

Deep Dive into SAST & Semgrep

Nikhil Sahoo
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Agenda

Understanding SAST

SAST for Developers & Pentesters

SAST tools & comparison

Semgrep & rules

RTF Challenge

rules:

- id: Ravindra Penumarthi

patterns:

- pattern:

 - work:

 - Security SWE Engineer 2 at Microsoft
 - Azure Edge + Platform Security SERPENT Team

- pattern:

 - education:

 - MTech, Cyber Security from BITS Pilani*
 - MCA from BVRIT

- pattern:

 - affiliation:

 - Chapter Lead, null Hyderabad
 - Distinguished Motorcyclist, Road Thrill Hyderabad

Polyglot:

- Telugu, English, Hindi, Deccani, Tamil*
- C#, JS, PS, PY

skills: [Can Code, Can Hack, Can Talk, Can Drive, Can Joke]

metadata

description: "Ravindra is a Developer turned Ethical Hacker"

tags: CVE-2025-2102



rules:

- id: Nikhil Sahoo

patterns:

- pattern:

work:

- Security SWE Engineer 2 at Microsoft
- Azure Edge + Platform Security SERPENT Team

- pattern:

certifications:

- OSCP, eWPTX, CRTP

achievements: Acknowledged from multiple orgs such as Oracle,
Dell, Microsoft, Apple, SAP, Sony etc.

CVE: CVE-2018-11471, CVE-2018-11472, CVE-2018-11473,
CVE-2018-11474, CVE-2018-11475

Polyglot:

- English, Hindi, Odia
- C#, JS, PS, PY


skills: [Can Code, Can Hack, Can Talk]

metadata


tags: CVE-2025-2102

links: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/nikhilsahoo>,
<https://github.com/nikhil1232>





Dev side of the story



Static Application Security Testing



Analyzes Source Code without execution



Most of OWASP vulns are found at code Level



Originally meant for Developers



Early identification of Vulnerabilities




Cost effective




Various stages of Implementation

When to SAST?



SAST at IDE



The screenshot displays the Visual Studio IDE with a C# file named `Program.cs` open. The code defines a `Demo` class with a `checkMD5` method. A lightbulb icon on line 9 indicates a suggestion or warning. The `Error List` panel at the bottom shows two critical errors related to a weak hash algorithm.

```
1 using System.IO;
2 using System.Security.Cryptography;
3 using System.Text;
4
5 public class Demo
6 {
7     public string checkMD5(string filename)
8     {
9         var hash = MD5.Create();
10        using (var stream = File.OpenRead(filename))
11        {
12            return Encoding.Default.GetString(hash.ComputeHash(stream));
13        }
14    }
15 }
```

Error List

	Code	Description	Project	File
▶	✖ DS126858	DevSkim: [Critical] Weak/Broken Hash Algorithm	Demo	Program.cs
▶	✖ DS126858	DevSkim: [Critical] Weak/Broken Hash Algorithm	Demo	Program.cs

SAST at Repo level



Scan for Secrets



Scan for Vulnerable/Outdated packages




AI based plugins (ex: PR Reviews)


SAST at Build Pipelines



Demo time!



Pentest side of the story



Pentesters & SAST



Use SAST results to perform Targeted DAST



Pentesters perform in-depth SAST



Perform both Manual & Automated reviews



Build and enhance SAST tools

A taste of Manual Source Code Review

```
[ApiController]
[Route("api/[controller]")]
public class YourController : ControllerBase
{
    private readonly HttpClient _httpClient;

    [HttpGet]
    public async Task<IActionResult> GetRequest([FromQuery] string url)
    {
        try
        {
            var response = await _httpClient.GetAsync(url);
            var content = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync();
            return Ok(content);
        }
        catch (HttpRequestException e)
        {
            return StatusCode(500, $"Internal server error: {e.Message}");
        }
    }
}
```

<https://mydomain/api/your/GetRequest?url=https://attacker.com/>

SSRF

Not as easy as you think

String contains dots (.)

```
function validateUri(uri: string): string {  
    const keyVaultDnsSuffix = "vault.azure.net";  
    const UriRegex = `^https:\\/\\/([a-zA-Z0-9-]{3,24}\\.${keyVaultDnsSuffix})[:0-9]*\\/secrets\\/([a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,127}\\/*$`;  
    const result = uri.match(UriRegex);  
    return (result && result?.length) ? "Valid" : "Invalid";  
}
```

Dots enter Regex without escaping!

