

Cybersecurity Investigation Report

Case ID: 2025-FTP-001

Date of Report: 20/04/2025

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1. Executive Summary


On 10/04/2025 at 9.00am EAT, a controlled security exercise was conducted in a virtual lab to simulate an FTP brute-force attack followed by data exfiltration. The objective was to capture and analyze the network traffic using Wireshark, identify indicators of compromise, and document findings. The investigation confirmed that a vulnerable Metasploitable2 FTP service was successfully compromised using Hydra password-cracking tool from Kali Linux attack machine. Captured PCAP analysis revealed repeated failed login attempts followed by a successful login, file transfers, and unencrypted credential exposure.

2. Incident Details

Date/Time Detected	16/04/2025 at 08:11:59am EAT
Incident Type	Brute-force attack and data exfiltration
Location	Virtual lab environment
Systems Involved	Kali Linux (Attacker), Metasploitable2 Victim
Service Targeted	FTP (Port 21)
Attack Tool Used	Hydra
Detection Method	Wireshark packet capture analysis

3. Environment Setup

Network Topology:



Configuration Details:

- Attacker Machine: Kali Linux, IP: 192.168.56.101
- Victim Machine: Metasploitable2, IP: 192.168.56.102
- Tools: Hydra, Wireshark
- PCAP File

4. Evidence Collected


PCAP File: bruteForce.pcapng

Hydra Command Used: hydra -l msfadmin -P ~/ftp-demo-list.txt ftp://192.168.56.102

Wireshark Filters Used:

- ip.addr == 192.168.56.102
- ftp || ftp-data
- ftp.request.command == "USER"
- ftp.request.command == "PASS"
- ftp.response.code == 230
- ftp.request.command == "STOR" || ftp.request.command == "RETR"

Screenshots:



Repeated failed login attempts

bruteForce.pcapng

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ftp.response.code == 230

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
11827	2025-04-16 08:19:31.588656033	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11829	2025-04-16 08:19:31.590034116	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11831	2025-04-16 08:19:31.590556862	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11833	2025-04-16 08:19:31.591939055	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11835	2025-04-16 08:19:31.592321278	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11843	2025-04-16 08:19:31.603524392	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11845	2025-04-16 08:19:31.604906004	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11847	2025-04-16 08:19:31.606272458	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11849	2025-04-16 08:19:31.611674630	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.
11993	2025-04-16 08:27:25.611158029	192.168.56.102	192.168.56.101	FTP	89	Response: 230 Login successful.

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> Frame 11993: 89 bytes on wire (712 bits), 89 bytes captured (712 bits) on interface eth0, id 0

> Ethernet II, Src: PCSSystemtec_aa:9f:ec (08:00:27:aa:9f:ec), Dst: PCSSystemtec_6e:13:6e (08:00:27:6e:13:6e)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.56.102, Dst: 192.168.56.101

> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 21, Dst Port: 32910, Seq: 55, Ack: 31, Len: 23

> File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

[Current working directory:]

0000 08 00 27 6e 13 6e 08 00 27 aa 9f ec 08 00
0010 00 4b 84 e6 40 00 40 06 c3 aa c0 a8 38 6
0020 38 65 00 15 80 8e 0c ce c3 c0 15 77 6a 0
0030 00 2e cc fb 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 04 5a 7
0040 a5 b9 32 33 30 20 4c 6f 67 69 6e 20 73 7
0050 65 73 73 66 75 6c 2e 0d 0a

bruteForce.pcapng Packets: 12117 - Displayed: 10 (0.1%) Profile: Default

Successful login packets

bruteForce.pcapng

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ftp.request.command == "STOR" || ftp.request.command == "RETR"

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
12017	2025-04-16 08:29:20.076492353	192.168.56.101	192.168.56.102	FTP	83	Request: STOR secret.txt
12041	2025-04-16 08:31:23.572231967	192.168.56.101	192.168.56.102	FTP	89	Request: RETR confidential.pdf
12059	2025-04-16 08:34:17.018076437	192.168.56.101	192.168.56.102	FTP	89	Request: STOR confidential.pdf
12077	2025-04-16 08:34:58.089203432	192.168.56.101	192.168.56.102	FTP	89	Request: RETR confidential.pdf

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> Frame 12017: 83 bytes on wire (664 bits), 83 bytes captured (664 bits) on interface eth0, id 0

> Ethernet II, Src: PCSSystemtec_6e:13:6e (08:00:27:6e:13:6e), Dst: PCSSystemtec_aa:9f:ec (08:00:27:aa:9f:ec)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.56.101, Dst: 192.168.56.102

> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 32910, Dst Port: 21, Seq: 57, Ack: 263, Len: 17

> File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

[Current working directory:]

0000 08 00 27 aa 9f ec 08 00 27 6e 13 6e 08 00
0010 00 45 0e ec 40 00 40 06 39 9b c0 a8 38 6
0020 38 66 80 8e 00 15 15 77 6a 1f 0c ce c4 9
0030 7e a7 f2 53 00 00 01 01 08 0a 04 fc 64 d
0040 87 2f 53 54 4f 52 20 73 65 63 72 65 74 2
0050 74 0d 0a

bruteForce.pcapng Packets: 12117 - Displayed: 4 (0.0%) Profile: Default

File transfer evidence (STOR / RETR commands)

5. Technical Analysis

Timeline of Attack (based on packet timestamps):

Time (HH:MM:SS)	Event
08:11:59	First brute-force attempt detected
08:12:02	Multiple failed login attempts
08:19:31	Successful login using username <i>msfadmin</i>
08:29:30	File download initiated
08:34:58	Data exfiltration completed

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

- Attacker IP: 192.168.56.101
- Victim IP: 192.168.56.102
- Credentials Compromised: msfadmin:msfadmin
- Protocol Weakness: Unencrypted FTP credentials visible in packets

6. Root Cause Analysis

The attack succeeded due to:

- Weak/default FTP credentials (msfadmin:msfadmin)
- Lack of encryption in FTP protocol
- No account lockout or brute-force protection
- No intrusion detection/prevention in place

7. Recommendations

- Replace FTP with Secure Alternatives - Implement SFTP/FTPS.
- Enforce Strong Password Policy - Minimum length, complexity, and periodic changes.
- Enable Account Lockout - After repeated failed logins.
- Implement Network Security Monitoring - Deploy IDS/IPS to detect brute-force attempts.
- Encrypt Data Transfers - Prevent credential interception.

8. Conclusion

This investigation confirmed that FTP services with weak credentials and no encryption are highly vulnerable to brute-force attacks and data theft.

The findings reinforce the importance of proactive security measures, including secure protocols, strong authentication, and real-time monitoring.

9. Appendices

- Appendix A: Network Topology Diagram
- Appendix B: Wireshark Packet Screenshots
- Appendix C: PCAP File