

# When Big Business Loses (?) : The Political Economy of Regulation in the Context of Noisy Politics

Oscar Dumas    Hyung Won Kim    Nikolaos Vichos

# Overview of Presentation

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Theoretical Framework and Important Concepts: Noisy Politics
- 3 Side-By-Side: Paper Summaries and Critical Discussion
- 4 Synthesis: What Unites the Two Papers?
- 5 Contextualization: Noisy Politics and the Political Economy of Regulation
- 6 Conclusion and Discussion

# Introduction

## Texts

- Massoc, Elsa. 2019. “Taxing Stock Transfers in the First Golden Age of Financial Capitalism: Political Salience and the Limits on the Power of Finance.” *Socio-Economic Review* 17 (3): 503–22. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwx039>.
- Feldmann, Magnus, and Glenn Morgan. 2021. “Brexit and British Business Elites: Business Power and Noisy Politics.” *Politics & Society* 49 (1): 107–31.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220985692>.

## Research Focus

Massoc (2019) :

- Why did powerful financial actors fail to prevent the adoption of stock-transfer taxes in France and New York?
- **Focus:** how public discontent + political framing raised salience and undermined “quiet politics.”

Feldmann and Morgan (2021):

- Under what conditions can business elites be effective in a context of noisy politics, and why did their influence differ between 1975 and 2016?
- **Focus:** how incentives, legitimacy, and cohesion shape business influence in high-politicization referendum campaigns.

# What brings these papers together?

Both papers examine how political visibility and public contestation reshape business/financial influence

- Massoc (2019) shows how politicization of a tax issue enabled politicians to override strong financial lobbying.
- Feldmann and Morgan (2021) analyze how changing political conditions over time affect business effectiveness in high-visibility referendum campaigns.

## Common Question

- *Under what conditions do business actors struggle to assert influence?*

# Culpepper's Framework: Quiet vs. Noisy Politics

**Core hypothesis:** The more the public cares about an issue, the less business can exercise disproportionate influence over regulation. Business power decreases as political salience increases.

<b>Quiet Politics</b>	<b>Noisy Politics</b>
Issues are technically complex and low in public salience. Business dominates through expertise monopoly and structural dependence.	Issues become publicly salient and politicized. Media attention and public engagement constrain business influence and organizations become cautious and may avoid public positioning.

Three forms of business power:

- 1 Structural: State depends on business for investment and employment.
- 2 Instrumental: Lobbying, campaign contributions, expertise

# Bibliography I

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