Malware Analysis

Executive Summary

The Malware file analysed is the malware known as venus locker. Venus Locker is a dangerous ransomware that encrypts all the files in the user's system and demands a ransom in exchange for the decryption tool and the private key. The malware presents the user with a deadline of 72 hours to pay the ransom by. Upon not meeting this deadline, the malware authors claim that the private key required to decrypt the files will be deleted automatically. The information presented below is a concise representation of the analysis done on the malware.

Basic Static Analysis

The program is not packed as inferred from PeiD. In addition, we can observe that the virtual size and the raw data size of the .text section are roughly the same further confirming that the program is unpacked. It is compiled using Microsoft Visual C# and is written in .NET. The malware was compiled on the 29th of July 2016 at 1:32 AM UTC as seen from PEview and is a Windows GUI application. This particular sample has an MD5 hash of 8675FFB697AD944748E0E24AC1A962CE.

The program's resources can be viewed using Resource Hacker. We observe an icon representing a Lock icon, suggesting that the malware locks files and prevents the user from accessing them. We also see the name of the malware "Venus Locker" referenced in the resources. The resources are presented below.

The program consists of 3 sections. .text, .rsrc, and .reloc sections. The sections and contents are shown below.

On observing the indicators using PEStudio, we see that the program references 3 urls as shown. We investigate further what these urls do in later sections.

The libraries and functions imported are of particular interest. Though the program does not appear to be packed, there only seems to be one dll imported - mscoree.dll which is a Microsoft .NET runtime execution library. Correspondingly, the only function that is referenced is

_CorExeMain which is presumed to be the main function that drives the malware. We assume that the malware imports the rest of its functionality dynamically.

There are also a large number of strings that are of concern. We provide a few important ones. We see a very large number of file extensions. These extensions are found within the strings in two sets containing nothing in common. This suggests that the malware has different functionality depending on the extension of the file selected. We investigate this further later. We see a number of strings related to cryptography like "System.security.cryptography", "Encoding", "SHA256", "CipherMode" and more further confirming that the program does some sort of encryption. We also see a large number of strings pertaining to certain programs or folders like "Avira", "Internet Explorer", "Adobe", "google" etc. This suggests that the program does some sort of special function for these programs or files belonging to these organizations. We see a number of url's being referenced as well as a tor email "VenusLocker@mail2tor.com" which is most likely the address the victim has to send the ransom bitcoins to.

Of particular interest is one string "OfflineAESKey". This informs us that the program contains some hard coded key value for its AES encryption scheme which provides a point of attack

against the malware for analysts. There are also strings like "RSAkeylength" which could suggest the same for the RSA key used.

Another string is the file name "\U2FsdGVKX1DKeR.vluni". This is a file that is created when the malware is run and is examined further later.

Finally, we see two strings which can be assumed to be pertaining to the AES key and the RSA key respectively as shown below.




Fig.1 Basic .NET program

_			
00000084	014C	Machine	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
00000086	0003	Number of Sections	
00000088	579AB237	Time Date Stamp	2016/07/29 Fri 01:32:39 UTC
0000008C	00000000	Pointer to Symbol Table	
R 00000090	00000000	Number of Symbols	
00000094	00E0	Size of Optional Header	
00000096	0102	Characteristics	
		0002	IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
		0100	IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE
I			

Fig.2 Compile date

Fig.3 Windows GUI



Fig.4 Lock icon resource

8675FFB697AD944748E0E24AC1A962CE
713C2291C8D8D9BE0B7748714130C39268895E6B
F34D5F2D4577ED6D9CEEC516C1F5A744
32-bit
439808
n/a
n/a
18:04:2017 - 23:34:26
Executable
GUI
Microsoft Visual C# / Basic .NET

Fig.5 General Information

```
🗏 📵 Icon
                           Compile Script
 ⊡ 📵 2
     Ø 0
🚊 🔄 Icon Group
                         1 VERSIONINFO
  ₫ 32512
                         FILEVERSION 1,0,0,0
     - Ø 0
                         PRODUCTVERSION 1,0,0,0
                         FILEOS 0x4
🚊 🦳 Version Info
                         FILETYPE 0x1
  □ □ 1
     *** 0
                         BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
🖃 🔄 24
  □ ■ 1
                               BLOCK "000004b0"
     ₩ 0
                                     VALUE "FileDescription", "VenusLocker"
                                     VALUE "FileVersion", "1.0.0.0"
                                     VALUE "InternalName", "VenusLocker.exe"
                                     VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © 2016"
                                     VALUE "OriginalFilename", "VenusLocker.exe"
                                     VALUE "ProductName", "VenusLocker"
                                     VALUE "ProductVersion", "1.0.0.0"
                                    VALUE "Assembly Version", "1.0.0.0"
                               }
                         BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
                               VALUE "Translation", 0x0000 0x04B0
```

