



LiquidHaskell

Usable Language-Based Verification

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Formal Verification

Prove Properties of Software

Formal Verification

Prove Properties of Real Software

Formal Verification

Prove Properties of Real Software



“A plane will not crush”

Formal Verification

Prove Properties of Real Software



“Medical Equipments will properly work”

Formal Verification

Prove Properties of Real Software



“Your passwords are SAFE”

Formal Verification, in Practise

Prove Properties of ~~Real Software~~

in Verification Specific Tools

Formal Verification, in Practice

Prove Properties of ~~Real Software~~

in Verification Specific Tools

Verification Specific Tools

```
Lemma plus_Snm_nSm : forall n m, S n + m = n + S m.  
intros.  
simpl in |- *.  
rewrite (plus_comm n m).  
rewrite (plus_comm n (S m)).  
trivial with arith.  
Qed.
```



“Plus is indeed associative!”

Verification Specific Tools

Difficult to use for Real Programs

Difficult to install

Special Syntax

No Compiler Optimizations

No Parallelism

Very Few Users!

Verification Specific Tools



Manual
Translation



Verification

My goal:

Verification of Real Programs

Verification of Real Programs

My approach:

Turn a Language into a Verifier

Reuse language's syntax, runtime, and users!

Verification of Real Programs

My approach:

Turn a Language into a Verifier

Target Language: Haskell

Turn a Haskell into a Verifier

Reuse language's syntax, runtime, and **users**!

I: Target Real Haskell Code

II: Application in **Industry**

Use Verification to speedup code

III: Application in **Education**

Teach verification in Haskell courses!

Haskell

+

Refinement Types

=




LiquidHaskell

Haskell

Functional Programming Language

Based on
Strong Typing + λ -calculus




*Well Typed Programs
cannot go wrong!*

Functional Programming Language



Based on
Typing + λ -calculus



Fact Check.

Can we encode Heartbleed?




The Heartbleed Bug.
Buffer overflow in OpenSSL. 2015

HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:


SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?
IF SO, REPLY "POTATO" (6 LETTERS).



User Eric wants pages about "boats". User Erica requests secure connection using key "4538538374224". User Meg wants these 6 letters: POTATO. User Ada wants pages about "irl games". Unlocking secure records with master key 5130985733435. Macie (chrome user) sends this message: "H




POTATO



SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?
IF SO, REPLY "BIRD" (4 LETTERS).




User Olivia from London wants pages about "new bees in car why". Note: Files for IP 375.381. 283.17 are in /tmp/files-3843. User Meg wants these 4 letters: **BIRD**. There are currently 345 connections open. User Brendan uploaded the file selfie.jpg (contents: 834ba962e2ceb9ff89bd3bfff84)



HMM...



BIRD




SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?

a connection. Jake requested pictures of deer. User Meg wants these 500 letters: HAT. Lucas

SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?
IF SO, REPLY "HAT" (500 LETTERS).




a connection. Jake requested pictures of deer.
User Meg wants these 500 letters: HAT. Lucas
requests the "missed connections" page. Eve
(administrator) wants to set server's master
key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about
"snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to
change account password to "CoHoBaSt". User



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key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about
"snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to
change account password to "CoHoBaSt". User





VS.





VS.



```
λ> :m +Data.Text Data.Text.Unsafe  
λ> let pack = "hat"  
  
λ> :t takeWord16  
takeWord16 :: Text -> Int -> Text
```



VS.



```
λ> :m +Data.Text Data.Text.Unsafe  
λ> let pack = "hat"  
  
λ> takeWord16 pack True  
Type Error: Cannot match Bool vs Int
```



VS.



```
λ> :m +Data.Text Data.Text.Unsafe  
λ> let pack = "hat"  
  
λ> takeWord16 pack 500  
“hat\58456\2594\SOH\NUL...
```



VS.



Valid Values for takeWord16?

`takeWord16 :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text`

All Ints

`..., -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, ...`

Valid Values for takeWord16?

`takeWord16 :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text`

Valid Ints


`0, 1 ... , len t-1`

Invalid Ints

`len t, ...`

Refinement Types

`take :: t:Text -> {v:Int | v < len t} -> Text`



Refinement Types

```
take :: t:Text -> {v:Int | v < len t} -> Text
```

```
λ> :m +Data.Text Data.Text.Unsafe
```

```
λ> let pack = "hat"
```

```
λ> take pack 500
```

```
Refinement Type Error
```

i.e.  **LiquidHaskell**
easily detect errors at compile time!

