

# Legitimacy, Public-Private Governance Initiatives, and Corporate Responsiveness to Stakeholders

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## **Abstract**

Can public-private governance initiatives help multinational corporations improve their social performance, even if they lack strong membership requirements or enforcement mechanisms? Extant work, citing the lack of a relationship between membership in such initiatives and firm performance on a variety of social issues, suggests that shallow initiatives can lead firms to substitute symbolic change for substantive change. In this paper, I first argue that past work has overlooked an important dimension of social performance: the extent to which firms are responsive to, and take accountability for, human rights violations that they have committed. I then argue that even weak public-private regulatory initiatives can induce greater responsiveness in their members, provided that the initiative is seen as legitimate. Employing novel data on firm responses to human rights allegations from the Business and Human Rights Resource Center, I find that membership in one such shallow initiative, the United Nations Global Compact, significantly increases firms' responsiveness to allegations made against them.

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# 1 Introduction

In the current era of global production, all consumers often use products that were made in the developing world. While firms may favor locating production in developing states due to their relaxed regulatory environments, developed state consumers, firms, and shareholders expect the products that they use to be manufactured in accordance with a high standard of human rights and environmental protection regardless of where they came from (Malesky and Mosley, 2018). In order to meet the demand for transnational human rights and environmental standards, firms often turn to public-private governance initiatives - collaborative efforts in which private actors opt into additional self-regulatory measures while receiving support and guidance from public bodies such as international organizations or states.

Public-private governance initiatives are analagous to traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in several ways: first, membership is voluntary. Second, initiatives mostly lack the ability to monitor firms' compliance due to the complex and transnational nature of global supply chains, and thus enforcement is weak. As a result, public-private regulatory initiatives tend to be broad in scope but shallow in their membership requirements; firms would not join initiatives that asked too much of them, and thus such initiatives are not created (Downs, Roche and Barsoom, 1996). However, public-private initiatives are becoming substantial players in global governance. Westerwinter (2019) identifies more than 400 initiatives created in the past twenty years, as growth in traditional IGOs has slowed (Abbott, Green and Keohane, 2016). Can these shallow, voluntary regulatory initiatives actually help firms improve their social performance? Or, as their critics have alleged, are they too weak to bind?<sup>1</sup>

I offer a bipartite theoretical response to the above questions. First, I problematize the use of extant measures of social responsibility to gauge the efficacy of public-private regula-

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<sup>1</sup>For an early, prominent criticism of the UNGC, see *Tangled Up In Blue: Corporate Partnerships at the United Nations* (2000)

tory initiatives. I introduce firm responsiveness to stakeholder concerns as a form of social responsibility.<sup>2</sup> By examining variation in how firms react when they are accused of violating transnational norms of sustainability and human rights protection, I shed light on an underexplored realm of corporate social performance. Second, I argue that public-private regulatory initiatives can help make member firms more likely to respond to stakeholder allegations if the regulatory initiatives are seen as possessing legitimate social purpose, or simply legitimacy (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Hurd, 1999; Ruggie, 1982). If the general public sees an initiative as a good faith effort to mitigate the negative externalities of business, then firms will be able to draw on this legitimacy through association. Then, they can leverage this legitimacy to frame their responses as good corporate stewardship, which attenuates the negative reputational effects of drawing attention to the alleged violations.

In this paper, I examine one public-private regulatory initiative in particular: the UN Global Compact, an initiative created with the goal of helping member firms improve human rights and sustainability practices throughout their entire supply chains (suppliers, contractors, affiliates, etc). Designed as a “learning network” in which members can share best practices, learn from others’ mistakes, and report on their progress, the UNGC is a prime example of a broad but shallow regulatory initiative (Ruggie, 2002). The Global Compact’s membership costs are relatively low; firms must pay a modest annual fee (adjusted to their size), and must submit public, annual reports detailing their achievements and goals in a wide range of human rights, labor, and sustainability areas. Further, the initiative only terminates firms’ membership for failing to submit progress reports, not for failing to make progress. However, the United Nations is perceived as a highly legitimate actor in international politics by citizens in developed and developing states (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2016) as well as elites (Verhaegen, Scholte and Tallberg, 2019). Thus, the primary resource that firms receive upon joining the UNGC should be their ability to ben-

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<sup>2</sup>I follow past literature in defining “stakeholders” as non-state actors - particularly NGOs, labor unions, and other civil society groups - who are affected by the externalities of global production (Bäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017; Bernstein and Cashore, 2007; Chrun, Berliner and Prakash, 2018)

efit from the legitimacy of the UN name. If membership in the UNGC does associate with greater responsiveness, then, it is likely that the effect was transmitted through the framing mechanism that I propose rather than some other benefit provided by UNGC membership.