Fig.6 Venus Locker Resource

Property	Value	Value	Value
Name	.text	.rsrc	.reloc
Virtual Size (bytes)	0x000654E4 (414948)	0x00005A80 (23168)	0x0000000C (12)
Virtual Address	0x00002000	0x00068000	0x0006E000
Raw Size (bytes)	0x00065600 (415232)	0x00005C00 (23552)	0x00000200 (512)
Raw Address	0x00000200	0x00065800	0x0006B400
PointerToRelocations	0x00000000	0×00000000	0×00000000
PointerToLinenumbers	0x00000000	0×00000000	0×00000000
NumberOfRelocations	0x00000000	0×00000000	0×00000000
NumberOfLinenumbers	0x00000000	0×00000000	0×00000000
Entry Point	×	-	-
MD5	16AA64375D6731FC9E08	7F0B337EFF297CD01419	C0C38DE7859E0878C642
Cave size (bytes)	0x0000011C (284)	0x00000180 (384)	0x000001F4 (500)
Obfuscated			-
Blacklisted			
Read	×	x	×
Write	-	2	2
Execute	×	ja.	
Shared	-		

Fig. 7 Sections

pFile								Raw	Dat	а							Value
00000200	CO	74	06	00	00	00	00	00	48	00	00	00	02	00	05	00	. t H
00000210	E0	DA	05	00	78	98	00	00	01	00	00	00	22	00	00	06	X "
00000220	50	81	00	00	8E	59	05	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	P Y
00000230	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000240	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000250	13	30	05	00	5D	1A	00	00	01	00	00	11	02	72	01	00	. O] r
00000260	00	70	28	12	00	00	0A	72	15	00	00	70	28	13	00	00	.p(rp(
00000270	OA.	7D	10	00	00	04	02	72	41	00	00	70	7D	12	00	00	. } rA p }
00000280	04	02	1F	2F	8D	2D	00	00	01	0A	06	16	72	43	00	00	/rC
00000290	70	A2	06	17	72	5F	00	00	70	A2	06	18	72	87	00	00	$p\ldotsr_{-}\ldotsp\ldotsr\ldotsr\ldots$
000002A0	70	A2	06	19	72	97	00	00	70	A2	06	1A	72	Α9	00	00	p r p r
000002B0	70	A2	06	1B	72	BB	00	00	70	A2	06	10	72	D3	00	00	p r p r
000002C0	70	A2	06	1D	72	DF	00	00	70	A2	06	1E	72	D3	00	00	$p \ldots r \ldots p \ldots r \ldots$
000002D0	70	A2	06	1F	09	72	E9	00	00	70	A2	06	1F	0A	72	F1	$p\ldotsr\ldotsp\ldotsr$
000002E0	00	00	70	A2	06	1F	0B	72	F9	00	00	70	A2	06	1F	00	p r p
000002F0	72	07	01	00	70	Α2	06	1F	OD	72	13	01	00	70	Α2	06	rprp
00000300	1F	0E	72	37	01	00	70	A2	06	1F	OF	72	53	01	00	70	r7prSp
00000310	A2	06	1F	10	72	7F	01	00	70	A2	06	1F	11	72	B1	01	$r\square$ p r
00000320	00	70	A2	06	1F	12	72	D1	01	00	70	A2	06	1F	13	72	. p r p r
UUUUU33U	E3	Π1	UU	70	Δ2	OB.	1F	1.4						Δ7	OB.	1F	n r n
									Fig.	8 .te	xt se	ction	1				

```
00065800
         00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00
00065810
         03 00 00 00 30 00 00 80
                                 OE 00 00 00 48 00 00 80
                                                         . . . . . O . . . . . . . H . . .
00065820
         10 00 00 00 60 00 00 80
                                 18 00 00 00 78 00 00 80
                                                         00065830
         00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
                                                         . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
00065840
         02 00 00 00 90 00 00 80
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                 00 7F 00 00 A8 00 00 80
00065850
         00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
                                                         00065860
         00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
                                                         00065870
         01 00 00 00 CO 00 00 80
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                         . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
00065880
         00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
                                 01 00 00 00 D8 00 00 80
                                                         . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
00065890
         00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
                                                         000658A0
         00 00 00 00 F0 00 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                         000658B0
         00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00
                                                         . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
         00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
000658C0
                                                         ina aviveria
000658D0
         00 00 00 00 10 01 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                         000658E0
         00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00
                                 00 00 00 00 20 01 00 00
                                                         00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000658F0
         FO 83 06 00 88 54 00 00
                                                         . . . . . T. . . . . . . . . .
00065900
         78 D8 06 00 14 00 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                         X.....
                                                         00065910
         30 81 06 00 C0 02 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00065920
         90 D8 06 00 EA 01 00 00
                                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                         00065930
         CO 02 34 00 00 00 56 00
                                 53 00 5F 00 56 00 45 00
                                                         ..4...V.S. .V.E.
00065940
         52 00 53 00 49 00 4F 00
                                 4E 00 5F 00 49 00 4E 00 R.S.I.O.N. .I.N.
```