Refinement Types



Checks valid arguments, under facts.

Checks valid arguments, under facts.

```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
heartbleed = let x = "hat"
             in take x 500
```

len x = 3 => v = 500 => v < len x

Checks valid arguments, under facts.

```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
heartbleed = let x = "hat"
            in take x 500
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len x = 3 => v = 500 => v < len x

Checks valid arguments, under facts.

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take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
```

```
heartbleed = let x = "hat"  
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```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text  
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```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
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             in take x 500
```

```
len x = 3 => v = 500 => v < len x
```

Checks valid arguments, under facts.

```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
heartbleed = let x = "hat"
            in take x 500
```

SMT-
query

len x = 3 => v = 500 => v < len x

Checks valid arguments, under facts.

```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
heartbleed = let x = "hat"
            in take x 500
```

SMT-
invalid

len x = 3 => v = 500 => v < len x

Checks valid arguments, under facts.

```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
heartbleed = let x = "hat"
            in take x 500
```

Checker reports **Error**

len x = 3 => v = 500 => v < len x

Checks valid arguments, under facts.

```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
heartbleed = let x = "hat"
            in take x 500
```

Checker reports **Error**

len x = 3 => v = 500 => v < len x

Checks valid arguments, under facts.

```
take :: t:Text -> {v | v < len t} -> Text
```

```
heartbleed = let x = "hat"  
           in take x 2
```

Checker reports **OK**

SMT-
valid


len x = 3 => v = 2 => v < len x



Checks valid arguments, under facts.

Static Checks

Efficiency



Safety

No Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text
take i t
= Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
```

No Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text
take i t
= Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
```

```
heartbleed = take "hat" 500
```

OK

No Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text
take i t
= Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
```

OK

```
heartbleed = take "hat" 500
```

UNSAFE

```
λ> heartbleed
λ> “hat\58456\2594\SOH\NUL...
```

Runtime Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text
take i t | i < len t
          = Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
take i t
          = error "Out Of Bounds!"
```

Runtime Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text
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Runtime Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text
take i t | i < len t
  = Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
take i t
  = error "Out Of Bounds!"
```

```
heartbleed = take "hat" 500
```

OK

Runtime Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text
take i t | i < len t
  = Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
take i t
  = error "Out Of Bounds!"
```

OK

```
heartbleed = take "hat" 500
```

SAFE

```
λ> heartbleed
```

```
λ> *** Exception: Out Of Bounds!
```

Runtime Checks are expensive

```
take :: t:Text -> i:Int -> Text
take i t | i < len t
          = Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
take i t
          = error "Out Of Bounds!"
```

Static Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:{i < len t} -> Text
take i t | i < len t
  = Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
take i t
  = error "Out Of Bounds!"
```

Static Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:{i < len t} -> Text
take i t | i < len t
  = Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
take i t
error "Out Of Bounds!"
```

Static Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:{i < len t} -> Text
take i t
= Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
```

Static Checks

```
take :: t:Text -> i:{i < len t} -> Text
take i t
= Unsafe.takeWord16 i t
```

UNSAFE

```
heartbleed = take "hat" 500
```



LiquidHaskell

Static Checks

Safe & Fast Code!

Static Checks

Safe & Fast Code!

Application: Speedup Parsing

Application: Speedup Parsing

UDP:User Datagram Protocol



Gabriel Gonzalez
 AWAKE




Gabriel Gonzalez



Application: Speedup Parsing

UDP:User Datagram Protocol





Gabriel Gonzalez



Application: Speedup Parsing

```
data UDP = UDP
  { udpSrcPort :: Text -- 2 chars
  , udpDestPort :: Text -- 2 chars
  , udpLength :: Text -- 2 chars
  , udpChecksum :: Text -- 2 chars
  }
```



Gabriel Gonzalez



Application: Speedup Parsing

```
udpP :: Text -> UDP
udpP bs =
  let (udp1, bs1) = splitAt 2 bs
  let (udp2, bs2) = splitAt 2 bs1
  let (udp3, bs3) = splitAt 2 bs2
  let (udp4, bs4) = splitAt 2 bs3
in UDP (udp1 upd2 udp3 upd4)
```

Safe but Slow (4 runtime checks)

Solution: Merge checks



Gabriel Gonzalez



Application: Speedup Parsing

