

A7010E Homework 3

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1.

Assumptions:

- Each employee will have his own workstation in the office.
- the company has at least a server for VPN and access control
- each employee has its own workstation in the office/desk connected to the company's network.

Access control

In order to access to the working files from remote, i suggest a VPN connection to the main server, and from there, each employee will have access to a personal workstation through remote connection (in case of Windows as OS, otherwise there are the variants for Unix systems and macOS). To access to the VPN the following type of access will be established, depending on the LoA.

- **Level 2 assurance:** According to NIST, Level 2 provides single factor remote network authentication. A person will be successfully authenticated after proving its entity through a secure authentication protocol, showing that the entity has control of an agreed credential. Level 2 of assurance allows:
 - Look-up Secret Tokens, storing a set of secrets and is used to look up the secret based on a prompt.
 - Out of Band Tokens, received over a separate channel and presented to the authentication protocol.


I propose an Out of Band authentication protocol, where a one-time PIN will be sent secretly by SMS to the phone number registred during enrollment when the employee wants to access the online platform. Then, the PIN code has to be entered in the platform in order to perform the authentication, as described in the following steps:

- Enrollment phase: the employee register a phone number. During this phase it is necessary to make sure that the number is correct and available. Moreover a email address or username is set.
- Employee start the login phase when starting the VPN connection: In this phase, the employee which wants to authenticate himself goes to the platform and tries to login with his username or email. The central server will send a SMS to the registered number with a PIN code.
- Authentication phase: after sending the SMS, a popup window will appear asking for the PIN code. The employee enters the PIN code in the platform and, if accepted will be authenticated otherwise a new PIN will be requested. The PIN code will be sent for a prestablished maximum of times, and after that the account will be blocked. To reactivate the account, the employee must contact the IT Department of the company and Identify himself in person.

the size of the PIN code and the number of times that the user can enter the wrong PIN code must be set in an "*Encryption Policy*".

- Level 3 assurance:** In LoA 3, multifactor authentication is enabled. In order to access to the VPN another factor used to authenticate the user must be used. Usually passwords are used, but as described in previous assignments, they are getting weaker and weaker. Biometrics will be then used, especially a technique called BioHashing, which doesn't store any detail related to the biometric feature, but only a sort of hash. The process will be described in LoA 4, where an external device (USB crypto token) will be used for the generation of this sort of HASH of biometric features. In this case, the registration will be done during enrollment time, when also the phone number will be registered. The user will generate a biohash and there will be an exchange through a secure channel of the digital certificate of the server. His public key will be used to initialize the authentication, by encrypting the bioHash that the user will generate during login phase. If the bioHash is decrypted by the server and equals to the one registered during enrollment time, he will send the PIN code to the user, which must then be entered in order to conclude the authentication (as described previously).
- Level 4 assurance:** LoA 4 is used when a high risk is associated with erroneous authentication. LoA 4 provides the highest level of entity authentication assurance defined. In order to authenticate itself, a user must prove the possession of a key through a cryptographic protocol. This level requires a physical token and strong cryptographic authentication of all parties and all sensitive data transfers between the parties. For this purpose, cryptographic USB keys are being developed since only "hard" cryptographic tokens which cannot readily be copied are allowed. The USB device needs to have an integrated biometric fingerprint's features reader. Internally, the device will, as described in the schema in Fig. 1, to authenticate the users using their biometrics data. As described in BioHASH, PIE

Figure 1: BioHASH protocol used in : <https://www.genkey.com>



introduces random seed and salting, plus redundancy to enable the use of error-correcting codes later on in the verification process. The template consists of two parts, the PI and the AD, without revealing any information about the biometric features that were used in creating them. During verification, error correction takes care of any finger placement differences, and this produces a candidate PI*. This creates a binary match with the PI from the template, if the template and the probe came from the same finger. In this process of generating PI*, the randomness that was introduced in PIE cancels out. This is the same process used also for fuzzy generator schemes, which are nowadays often used for IoT devices authentication using data from the environment like sounds and light. This process doesn't

store any biometric key. PI and AD will be stored in a secured server encrypted using asymmetric key algorithms. An enrollment phase will be established the first day of each employee, where the cryptographic USB stick will be handed to the employee and used to generate the PI and AD with the biometrics features of the employee's fingerprint. the features extraction function has to be unique for each USB and kept secret. The main server will send its own digital certificate to the user's device used as BYOD and encrypted using AES algorithm and as a password PI*.