Fig.9 .rsrc section

00	006B400	00	70	06	00	0C	00	00	00	E0	34	00	00	00	00	00	00	. p 4
00	006B410	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	006B420	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	006B430	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	006B440	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	006B450	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	or southernoon southernoon
00	006B460	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	006B470	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	006B480	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	006B490	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	or succession states on
00	106B4A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00)06B4B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	06B4C0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	106B4D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	06B4E0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	006B4F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00	06B500	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	N. PERSONAN PERSONA
00	006B510	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	of sandages data. Sandages dat
00	006B520	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	th exceptional exceptions

Fig.10 .reloc section

The count (215) of blacklisted strings reached the maximum (30) threshold	1
The time stamp (Year:2016)of the File Header reached the maximum (Year:2015) threshold	1
The time stamp (Year:2016) of the Debug block reached the maximum (Year:2015) threshold	1
The file references a URL (11.0.0.0)	1
The file references a URL (https://158.255.5.153/create.php)	1
The file references a URL (http://ip-api.com/csv?fields=country)	1
The file references a URL (https://158.255.5.153/keysave.php)	1
The file references a URL (http://i.imgur.com/Jk67LrS.jpg)	1
The file references a URL (https://158.255.5.153/)	1
The file opts for Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) as mitigation technique	2
The file checksum (0x00000000) is invalid	2
The manifest identity name (MyApplication.app) is different than the file name (d31afd6d582a666e	2
The original filename (VenusLocker.exe) is different than the file name (d31afd6d582a666e121a1e1	2
The debug file name (venuslocker.pdb) is different than the file name (d31afd6d582a666e121a1e1	2
The file is not signed with a Digital Certificate	2

Fig.11 PEstudio Indicators

Library (1)	Blacklisted (0)	Туре	Symbols (1)	Description
mscoree.dll	2	Implicit	1	Microsoft .NET Runtime Execution Engine

Fig.12 Libraries

Symbol (1)	Blacklisted (0)	Ordinal (0)	Anti-Debug (0)	Library (1)
CorExeMain	-		-	mscoree.dll

Fig.13 Functions

unicode	4	.text:0	ж	l.txt
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.ini
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.php
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.html
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.CSS
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.срр
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.log
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.java
unicode	4	.text:0	н	,doc
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.dot
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.docx
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.docm
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.dotm
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	rtf
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.wpd
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.wps
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.msg
unicode	4	.text:0	н	ıxls
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.xlt
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.xlsx
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.xlsm
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.xla
unicode	4	.text:0	н	lk:
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.xlw
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.ppt
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.pot
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.pps
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.pptx
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.pptm
unicode	5	.text:0	ж	.ppsx
unicode	5	.text:0	×	.ppsm
unicode	6	.text:0	×	.class
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.jar
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.csv
unicode	4	.text:0	×	,xml
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.dwg
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.asp
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.asf
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.pdf
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.mp3