```
udpP :: Text -> Maybe UDP
udpP bs =
  if length bs < 8 then
    let (udp1, bs1) = US.splitAt 2 bs
    let (udp2, bs2) = US.splitAt 2 bs1
    let (udp3, bs3) = US.splitAt 2 bs2
    let (udp4, bs4) = US.splitAt 2 bs3
    in Just (UDP udp1 upd2 upd3 upd4)
  else Nothing
```

Safe and Fast (1 runtime check!)



Gabriel Gonzalez



Application: Speedup Parsing

```
udpP :: Text -> Maybe UDP
udpP bs =
  if length bs < 8 then
    let (udp1, bs1) = US.splitAt 2 bs
    let (udp2, bs2) = US.splitAt 2 bs1
    let (udp3, bs3) = US.splitAt 4 bs2
    let (udp4, bs4) = US.splitAt 2 bs3
    in Just (UDP udp1 upd2 upd3 upd4)
  else Nothing
```

Safe and Fast, but error prone



Gabriel Gonzalez



Application: Speedup Parsing

```
udpP :: Text -> Maybe UDP
udpP bs =
  if length bs < 8 then
    let (udp1, bs1) = US.splitAt 2 bs
      in Just (UDP udp1 upd2 upd3 upd4)
  else Nothing

splitAt :: i:Int -> t:{i < len t} ->
(tl:{i = len tl}, tr:{len tr = len t - i})
```

Enforce Static Checks!



Gabriel Gonzalez

Application: Speedup Parsing

UNSAFE

```
udpP :: Text -> Maybe UDP
udpP bs =
  if length bs < 8 then
    let (udp1, bs1) = US.splitAt 2 bs0
    let (udp2, bs2) = US.splitAt 2 bs1
    let (udp3, bs3) = US.splitAt 4 bs2
    let (udp4, bs4) = US.splitAt 2 bs3
    in Just (UDP udp1 upd2 upd3 upd4)
  else Nothing
```

Enforce Static Checks!



Application: Speedup Parsing

Sébastien Gonzalez
AWAKE

SAFE

```
udpP :: Text -> Maybe UDP
udpP bs =
  if length bs < 8 then
    let (udp1, bs1) = US.splitAt 2 bs
    let (udp2, bs2) = US.splitAt 2 bs1
    let (udp3, bs3) = US.splitAt 2 bs2
    let (udp4, bs4) = US.splitAt 2 bs3
    in Just (UDP udp1 upd2 upd3 upd4)
  else Nothing
```

Provably Correct & Faster (x6) Code!



Gabriel Gonzalez



Application: Speedup Parsing

Provably Correct & Faster (x6) Code!

Safe & Efficient Code!



LiquidHaskell

Safe & Efficient Code!

Efficiency



No Checks


Runtime Checks




Safety

Static Checks





Efficiency



Safety

Expressiveness

What properties can be expressed in types?

Expressiveness vs. Automation

Expressiveness vs. Automation

If p is safe indexing ...

```
{t:Text | i < len t }
```

... then SMT-automatic verification.

Expressiveness vs. Automation

If p from decidable theories ...

$$\{t : a \mid p\}$$

... then SMT-automatic verification.

Expressiveness vs. Automation

If p from decidable theories ...

$$\{t : a \mid p\}$$

Boolean Logic


(QF) Linear Arithmetic

Uninterpreted Functions ...

... then SMT-automatic verification.

What about expressiveness?

Automation



Expressiveness

Classic Refinement Types

```
fib :: i:{Int | 0≤i} -> {v:Int | 0<v∧i≤v}
fib i
| i≤1          = 1
| otherwise    = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)
```

SAFE

Can we increase expressiveness?

Can we increase expressiveness?

```
fib :: i:{Int | 0≤i} -> {v:Int | 0<v ∧ i≤v}
fib i
| i≤1          = 1
| otherwise     = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)
```

How to express **theorems** about functions?

