

A7010E Homework 3

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1. Please download the two PDF files! Please discuss and reflect on these two cases in light of the studied concepts in the applied computer security course?

Observing the emails we can notice that the sender looks suspicious. In fact, in the first email the sender is not an email address connected to IKEA. Since they want you to insert personal details for discounts, this could lead to attacks like **Phishing**.

In the second email, the domain of the email is reported in some websites and, after some researches, it is possible to notice that there are not markets online with that name. The attachment in the email is an Excel file. Excel files could execute macros and install Trojan viruses. This could lead to an attack called **Malspam**. An example comes from a hacking group known as Evil Corp or TA505 has presented a new risk by targeting businesses through the use of malicious Microsoft Excel documents. The victim was opening an excel file known as Grace Wire or Flawed Grace (which could be shared by email) leading to the malware attempting to put a remote access trojan (RAT) on their system.

In order to react to these spam emails, the first thing would be to inform the colleagues in the company about the threat. In fact, information and education is vital for preventing malware resulting from phishing. Enabling the Microsoft Office protections and enabling an antivirus will all help to block the threat and prevent the download of malicious files. Moreover, all the attachments must be checked from malwares before being opened. Policies must be applied in order to not share and ask for credentials through email. Some other policies could encourage to accept emails just from addresses present in some sort of white list database, where only the trusted emails are registered.

Some anti-spam software has been implemented during the years. Some techniques help to reduce the phenomena where an attacker sends malicious emails to several victims by applying some sort of proof-of-work [1]. Other techniques enable a database with a black list, but these do not help to protect from zero day phishing attacks [2]. New techniques try to use dynamic evolving Neural Networks in order to help to find zero-day phishing attacks [3].

2. What is your own reflection on the entire week of the course?

3. References

- [1] Adam Back. *Hashcash-A Denial of Service Counter-Measure*. Tech. rep. 2002.
- [2] Steve Sheng et al. "An empirical analysis of phishing blacklists". In: *6th Conference on Email and Anti-Spam, CEAS 2009* (2009).
- [3] Sami Smadi, Nauman Aslam, and Li Zhang. "Detection of online phishing email using dynamic evolving neural network based on reinforcement learning". In: *Decision Support Systems* 107 (2018), pp. 88–102. ISSN: 01679236. DOI: [10.1016/j.dss.2018.01.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2018.01.001). URL: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2018.01.001>.

Blockchain Technology

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I. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY

Blockchain is a distributed database of records, or public register (called Distributed Ledger Technology) of all transactions and events shared and executed among the participating parties, based on P2P protocol. Each entry on this ledger is verified by the majority of participants and cannot be deleted once inserted [1]. Blockchain is a technology which combines cryptography with distributed computing, created by the creator of Bitcoin which uses the alias Satoshi Nakamoto. He combined them generating a model where a network of computers collaborate in order to maintain a secure and shared database, consisting in a string of blocks.

Each block contains a set of transaction and a unique identifier of the data generated using the hash of the data. The block contains also a timestamp, a nonce used to verify the hash and the hash of the previous block, ensuring the integrity of the entire blockchain through to the first block, called genesis block, as shown in Figure 1.

The computers on the network will have the role to validate the transactions, add them to the block that they are building and then broadcast the block to the network in order to have the same copy among all the computers in the network.

Since there is no central component which validates the database alterations, blockchain depends on a consensus algorithm where all the computers agree on the state of the database. This consensus mechanism is the process in which a majority (or in some cases all) of network validators come to agreement on the state of a ledger maintaining coherent set of facts between the participating nodes.

This consensus algorithm ensures that the transaction are stored in a block before being inserted in the public ledger [2]. When the block is verified, it is added to the blockchain which will result in a chronologically ordered, linear and un-mutable chain of blocks. In fact, each hash value of the block depends on the hash of the previous one, and in order to modify a block, all the other blocks must be altered.

In some blockchain's applications such as Bitcoin, the validation of a block is performed by the miners. Miners have the role to validate the blocks and keep their order. In order to do so, a proof-of-work concept has been implemented. The proof-of-work is based on [3] and involves scanning for a value that, when hashed, the hash begins with a prefixed number of zero bits. The work required is exponential the number of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash. After effort has been spent in order to satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot

be changed without redoing the work [4].