Fig.14.1 File extension set 1

Maria Control of the Control	DE 2000	and the second s	939	
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.jpg
unicode	5	.text:0	н	, jpeg
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.rar
unicode	4	.text:0	×	,zip
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.psd
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.tif
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.wma
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.gif
unicode	4	.text:0	н	,bmp
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.eps
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.png
unicode	4	.text:0	×	,tar
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.cdr
unicode	4	.text:0	н	,wmv
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.avi
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.mp4
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.pdd
unicode	6	.text:0	×	.accdb
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.raw
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.bik
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.flv
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.swf
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.dng
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.mag
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.msp
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.odc
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.mlx
unicode	5	.text:0	×	.mbox
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.odm
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.oft
unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.wbk
unicode	4	.text:0	н	wsh
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.arc
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.arj
unicode	4	.text:0	н	,pak
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.sfx
unicode	5	.text:0	×	.zipx
unicode	5	.text:0	×	indd
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.cer
unicode	4	.text:0	*	.crt

Fig.14.2 File extension set 1

unicode	4	.text:0	н	.htm
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.url
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.big
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.iwd
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.WL
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.map
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.sav
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.vtf
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.w3x
unicode	4	.text:0	H	.mdf
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.nrg
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.bkf
unicode	4	.text:0	H	.ade
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.dex
unicode	4	.text:0	H	.dif
unicode	5	.text:0	н	.itdb
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.itl
unicode	4	.text:0	H	.mdn
unicode	4	.text:0	H	.odp
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.ods
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.qdf
unicode	4	.text:0	H	.sdb
unicode	4	.text:0	H	ısql
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.xlc
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.cap
unicode	4	.text:0	H	.dsp
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.jav
unicode	5	.text:0	н	rsrc
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.vlv.
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.cfg
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.bak
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.odt
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.pst
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.mpg
unicode	5	.text:0	н	.mpeg
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.odb
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.xlk
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.mdb
unicode	4	.text:0	н	.dxg
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.wb2

Fig.15.1 File Extension set 2

unicode	4	.text:0	ж	.dbf
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.3fr
unicode	4	.text:0	×	,arw
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.srf
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.sr2
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.bay
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.crw
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.cr2
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.dcr
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.kdc
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.erf
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.mef
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.nrw
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.orf
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.raf
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.rwl
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.rw2
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.r3d
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.ptx
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.pef
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.Srw
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.x3f
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.der
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.pem
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.pfx
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.p12
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.p7b
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.p7c
unicode	5	.text:0	×	.jfif
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.pdb
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.dat
unicode	5	.text:0	×	.idml
unicode	4	.text:0	×	.svq

Fig.15.2 File Extension set 2

ascii	6	?:0x017E	ж	`.rsrc
ascii	17	.text:0	×	Adobe ImageReadyg
ascii	4	.text:0	×	12.H
ascii	4	.text:0	ж	IO.H
ascii	15	.text:0	н	VenusLocker.exe
ascii	7	.text:0	×	Program
ascii	8	.text:0	×	Settings
ascii	6	.text:0	ж	System
ascii	6	.text:0	ж	Source
ascii	5	.text:0	н	Email
ascii	20	.text:0	×	SystemParametersInfo
ascii	28	.text:0	н	System.Security.Cryptography
ascii	7	.text:0	ж	Default
ascii	6	.text:0	×	sender
ascii	30	.text:0	×	System.Runtime.InteropServices
ascii	17	.text:0	×	System.Reflection
ascii	31	.text:0	×	System.Runtime.CompilerServices
ascii	10	.text:0	×	user32.dll
ascii	10	.text:0	н	System.Net
ascii	15	.text:0	н	get_MachineName
ascii	8	.text:0	н	Encoding
ascii	11	.text:0	н	ComputeHash
ascii	6	.text:0	ж	SHA256
ascii	14	.text:0	×	RuntimeHelpers
ascii	12	.text:0	ж	MemoryStream
ascii	10	.text:0	H	CipherMode
ascii	11	.text:0	×	PaddingMode PaddingMode
ascii	12	.text:0	н	DownloadFile
ascii	7	.text:0	ж	Process
ascii	5	.text:0	ж	Start
ascii	8	.text:0	ж	11.0.0.0
ascii	107	.text:0	н	c:\Users\Hacker\Documents\Visual Studio 2012\Projects\VenusLockerV2\VenusLocker\obj\Release\
ascii	11	.text:0	н	mscoree.dll

