

## **NPTEL ONLINE CERTIFICATION COURSES**

**Course Name: Hardware Security**

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**Department : Computer Science and Engineering**

### **Topic**

**Lecture 43: Power Analysis Countermeasures**

# CONCEPTS COVERED

Concepts Covered:

☐ Masking

☐ TI

☐ Properties of TI

☐ Some Constructions

☐ Experimental Evaluations and Results



# Countering DPA

- Two broad approaches are taken
  - Make the power consumption of the device independent of the data processed
    - Detached power supplies
    - Logic styles with a data independent power consumption
    - Noise generators
    - Insertion of random delays
  - Methods are costly and not in tune with normal CAD methodologies


# Countering DPA (Second Approach)

- *Second Approach* is to randomize the intermediate results
- Based on the principle that the power consumption of the device processing randomized data is uncorrelated to the actual intermediate results
- **Masking**: Can be applied at the algorithm level or at the gate level

# Gate Level Masking

- No wire stores a value that is **correlated** to an intermediate result of the algorithm.
- Process of converting an unmasked digital circuit to a masked version can be automated

# Masked AND Gate



$$a_m = a \oplus m_a$$

$$b_m = b \oplus m_b$$

$$q_m = q \oplus m_q$$

$$q = f(a, b)$$

$$q_m = \hat{f}(a_m, m_a, b_m, m_b, m_q)$$



# Masked AND Gate


$$\begin{aligned}q_m &= (a \cdot b) \oplus m_q \\&= (a_m \oplus m_a) \cdot (b_m \oplus m_b) \oplus m_q \\&= (((a_m \cdot b_m \oplus b_m \cdot m_a) \oplus (m_b \cdot a_m)) \oplus m_a \cdot m_b) \oplus m_q\end{aligned}$$

# Masked AND Gate

- There are  $4^5=1024$  possible input transmissions that can occur.
- It turns out that the expected value of the energy required for the processing of  $q=0$  and  $q=1$  are identical.
- Thus protected against DPA, under the assumption that the CMOS **gates switch only once in one clock cycles.**
- But we know there are glitches, and so the output of gates swing a number of times before reaching a steady state. Hence... the argument continues.



# Masked Multiplier



Same Principle may be applied for multiplier circuits.

# Masking and 1<sup>st</sup> order Analysis

- In these masking designs, the intermediate variable  $X$  is split into two random variables  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ , st.  $X_1 \oplus X_2 = X$ .
- Assume the leakage  $L(X) = HW(X_1, X_2)$ , we have the following:

$x$	$x_1$	$x_2$	$L(X)$	Mean( $L(X)$ )	Var( $L(X)$ )
0	0	0	0	1	1
0	1	1	2		
1	0	1	1	1	0
1	1	0	1		

Masking does not reveal any information from 1<sup>st</sup>-order analysis, as the mean is constant for different values of  $x$ . However, a 2<sup>nd</sup> -order analysis can reveal because of the dependence of variance on  $x$ .

# Higher Order Masking

- Thus in a  $d$ th order masking aims to randomize intermediate sensitive data  $X$  by splitting into  $d+1$  uniformly distributed variables

$X_1, \dots, X_d, X_{d+1}$ , st:

$$X = X_1 \perp X_2 \perp \dots \perp X_d \perp X_{d+1}$$

- Depending on the exact  $\perp$  operator, we can have multiplicative, additive masking.
- When the  $\perp$  operator is XORing, we call it Boolean Masking.
- Each variable  $X_i$  is referred to as a secret share and the secret sharing can be done by randomly generating  $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_d$ , and calculating  $X_{d+1}$ .

# Hiding within the Mask

- Given an input sharing, all the cipher operations are done inside a mask:
  - Linear Transformations
  - S-Box computations
- Linear transformations are easy:
  - Thus,  $l(X) = l(X_1 \oplus X_2 \oplus \dots \oplus X_{d+1}) = l(X_1) \oplus \dots \oplus l(X_{d+1})$
- So, we can perform the linear operations on the masks.

# Nonlinear Masking

- It is challenging for nonlinear functions.
- Example:  $f(X, Y) = Z \oplus XY$
- Masked Circuit:
  - $f_1(X_1, Y_1) = Z_1 \oplus X_1Y_1$
  - $f_2(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = ((Z_2 \oplus X_1Y_2) \oplus X_2Y_1) \oplus X_2Y_2$
- Note again the ordering of the operations is very important!
  - Don't do,  $f_2(X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2) = (Z_2 \oplus X_1Y_2) \oplus (X_2Y_1 \oplus X_2Y_2)$  ...as the second parenthesis is dependent on Y
- However, this is not secure against higher order attacks.
- Actually, not even 1<sup>st</sup> order attacks if there are glitches.





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**Thank  
you!**