Each transaction is protected through a digital signature, signing it digitally with the private key of the sender and sent to the "public key" of the receiver. The owner of the cryptocurrency needs to prove his ownership of the "private key" in order to spend money. The entity receiving the digital currency then verifies the digital signature by using the public key of the sender on the respective transaction.

In this way, each entity can be referred with his public key, without sharing personal data which may be easily linked to a real-world identity.

In order to keep the blockchain alive, an incentive is given to the miners. This incentive can be obtained by a special transaction in the mined block or by transaction fees.

II. SECURITY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

A. The Majority Attack (51% Attacks)

With Proof of Work, the probability of mining a block depends on the work done by the miner. Due to reward obtained by mining blocks, more entities take part in *mining pools*, where they share the power in order to try to mining more blocks. When one entity or a mining pool holds the 51% of the computing power, it can control the blockchain.

Having 51% of the computing power, means that the entity can find Nonce value quicker than others and having authority to decide which block is permissible, leading to the following risks:

- Modify the transaction data, it may cause double-spending attack
- To stop the block verifying transaction
- To stop miner mining any available block.

Some solutions to this type of attack have been studied in [5] [6].

B. Scalability of the Blockchain

With the growth of the blockchain, data will become bigger and it will require more and more computing power, as described in [7]. A mitigation to this problem is Simplified Payment Verification (SPV), a payment verification technology which doesn't maintain the full blockchain information but only needs block header message.

C. Energy Consumption

Due to the Proof-of-Work, blockchain is consuming enormous amounts of power today, with big mining farms running continuously to maintain the networks of the various blockchains. New alternative and innovative technology rises, which focuses on a sustainable solution, such as IOTA, a cryptocurrency based on an innovative technology called the Tangle [8] [9].





Fig. 1. blockchain example [2]


REFERENCES

- [1] M. Crosby Nachiappan Pradan Pattanayak Sanjeev Verma and V. Kalyanaraman, "BlockChain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin," Tech. Rep., 2016.
- [2] M. Nofer, P. Gommer, O. Hinz, and D. Schiereck, "Blockchain," *Business and Information Systems Engineering*, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 183–187, 6 2017.
- [3] A. Back, "Hashcash-A Denial of Service Counter-Measure," Tech. Rep., 2002.
- [4] S. Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System," Tech. Rep. [Online]. Available: www.bitcoin.org
- [5] I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer, "Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable *," Tech. Rep.
- [6] X. Yang, Y. Chen, and X. Chen, "Effective scheme against 51% attack on proof-of-work blockchain with history weighted information," in *Proceedings - 2019 2nd IEEE International Conference on Blockchain, Blockchain 2019*. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 7 2019, pp. 261–265.
- [7] G. O. Karame, "On the security and scalability of Bitcoin's blockchain," in *Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, vol. 24-28-October-2016. Association for Computing Machinery, 10 2016, pp. 1861–1862.
- [8] S. Popov, "The Tangle," Tech. Rep., 2018.
- [9] S. Popov, H. Moog, D. Camargo, A. Caposelle, V. Dimitrov, A. Gal, A. Greve, B. Kusmierz, S. Mueller, A. Penzkofer, O. Saa, W. Sanders, L. Vigneri, W. Welz, and V. Attias, "The Coordicide," Tech. Rep., 2020.

After Setting up wireshark in order to not receive packets sent to other machines, we can start to capture the packets when the network on the VM is enabled.



Since Virtual Box has an internal DHCP server enabled when NAT is activated, the VM will get its own ip address with the DHCP protocol as shown in the picture.




In order to analyze some unencrypted traffic, the <http://staff.www.ltu.se/~raiuli/> website has been used. Since it uses the http protocol, the traffic will be unencrypted, so eventual credentials can be stolen. In this case we had a login form where the right credentials were:


username= admin

password=12345

Analysing the traffic we can capture the packet and those credentials are shown in clear, together with all the other info regarding the packet.



In order to encrypt the traffic, the https protocol has been used and as we see in the following screenshot the traffic is encrypted.



Analysing the transmission, we see that the VM sent a 'Client Hello' packet stating the available cipher suites (18 in total).