Fig.16.1 Strings

unicode	5	.text:0	×	Avira
unicode	17	.text:0	н	Internet Explorer
unicode	13	.text:0	н	Microsoft.NET
unicode	10	.text:0	н	Windows NT
unicode	5	.text:0	н	Adobe
unicode	14	.text:0	н	AVAST Software
unicode	8	.text:0	×	CCleaner

Fig.16.2 Strings

unicode	8	.text:0	×	username
unicode	5	.text:0	н	Vista
unicode	4	.text:0	×	2003
unicode	4	.text:0	H	2000
unicode	32	.text:0	×	https://158.255.5.153/create.php
unicode	1	.text:0	H	POST
unicode	36	.text:0	×	http://ip-api.com/csv?fields=country
unicode	33	.text:0	×	https://158.255.5.153/keysave.php
unicode	24	.text:0	×	VenusLocker@mail2tor.com
unicode	6	.text:0	×	bg.jpg
unicode	30	.text:0	×	http://i.imgur.com/Jk67Lr5.jpg
unicode	19	.text:0	×	\Desktop\ReadMe.txt
unicode	12	.text:0	×	CoinCafe.com
unicode	21	.text:0	×	HowToBuyBitcoins.info
unicode	22	.text:0	×	https://158.255.5.153/
unicode	11	.text:0	×	keysave.php
unicode	36	.text:0	×	http://ip-api.com/csv?fields=country
unicode	24	.text:0	×	VenusLocker@mail2tor.com
unicode	15	.text:0	×	VenusLocker.exe
unicode	15	.text:0	×	VenusLocker.exe

Fig.16.3 Strings

ascii	11	.text:0	-	VenusLocker
ascii	4	.text:0	24	Mode
ascii	9	.text:0	28	Resources
ascii	22	.text:0	- 50	VenusLocker.Properties
ascii	20	.text:0		System.Windows.Forms
ascii	4	.text:0	25	Form
ascii	8	.text:0	20	mscorlib
ascii	4	.text:0	8%	Enum
ascii	6	.text:0		Object
ascii	20	.text:0	25	System.Configuration
ascii	23	.text:0	20	ApplicationSettingsBase
ascii	7	.text:0	#1	Expired
ascii	9	.text:0	75	ServerUrl
ascii	16	.text:0	28	ServerInfoSubmit
ascii	13	.text:0	25	ServerKeySave
ascii	13	.text:0	#1	BackgroundUrl
ascii	14	.text:0		IPAPIServerUrl
ascii	19	.text:0	28	BTCReceivingAddress
ascii	13	.text:0	-	OfflineAESKey
ascii	14	.text:0	- 89	EncryptedBytes
ascii	17	.text:0	70	AESPasswordLength
ascii	10	.text:0	25	RSAKevSize
ascii	6	.text:0	28	isOAEP
ascii	15	.text:0	- 80	RSAPublicKeyXML
ascii	13	.text:0		SingletonPath
ascii	8	.text:0	28	FirstRun
ascii	10	.text:0	28	PersonalID
ascii	26	.text:0		System.Collections.Generic
ascii	13	.text:0		ICollection`1
ascii	13	.text:0		ExcludeFolder
ascii	18	.text:0	46	FullCryptExtension
ascii	11	.text:0		ValidExtension
ascii	5	.text:0	-	ctor
ascii	2	.text:0		EventAras
ascii	13	.text:0		MainForm Load
ascii	14	.text:0	=	VenusLockerRun
ascii	8	.text:0		SendInfo
ascii	11	.text:0	<u>16</u>	IP2Location Programme Transfer of the IP2Location Programme Transfer o
ascii	14	.text:0		CreatePassword
ascii	24	.text:0		RNGCryptoServiceProvider