Dot . in a regular expression matches any character in the supported character set

Spot the Bug – Cont..

```
const UriRegex = `^https:\\\\[a-zA-Z0-9-]{3,24}\\.${keyVaultDnsSuffix}[ :0-9]*\\/secrets\\/ [a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,127}\\/*$` ;
```



```
const UriRegex = `^https:\\\\[a-zA-Z0-9-]{3,24}\\.vault.azure.net[ :0-9]*\\/secrets\\/ [a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,127}\\/*$` ;
```

```
// Test cases
```

```
validateUri("https://test.vault.azure.net/secrets/secretname"); // Valid
```

```
validateUri("https://malicious-domain.net/secrets/secretname"); // Invalid
```

```
validateUri("https://test.vaultAazure.net/secrets/secretname"); // Valid
```

```
validateUri("https://test.vaultxazure.net/secrets/secretname"); // Valid
```

Attacker's domains

Automated Source code Review

 Regex/String based lint


 AST based lint

 Taint and Data Flow analysis


Demo




DevSkim and its rules



SCA Tools Infographic



Regex Problems



https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/images/1/10/perl_problems.png

Regex Problems

REGULAR EXPRESSION	REGULAR EXPRESSION	REGULAR EXPRESSION
<code>:: / if\(.+\)</code>	<code>:: / if\s*\(.+\)</code>	<code>:: / if\ (a==b\)</code>
TEST STRING	TEST STRING	TEST STRING
<code>if(someconditi</code> <code>if.(someconditi</code>	<code>if(someconditi</code> <code>if.(someconditi</code>	<code>if(a==b)↵</code> <code>if(↵</code> <code>a==b↵</code> <code>)</code>

Code is not a string, It's a Tree



String

!=



Tree

```
using System;
```

```
namespace Demo
```

```
{
```

0 references

```
internal class Program
```

```
{
```

0 references

```
static void Main(string[] args)
```


```
{
```

```
    Console.WriteLine("Hello World !");
```

```
}
```

```
}
```


```
}
```



```
using System;

namespace ConsoleAppOwasp
{
    0 references
    internal class Program
    {
        0 references
        static void Main(string[] args)
        {
            Console.WriteLine("Hello World!");
        }
    }
}
```

- NamespaceKeyword [17..26]
- IdentifierName [27..42]
- OpenBraceToken [44..45]
- ClassDeclaration [51..198]
 - InternalKeyword [51..59]
 - ClassKeyword [60..65]
 - IdentifierToken [66..73]
 - OpenBraceToken [79..80]
 - MethodDeclaration [90..191]
 - MethodBodyOperation [90..191]
 - StaticKeyword [90..96]
 - PredefinedType [97..101]
 - IdentifierToken [102..106]
 - ParameterList [106..121]
 - Block [131..191]
 - OpenBraceToken [131..132]
 - ExpressionStatement [146..180]
 - InvocationExpression [146..179]



What is Semgrep?

- Fast and lightweight static analysis tool to find bugs and enforce code standards.



WORKS WITH 30+ FRAMEWORKS AND TECHNOLOGIES




Reference: <https://semgrep.dev>

History: Sgrep (Syntactic Grep)

- Initially called Sgrep/Pfff
- Written By Yoann Padioleau at Facebook for analyzing PHP code
- Was used to Enforce Best Practices
- Easy for developers to organize and understand the rules
- Joined R2C and renamed Sgrep to Semgrep
- Goal was to match based on semantics of the code

Reference: <https://semgrep.dev/blog/2021/semgrep-a-static-analysis-journey>

Internals



<https://r2c.dev/static/00125f77fba64f5350b367c373c4e849/1132d/semgrep-flow.png>

Installation and Getting Started

- Must have Python 3.9 or later where the Semgrep CLI is running
- `python3 -m pip install semgrep`
- Supports installation on multiple OS such as Linux, mac and windows
- Has a docker version
- Supports GUI and CLI mode. CLI scans can also be done without the need of a Github/Gitlab account.