*eth0 (as superuser)

o.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	10.0.2.15	172.67.75.39	TLSv1.2	93	Application Data
3	0.029938397	172.67.75.39	10.0.2.15	TLSv1.2	93	Application Data
8	1.087790392	10.0.2.15	130.240.43.57	TLSv1.2	629	Client Hello
10	1.166578312	130.240.43.57	10.0.2.15	TLSv1.2	206	Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshak...
12	1.166960935	10.0.2.15	130.240.43.57	TLSv1.2	105	Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
14	1.168690839	10.0.2.15	130.240.43.57	TLSv1.2	620	Application Data
16	1.235267513	130.240.43.57	10.0.2.15	TLSv1.2	344	Application Data

Session ID Length: 32
Session ID: 23dcd54f7a8397e5e0d2c71050d508ed7acd5ffe30a29019...
Cipher Suites Length: 36
▼ Cipher Suites (18 suites)

Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x1301)
Cipher Suite: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x1303)
Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x1302)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcca9)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xc030)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) ←
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00a)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc009)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0003)
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0002)

0000	52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00	27 1a 4a fc 08 00 45 00	RT...J...E...
0010	02 67 1d 38 40 00 40 06	61 21 0a 00 02 0f 82 f0	g 8@. @ a!...
0020	2b 39 89 dc 01 bb 8a 2b	f4 00 24 ce da 02 50 18	+9.....+...\$...P...
0030	fa f0 bc 91 00 00 16 03	01 02 3a 01 00 02 36 03:..6...
0040	03 4e f2 a6 5f 2e f8 7e	c8 c7 a6 48 50 2c 71 42	.N...~...HP,qB...
0050	02 fe 74 7c b8 7d 7e 14	c7 d9 f8 b9 ba 17 cd fd	..t .}~.....
0060	b1 20 23 dc d5 4f 7a 83	97 e5 e0 d2 c7 10 50 d5	.#..0z.....P...
0070	08 ed 7a cd 5f fe 30 a2	90 19 f3 fa 3f 91 2e 1d	..z_0.....?..
0080	a5 b0 00 24 13 01 13 03	13 02 c0 2b c0 2f cc a9	..\$......+/-..
0090	cc a8 c0 2c c0 30 c0 0a	c0 09 c0 13 c0 14 00 9c	.../0.....
00a0	00 9d 00 2f 00 35 00 0a	01 00 01 c9 00 00 00 15	.../5.....
00b0	00 13 00 00 10 73 74 61	66 66 2e 77 77 77 2e 6c	...sta ff.www.l...
00c0	74 75 2e 73 65 00 17 00	00 ff 01 00 01 00 00 0a	tu.se.....
00d0	00 0e 00 0c 00 1d 00 17	00 18 00 19 01 00 01 01#...6.F...
00e0	00 0b 00 02 01 00 00 23	00 d0 01 36 7f 46 eb ae	...P...P...H...t...
00f0	1b 04 50 04 8f 87 ab 50	2e 1d 48 fa 8a aa 74 a5	...'J...Y...@7...
0100	8b 08 27 4a ee d9 59 f1	92 a3 0b 16 a3 40 cc 37	...6ZL Ee W E>...
0110	f2 1b 36 5a 4c d2 45 65	f7 57 a7 45 3e c5 ff 05	

The server then replied to that packet choosing the cipher suite (in this case
TCL_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)

*eth0 (as superuser)					
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help					
ssl					
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
1	0.000000000	10.0.2.15	172.67.75.39	TLSv1.2	93 Application Data
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12	1.166960935	10.0.2.15	130.240.43.57	TLSv1.2	105 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
14	1.168690839	10.0.2.15	130.240.43.57	TLSv1.2	620 Application Data
16	1.235267513	130.240.43.57	10.0.2.15	TLSv1.2	344 Application Data

