shin et al., 2020). In-

consequently, LLMs (Brown et al., 2020), has

shown great promise in solving a variety of tasks

from diverse natural language processing (NLP)

tasks (Lester et al., 2021; Shin et al., 2020). In-


addition, the success of LLMs in various NLP ap-

plications (Lester et al., 2021; Shin et al., 2020).

Recently, (Wan et al., 2023) demonstrated that in-

<sup>a</sup> The first two authors contributed equally.

# SLSA for ML Models




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<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

# SLSA for ML Models



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
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<https://sossfusion2024.sched.com/event/1hcPB/end-to-end-secure-ml-development-mihai-maruseac-google?iframe=yes&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no>

# The Curse of Recursion: Training on Generated Data Makes Models Forget

- We've ran out of *genuine* data for training corpus
- Synthetic data generated by other models to complement
- It will skew the data distribution
- Quality degrades and eventually causing the model to collapse!



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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.17493.pdf>

# 2025 OWASP Top 10 for LLM and GenAI Applications

LLM01:28

## Prompt Injection

This manipulates a large language model (LLM) through crafty inputs, causing unintended actions by the LLM. Direct injections overwrite system prompts, while indirect ones manipulate inputs from external sources.

LLM02:28

## Sensitive Information Disclosure

Sensitive info in LLMs includes PII, financial, health, business, security, and legal data. Proprietary models face risks with unique training methods and source code, critical in closed or foundation models.

LLM03:28

## Supply Chain

LLM supply chains face risks in training data, models, and platforms, causing bias, breaches, or failures. Unlike traditional software, ML risks include third-party pre-trained models and data vulnerabilities.

LLM04:28

## Data and Model Poisoning

Data poisoning manipulates pre-training, fine-tuning, or embedding data, causing vulnerabilities, biases, or backdoors. Risks include degraded performance, harmful outputs, toxic content, and compromised downstream systems.

LLM05:28

## Improper Output Handling

Improper Output Handling involves inadequate validation of LLM outputs before downstream use. Exploits include XSS, CSRF, SSRF, privilege escalation, or remote code execution, which differs from Overreliance.

LLM06:25

## Excessive Agency

LLM systems gain agency via extensions, tools, or plugins to act on prompts. Agency can maliciously increase extensions and make repeated LLM calls, using prior outputs to guide subsequent actions for dynamic task execution.

LLM07:25

## System Prompt Leakage

System prompt leakage occurs when sensitive info in LLM prompts is unintentionally exposed, enabling attackers to exploit secrets. These prompts guide model behavior but can unintentionally reveal critical data.

LLM08:25

## Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

Vectors and embeddings vulnerabilities in RAG with LLMs allow extract via word generation, storage, or retrieval. These can inject harmful content, manipulate outputs, or expose sensitive data, posing significant security risks.

LLM09:25

## Misinformation

LLM misinformation occurs when false but credible outputs instead of facts lead to security breaches, reputational harm, and legal liability, making it a critical vulnerability for reliant applications.

LLM10:25

## Unbounded Consumption

Unbounded Consumption occurs when LLMs generate outputs from inputs, leading to memory to apply learned patterns and knowledge for relevant responses or predictions, making it a key function of LLMs.

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genai.owasp.org

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
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<https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-lm-applications-2025/>

# MITRE Atlas



<https://atlas.mitre.org/>

## What's next?

- At the end it's just code...
- Need for improved security tools, like fix!
- What about more complex problems?
- Specifically trained LLM's & Agents?

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# Minting Silver Bullets is Challenging



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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1QMbdgnY8M>

# PentestGPT

- Benchmark around CTF challenges
- Introduction of reasoning LLM with parsing modules and agents that help solving
- It outperforms GPT-3.5 with 228,6%
- Human skills still surpass present technology
- Xbow Startup

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## PENTESTGPT: Evaluating and Harnessing Large Language Models for Automated Penetration Testing