Usage

CLI

```
nikhil@LAPTOP-5SA3IUEV:~/semgrepxternal/semgrep-rules/csharp/lang/security$ semgrep scan --config=/home/nikhil/semgrepxternal/semgrep-rules/csharp/lang/security/ad /home/nikhil/semgrepxternal/semgrep-rules/csharp/lang/security/ad/ --sarif -o /home/nikhil/owaspjwtruletest.sarif -v
```

Docker

```
C:\Tools\semgrepxternal\semgrep-rules\csharp\lang\security\ad>docker run --rm -v "C:\Tools\semgrepxternal:/src" returntocorp/semgrep --lang=csharp --config=semgrep-rules/csharp/lang/security/ad --metrics=off
```

Semgrep in Editors

- IntelliJ extension: [semgrep-intellij](#)
- Microsoft Visual Studio Code: [semgrep-vscode](#)

Rule Syntax

```
rules:
- id: random-rule
  patterns:
  - pattern: somepattern
  fix: pattern2
  message: |
    some msg
  severity: ERROR
  metadata:
    likelihood: LOW
    impact: MEDIUM
    confidence: MEDIUM
    category: security
    cwe:
      - "CWE-862: Missing Authorization"
    owasp:
      - A01:2021 - Broken Access Control
    references:
      - https://owasp.org/Top10/A01\_2021-Broken\_Access\_Control
    subcategory:
      - vuln
    technology:
      - .net
      - mvc
  languages:
    - csharp
```

Operators

- pattern
- patterns
- pattern-either
- pattern-regex
- pattern-not-regex
- focus-metavariable
- metavariable-regex
- metavariable-pattern
- metavariable-comparison
- pattern-not
- pattern-inside
- pattern-not-inside
- pattern-where-python

<https://semgrep.dev/docs/writing-rules/rule-syntax/>

Rule Syntax – Required Fields

Field	Type	Description
<code>id</code>	string	Unique, descriptive identifier, for example: <code>no-unused-variable</code>
<code>message</code>	string	Message that includes why Semgrep matched this pattern and how to remediate it. See also Rule messages .
<code>severity</code>	string	One of the following values: <code>INFO</code> (Low severity), <code>WARNING</code> (Medium severity), or <code>ERROR</code> (High severity). The <code>severity</code> key specifies how critical are the issues that a rule potentially detects. Note: Semgrep Supply Chain differs, as its rules use CVE assignments for severity. For more information, see Filters section in Semgrep Supply Chain documentation.
<code>languages</code>	array	See language extensions and tags
<code>pattern</code> *	string	Find code matching this expression
<code>patterns</code> *	array	Logical AND of multiple patterns
<code>pattern-either</code> *	array	Logical OR of multiple patterns
<code>pattern-regex</code> *	string	Find code matching this PCRE2-compatible pattern in multiline mode


<https://semgrep.dev/docs/writing-rules/rule-syntax>

Rule Syntax – Optional Fields

Field	Type	Description
<code>options</code>	object	Options object to enable/disable certain matching features
<code>fix</code>	object	Simple search-and-replace autofix functionality
<code>metadata</code>	object	Arbitrary user-provided data; attach data to rules without affecting Semgrep behavior
<code>min-version</code>	string	Minimum Semgrep version compatible with this rule
<code>max-version</code>	string	Maximum Semgrep version compatible with this rule
<code>paths</code>	object	Paths to include or exclude when running this rule

<https://semgrep.dev/docs/writing-rules/rule-syntax>

Playground



<https://semgrep.dev/playground/new>

Demo



Writing SEMGREP RULES



<https://semgrep.dev/playground/new>
<https://aka.ms/seasidesemgrep>

Ellipsis

- Ellipsis Operator: "..."
- Matches zero or more items such as arguments, statements, parameters, fields, characters.
- Exercise 1: Find PHP Command Injection Functions
- <https://github.com/nikhil1232/sastwithsemgrepseasides25/blob/main/Exercises/Exercise1.php>
- Exercise 2: Find call to the unsafe custom function callsystem()
- <https://github.com/nikhil1232/sastwithsemgrepseasides25/blob/main/Exercises/Exercise2.php>

Ellipsis

- Exercise 1: Find PHP Command Injection Functions
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/7KUg3vd/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.ellipsis-php-exec

```
1 rules:
2   - id: ellipsis-php-exec
3     pattern: exec(...)
4     message: rule to catch exec calls
5     languages:
6       - php
7     severity: WARNING
8
```

```
1 <?php
2
3 $command = "ls ".$_GET['modifiers'];
4
5 $output = exec($command);
```