Fig.16.4 Strings

ascii	6	.text:0		GetInt
ascii	15	.text:0	1023	Disk_Encryption
ascii	22	.text:0	929	CurrentPath_Encryption
ascii	9	.text:0		System.IO
ascii	8	.text:0		FileInfo
ascii	15	.text:0	1727	File_Encryption
ascii	11	.text:0	020	AES_Encrypt
ascii	19	.text:0	1880	AESKeyEncryptWithRS
ascii	7	.text:0	0.5	Sendkey
ascii	6	.text:0	1920	ShowUI
ascii	12	.text:0	32 <u>4</u> 8	SetWallPaper
ascii	14	.text:0	93 4 3	MessageCreator
ascii	45	.text:0	0.70	System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates
ascii	15	.text:0	1020	X509Certificate
ascii	9	.text:0	19 <u>2</u> 8	X509Chain
ascii	19	.text:0	0. 4 0	System.Net.Security
ascii	15	.text:0	2.53	SslPolicyErrors
ascii	25	.text:0	1020	ValidateRemoteCertificate
ascii	8	.text:0	3/ 4 /3	TimeSpan
ascii	10	.text:0	93 4 3	Timer_Tick
ascii	29	.text:0		LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs
ascii	20	.text:0	1020	HomePage_LinkClicked
ascii	29	.text:0	949 1	GetStartLinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	31	.text:0	1980	BlockChainlinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	34	.text:0	0.50	LocalBitcoinslinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	29	.text:0		CoinCafelinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	30	.text:0	929	BTCDirectlinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	24	.text:0	190	CEXlinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	29	.text:0	0.70	CoinMamalinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	29	.text:0	1923	HowToBuylinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	33	.text:0	298	PerfectMoneyLinkLabel_LinkClicked
ascii	30	.text:0	16.0	PMBitcoinLinkLabel_LinkClicked

Fig.16.5 Strings

ascii	15	.text:0	50	WhatHappenLabel
ascii	17	.text:0	arama Arama	HowToDecryptLabel
ascii	13	.text:0	20	HowToPayl abel

Fig.16.6 Strings

unicode 21	.text:0	\U2FsdGVkX1DKeR.vluni

Fig.16.7 Strings

unicode	6	.text:0	2	Google
unicode	5	.text:0	93	Intel
unicode	13	.text:0	52	Kaspersky Lab
unicode	21	.text:0	53	Microsoft Bing Pinyin
unicode	24	.text:0	22	Microsoft Chart Controls
unicode	15	.text:0	93	Microsoft Games
unicode	16	.text:0	52	Microsoft Office
unicode	12	.text:0	50	MicrosoftBAF
unicode	7	.text:0	29	MSBuild
unicode	12	.text:0	83	QQMailPlugin
unicode	7	.text:0	52	Realtek
unicode	5	.text:0	50	Skype
unicode	20	.text:0	29	Reference Assemblies
unicode	7	.text:0	¥3	Tencent
unicode	11	.text:0	52	USB Camera2
unicode	6	.text:0	50	WinRAR
unicode	15	.text:0	29	Windows Sidebar
unicode	24	.text:0	#4	Windows Portable Devices
unicode	20	.text:0	50	Windows Photo Viewer
unicodo	20	.toxt:0		Windows Media Player
unicodo	12	.text:0		Windows Mail
unicode	18	.toxt:0		NVIDIA Corporation
unicodo	5	.toxt:0		IObit
unicodo	9	.toxt:0		VirtualDJ
unicodo	10	.toxt:0		TeamViewer
unicode	1	.toxt:0		java
unicode	6	.toxt:0		Yahoo!

Fig.16.8 Strings

unicode	32	.text:0		BGORMkj8v=u1X002h0ybNdRvZb95GGnm
unicode	- 1	.text:0		NULL
unicode	6	.text:0		pcname
unicode	7	.text:0		unknown
unicode	1	.text:0		lang
unicode	- 1	.text:0		time
unicode	5	.text:0		loads
unicode	6	.text:0		userid
unicode	524	.text:0	10	<rsakeyvalue><modulus>laQ/Ndkbwswz2zvMG4MaRAt7/t/1krRdDHURawFCEUiqMbkmwY9MKxmq1TFC6dpLNt2cj6sezKg9c38YaBRg43BF5PaHtZW4Og+jP9W</modulus></rsakeyvalue>
unicode	524	.text:0		VrCT153+wwIRSfajzp1FNe1CNWr8BcTGXKgKGgz/xCkuk3QFGCufw1fMyQi/dUZ2dROhNKfpRCl9v2yN2lXqdVjXapWnpDVGaIP8zTeQ==
unicode	34	.text:0	#1	1Dj9YnMiciNgaKuyzKynygu7nB21tvV6QD

Fig.16.9 Strings

Basic Dynamic Analysis

Upon executing Venus Locker, It creates a file U2FsdGVKX1DKeR.vluni at C:\Users\current user\. The actual contents of this file is unknown and encrypted however we assume that this file is used as a way of ensuring persistence and notifying multiple instances of the malware that the system is already infected. This assumption is made as the malware does not execute if it is already running on the system.