The resources in the network will then have an ABAC access mode. in this way, each user will have certain attributes and will have access only to the resources allowed by those attributes. For example, documents shared among the HR should not be accessible by developers, which will not have those kind of attributes. **Secure emails** each mailbox must have a spam filter and a list of trusted email addresses/ domains (such as the domain used by the company). in order to add new trusted email, the user must contact the IT department and ask to allow to send emails the following email address. Each email must be encrypted using GPG protocol. The keys must be created by each employee in the beginning and they will follow the guidelines explained in the 'encryption policy'.

Malware analysis in case of malware analysis, a separate workstation, disconnected from the network must be enabled. VMs can be detected by malwares and they will not run anymore in order to stay hidden. moreover, they can be exploited and infect the system anyway. therefore it is better to have a workstation just for malware analysis .

Trainings in order to make the users aware of security threats, training must be organized for the new employees. During this courses, the employees will learn how to detect suspicious emails and attachments, moreover they will learn the security policies and guidelines.


Policies some policies must be created, especially:


- Encryption policy: this policy must set the guidelines to create a random PIN, such as length and maximum number of wrong attempts. Moreover, must set the key length for the AES protocol and the length of the bioHash. In this policy will also established the length of the keypair generated with tools such as gnuPG and the expiration time of those. In order to use smaller keys, Elliptic Curve cryptography must be used. This policy must state also that the personal files in the workstations must be encrypted with a public key of the employee, and they must not be stored on personal devices.
- software policy: this policy must ensure that the software must be installed by an IT department, which also will take care of fixing patches and ensure that updates and patches do not 'block' the workflow of the employees. In fact, the IT department must constantly check for security issues in the software installed and look for patches. when a patch or updates are available, they must be checked first and then , if they are selected to be implemented, they will be installed in the employees computers.
- system protection: each computer must have an antivirus software installed and a firewall enabled on each workstation.
- email policy: this policy must ensure that employees do not send executables files by email. moreover, spam filter must be enabled and constantly updated. Each email communication must be secured using GPG protocol and a white list of contacts must be used in order to send emails only to those which are known. In case of suspicious emails, they must be reported to the InfoSec team of the company. the mailbox must not be used for personal user.



2. What is your own reflection on the entire week of the course?


busy week, studying for the exam and then the assignment. asymmetric key is really a fun topic, and creating 'secure' channels among users is very interesting.

The first parts of the lab are a bit different compared to the one shown in the slides. Instead of login with root user, i will use the current user *user*. The users created will then be user and user2. Enigmail doesn't have the checkbox *Force using S/MIME and Enigmail*.









Challenge

In order to create my keyset with GnuPG, i execute the command `gpg --full-generate-key`. this will create a pub key and private key associated to a specific user name and email. To create the keyset i used the default parameters (RSA 4096 bit long).


```
~[user@parrot-virtual]~[~]
$ gpg --full-generate-key
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.20; Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Please select what kind of key you want:
  (1) RSA and RSA (default)
  (2) DSA and Elgamal
  (3) DSA (sign only)
  (4) RSA (sign only)
  (14) Existing key from card
Your selection? 1
RSA keys may be between 1024 and 4096 bits long.
What keysize do you want? (4096)
Requested keysize is 4096 bits
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
    0 = key does not expire
    <n> = key expires in n days
    <n>w = key expires in n weeks
    <n>m = key expires in n months
    <n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0) 10
Key expires at Mon 09 Nov 2020 09:06:47 GMT
Is this correct? (y/N) y

GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key.


Real name: user
Email address: user@localhost.localdomain
Comment: test gpg
You selected this USER-ID: "user (test gpg) <user@localhost.localdomain>"


Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? 0
You selected this USER-ID:
    "user (test gpg) <user@localhost.localdomain>"

Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? 0
We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform
some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the
disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number
generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.
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gpg: key 594B3A78F21FA4F7 marked as ultimately trusted
gpg: revocation certificate stored as '/home/user/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/8C658ABAE08D351B391EC1D5594B3A78F21FA4F7.rev'
public and secret key created and signed.

pub   rsa4096 2020-10-30 [SC] [expires: 2020-11-09]
      8C658ABAE08D351B391EC1D5594B3A78F21FA4F7
uid           user (test gpg) <user@localhost.localdomain>
sub   rsa4096 2020-10-30 [E] [expires: 2020-11-09]
```


when i open the key management tool of enigmail, the keyset is already recognized and i can select that key to encrypt the future messages as shown in the screenshots below.





When i want to attach the pub key in the message, i will choose the newly created public key instead of the one used earlier.

