



Title

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by
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and
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1 Abstract

2 Introduction

2.1 MPC and Databases

A famous problem in the context of MPC is Yao's millionaire's problem. In Yao's millionaire's problem there are two millionaires Alice and Bob. We will call Alice's wealth x and Bob's wealth y . Alice and Bob want to know who of them has more money. i.e. they want to compute the function $F(x,y) := \begin{cases} \text{Alice is richer} & y \leq x \\ \text{Bob is richer} & y > x \end{cases}$. Yet neither of them is willing to trust the other and tell him how much money he has. Yao's millionaire's problem can be generalised into the general MPC problem. Instead of Bob and Alice, we now consider n parties p_0, \dots, p_{n-1} and each party i holds an arbitrary input x_i for an arbitrary function $F(x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$, that all parties have agreed upon. A MPC protocol π is protocol, that allows p_0, \dots, p_{n-1} to compute $F(x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$ without revealing any information about x_0, \dots, x_{n-1} .

Andrew Yao proposed a solution for Yao's millionaire's problem in 1982 [1]. It has also been shown that MPC is Turing-complete[2]. This means that for any function f that can be computed with a Turing machine. There exists a MPC protocol π that can compute f . -Databases ...

2.2 related work

2.2.1 From Keys to Databases—Real-World Applications of Secure Multi-Party Computation

2.3 goals

In this section we describe the goals of our work.

2.4 structure

In this section we outline the structure this document.

3 Preliminary

3.1 Secure Multiparty Computation

In the an secure multiparty computation(short MPC) scenario there are n parties p_0, \dots, p_{n-1} . They want to compute an agreed upon functionality $F(x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$. A functionality is a function that is allowed to have internal randomness, so its not function in the strict mathematically sense of the word. Each party p_i holds an input value x_i . The parties hold their input private and do not want to reveal any information about it. The Goal of secure multiparty computation is to develop a protocol π that enables them to jointly compute $F(x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$. The security goal of "not revelling the inputs" is often formalised through the Real-/Ideal-World Paradigm.

The attacker or adversary in this scenario has the ability to corrupt one or more party's. Once a party is corrupted the adversary get full information about every message the party send our receives, this also includes the messages from the time before the party had been corrupted.

3.1.1 Real World and Ideal World

Real World In the real world there exists a protocol π that enables the parties to compute F . All parties execute the protocol together. During the execution they exchange several rounds of communication. The attacker or adversary has the ability to corrupt one or more of the parties. His capability to influence the corrupted parties is an important parameter and may differ based on different security assumptions. These may range for example from a relative weak adversary that can only read massages to a very powerful adversary. We explain the adversary models that are of importance for our benchmarks in Section 3.2 in detail. The real world view of party A consist of the input of A , all massages A sends or receives during the execution of the protocol and his internal randomness. The protocol achieves the security goal of confidentially if the attacker is unable to derive new information from the views of the parties he did corrupt.

...

Ideal World In the Ideal World the parties to not need run a protocol. Instead they can rely on a trusted, incorruptible third party P that aids them. With the aid of P , the parties can evaluate F in two simple steps. In a first round of communication every party send P its input. P now holds all information it needs to compute F . Afterwards P can send each party the result in a second round of communication. Like in the real world, in the ideal world their also exists an adversary. Similar to his real world counterparty he is also able to corrupt one or more parties. Compared to his real world

Schaubild einfügen ?

counter part the ideal world adversary has otherwise very limited ability's. He can only see the input and output of the parties he corrupts. Since the computation with the aid of P produces no intermediate results that he can observe. Depending on the underlying security assumptions he also may be able to modify the input a corrupted party sends to P in the first round of communication. Because of these very limited ability's of the adversary it's far more feasible to ...

