

Usability Challenges in Secure Email Communication



The paper explores the gap between the security needs of email communication and the user experience of non-technical individuals. This research delves into the usability and practicality of public-key cryptography for securing email communication, focusing on the everyday user. It examines the effectiveness of commonly used tools such as Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), and GNU Privacy Guard (GPG), considering their strengths and weaknesses in the context of everyday usability.

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Public-Key Cryptography and S/MIME

S/MIME: Integration and Limitations

S/MIME was chosen for testing due to its integration into popular email clients such as Apple Mail, Outlook Express, and Mozilla Thunderbird. However, despite its accessibility, S/MIME is not without limitations. It requires users to manage certificates and private keys, which can be complex for non-technical individuals. S/MIME also relies on a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) network, which introduces concerns about trust and potentially vulnerable security measures.

PGP and GPG: Challenges for Everyday Users

While PGP and GPG offer robust encryption and signing capabilities, they were considered less suitable for everyday users due to the requirement of installing additional software. Non-technical users often find navigating complex software installations and configuration processes difficult. This barrier to entry can hinder the adoption of these tools by a broader user base.

Digital Signatures: Nonrepudiation and Integrity

Nonrepudiation: Vulnerability of Private Keys

Digital signatures provide the illusion of nonrepudiation, meaning they are intended to prove the authenticity of a message and the sender's identity. However, this is vulnerable if the sender's private key is compromised or published. If an attacker gains access to a private key, they can forge signatures and impersonate the original sender, undermining the integrity of the signature.

Integrity: Vulnerability to Sophisticated Attacks

While signatures help verify the integrity of a message, they don't fully protect against sophisticated phishing techniques. For example, an attacker could modify the content of an email without altering the signature, potentially deceiving users into revealing sensitive information. Users often rely on "semantic integrity," recognizing suspicious content, rather than relying solely on technical verification, highlighting the need for both technical and user-awareness-based security.

Problems with Digital Signatures: Confusion and Mistrust

1

Unnecessary Complexity

In many cases, everyday users don't necessarily need to sign emails. For those unfamiliar with digital security, the signing process can be confusing and lead to mistrust or suspicion. The burden of understanding and using digital signatures can detract from the overall ease of use, particularly for users who primarily use email for casual communication.

2

Misinterpretation of Purpose

The paper notes reported incidents where correspondents misunderstood the purpose of digital signatures, resulting in mistrust or unnecessary complications in communication. These misunderstandings can lead to misinterpretations of the intended message and hinder effective communication. Addressing these issues requires providing clear and concise explanations of the purpose and function of digital signatures in a user-friendly way.

Encryption and Key Distribution Issues: Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

1

Need for Encryption

Email encryption is crucial for protecting the privacy of sensitive information. However, the key distribution problem presents a significant challenge. Exchanging and verifying public keys can be susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, where an attacker intercepts the communication and impersonates both parties, compromising the security of the communication.

2

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Public key infrastructure (PKI) and certification authorities (CAs) like Thawte or VeriSign attempt to address the key distribution problem. However, PKI is often complex for everyday users and can be prone to trust issues. Trusting a CA implies relying on their ability to verify the authenticity of certificates and prevent malicious actors from obtaining fraudulent certificates, which poses potential risks.

3

Vulnerability of Trust

The pre-installed list of CAs in email clients does not always reflect user trust. This inconsistency can be exploited by a man-in-the-middle attacker to impersonate a trusted CA, potentially leading to the interception and compromise of sensitive communication.



PKI and Trust: Enterprise vs. Everyday Users

Enterprise Systems

Enterprise systems can implement stricter CA trust models, where only specific, pre-approved CAs are allowed. This approach is more secure but less practical for everyday users, who typically rely on the default settings in their email clients.

Everyday Users

Everyday users typically lack the technical expertise and resources to configure and maintain a sophisticated PKI system. They rely on the pre-installed CA list in their email clients, which can be vulnerable to manipulation by malicious actors.

Key Continuity Management (KCM): An Alternative Approach

1

KCM: Bypassing CA Reliance

Key Continuity Management (KCM) is proposed as an alternative to CA-based trust. It allows users to verify key continuity (e.g., through fingerprint verification) over time without relying on an elaborate CA network. This approach potentially reduces reliance on centralized authorities, making it more resilient to attacks.

2

Compromised Key Revocation

However, KCM lacks a reliable way to handle compromised keys. Revocation of a compromised key depends on user notification rather than an automated system like CA revocation lists. This manual process can be slow and inefficient, potentially leaving users vulnerable to attacks for an extended period.

3

Improving User Security

KCM emphasizes user awareness and active participation in managing their keys. By employing techniques like fingerprint verification, users can directly verify the integrity of their keys, reducing the reliance on external entities and potentially enhancing user security.

Out-of-Band (OOB) Fingerprint Verification: Enhancing Security



Phone Calls

The paper suggests verifying key fingerprints over different communication channels, such as phone calls or SMS, to improve security. This out-of-band (OOB) verification can help prevent certain types of attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, by adding an extra layer of authentication.



SMS Messages

OOB verification adds an extra layer of security by ensuring that the communication between parties is not intercepted or manipulated by malicious actors. This can be especially useful in situations where the email channel itself is potentially compromised.



Vulnerability to Sophisticated Adversaries

While practical for preventing some attacks, OOB verification can still be vulnerable to sophisticated adversaries who might be able to compromise multiple communication channels, including phones and SMS services. Therefore, it's crucial to consider the limitations of this approach and implement additional security measures as necessary.

Usability and Everyday Users: Bridging the Gap

The Usability Challenge

The paper underscores the significant gap between existing security mechanisms and their usability for non-technical users. Everyday users often struggle to understand and trust PKI, making current methods unsuitable for them without significant improvements in usability.

Addressing the Usability Gap

Addressing this gap requires a combination of usability improvements, better education, and more intuitive security tools integrated into email clients. Users need tools that are easy to understand, use, and trust, without overwhelming them with technical details.