During its execution, Venus Locker slowly starts encrypting files as can be seen below. It creates 2 different encrypted files - .Venusf files or .Venusp files. As previously mentioned, we saw that the malware has 2 sets of file extensions that are to be encrypted if found. We can correlate these 2 findings and establish that Venus Locker encrypts one set of file extensions into .Venusf files and the other set of file extensions into .Venusp files. There do not seem to be any significant structural differences between both files. However, it is interesting to note that Venus Locker does not prevent using any of the applications that have been encrypted and we can still make use of their functionality. Another subject of note is that Venus Locker does not encrypt some files. We assume this corresponds to those applications that we previously saw in the strings section. Once the program has completed its encryption process, It launches a GUI explaining to the user that his files have been encrypted. It gives him a deadline of 72 hours after which the private key needed to decrypt his files will be deleted. It also provides a number of ways to purchase bitcoins and prompts the user to pay the ransom.

Venus Locker also seems to execute a method to change the user's wallpaper as shown. While during analysis, the default Windows XP wallpaper was only removed, we believe that the malware attempts to download an image from the url http://i.imgur.com/JK67LrS.jpg mentioned earlier and set this image as the wallpaper, which in this case it failed to do so due to lack of connectivity.

Venus Locker does communicate with a command and control server located at https://158.255.5.153. The other url that the malware contacts is http://ip-api.com/csv?fields=country which is a service used to collect intelligence about the victim's machine like external ip address etc. We can correlate the two and presume that the malware reports infected victim data to the CnC server.

The malware as previously mentioned uses the AES encryption scheme along with an RSA scheme to encrypt the AES key. It dynamically loads a lot of dlls as can be seen using procmon of which one in particular is the rsaenh.dll encryption library. While it does not set an autorun registry value, it adds a prefetch file to the registry as shown below.

Finally, the malware has some date checking mechanism wherein it only executes its functionality thread if the date is not beyond the 30th of August 2016. If the system date has exceeded this point, the process is instantly terminated while if it is before, the malware proceeds along its main thread.

□ 🖳 explorer.exe	1540		10.93 MB	MALWAR\Administrator	Windows Explorer
rundll32,exe	1696		2,13 MB	MALWAR\Administrator	Run a DLL as an App
Procmon.exe	3060	1.56	7.07 MB	MALWAR\Administrator	Process Monitor
ProcessHacker.exe	1924		7.67 MB	MALWAR\Administrator	Process Hacker
🐞 d31afd6d582a666e121a1	500		19.09 MB	MALWAR\Administrator	VenusLocker