Length: 96	
Handshake Protocol: Server Hello	
Handshake Type: Server Hello (2)	
Length: 92	
Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)	
Random: 0bcd138932ef6ed5bc678d5bd522e1a5d2939bf113253983...	
Session ID Length: 32	
Session ID: 23dcd54f7a8397e5e0d2c71050d508ed7acd5ffe30a29019...	
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)	
Compression Method: null (0)	
Extensions Length: 20	
Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)	
Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=11)	
TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Change Cipher Spec Protocol: Change Cipher Spec	
Content Type: Change Cipher Spec (20)	
Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)	
Length: 1	
Change Cipher Spec Message	
<pre> 0000 08 00 27 1a 4a fc 52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 45 00 ...J RT ...5...E 0010 00 c9 3f ba 00 00 40 06 80 46 82 f0 2b 39 0a 00 ...?...@...F...+9... 0020 02 0f 01 bb 89 dc 24 ce da 02 8a 2b f6 3f 50 18 ...?...\$. ...+?P... 0030 ff ff 71 42 00 00 16 03 03 00 60 02 00 00 5c 03 ...qB... ...+...\... 0040 03 0b cd 13 89 32 ef 6e d5 bc 67 8d 5b d5 22 e1 2 n ...g...["... 0050 a5 d2 93 9b f1 13 25 39 83 81 c2 46 a6 15 14 d1 %9 ...F... 0060 f1 20 23 dc d5 4f 7a 83 97 e5 e0 d2 c7 10 50 d5 ...#...0z... ...P... 0070 08 ed 7a cd 5f fe 30 a2 90 19 f3 fa 3f 91 2e 1d ...z..._0... ...?... 0080 a5 b0 c0 30 00 00 14 ff 01 00 01 00 00 10 00 0b ...0... 0090 00 09 08 68 74 74 70 2f 31 2e 31 14 03 03 00 01 ...http/ 1.1... 00a0 01 16 03 03 00 28 7f f8 84 50 dc 93 39 b3 37 9e {...P...9...7... 00b0 35 8e aa 2a a8 5f 36 37 4a e5 32 7d 08 32 37 54 5...*_67 J 2} 27T 00c0 5f 32 cf 28 a9 24 cb 81 bb 5e 6a 02 e9 c3 _2...{...\$... ^j... </pre>	

.From the ' Client Help'packet it is possible also to se the hash algorithms available. In this case
4: SHA246,SHA384, SHA512,SHA1

*eth0 (as superuser)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	10.0.2.15	172.67.75.39	TLSv1.2	93	Application Data
3	0.029938397	172.67.75.39	10.0.2.15	TLSv1.2	93	Application Data
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16	1.235267513	130.240.43.57	10.0.2.15	TLSv1.2	344	Application Data

```

Supported Version: TLS 1.3 (0x0304)
Supported Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
  Extension: signature_algorithms (len=24)
    Type: signature_algorithms (13)
    Length: 24
    Signature Hash Algorithms Length: 22
    Signature Hash Algorithms (11 algorithms)
      Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (0x0403)
      Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (0x0503)
      Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 (0x0603)
      Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 (0x0804)
      Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 (0x0805)
      Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 (0x0806)
      Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401)
      Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha384 (0x0501)
      Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha512 (0x0601)
      Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_sha1 (0x0203)
      Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201)

```

0160 4c f2 0e 75 bb eb c7 df 02 8d 9a f6 11 42 d7 38 L..u....B.B
0170 06 41 6c f7 b6 a0 8a 3b 2d 15 af 5f 21 aa 2b 11 .Al....;..!..+
0180 e2 a3 d9 89 f0 b4 66 5e 13 62 7b d9 44 d9 9a 11f^..b{.D..
0190 f3 d8 b7 4b fd 96 e5 27 b6 5f 03 68 e1 4c 29 47 ...K...'.h.L)G
01a0 ca 3e 6f 42 03 a6 14 c3 b6 83 b7 3d 40 86 61 b2 >oB....:=@.a.
01b0 f3 fc 63 db 3c 98 b6 54 0a 64 00 10 00 0e 00 0c ..c<..T.d.....
01c0 02 68 32 08 68 74 74 70 2f 31 2e 31 00 05 00 05 ..h2..http/1.1....
01d0 01 00 00 00 00 00 33 00 6b 00 69 00 1d 00 20 3d3.k.i...=
01e0 be a8 f3 70 14 7d 3e 79 f0 6d a7 70 29 f4 45 c7 ...p>..y.m.p).E.
01f0 99 b7 55 a7 fb 03 17 a8 80 12 c6 be 81 5d 65 00 ..U....je..
0200 17 00 41 04 cd 03 61 65 74 82 23 dd 22 5a 6c 04 ..A...ae t.#."Zl..
0210 23 6e c3 84 25 c9 e0 36 b2 f3 b1 1a 84 f6 6c 81 #n..%..6.....l..
0220 37 d4 fc a1 7a e1 de 05 e9 1f d9 f2 37 b1 2d de 7...z....7...
0230 de b3 48 d8 74 9d 04 a1 9a 64 fc bd 7f 5f f6 be ..H.t....d...._
0240 67 f7 b9 df 00 2b 00 05 04 03 04 03 03 00 0d 00 g....+....
0250 18 00 16 04 03 05 03 06 03 08 04 08 05 08 06 04
0260 01 05 01 06 01 02 03 02 01 00 2d 00 02 01 01 00 .@.....
0270 1c 00 02 40 01 ..@.