```
\forall i. 0 ≤ i => fib i ≤ fib (i+1)
```

How to express **theorems** about functions?

Step 1: Definition

In SMT **fib** is “Uninterpreted Function”

\forall i j. i = j => fib i = fib j

How to connect logic **fib** with target **fib**?

How to connect logic fib with target fib?

~~fib :: i:{Int | 0≤i} > {v: Int | 0< v ∧ i ≤ v}~~

~~fib i~~

~~| 1≤1~~

~~| otherwise = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)~~

NOT decidable

~~SMT AXIOM~~

~~\forall i.~~

~~if i ≤ 1 then fib i = 1~~

~~else fib i = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)~~

Decidable

How to connect logic fib with target fib?

```
fib :: i:{Int | 0≤i} -> {v:Int | 0<v∧i≤v}
fib i
| i≤1          = 1
| otherwise    = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)
```

Refinement Reflection

```
fib :: i:{Int | 0≤i} -> {v:Int | v=fib i ∧
  if i≤1 then fib i = 1
  else fib i = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)
}
```

Refinement Reflection

Step 1: Definition

Step 2: Reflection

```
fib :: i:{Int | 0≤i} -> {v:Int | v=fib i ∧
  if i≤1 then fib i = 1
  else fib i = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)
}
```

Refinement Reflection

Step 1: Definition

Step 2: Reflection

```
fib :: i:{Int | 0≤i} -> {v:Int | v=fib i ∧
    if i≤1 then fib i = 1
    else fib i = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)
}
```

Step 3: Application

```
fib 0 :: {v:Int | v=fib 0 ∧ fib 0 = 1}
```

Application is Type Level Computation

fib 0

fib 0 = 1

Application Type Level Computation

fib 0

fib 0 = 1

fib 1

fib 1 = 1

fib 2

fib 2 = fib 1 + fib 0

fib i

?

- ? if $i \leq 1$ then fib i = 1
- ? else fib i = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)

Application Type Level Computation

fib 0

fib 0 = 1

fib 1

fib 1 = 1

fib 2

fib 2 = fib 1 + fib 0

if 1 < i then

fib i

fib i = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)

if $i \leq 1$ then fib i = 1

else fib i = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)

Application Type Level Computation

fib 0

fib 0 = 1

fib 1

fib 1 = 1

fib 2

fib 2 = fib 1 + fib 0

if 1 < i then

fib i

fib i = fib (i-1) + fib (i-2)

fib (i+1)

fib (i+1) = fib i + fib (i-1)

Theorem Proving

```
fibUp :: i:Nat -> {fib i ≤ fib (i+1)}
fibUp i
| i == 0
= fib 0 <. fib 1
*** QED
| i == 1
= fib 1 <=. fib 1 + fib 0 <= fib 2
*** QED
| otherwise
= fib i
<=. fib i + fib (i-1)
<=. fib (i+1)
*** QED
```

Reflection for Theorem Proving

Theorems are refinement types.

Proofs are functions.

Check that functions prove theorems.

Proofs are functions.

`fibUp :: i:Nat -> {fib i ≤ fib (i+1)}`

Proofs are functions.

```
fibUp :: i:Nat -> {fib i ≤ fib (i+1)}
```

Let's call them!

```
fibUp 4 :: {fib 4 ≤ fib 5}
```

```
fibUp i :: {fib i ≤ fib (i+1)}
```

```
fibUp (j-1) :: {fib (j-1) ≤ fib j}
```

Proofs are functions. Let's call them!

```
fibMono :: i:Nat -> j:{Nat | i < j}  
         -> {fib i ≤ fib j}
```

```
fibMono i j  
| i + 1 == j  
= fib i  
<=. fib (i+1) ? fibUp i  
==. fib j  
*** QED  
| otherwise  
= fib i  
<=. fib (j-1) ? fibMono i (j-1)  
<=. fib j      ? fibUp (j-1)  
*** QED
```

Proofs are functions. Let's call them!

```
fibMono :: i:Nat -> j:{Nat | i < j}  
         -> {fib i ≤ fib j}
```

```
fibMono i j  
| i + 1 == j  
= fib i  
<=. fib (i+1) ? fibUp i  
==. fib j  
*** QED  
| otherwise  
= fib i  
<=. fib (j-1) ? fibMono i (j-1)  
<=. fib j      ? fibUp (j-1)  
*** QED
```

Proofs are functions. Let's abstract them!