Ellipsis

- Exercise 2: Find call to the unsafe custom function `callsystem()`
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/L1Uqg5Z/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.ellipsis-php-customfunc

```
1 rules:
2   - id: ellipsis-php-customfunc
3     pattern: |
4       function callsystem(...){
5         ...
6       }
7     message: rule to catch callsystem function
8     languages:
9       - php
10    severity: WARNING
11
```

```
1 <?php
2
3 function callsystem($command){
4   system($command);
5   exec($command);
6 }
7
8 $command = "ls ".$_GET['modifiers'];
9 callsystem($command);
```

Metavariable

- Metavariable Operator: "\$X"
- Way to match code when you don't know the value or contents ahead of time.
- Should begin with a \$ and can only contain uppercase characters, _, or digits.
- Exercise 3: Find all functions calling preg_replace()

Metavariable

- Exercise 3: Find all functions calling preg_replace()
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/8GUQrzD/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.metavariable-php-preg

```
1 rules:
2   - id: metavariable-php-preg
3     pattern: |
4       function $FUNC(...){
5         ...
6         echo preg_replace(...);
7         ...
8       }
9     message: rule to catch functions calling preg_replace
10    languages: [php]
11    severity: WARNING
12
```

```
1 <?php
2
3 function pregfunc($userinput)
4 {
5   echo preg_replace('/(.*)/e', 'strtoupper("\\1")', $userinput);
6 }
7
8
9 function pregfuncregex($userinputreg, $userinput)
10 {
11   echo "--- Execution Starts ---";
12   echo preg_replace($userinputreg, 'strtoupper("\\1")', $userinput);
13   echo "--- Execution Stops ---";
14 }
15
16 $userinput = $_GET['search'];
17 $userinputreg = $_GET['reg'];
18 pregfunc($userinput);
19 pregfuncregex($userinputreg, $userinput);
20
21 ?>
```

Deep Expression

- Deep Expression Operator: "<... [your pattern]...>"
- Used to match an expression that could be deeply nested within another expression
- Exercise 3: Catch the function vulnerable to SSRF

Deep Expression

- Exercise 4: Catch the function vulnerable to SSRF
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/3qUkXjA/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.ssrp_deep_expression

```
1 rules:
2   - id: ssrf_deep_expression
3     pattern: |
4       $TYPE $FUNC(..., $URL ,...){
5         ...
6         var $RES = (HttpClient $CLIENT).GetAsync(<... $URL ...>);
7         ...
8       }
9
10    message: rule to catch function vulnerable to ssrf
11    languages: [csharp]
12    severity: WARNING
13
```

```
1 using System.Net.Http;
2
3 namespace ServerSideRequestForgery
4 {
5     public class Ssrf
6     {
7
8         public string HttpClientAsync(string host)
9         {
10             HttpClient client = new HttpClient();
11             var response = client.GetAsync("https://" + host + "/api/discover");
12             return response;
13         }
14     }
15 }
16
17 }
```


Pattern-Either

- Performs a logical OR operation on one or more child patterns.
- Helps to combine multiple patterns together where any pattern maybe be true.
- Exercise 4: Catch all MD5 and SHA1 instances
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/JDUNxp8/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.insecurehash-patterneither

Pattern-Either

- Exercise 5: Catch all MD5 and SHA1 instances

```
rules:
- id: InsecureHash-PatternEither
  pattern-either:
  - pattern: SHA1.Create()
  - pattern: MD5.Create()
  message: Catch Insecure Hashing Functions
  languages: [csharp]
  severity: WARNING
```

```
public string ComputeMd5Hash(string input)
{
    using (MD5 md5 = MD5.Create())
    {
        byte[] inputBytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(input);
        byte[] hashBytes = md5.ComputeHash(inputBytes);

        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
        foreach (byte b in hashBytes)
        {
            sb.Append(b.ToString("x2"));
        }
        return sb.ToString();
    }
}

public string ComputeSha1Hash(string input)
{
    using (SHA1 sha1 = SHA1.Create())
    {
        byte[] inputBytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(input);
        byte[] hashBytes = sha1.ComputeHash(inputBytes);
    }
}
```

Patterns

- Performs a logical AND operation on one or more child patterns.
- Helps to combine multiple patterns together where all must be true.