To test my hypothesis that UNGC membership should increase firms' responsiveness to human rights violations, I rely on data from the Business and Human Rights Resource Center (BHRRC). The BHRRC is an NGO that serves as a sort of indirect grievance mechanism for human rights and environmental claims against firms; the center searches for unresolved allegations, and then reaches out to the offending firm and requests a formal, public response. Restricting my focus to the world's largest multinational firms, I find that UNGC member firms are significantly more likely to respond to human rights claims made against them than nonmembers. Further, analysis of the text of firms' responses provides support for the legitimacy mechanism; UNGC member firms commonly cite their UN association in their responses, even when it is not germane to the allegations themselves.

These findings speak to the growing "new interdependence" literature in international political economy ([Farrell and Newman, 2014](#)), which examines the ever-larger role played by transnational actors such as MNCs ([Farrell and Newman, 2015](#); [Hale and Roger, 2014](#)) and INGOs ([Andonova, Hale and Roger, 2017](#)) in global regulatory governance. First, I provide evidence that even shallow public-private regulatory initiatives can induce member firms to become more responsive to stakeholder concerns, thus increasing the extent to which firms participate in the governance of their global operations. Second, my theoretical framework suggests a new approach to the relationship between nonstate actors and IOs in global governance. While extant work has argued that IOs work with firms, NGOs, and civil society groups in order to increase their own legitimacy ([Abbott et al., 2016](#); [Bäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017](#); [Börzel and Risse, 2005](#)), I argue that the converse may also be true; specifically, firms may draw on the reputation of public actors such as the United Nations in order to legitimate themselves as well.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first, I review extant scholarship on private

regulation and corporate social responsibility. Second, I lay out the paper’s theoretical framework and derive hypotheses. Third, I describe the data, research design, and results of statistical analyses. The fourth section concludes.

## 2 Voluntary Initiatives and Corporate Social Responsibility

For global firms, joining transnational, voluntary regulatory initiatives is an increasingly common response to the demand for corporate social responsibility (CSR). These voluntary initiatives may be cooperative efforts between public actors and firms (public-private initiatives) or they may be wholly private efforts between member firms. Firms may choose to join such initiatives instead of going it alone for several reasons: initiatives can provide information on what types of self-regulation are seen as appropriate ([Hassel, 2008](#)), firms may receive financial returns from initiative-related labeling on their products ([Hainmueller, Hiscox and Sequeira, 2014](#)), or they may hope that voluntary self-regulation preempts future public regulation ([Malhotra, Monin and Tomz, 2019](#)). While firms may join voluntary regulatory initiatives for myriad reasons, the more pressing question for global governance is whether or not these initiatives have been successful in inducing firms to behave responsibly. Extant answers to this question vary along two metrics: first, whether or not compliance with the initiative in question is easily observable. Second, whether the outcome of interest is social responsibility outcomes (such as pollution levels or experts’ ratings) or socially responsible behaviors (such as adopting corporate human rights policies or filing sustainability reports).

The literature on voluntary regulation has generally found that initiatives with which compliance is easily verified, typically through audits, are more successful in bringing about socially responsible outcomes. Looking at the ISO 14001 standard, which requires an audit for initial certification and annual audits for recertification, [Potoski and Prakash \(2005\)](#)

find that certified firms are more likely to be in compliance with domestic environmental regulations; in later work, [Prakash and Potoski \(2014\)](#) find that higher rates of ISO 14001 membership at the national level lead to reduced levels of air pollution in countries with weak regulatory environments. [Marx and Cuypers \(2010\)](#) find that states with higher rates of membership in the Forest Stewardship Council, an initiative designed to promote responsible forest management that requires audits prior to certification, experience lower rates of deforestation (though the effect size is small). In a review of the literature on Fair Trade certification, a massive labeling initiative that requires audits of the producer and the buyer, [Dragusanu, Giovannucci and Nunn \(2014\)](#) find that Fair Trade certification generally improves the welfare of producers and the uptake of environmentally friendly farming practices.

Other private regulatory initiatives, such as the UNGC, ask firms to implement a wide range of practices throughout their entire production networks; these “shallow” initiatives typically require member firms to adopt regulatory codes and report on their process in implementing them, but compliance with these broad regulations is not easily verified. Work examining the efficacy of such initiatives has found evidence that they can induce firms to engage in socially responsible behaviors, but only mixed evidence that they can significantly impact outcomes. Looking at firm behaviors, [Bernhagen and Mitchell \(2010\)](#) find that UNGC member firms are more likely to adopt official human rights policies than nonmembers. [Mwangi, Rieth and Schmitz \(2013\)](#) find that UNGC members file sustainability reports with the Global Reporting Initiative at higher rates than nonmembers. Looking at responsibility outcomes, [Barrientos and Smith \(2007\)](#) find that firms who joined the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) - an initiative focused on improving labor conditions/rights in global supply chains - improved health and safety conditions in their supplier facilities, but did not improve workers’ rights. Using expert ratings of firms’ CSR performance, [Berliner and Prakash \(2015\)](#) find that UNGC membership leads firms to improve only in issue areas in which they were already strong, and to decline in areas in which they were already weak; they suggest that firms join the UNGC in order to “bluewash,” or benefit from the UN

affiliation while failing to take steps to improve their social performance.