Security π is secure against A , if the view S generates is indistinguishable from a view generated by A . If π is secure against A

3.1.2 Real World and Ideal World

TODO noch zu überarbeiten For semi-honest adversary's we can now formalise the question if a protocol π archives our security goal of "not revealing x_0, \dots, x_{n-1} .", this is done by describing an ideal world where there exists a perfect solution for the MPC problem and then comparing the execution of π to this ideal world. In an ideal world there exists an incorruptible third party P that all parties trust. In the real world there is no such incorruptible third party. Instead the parties execute the protocol π by exchanging messages. In the ideal world evaluating $F(x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$ can be done in two steps. In a first round of communication party p_i send x_i to P . This gives P all the information required for computing $F(x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$. In a second round of communication P send each party $F(x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$. If $F(x_0, \dots, x_{n-1})$ is computed this way the ability of the adversary to gain new knowledge about x_0, \dots, x_{n-1} is minimized. We say that π is secure against adversary A if A cannot learn more information by attacking π in the real world then by attack the ideal world. This can be shown using simulation based proof. The View of a party consist of its input, the state of its memory which includes its internal randomness i and all messages it received. We say π is secure against A , if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S that given the ideal world views of all parties A corrupts can compute the corresponding views in the real world. We require that the output of S has an identical distribution of values as the views that A would see when A attacks π in the real world. Given such S exists, A could instead of attacking the real world, simply attack the ideal world and then run S to get views that are identical distributed as the views A would have obtained by attacking the real world. So there is no advantage for A in attacking the real world compared to attacking the ideal world. Furthermore π is secure ,if π is secure against all A .

3.2 Adversarial Models

There are multiple models and categorizations of adversary's and their capability's. These distinctions have significant impact on feasibility and difficulty of secure multi-party computation. In the following we will outline the models and assumptions that are of importance for our benchmarks .

Passive Adversary vs Active Adversary A passive adversary can not force a corrupted party to deviate from the protocol in any way. A active adversary has the power to force a corrupted party to deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way. So if for example the protocol would at some point require that each party choses an integer between 1 and n uniformly at random. Then a passive adversary would have no choice but to choose the integer between 1 and n uniformly at random. On the contrary an active adversary would be able to force a corrupted party to chose the value 42 or any other value that the adversary considers to be advantageous for him. In the ideal world a passive adversary is bound to forward the real input values. A active adversary can choose to ignore the real input and forward any value instead.

Monolithic Adversary In the following we will assume a monolithic adversary unless explicitly stated otherwise. This means that there is only a single adversary that controls all corrupt parties. For the honest parties a monolithic adversary is a worst-case scenario. A monolithic adversary is more powerful compared to multiple adversary's that control the same total amount of parties but to not corporate with each other. A protocol that is secure in the presence of a single adversary that corrupts n parties and is able to coordinate their efforts. Will be secure in the presence of up to n adversary's that corrupt n parties total and do not coordinate their efforts.

General Adversary vs Threshold Adversary In the threshold MPC setting the adversary can choose to corrupt any party. The threshold adversary is only limited in the way that can at most corrupt t parties where t is set to be $0 < t < n$. A common setting for t is $t = \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor$, which called the honest majority. For example and for $n=3$ the presence of an honest majority means, that it is assumed that the threshold adversary can corrupt at most 1 party. Threshold MPC best fits scenarios that feature a very homogenous group of parties. A general adversary is limited in his choice which party he corrupts by an adversary structure $Z = \{Z_1, \dots, Z_l\}$. Where Z_i can be any set of parties. The general adversary must corrupt a set of parties P such that there exists an $x \in Z$ that holds $P \subset x$. This allows for a flexible way to formalise assumptions. If for example in protocol there are two parties that hold a very vital role and one want to assume that no adversary can corrupt both of these parties. That can be formalised by using a general adversary an defining Z so that no element in Z contains both of these two parties.

Static vs Dynamic Corruptions Another important distinction is the distinction between static and adaptive adversary's. A static adversary is bound to chose which parties he wants to corrupt before the execution of π starts. An adaptive adversary can corrupt a party during the execution of the protocol. This makes the adaptive adversary much more powerful. As he can try to identify "weak links" based on the information he gets during the execution of the protocol and then choose corrupt those.

3.2.1 Additional Properties

3.3 Databases

4 framework description

4.1 CipherCompute

One candidate for our study was Cipher Compute. With the CipherCompute framework it is possible to solve a huge range of MPC problems using Rust. These include SQL operations like joins that are of interest for us. Furthermore CipherCompute provides a rich documentation, consisting of a full quickstart guide and several well documented example projects. CipherCompute utilises the SCALE-MAMBA framework for its underlying MPC operations. SCALE-MAMBA itself has evolved out of the well-known SPDZ protocol. Unfortunately the early access version of CipherCompute is not functioning by the time we conducted this study. Therefore we have decided to not include CipherCompute in our study.