Pattern-Inside

- Keeps matched findings that reside within its expression.
- Helps to find code inside other pieces of code like functions or if blocks.
- Exercise 6: Catch ECB instances
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/5rUd1Ag/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.ecbmode

Pattern-Inside

- Exercise 6: Catch ECB instances

```
rules:
- id: ECBmode
  pattern-either:
  - patterns:
    - pattern: CipherMode.ECB;
    - pattern-inside: |
        using System.Security.Cryptography;
        ...
  - patterns:
    - pattern: System.Security.Cryptography.
      CipherMode.ECB
  message: Semgrep found a match
  languages: [csharp]
  severity: WARNING
```

```
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;

public class EcbExample
{
    public byte[] EncryptEcb(string plainText, byte[] key)
    {
        using (Aes aesAlg = Aes.Create())
        {
            aesAlg.Mode = CipherMode.ECB;
            aesAlg.Padding = PaddingMode.PKCS7;
```

```
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Text;

public class EcbExample
{
    public byte[] EncryptEcb(string plainText, byte[] key)
    {
        using (Aes aesAlg = Aes.Create())
        {
            aesAlg.Mode = System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode.
            ECB;
            aesAlg.Padding = PaddingMode.PKCS7;
```

Pattern-Not-Inside

- Keeps matched findings that reside within its expression.
- Helps to find code inside other pieces of code like functions or if blocks.
- Exercise 7: Catch functions vulnerable to open redirection
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/GdUve6E/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.openredirect

Pattern-Not-Inside

- Exercise 7: Catch functions vulnerable to open redirection

```
rules:
- id: openredirect
  patterns:
  - pattern: |
    | Response.Redirect($URL);
  - pattern-inside: |
    | $TYPE $METHODNAME($URL)
    | {...}
  - pattern-not-inside: |
    | if(allowedUrls.Contains($URL))
    | {...}
  message: Catch instances vulnerable to open
  redirection
  languages:
  - csharp
  severity: WARNING
```

```
using System.Web;
using System.Web.Mvc;

public class ExampleController : Controller
{
    private readonly string[] allowedUrls = { "/",
        "/login", "/logout" };

    [HttpGet]
    public void Redirectinsecure(string url)
    {
        Response.Redirect(url);
    }

    [HttpGet]
    public void Redirect(string url)
    {
        if (allowedUrls.Contains(url))
        {
            Response.Redirect(url);
        }
    }
}
```

Pattern-Not

- Opposite of the pattern operator.
- Helps to find code that does not match its expression.
- Useful for eliminating common false positives.
- Exercise 8: Catch all instances vulnerable to Json.net deserialization
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/X5UQy4l/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.jsontypenamehandling-patternnot

Pattern-Not

- Exercise 8: Catch all instances vulnerable to Json.net deserialization

```
rules:
- id: jsontypenamehandling-patternnot
  pattern-either:
  - patterns:
    - pattern: |
      JsonConvert.DeserializeObject(..., new JsonSerializerSettings
      {TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.$TYPE})
    - pattern-not: |
      JsonConvert.DeserializeObject(..., new JsonSerializerSettings
      {TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.None})
  - patterns:
    - pattern: |
      JsonConvert.DeserializeObject(..., $SET)
    - pattern-not-inside: |
      JsonSerializerSettings $SET = new JsonSerializerSettings
      {
      | TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.None
      };
      ...
    - pattern-inside: |
      JsonSerializerSettings $SET = new JsonSerializerSettings
      {
      | TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.$TYPE
      };
      ...
  message: Catch all json.net instances where TypeNameHandling is not set to None
  languages:
  - csharp
  severity: WARNING
```

```
public static object Deserialize1(TextBox data)
{
    return JsonConvert.DeserializeObject(data.Text, new JsonSerializerSettings
    {
        TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.None
    });
}

public static object Deserialize2(TextBox data)
{
    return JsonConvert.DeserializeObject(data.Text, new JsonSerializerSettings
    {
        TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.Auto
    });
}

public static object Deserialize3(TextBox data)
{
    JsonSerializerSettings settings = new JsonSerializerSettings
    {
        TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.Auto
    };
    return JsonConvert.DeserializeObject(data.Text, settings);
}

public static object Deserialize4(TextBox data)
{
    JsonSerializerSettings settings = new JsonSerializerSettings
    {
        TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.None
    };
    return JsonConvert.DeserializeObject(data.Text, settings);
}

public static object Deserialize5(TextBox data)
{
    return JsonConvert.DeserializeObject(data.Text);
}
```

Catching Attributes

- Exercise 9: Find all functions vulnerable to CSRF
- Solution: https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/r6UyK1g/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.csrf-attributes
- Exercise 10: Broken Access Control
- Solution: https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/bwUb3ZD/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.possible-anonymous-action