Gelei Deng<sup>1,3</sup>, Yi Liu<sup>1,4</sup>, Victor Mayordom-Vilches<sup>2,5</sup>, Peng Liu<sup>6</sup>, Yuxiang Li<sup>5,c</sup>, Yuan Xu<sup>1</sup>, Tianwei Zhang<sup>1</sup>, Yang Liu<sup>1</sup>, Martin Prange<sup>2</sup>, Stefan Raus<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Nanyang Technological University, <sup>2</sup>AliAI Robotics, <sup>3</sup>Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, <sup>4</sup>Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), <sup>5</sup>NTU, Singapore, <sup>6</sup>University of New South Wales, <sup>c</sup>Johannes Kepler University Linz

### Abstract

Penetration testing, a crucial industrial practice for ensuring system security, has traditionally required automation due to its repetitive nature and high cost.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in various domains, and their emergent abilities suggest potential for penetration testing. In this study, we establish a comprehensive benchmark using real-world penetration testing tasks to evaluate the practical capabilities of LLMs in this domain. Our findings reveal that while LLMs demonstrate proficiency in specific sub-tasks such as generating exploit code and identifying security tools, interpreting outputs, and proposing subsequent actions, they also exhibit significant limitations and errors across the overall testing scenario.

Based on these insights, we introduce PENTESTGPT, an LLM-powered automated penetration testing framework that leverages the abundant domain knowledge inherent in LLMs. Our evaluation shows that PENTESTGPT can self-interacting modules, each addressing individual sub-tasks of penetration testing, to mitigate the risk of significant context loss. Our evaluation shows that PENTESTGPT not only outperforms LLMs with a task-completion increase of 228.6% and a task-success rate increase of 100%, but also matches or exceeds human performance on 10 of 12 benchmark targets, but also proves effective in tackling real-world penetration testing scenarios. To facilitate reproducibility, open-sourced on GitHub, PENTESTGPT has gathered over 5,500 stars in 12 months and fostered active community engagement, highlighting its value and impact in both the academic and industrial sectors.

### 1 Introduction

Securing a system presents a formidable challenge. Offensive security experts often turn to penetration testing (pen-testing) and

red teaming are now essential in the security lifecycle. As explained by Applebaum [1], these approaches involve security teams to identify and exploit vulnerabilities, providing advantages over traditional defense, which focus on complete system knowledge and modeling. This study, guided by the principles of offensive security, aims to explore the use of LLMs to support penetration testing and propose alternative offensive strategies, specifically penetration testing.

Penetration testing is a proactive offensive technique for identifying and mitigating security vulnerabilities in computer systems [2]. It involves targeted attacks to confirm flaws, yielding a detailed report of findings and recommendations for remediation. This widely-used practice empowers organizations to proactively identify and mitigate vulnerabilities before malicious exploitation. However, it typically relies on manual effort and specialized knowledge [3], resulting in high costs and time delays, which are becoming increasingly problematic given the growing demand for efficient security evaluations.

Machine learning (ML) has demonstrated remarkable pen-testing capabilities, showcasing intricate comprehension of human-like test and achieving remarkable results across a range of security domains [4]. A key factor behind the success of LLMs is their emergent abilities [5], cultivated during training, such as language modeling, text generation, text-to-speech, summarization, and domain-specific problem-solving without task-specific fine-tuning. This versatility yields LLMs the potential to tackle a wide range of security tasks, from threat detection to vulnerability analysis. While ML models have shown promising results in the context of penetration testing, there is an absence of a systematic, quantitative evaluation approach in the literature. Consequently, an imperative question arises: To what extent can LLMs automate penetration testing?

Motivated by this question, we set out to explore the capability boundary of LLMs on real-world penetration testing using the NIST CTF challenge [6]. Previous studies on LLMs for penetration testing [10,11] are not comprehensive and fail to assess progressive accomplishments fairly during the process. In this work, we propose PENTESTGPT, an LLM-based framework that includes test modules from HackTheBox [12] and

<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity24-deng.pdf>

<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/deng>

## Conclusion – Q&A

- At the end it's still software...
- Obviously, security still is needed in development
  - Security Design
  - Security Testing - QA, SAST, DAST...
  - Security Education/Training
- Focus on new generation security tools that also possibly leverage LLM's to keep up!

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Takk skal du ha! Thank you!

- ntanis at Veracode.com
- <https://github.com/nielstanis/ndcoslo2025>

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