```
fibMono :: i:Nat -> j:{Nat | i < j}
          -> fib:(Nat -> Int)
          -> (k:Nat -> {fib k ≤ fib (k+1)})
          -> {fib i ≤ fib j}
```

```
fibMono i j fib fibUp
| i + 1 == j
= fib i
<=. fib (i+1) ? fibUp i
==. fib j
*** QED
| otherwise
= fib i
<=. fib (j-1) ? fibMono i (j-1)
<=. fib j      ? fibUp (j-1)
*** QED
```



Refinement Reflection for **Expressiveness**

 Liquid Haskell

Refinement Reflection for **Expressiveness**

Idea:

Encode HO specs in FO SMT decidable logic

Metatheory:

THEOREM 4.1. [Soundness of λ^R]

- **Denotations** If $\Gamma; R \vdash p : \tau$ then $\forall \theta \in [\![\Gamma]\!]. \theta \cdot p \in [\![\theta \cdot \tau]\!]$.
- **Preservation** If $\emptyset; \emptyset \vdash p : \tau$ and $p \hookrightarrow^* w$, then $\emptyset; \emptyset \vdash w : \tau$.

Metatheory:

THEOREM 4.1. [Soundness of λ^R]

- **Denotations** If $\Gamma; R \vdash p : \tau$ then $\forall \theta \in [[\Gamma]]. \theta \cdot p \in [[\theta \cdot \tau]]$.
- **Preservation** If $\emptyset; \emptyset \vdash p : \tau$ and $p \hookrightarrow^* w$, then $\emptyset; \emptyset \vdash w : \tau$.

E PROOF OF SOUNDNESS

We prove Theorem 4.1 of § D by reduction to Soundness of λ^U [Vazou et al. 2014a].

THEOREM E.1. [Denotations] If $\Gamma \vdash p : \tau$ then $\forall \theta \in [[\Gamma]]. \theta \cdot p \in [[\theta \cdot \tau]]$.

PROOF. We use the proof from [Vazou et al. 2014b] and specifically Lemma 4 that is identical to the statement we need to prove. Since the proof proceeds by induction in the type derivation, we need to ensure that all the modified rules satisfy the statement.

- T-EXACT Assume $\Gamma \vdash e : \{v : B \mid \{|r\} \wedge v = e\}$. By inversion $\Gamma \vdash e : \{v : B \mid \{|r\}\}(1)$. By (1) and IH we get $\forall \theta \in [[\Gamma]]. \theta \cdot e \in [[\theta \cdot \{v : B \mid \{|r\}\}]]$. We fix a $\theta \in [[\Gamma]]$. We get that if $\theta \cdot e \hookrightarrow^* w$, then $\theta \cdot \{|r\}[v/w] \hookrightarrow^* \text{True}$. By the Definition of $=$ we get that $w = w \hookrightarrow^* \text{True}$. Since $\theta \cdot (v = e)[v/w] \hookrightarrow^* w = w$, then $\theta \cdot (\{|r\} \wedge v = e)[v/w] \hookrightarrow^* \text{True}$. Thus $\theta \cdot e \in [[\theta \cdot \{v : B \mid \{|r\} \wedge v = e\}]]$ and since this holds for any fixed θ , $\forall \theta \in [[\Gamma]]. \theta \cdot e \in [[\theta \cdot \{v : B \mid \{|r\} \wedge v = e\}]]$.

E PROOF OF SOUNDNESS

We prove Th

THEOREM

PROOF. We state the statement need to ensure

- T-EXA (1) and $\theta \cdot e \hookrightarrow^* \text{True}$.
- T-LET $\tau(2)$, and $(2')$. By (3) $\forall \theta$
- T-REFL $e \in p$ are closed
- T-FIX $p' \equiv p$ and p

THEOREM

PROOF. In Lemma 7. The Lemma.

LEMMA E.

PROOF. Since rule is replaced by the same source

- T-EXA $\emptyset \vdash p'$ is closed
- T-SUB

By 25, the ab

Example: If the term fib

Thus, by The

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Predicates } p ::= p \bowtie p \mid \oplus_1 p \\ \mid n \mid b \mid x \mid D \mid x \bar{p} \end{array}$$

Transformation

$\Gamma \vdash e \rightsquigarrow p$

rule $\vdash F \hookrightarrow^* \text{UN}$. The term $\lambda x.e$ of type $\tau_x \rightarrow \tau$ is transformed to $\text{lam}_s^x x p$ of sort $\text{Fun } s_x s$, where s_x and s are respectively $\llbracket \tau_x \rrbracket$ and $\llbracket \tau \rrbracket$, lam_s^x is a special uninterpreted function of sort $\text{Fun } s_x s$.

Refinement Reflection, POPL'18