Catching Attributes

- Exercise 9 : Find all functions vulnerable to CSRF

```
rules:
- id: csrf-attributes
  patterns:
  - pattern: |
    [HttpPost]
    public $TYPE $METHOD(...){...}
  - pattern-not: |
    [HttpPost]
    [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
    public $TYPE $METHOD(...){...}
  - pattern-not-inside: |
    [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
    public class $CLASSNAME{...}
  - pattern-not-inside: |
    [AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken]
    public class $CLASSNAME{...}
  - pattern-inside: |
    using System.Web.Mvc;
    ...
  message: Catch actions vulnerable to CSRF
  languages: [csharp]
  severity: WARNING
```

```
using System.Web.Mvc;

public class HomeController : Controller
{
    [HttpPost]
    public ActionResult Profile()
    {
        return View();
    }

    [HttpPost]
    [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
    public ActionResult UpdateDetails()
    {
        return View();
    }
}

[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
public class SaveController : Controller
{
    [HttpPost]
    public ActionResult Login()
    {
        return View();
    }
}

[AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken]
public class PushController : Controller
{
    [HttpPost]
    public ActionResult Login()
    {
        return View();
    }
}
```

Catching Attributes

- Exercise 10 : Broken Access Control

```
rules:
- id: possible-anonymous-action
  patterns:
    - pattern-either:
      - patterns:
        - pattern: |
            [AllowAnonymous]
            $R $M(...) {
              ...
            }
        - patterns:
          - pattern: |
              $R $M(...) {
                ...
              }
          - pattern-not-inside: |
              [Authorize(...)]
              class $N {...}
        - pattern-not: |
            [Authorize(...)]
            $R $M(...) {
              ...
            }
        - pattern-inside: |
            using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
            ...
      message: Possible Anonymous Function
      languages:
      - csharp
      severity: WARNING
```

```
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;

public class HomeController : Controller
{
    [HttpGet]
    public ActionResult Profile()
    { return View(); }

    [HttpPost]
    [Authorize]
    public ActionResult UpdateDetails()
    { return View(); }
}

[Authorize]
public class SaveController : Controller
{
    [HttpPost]
    public ActionResult Profile()
    { return View(); }
}

[Authorize]
public class PushController : Controller
{
    [AllowAnonymous]
    [HttpPost]
    public ActionResult Profile()
    { return View(); }
}

[Authorize (Role ="Admin")]
public class AdminController : Controller
{
    [AllowAnonymous]
    [HttpPost]
    public ActionResult Profile()
    { return View(); }
}
```

Metavariable regex

- Searches metavariables for a PCRE2 regular expression
- Exercise 11 : Catch the vulnerable settings responsible for insecure token validation
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/6JUv9R2/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.jwtinsecure

Metavariable regex

- Exercise 11 : Catch the vulnerable settings responsible for insecure token validation

```
rules:
- id: jwtinsecure
  pattern-either:
  - patterns:
    - metavariable-regex:
      metavariable: $CLASSNAME
      regex: ^(((Microsoft|System)[.]IdentityModel[.]Tokens[.]?)
        (TokenValidationParameters))$
    - metavariable-regex:
      metavariable: $PROPERTY
      regex: ^(RequireSignedTokens|RequireExpirationTime|
        ValidateAudience|ValidateIssuer|ValidateLifetime)
        $
    - pattern: ($CLASSNAME $OBJECT).$PROPERTY = false;
  - patterns:
    - metavariable-regex:
      metavariable: $CLASSNAME
      regex: ^(((Microsoft|System)[.]IdentityModel[.]Tokens[.]?)
        (TokenValidationParameters))$
    - metavariable-regex:
      metavariable: $PROPERTY
      regex: ^(RequireSignedTokens|RequireExpirationTime|
        ValidateAudience|ValidateIssuer|ValidateLifetime)
        $
    - pattern: $PROPERTY = false
    - pattern-inside: var $OBJECT = new $CLASSNAME{...};
  message: Insecure JWT settings
  languages: [csharp]
  severity: WARNING
```

```
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;

public class Test
{
    public void TokenValidationMethod()
    {
        TokenValidationParameters tokenvalidate = new TokenValidationParameters
        {
            ValidateIssuer = false,
            ValidateAudience = false,
            RequireExpirationTime = false,
            ValidateLifetime = false,
            RequireSignedTokens = false
        };

        TokenValidationParameters parametersinsecure = new TokenValidationParameters();
        parametersinsecure.ValidateIssuer = false;
        parametersinsecure.ValidateAudience = false;
        parametersinsecure.ValidateLifetime = false;
        parametersinsecure.RequireSignedTokens = false;

        TokenValidationParameters parameterssecure = new TokenValidationParameters();
        parameterssecure.ValidateIssuer = true;
        parameterssecure.ValidateAudience = true;
        parameterssecure.RequireSignedTokens = true;
    }
}
```