4.2 Prio+

Prio+ [AGJ+21] is the next generation of the highly influential Prio [CGB17]. Prio+ strives to maintain the same use and security as Prio, while significantly increasing performance compared to its predecessor. Prio Plus allows an arbitrary number of parties to jointly compute aggregated statistics, like SUM, MAX, MIN operators. Prio+ utilises a client server model. In which the (potentially many) input parties use a small number of servers to compute the statistics. Prio+ guarantees confidentiality of the input values if at least one server stays honest. Unlike CipherCompute or conclave Prio+ is not a framework for developing MPC solutions. It's rather an already complete system. This means that the use of Prio+ can not be extended beyond the usecases that have been originally implemented by the authors of Prio+. This leaves Prio+ with a relatively small range of usecases compared to frameworks like aby3 or conclave. Therefore we have decided to not include Prio+ in our study.

4.3 conclave

4.3.1 functionality

Conclave is a framework that allows two or three parties to perform MPC analytics on "big data". Conclave aims to provide a high-level interface that abstracts internal MPC details away from the user. Through this high abstraction level conclave aims to make MPC more accessible for those who are not experts in this field. Every operation done with conclave is composable, that means that the output of every query can be the

input of another query. This mechanism makes it possible to construct very complex queries out of multiple relative simple queries. With conclave one can join tables using the equivalent of an equi-join or an union operator. Conclave also supports a range of aggregate functions these include sum, mean, standard deviation.

4.3.2 underlying MPC technology

- relying on Obliv-C and Sharemind as MPC backend
- inherits security guarantees of backend -> honest majority
- secure against semi-honest adversary
- adversary is statically
- no secure channel setting

Instead of exclusively using MPC operations, conclave evaluates queries with a combination of cleartext processing and MPC operations. MPC techniques are usually multiple orders of magnitude slower than cleartext processing.

4.3.3 Query optimization

Conclave speeds up computation by optimizing queries. There are two key techniques conclave applies for optimizing queries. The first one is rearranging the query's operation to minimize the amount of MPC operations required. The second technique is cutting out redundant MPC sorts and shuffles.

Rearranging queries

Sorts and shuffles - moving operations outside of MPC to maximise performance

- maintaining same end-to-end security as "pure" MPC
- contrary to conventional sql operations that aims to minimize the total amount of work e.g. filters before join

- published in 2019,
- allows to explicitly annotate trust between parties
- utilises trust through hybrid operations for additional performance increase

- backend theoretic exchangeable through generic interface

- compares to "SMCQL most similar existing system"
- jiff dependency
- requires python 3.5
- ...

4.4 aby3

4.4.1 functionality

aby3 is a 3 party MPC framework that allows to compute query's on relational database tables. These query's are not limited to queering only one table. Aby3 supports a variety of join operations these include but are not limited to left join , right join, set union, set minus and also full joins. Note that the semantic of the set union operator in aby3 does not 100 percent matches the semantic of the SQL union operator. Similar to the SQL-union the aby3-union does row-concatenation of two tables. The result of such join can again be queried using with query's that have a comparable semantic to the SELECT, FROM, WHERE; statement in SQL. Furthermore aby3 comes with a description how aggregate functions like MAX, SUM, COUNT can be realised when utilising aby3.

todo :union
und andere
operationen die
von standart
sql abweichen
beschreiben

4.4.2 underlying MPC technology

- honest majority
- passiv adversary
- all protocols constant rounds of communication
- $O(n)$ overhead in for join where n is number of rows

aby3 demonstrates its capability's in two prototype applications. One of them could be used by the states of the United States to detected voters that are registered in more then one state. What would allow to them to illegitimacy cast a vote in both of these states. This is a showcase example for the use of MPC on very sensitive data that ...

- In [MRR20] .. - prototype - does feature a LAN VS WAN comparison in benchmarks
- fully composable - arbitrary computation computation

4.5 smcql

4.5.1 functionality

Just like Prio+ and contrary to conclave and aby3, smcql is not a framework for developing MPC solutions, but rather an already complete MPC system. Unlike in the case if Prio+ the lack of flexibility that come with this is not problem. As the intended use for smcql perfectly fits our requirements. Smcql ...

4.5.2 underlying MPC technology

4.5.3 querie optimization

- prototype for 2 parties can be expanded for more parties - honest adversary

5 implementation

6 evaluation

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