by **Vazou**, Tondwalkar, Choudhury, Scott, Newton, Wadler, and Jhala

- T-LET A (2), and et al. 2016
- T-REFL $x : \tau'_x \vdash x : \tau_x$ (1'), (2), and et al. 2016
- T-FIX $p' \equiv p$ and p

F ALGORITHM

Next, we describe rule is replaced by the same source

F.1 The Syntax

Syntax: Terms of quantifier-free logic [Nelson 2010; Nelson 2016] (encoded as closures) and uninterpreted functions over integer and boolean values. Function sorts are represented as other values.

Semantics: Semantics includes $(\vdash B \hookrightarrow^* C)$ in λ^S , all function constants and like $(+ 1)$ to

F.2 Translation

The judgment term p . The Embedding

Definition F. The axioms of the embedding

$\text{FUN } (\tau) \mid (\tau_{i,j})$ using the checker example, follow

$[] \rightsquigarrow$
 $(x : xs) \rightsquigarrow$

is reflected in

We favor selected et al. 2016] to

Termination described by conjoining (t

Informally, the expression the

Definition F. the axioms of

F.4 Decidability Figure 17 summarizes types are extended helper function

refinement that refinement et al. 2014a]. refinements to

Verification described by conjoining (t

informally, the expression the

Definition F. the axioms of

where we embed

Subtyping via denotational model SMT solver to subtyping. We connect the

LEMMA F.4.

Soundness of Embedding

In this section referring to the

Where x_i^x are helper functions

$\Gamma \vdash e : x$

$\bullet \vdash I \hookrightarrow^*$

Since $\Gamma \vdash$

$\Gamma \vdash e_2 : t$

Thus, Δ_0

$\bullet \vdash C \hookrightarrow^*$

and $\Gamma \vdash$

$e_1[y_i / se]$

we get Δ_0

LEMMA G.2.

PROOF. We

For Boolean

COROLLARY

PROOF. We

• $\vdash B$

• $\vdash I$

• $\vdash U$

LEMMA G.5.

$\sigma^\beta \cup (\sigma_2^\beta \setminus \sigma^\beta) \vdash p = p$, thus $\sigma^\beta \cup (\sigma_2^\beta \setminus \sigma^\beta) \vdash \text{app } D \bar{p}_i p \bar{p}_j = \text{app } D \bar{p}_i p' \bar{p}_j$.

$\bullet \vdash (\theta^\perp; c w) \hookrightarrow (\theta^\perp; \delta(c, w))$. By the definition of the syntax, $c w$ is a fully applied logical operator, thus $\sigma^\beta \cup (\sigma_2^\beta \setminus \sigma^\beta) \vdash c w = \llbracket \delta(c, w) \rrbracket$

$\bullet \vdash (\theta^\perp; (\lambda x.e)e_x) \hookrightarrow (\theta^\perp; e[x/e_x])$. Assume $\Gamma \vdash e \rightsquigarrow p$, $\Gamma \vdash e_x \rightsquigarrow p_x$. Since σ^β is defined to satisfy the β -reduction axiom, $\sigma^\beta \cup (\sigma_2^\beta \setminus \sigma^\beta) \vdash \text{app } (\text{lam } x e) p_x = p[x/p_x]$.

$\bullet \vdash (\theta^\perp; \text{case } x = D_j \bar{e} \text{ of } (D_i \bar{y}_i \rightarrow e_i)) \hookrightarrow (\theta^\perp; e_j[x/D_j \bar{e}][y_i/\bar{e}])$. Also, let $\Gamma \vdash e \rightsquigarrow p$, $\Gamma \vdash e_i[x/D_j \bar{e}][y_i/\bar{e}] \rightsquigarrow p_i$. By the axiomatic behavior of the measure selector $\text{is}_{D_j} \bar{p}$, we get $\sigma^\beta \vdash \text{is}_{D_j} \bar{p}$. Thus, $\sigma^\beta \vdash \text{is}_{D_j} p$ if $\text{is}_{D_j} p$ then p_i else ... else $p_n = p_j$.

$\bullet \vdash ((x, e_x)\theta^\perp; x) \hookrightarrow ((x, e'_x)\theta_2^\perp; x)$. By inversion $\langle \theta^\perp; e_x \rangle \hookrightarrow \langle \theta_2^\perp; e'_x \rangle$. By identity of equality, $(x, p_x)\sigma^\beta \cup (\sigma_2^\beta \setminus \sigma^\beta) \vdash x = x$.