Metavariable comparison

- Compares metavariables against a basic comparison expression.
- Useful for filtering results based on a metavariable's numeric value.
- Exercise 12: Find all instances of persistent cookies (set to more than 5 mins)
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/gxU37vX/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.persistent-cookie

Taint Analysis

- Data-flow analysis that tracks the flow of untrusted, or tainted data throughout the body of a function or method
- Exercise 13: Find all instances of XML unsafe parsing.
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/DbU6boq/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_or_g.xmlreadersettings-unsafe-parser-override

Pattern-sanitizers

- Exercise 14: Path.Combine() Path Traversal
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/WAUWK5l/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_or_g.modified-unsafe-path-combine


Generic Pattern matching

- Exercise 15: Debugging Enabled(Web.Config)
- Solution:
https://semgrep.dev/playground/r/0oULzk5/nikhilsahoo1232_personal_org.generic-debuggingenabled

Limitation


```
[ApiController]
[Route("[controller]")]
0 references
public class WeatherForecastController : ControllerBase
{
    [HttpGet]
    0 references
    public ActionResult Get(string url)
    {
        HttpClient client = new HttpClient();

        var content = client.GetStringAsync(url).Result;
        return Ok(content);
    }
}
```



```
[ApiController]
[Route("[controller]")]
0 references
public class WeatherForecastController : ControllerBase
{
    [HttpGet]
    0 references
    public ActionResult Get(string url)
    {
        // some operation on uri

        var content = FetchResponse(url);
        return Ok(content);
    }
}
```



```
1 reference
private string FetchResponse(string url)
{
    HttpClient client = new HttpClient();

    var content = client.GetStringAsync(url).Result;

    return content;
}
```

Multi File Analysis:
Sengrep Pro Engine

Semgrep on Push

 **GitLab + Semgrep**

Find bugs and enforce code standards
on every merge request

```
.gitlab-ci.yml

semgrep:
  image: returntocorp/semgrep
  script: semgrep ci
  rules:
    - changes:
      - .gitlab-ci.yml
    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "web" # allow triggering a scan manually from the gitlab UI
    - if: $CI_MERGE_REQUEST_IID

variables:
  SEMGREP_RULES: >- # more at semgrep.dev/r
    p/security-audit
    p/secrets
  SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN: $SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN

# Setup inline MR comments:
#
https://semgrep.dev/docs/semgrep-app/notifications/#enabling-gitlab-merge-request-comments
```

Copy this Semgrep CI snippet to your project to scan merge requests with two starter security rulesets.

[Semgrep CI Docs](#) [Copy snippet](#)

Separate from Semgrep CI, GitLab 14+ includes a Semgrep analyzer in *GitLab SAST*, pre-configured for JS, TS, & Python. You can run Semgrep CI and GitLab SAST in the same pipeline.

<https://semgrep.dev/docs/semgrep-ci/overview/>

Tools

- Semgrep: <https://github.com/returntocorp/semgrep>
- Semgrep External Rules: <https://github.com/returntocorp/semgrep-rules>
- Semgrep Playground: <https://semgrep.dev/playground>
- CodeQL: <https://codeql.github.com/>
- Devskim: <https://github.com/microsoft/DevSkim>

References

- <https://semgrep.dev/docs/>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kb8oo7Wyk84>
- <https://youtube.com/watch?v=O5mh8j7-An8>
- <https://semgrep.dev/playground/>
- <https://rules.sonarsource.com/>
- <https://semgrep.dev/blog/2021/semgrep-a-static-analysis-journey>
- <https://github.com/returntocorp/semgrep-rules>

RTF

[Remediate The Flag](#) [Challenges](#) [Scoreboard](#) [Code Explorer](#) Hello Nikhil Sahoo!

Easy

Unauthenticated Territories

Points: 100

Lost Ticket

Points: 100

A Certificate Of Trust

Points: 100

The Art of Forgery

Points: 100

<https://aka.ms/rtfseasides>

Thank You