Upon first viewing, the conclusion may seem obvious: firms join initiatives with which deep compliance is difficult to verify because they do not intend to comply (Mitchell, 1994). In the case of the UNGC, the implication is that firms may be willing to take relatively inexpensive measures (such as drafting a human rights policy) in order to retain their membership, but they are not willing to take costly measures to substantially mitigate the negative externalities created by their global operations. In this view, shallow regulatory initiatives are at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive for global governance.

I contend that this perspective fails to appreciate the magnitude of the task that shallow initiatives like the Global Compact were created to help firms tackle: adopting and maintaining labor, environmental, and human rights standards throughout their entire supply chains. Three structural issues make this task highly difficult for even the most motivated firms. The first problem is that large multinational firms often have staggeringly large supply chains. In its most recent sustainability report, Ford Motor Company claims to source materials from more than 4,400 facilities in over 60 countries, in addition to 10,000 indirect supplier companies.<sup>3</sup> Verifying the conditions at thousands of supplier facilities is substantially more difficult than bringing a handful of factories into compliance with the ISO 14001 standard; the architects of the UNGC understood that the initiative would never be accepted by MNCs if it required similarly strict certification requirements (Ruggie, 2013). The second problem is that facility audits, the tool of choice for firms who wish to monitor and detect noncompliance in their supply chains, are problematic. Auditors are prone to corruption (Dufflo et al., 2013), and report fewer violations when they are inexperienced or commissioned by the owner of the facility being audited (Short, Toffel and Hugill, 2016). Third, evidence suggests that the strength of domestic public regulations is a key predictor of facility-level compliance, even when private regulation is accounted for (Bartley, 2018; Distelhorst, Locke and Samel, 2015).

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<sup>3</sup>See <https://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustainability-report-2017-18>

In sum, multinational firms may be unable to substantially improve the human rights performance of their entire supply chains in the short term. Thus, studies of UNGC membership’s effects on such social performance outcome measures should be taken as tough tests of the initiative’s ability to induce firms to engage in socially responsible behaviors. On the contrary, studies of the Global Compact’s effects on relatively cheap behaviors such as adopting human rights policies or filing sustainability reports can be seen as easy tests. In this paper, I examine the effects of UNGC membership on firms’ willingness to engage in a costlier socially responsible behavior: responding publicly to alleged human rights violations.

### 3 Theoretical Framework

I advance two theoretical arguments. First, I contend that firms’ responsiveness to stakeholder allegations of human rights or environmental violations is an important social responsibility metric, and that responding to such allegations is not costless. Second, I argue that private regulatory initiatives can increase firms’ responsiveness through the mechanism of conferred legitimacy.

#### 3.1 Responsiveness as Social Responsibility

As employed here, responsiveness can be defined as the extent to which firms issue formal, public responses to non-salient allegations levied against them by nonstate actors. This definition captures three features that I argue are critical for a response to be considered socially responsible. First, the situation must be one in which the firm has the option to keep the alleged violation obscure via nonresponse. This means that responses to major scandals for which the firm is directly implicated (BP and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010, for example)<sup>4</sup> are not incidents of responsiveness, as firms lack the option to keep such incidents quiet by ignoring them or responding privately.<sup>5</sup> Second, the actor making the claim against

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<sup>4</sup>See [Weber \(2010\)](#) for more details.

<sup>5</sup>Further, firms understand well the importance of managing scandals; see [Diermeier \(2011\)](#).



the firm must lack the legal power to coerce the firm into responding to their allegations; corporate social responsibility is necessarily extralegal, so responses to allegations made by sovereign states cannot be considered examples of responsiveness. Finally, responses must be public. Private responses are less costly for firms, as they do not raise public awareness of the issue, and thus are far more likely to be cheap talk than public responses.

I offer two justifications for responsiveness as a meaningful measure of social performance. First, public responses to alleged violations have a platforming effect; by virtue of publicly acknowledging a claim, firms are necessarily communicating the content of the alleged violation to a wider audience than the claimant would otherwise be able to reach. Most of the claims in the BHRRC data are made by workers, labor unions, or small NGOs in developing countries, and these actors typically lack the ability to make their voices heard globally in the way that large multinationals can. By responding publicly (therefore, transparently) to these actors' allegations, even if they deny accountability for the alleged violation, firms make these claims more salient than they were before.