$\bullet \vdash ((y, e_y)\theta^\perp; x) \hookrightarrow ((y, e_y)\theta_2^\perp; e_x)$. By inversion $\langle \theta^\perp; x \rangle \hookrightarrow \langle \theta_2^\perp; e_x \rangle$. Assume $\Gamma \vdash e_x \rightsquigarrow p_x$. By IH $\sigma^\beta \cup (\sigma_2^\beta \setminus \sigma^\beta) \vdash x = p_x$. Thus $(y, p_y)\sigma^\beta \cup (\sigma_2^\beta \setminus \sigma^\beta) \vdash x = p_x$.

$\bullet \vdash ((x, w)\theta^\perp; x) \hookrightarrow ((x, w)\theta^\perp; w)$. Thus $(x, \llbracket w \rrbracket)\sigma^\beta \vdash x = \llbracket w \rrbracket$.

$\bullet \vdash ((x, D \bar{y})\theta^\perp; x) \hookrightarrow ((x, D \bar{y})\theta^\perp; D \bar{y})$. Thus $(x, \text{app } D \bar{y})\sigma^\beta \vdash x = \text{app } D \bar{y}$.

$\bullet \vdash ((x, D \bar{e})\theta^\perp; x) \hookrightarrow ((x, D \bar{e}), (y_i, e_i)\theta^\perp; D \bar{y})$. Assume $\Gamma \vdash e_i \rightsquigarrow p_i$. Thus $(x, \text{app } D \bar{y}), (y_i, e_i)\theta^\perp \vdash x = \text{app } D \bar{y}$.

□

G.2 Soundness of Approximation

THEOREM G.6 (SOUNDNESS OF ALGORITHMIC). If $\Gamma \vdash_S e : \tau$ then $\Gamma \vdash e : \tau$.

PROOF. To prove soundness it suffices to prove that subtyping is appropriately approximated, as stated by the following lemma.

LEMMA G.7. If $\Gamma \vdash_S \{v : B \mid e_1\} \leq \{v : B \mid e_2\}$ then $\Gamma \vdash \{v : B \mid e_1\} \leq \{v : B \mid e_2\}$.

PROOF. By rule $\leq\text{-BASE-}\lambda^S$, we need to show that $\forall \theta \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket. [\theta \cdot \{v : B \mid e_1\}] \subseteq [\theta \cdot \{v : B \mid e_2\}]$. We fix a $\theta \in \llbracket \Gamma \rrbracket$ and get that for all bindings $(x_i : \{v : B \mid e_i\}) \in \Gamma$, $\theta \cdot e_i[v/x_i] \hookrightarrow^* \text{True}$.

Then need to show that for each e , if $e \in \llbracket \theta \cdot \{v : B \mid e_1\} \rrbracket$, then $e \in \llbracket \theta \cdot \{v : B \mid e_2\} \rrbracket$.



Liquid Haskell on papers

↑
Expressiveness

Refinement Reflection, POPL'18

by **Vazou**, Tondwalkar, Choudhury, Scott,
Newton, Wadler, and Jhala

Refinement Types for Haskell, ICFP'14

by **Vazou**, Seidel, Jhala, Vytiniotis, and Peyton-Jones



Liquid Haskell on papers

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Liquid Haskell on papers

Expressiveness



Refinement Reflection, POPL'18


by **Vazou**, Tondwalkar, Choudhury, Scott,
Newton, Wadler, and Jhala

Refinement Types for Haskell, ICFP'14

by **Vazou**, Seidel, Jhala, Vytiniotis, and Peyton-Jones



Liquid Haskell on papers



Liquid Haskell on github

ucsd-progsys / liquidhaskell

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Liquid Types For Haskell Edit

Add topics

8,382 commits 94 branches 19 releases 38 contributors

Branch: develop New pull request Create new file Upload files Find file Clone or download

nikivazou Merge pull request #1223 from ucsd-progsys/HaskellFunInRefs ... Latest commit 82f5baa 5 days ago

benchmarks move tests into pos a month ago

devel Fix travis error 6 days ago

Liquid Haskell on github

Jan 15, 2012 – Jan 25, 2018

Contributions: Commits ▾



[ranjitjhala](#)

3,093 commits 474,271 ++ 304,536 --




#1



[nikivazou](#)

2,113 commits 358,364 ++ 294,962 --

#2



[gridaphobe](#)

814 commits 114,731 ++ 79,008 --

#3




[spinda](#)

155 commits 7,430 ++ 5,350 --

#4

Liquid Haskell dev team



Niki Vazou & Ranjt Jhala,
Liquid Haskell dev team

Liquid Haskell in the real world


Education



Will Kunkel,
undergrad @UMD



Rachel Xu & Xinyue Zhang,
undergrads @Bryn Mawr College




Niki Vazou & Ranjt Jhala,