Fig.17 Process running




Fig.18 Network Activity

9:55:4 🔓 d31afd6d582a	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\d31afd6d582a666e121a1e1df8bc15a93a8793c46c2814730da2e56fdce3ba4a.exe	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x400
9:55:4 🔓 d31afd6d582a	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7c9
9:55:4 § d31afd6d582a	a6 1548 🚉 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\mscoree.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x790
9:55:4 § d31afd6d582a	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7c8
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\advapi32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77d
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\rpcrt4.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77e
	a6 1548 🧟 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\secur32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77f
	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscoreei.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x603
	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\shlwapi.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77f
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\qdi32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77f
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\user32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7e4
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77c
	6 1548 🌌 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorwks.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x79e
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\Winsx5\x86_Microsoft.VC80.CRT_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.3053_x-ww_b80fa8ca\msvcr80.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x781
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\system32\shell32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7c9
	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\WinSx5\x86 Microsoft\Windows.Common-Controls 6595b64144ccf1df 6.0.2600.5512 x-ww 35d4ce83\comctl32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x773
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cometl32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x5d0
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\9adb89fa22fd5b4ce433b5aca7fb1b07\mscorlib.ni.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x790
	a6 1548 🌌 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x774
	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\system32\uxtheme.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x5ad
	6 1548 2 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorijt.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x790
	a6 1548 🚭 Load Image	C:\wNDDwS\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System\aa7926460a336408c8041330ad90929d\System.ni.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7a4.
	a6 1548 🚭 Load Image	C:\wNDDwS\assembly\Nativelmages_v2.0.50727_32\System.Drawing\6378f2e90f13bc720d57fa6895c911e2\System.Drawing.ni.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7ad.
	a6 1548 🍣 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System.Windows.Forms\9a254c455892c02355ab0ab0f0727c5b\System.Windows.Forms.ni.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7af
	a6 1548 🥞 Load Image	C:\w/INDOWS\\win5x\$\x86 Microsoft.\windows.GdiPlus.6595b64144ccf1df 1.1.02500.5512 x-vwv dtb54e0\\GdiPlus.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x4ec
	a6 1548 🎎 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\Culture.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x603.
	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\wINDOwS\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System.Configuration\cb4cb21d14767292e079366a5d3d76cd\System.Configuration.ni.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x648
	a6 1548 🌌 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\assembly\NativeImages v2.0.50727 32\System:Xml\36/3953/24d4/0b767bf172331ad6/3e\System:Xml.ni.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x637
	a6 1548 2 Load Image	C:\WINDDWS\system32\rasapi32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x76e
	a6 1548 & Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasman.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x76e
	a6 1548 💐 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\netapi32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x5b8
	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ws2 32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x71a
	a6 1548 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ws2help.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x71a
	a6 1548 🚉 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\tapi32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x76e
	a6 1548 🌌 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\rtutils.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x76e
	a6 1548 2 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\winmm.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x76b
	a6 1548 💐 Load Image	C:WINDOWS\system32\mswsock.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x70a
	a6 1548 💐 Load Image	C:WINDOWS\system32\hnetci,dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x662
	a6 1548 🌌 Load Image	C.WHNDOWS\system32\wshtcpip.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x71a
	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C.WHINDOWS\system32\msv1.0.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77c
	a6 1548 🎎 Load Image	C.WHNDOWS\system32\iphipapi dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x76d
	a6 1548 🎎 Load Image	C. WHINDOWS System 32 vpsp. Zers. dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x355
	a6 1548 🌌 Load Image	C.\WINDOWS\system32\wshbth.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x355 Image Base: 0x751
	a6 1548 🚉 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\setupapi.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x779
	a6 1548 🚉 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\dnsapi.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x775
	a6 1548 💸 Load Image	C.\WINDOWS\system32\winnnr.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x76f
	a6 1548 🥰 Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\wildap32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x76f
	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:W/NDDWS\system32\rasadhlp.dll		Image Base: 0x76f
.55:5 🌘 d31 ald6d5828	a6 1548 🌊 Load Image	C:\\WINDO\WS\svstem32\rsaenh.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x6

Fig.19 Libraries imported

```
Files [attributes?] modified:11

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\ntuser.dat.LOG
C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\APATEDNS.EXE-3AE1E42D.pf

C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\D31AFD6D582A666E121A1E1DF8BC1-097C0992.pf
C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\LOGON.SCR-151EFAEA.pf
C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\PROCEXP.EXE-37D9F3A4.pf
C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\PROCMON.EXE-374C12E7.pf
C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\WMIPRVSE.EXE-28F301A9.pf
C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LOG
C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\system.LOG
C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\Logs\wbemcore.log
C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\Logs\wbemcore.log
C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\Logs\wbemcore.log
C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\Logs\wbemcore.log
```

Fig.20 Prefetch file added




Fig.21 Encrypted files




Fig.22 Two encrypted extensions



Fig.23 Applications still usable




Fig.24.1 GUI




Fig.24.2 GUI




Fig.24.3 GUI



Fig.25 Wallpaper changed

Indicators of Compromise

Venus Locker shows a large number of host and network based indicators.

The network activity can be used as an indicator. If the program attempts to contact the url http://ip-api.com/csv?fields=country then it can be used as a strong indicator of compromise. The wallpaper image url http://ii.imgur.com/JK67LrS.jpg can also be used as another network based indicator.

The malware initially creates a file U2FsdGVKX1DKeR.vluni at C:\Users\current user\. This can be used as a strong host based indicator of compromise. The prefetch registry file can also be used as another indicator of compromise.

Conclusion

Venus Locker is a dangerous albeit basic ransomware that is hard to mitigate once activated, hence prevention is definitely a critical priority. Periodic backup of system files can help by facilitating system formats followed by system restores.