Hash algorithm (TLS 1.2) (tls.handshake.sig_hash_hash), 1 byte Packets: 17 · Displayed: 7 (41.2%) · Dropped: 0 (0.0%) Profile: Default

From the wireshark wiki, i have analyzed a teardrop attack. the traffic is recorder in the teardrop.cap file downloaded from the wiki and recorded the traffic during an IP fragmentation attack (aka. Teardrop). During this attack, the victim receives a fragmented packet where the offset field, which indicates the starting position or offset of the data relative to the data of the original unfragmented packet, is not consistent. In fact, when the sum of the offset and size of one fragmented packet differs from that of the next fragmented packet, the packets overlap and the server attempting to reassemble the packet might crash. This was a vulnerability of TCP/IP which affected several OSs such as Windows95, Windows NT and versions of the Linux kernel prior to 2.1.63.

As we can notice fro the following 2 screenshots, the packet n. 8 is the first fragment of a fragmented packet (offset= 0 and More fragments= set). It contains 36 bytes of data but when packet n. 9 is sent (second and last fragment because the flag More fragments= not set), we

[illegible]


```
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
boot/      lib/      opt/      tmp/
.cache/    lib32/    proc/     usr/
dev/       lib64/    root/     var/
etc/       libx32/   run/      vmlinuz
home/      lost+found/ sbin/     vmlinuz.old

root@kali:~# cat > /root/Desktop/tes.txt
example.
root@kali:~# gpg -c
.bash_history Documents/ .mozilla/ Public/ yersinia.log
.bashrc Downloads/ .msf4/ .ssh/
.cache/ .gnupg/ Music/ sslstrip.log
.config/ .ICEauthority Pictures/ Templates/
Desktop/ .local/ .profile Videos/

root@kali:~# gpg -c
.bash_history Documents/ .mozilla/ Public/ yersinia.log
.bashrc Downloads/ .msf4/ .ssh/
.cache/ .gnupg/ Music/ sslstrip.log
.config/ .ICEauthority Pictures/ Templates/
Desktop/ .local/ .profile Videos/

root@kali:~# gpg -c Desktop/tes.txt
gpg: keybox '/root/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/
Loki/ tes.txt tes.txt.gpg
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/
Loki/ tes.txt tes.txt.gpg
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes.txt.gpg
0 8000
0.00E00k00"001000;UhJX0Z0"8]00^M00
E0*00$00000root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes.txt
example.
root@kali:~# gpg -o Desktop/tes_decr.txt Desktop/tes.txt.gpg
gpg: WARNING: no command supplied. Trying to guess what you mean ...
gpg: AES256 encrypted data
gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes_decr.txt
example.
root@kali:~#
```



```

root@kali:~# openssl genrsa -out Desktop/infosec_private_key.pem 1024
Generating RSA private key, 1024 bit long modulus (2 primes)
.....+++++
.....+++++
e is 65537 (0x010001)
root@kali:~# openssl rsa
rsa      rsautl
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -
-check    -des3    -idea    -inform    -noout    -outform    -passout    -pubout    -text
-des      -engine    -in      -modulus    -out      -passin    -pubin    -sgckey
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -i
-idea    -in      -inform
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -i
-idea    -in      -inform
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -in Desktop/
infosec_private_key.pem tes_decr.txt tes.txt.gpg
Loki/ tes.txt
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -in Desktop/
infosec_private_key.pem tes_decr.txt tes.txt.gpg
Loki/ tes.txt
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -in Desktop/infosec_private_key.pem -out Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -out
-out      -outform
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -in Desktop/infosec_private_key.pem -out Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -outfo
rm PEM -p
-passin    -passout    -pubin    -pubout
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -in Desktop/infosec_private_key.pem -out Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -outfo
rm PEM -pub
-pubin    -pubout
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -in Desktop/infosec_private_key.pem -out Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -outfo
rm PEM -pub
-pubin    -pubout
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -in Desktop/infosec_private_key.pem -out Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -outfo
rm PEM -pub
-pubin    -pubout
root@kali:~# openssl rsa -in Desktop/infosec_private_key.pem -out Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -outfo
rm PEM -pubout
writing RSA key
root@kali:~# openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -pubin -in Desktop/tes
tes_decr.txt tes.txt tes.txt.gpg
root@kali:~# openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -pubin -in Desktop/tes
tes_decr.txt tes.txt tes.txt.gpg
root@kali:~# openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey Desktop/infosec_public_key.pem -pubin -in Desktop/tes.txt -o
ut Desktop/tes_encrypted_with_RSA.dat
root@kali:~#