Liquid Haskell dev team

Industry



Gabriel Gonzalez
Awake Security



Edsko de Vries
Well-Typed

Liquid Haskell in Education

This is Will Kunkel.


Will took my undergrad course on Haskell.

Will learnt Liquid Haskell in 2 weeks.

Will was **3rd** in POPL'18 **Student Research Competition** with his project “Comparing Liquid Haskell and Coq”

Will is smart.

Be like Will.



Liquid Haskell in Education

Two winners in POPL'18 Student Research Competition



“Comparing Liquid Haskell and Coq”



Will Kunkel,
undergrad @UMD



“Comparing Dependent Haskell,
Liquid Haskell and F*”



Rachel Xu & Xinyue Zhang,
undergrads @Bryn Mawr College

Liquid Haskell in the real world


Education



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undergrads @Bryn Mawr College



Niki Vazou & Ranjt Jhala,
Liquid Haskell dev team



Gabriel Gonzalez
Awake Security



Edsko de Vries
Well-Typed



Liquid Haskell in Industry

Gabriel Gonzalez



Static checks during parsing.


Provably Correct & Faster (x6) Code!

Huge speedup for internet traffic parsing.



Liquid Haskell in Industry

Gabriel Gonzalez




Edsko de Vries






I am a Haskell consultant at a
cryptocurrency/blockchain company.
We have a blockchain algorithm written
in paper & a Haskell implementation.
We want Liquid Haskell to connect them.



I am a Haskell consultant at a
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
Awesome! Lmk if you need anything!






I am a Haskell consultant at a
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We have a blockchain algorithm written
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Awesome! Lmk if you need anything!



I want **interactive proof generation!**

Future work ideas are crowd sourced!



Edsko de Vries
industrial rep.

I want **interactive proof generation**!



Richard Eisenberg
ghc devs rep.


Can we use Liquid Haskell proofs for
compiler optimizations?



Leo Lambropoulos
Coq rep.

I do not trust it! Liquid Haskell should
generate **proof certificates**!

Future work ideas are crowd sourced!



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



Leo Lambropoulos
Coq rep.



I do not trust it! Liquid Haskell should
generate **proof certificates**!

Liquid Haskell has many users




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


many users, but two main devs




many users, but two main devs



many users, but two main devs



many users, but two main devs



Goal: Expand the Liquid Haskell Dev Team

Goal: Expand the Liquid Haskell Dev Team

for

compiler optimizations,

interactive proof generation,

easy verification of real-world applications, ...

Vision:

Use verification to aid programming in Haskell

Vision:

Use verification to aid programming in Haskell

Specs are just comments **inside** the languages, ...
thus, learning effort is small.

Semi-**automatically** machine checked, via SMTs.

For runtime **optimizations**, by the user or the **compiler**.

Vision: Use verification to aid programming in Haskell **X language**

X = Ruby, JavaScript, Scala, ...

Refinement Types for Ruby

Refinement Types for TypeScript

SMT-Based Checking of Predicate-Qualified Types for Scala

Georg Stefan Schmid Viktor Kuncak
EPFL, Switzerland
`{firstname.lastname}@epfl.ch`



LiquidHaskell

Use verification to aid programming in Haskell



LiquidHaskell

Use verification to aid programming in Haskell

Fast & Safe Code Static Checks

Theorem Proving Refinement Reflection

Applications Education & Industry

Thanks!