```

```

root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help
root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~ x
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes_encrypted_with_RSA.dat
0}Z00t100"~_w0h0#0jh0:X0N0\00[000vm[01`XI00"00"/00FG00000"0000000hmU
RP0|00= 0%:I00&0T00Xm0u0000
0000,
root@kali:~#

```

```
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help

root@kali: ~
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes_encrypted_with_RSA.dat
0}Z00t100"~_w0h0#0jh0:X0N0\000000vm01`XI00~00' /00FG00000"0000000hmU
RP0|00= o%:I00&0T00Xm0u0000 0000,

root@kali:~# openssl rsautl -decrypt -inkey Desktop/infosec_private_key.pem -in Desktop/tes_encrypted_wi
th_RSA.dat -out Desktop/tes_decr.txt
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes_decr.txt
example.
root@kali:~#
```

```
root@kali:~# echo -n "Sample text" | md5sum | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '\n' | wc -c
32
root@kali:~# echo -n "Sample text" | md5sum | awk '{print $1}'
1ba249ca5931f3c85fe44d354c2f274d
root@kali:~# echo -n "Sample text" | shasum | awk '{print $1}'
45aa94d570fb86da79b38a3b7f84f7230c84c01f
root@kali:~# echo -n "Sample text" | shasum | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '\n' | wc -c
40
root@kali:~# echo -n "Sample text, longer" | shasum | awk '{print $1}'
828eafd04e6c4a8a63ce8ee900285f8295380370
root@kali:~# echo -n "Sample text, longer" | shasum | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '\n' | wc -c
40
root@kali:~# echo -n "Sample text, longer" | md5sum | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '\n' | wc -c
32
root@kali:~#
```



```

Tue 11:30
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help
root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~ x
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes.txt
test.
root@kali:~# echo -n "$(<Desktop/tes.txt )" | shasum | awk '{print $1}'
95ed7744c2076fc83d4c78f23f78b6a5b91c147f
root@kali:~# echo -n "$(<Desktop/tes.txt )" | md5 | awk '{print $1}'
md5deep md5sum md5sum.textutils
root@kali:~# echo -n "$(<Desktop/tes.txt )" | md5sum | awk '{print $1}'
8cff6a87456225afc3b0bd8fecb8c515
root@kali:~# awk '{gsub(/test/,"example")}' Desktop/tes.txt >Desktop/tes2.txt && mv Desktop/tes2.txt Desktop/tes.txt
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes.txt
example.
root@kali:~# echo -n "$(<Desktop/tes.txt )" | shasum | awk '{print $1}'
9133ab60caalc7be379f21f1ba2968365a54bf36
root@kali:~# echo -n "$(<Desktop/tes.txt )" | md5sum | awk '{print $1}'
79f86bba3d7197b9812fd6c61cdd21c4
root@kali:~# awk '{gsub(/example/,"Example")}' Desktop/tes.txt >Desktop/tes2.txt && mv Desktop/tes2.txt Desktop/tes.txt
root@kali:~# cat Desktop/tes.txt
Example.
root@kali:~# echo -n "$(<Desktop/tes.txt )" | shasum | awk '{print $1}'
2127c4e9675a0310c7de7cc446647e16bb4900ef
root@kali:~# echo -n "$(<Desktop/tes.txt )" | md5sum | awk '{print $1}'
6ac867a9516e0429ba8a8f1dc211dcfb
root@kali:~# mkpasswd -m sha-256 -S infosecSalt -s <<< infosec
$5$infosecSalt$yNv7DcJZ2rDg721037HGTFvKEzqR3lmy1mS8Q3ZoBm9
root@kali:~#

```

Wireshark Alternatives

Omnipeek : Omnippeek offers the analytical capabilities superior to those of Wireshark. In fact Omnippeek can scan packets for signs of trouble or detect changes in transfer speeds and then trigger alerts. Omnippeek is not opensource and can run only on WIndows systems.

Ettercap: Ettercap can detect other hacker activities and intrusion, so it is very useful for system defense and, moreover, can generate by default several attacks. It can also identify malicious users and isolate them from the network resulting then in a more powerful tool than wireshark.