This platforming effect is not costless for firms; increasing the salience of a claim increases the risk of public backlash against the firm, which in turn can result in reputational and even financial damage. For example, in 2013 the BHRRC requested a response from Korean trading conglomerate Posco Daewoo International to a claim made by Cotton Campaign (a new, small NGO) regarding the company's alleged use of Uzbek cotton harvested using forced labor. On June 6 the BHRRC posted Daewoo's response, in which the company acknowledged their use of Uzbek cotton and described their efforts to fight forced labor.<sup>6</sup> By June 21, Daewoo's stock had fallen to its lowest value in several months; the company's response prompted headlines such as "Posco Unit Admits Using Cotton From Forced and Child Labor" in the Wall Street Journal.<sup>7</sup> Even though Daewoo used their response to take accountability and detail their efforts to combat forced labor in Uzbekistan, the increased

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<sup>6</sup><https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/daewoo-internationals-response>

<sup>7</sup><https://www.wsj.com/articles/daewoo-faces-criticism-for-use-of-uzbekistan-cotton-made-with-forced-labor-1407918539>

salience of the issue led to public backlash.

Second, firms who publicly respond to nonsalient allegations should be more likely to go on to resolve the issue than firms who do not. One of the mechanisms driving this connection is audience costs (Fearon, 1994; Schulz, 2001). By publicly announcing their plans for resolving the claim, as Daewoo International did, firms raise the cost of failing to implement them; shareholders, customers, and NGOs can punish firms for failing to keep to keep their promises, once the promised actions are public knowledge. Another mechanism is the platforming effect. Even when firms do not admit fault or promise actions in their responses, the increased salience of the claim inevitably increases the pressure being put on the firm to remedy the issue in some way. For example, in 2005 the BHRRC requested a response from Tiffany, a large commercial jeweler, regarding its exploitation of a loophole in U.S. law that allowed it to import “blood diamonds” from Burma. Tiffany responded, claiming that it would continue to import Burmese diamonds given that it was not illegal to do so. Tiffany’s response caught the attention of a wide range of NGOs, who in turn pressured the firm to discontinue sourcing from the country. Two days after the response was posted, Tiffany announced that they would no longer import Burmese diamonds.<sup>8</sup>

In sum, responding publicly to stakeholder allegations is a meaningful form of social responsibility. In addition to promoting transparency and giving a platform to often marginalized claimants, responsiveness to allegations is often the first step towards the resolution of the grievance at hand; in turn, remediation is often a critical element of private regulatory initiatives’ missions.<sup>9</sup> Further, these responses are not costless; firms such as Daewoo face backlash when their responses publicize their transgressions, damaging their reputations and possibly their bottom lines. However, firms are not limited in their capacity to issue

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<sup>8</sup><https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Examples-of-impact-full-Jan-2015.pdf>

<sup>9</sup>In particular, UNGC member firms agree to uphold the “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework, also known as the UN Guiding Principles. One Global Compact memo states that “The third pillar, Access to Remedy, outlines that where people are harmed by business activities, there is both adequate accountability and effective redress... The principles relating to the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights are of direct relevance to the commitment undertaken by Global Compact participants.”

responses like they are limited in their capacity to prevent violations throughout their supply chains. Thus, responsiveness is a useful outcome measure for determining the efficacy of private regulatory initiatives such as the UNGC; it is socially responsible, potentially costly, and firms who wish to increase or decrease responsiveness can do so relatively quickly.

### 3.2 Legitimacy and Responsiveness

I argue that UNGC membership should make firms more responsive to stakeholder allegations by increasing the extent to which the firms' operations are perceived as legitimate, and thus reducing the reputational costs to firms of issuing a response. In this section, I define legitimacy and explain the process through which legitimacy conferred upon firms through UNGC membership leads them to become more responsive.

I follow [Hurd \(1999, p. 381\)](#) in defining legitimacy as “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed,” and agree that legitimacy “is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the institution.” Legitimacy underscores the sovereignty of domestic governments, but is not completely absent from international politics either ([Milner, 1991](#)). The concept has been of particular interest to scholars of international order, who argue that international norms and institutions are abided by when they are seen as legitimate ([Hurd, 1999](#); [Ruggie, 1982](#)) and when compliance can confer legitimacy upon the complying states ([Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998](#)).

International organizations are both recipients and distributors of legitimacy in international politics. IOs are created by their member states,<sup>10</sup> and the extent to which they are perceived as legitimate is contingent not only on the content of their mandate but on the composition of their membership. Once created, however, IOs also serve a legitimation function. The United Nations in particular has long been recognized as a key source of legitimation ([Claude Jr., 1966](#)); the organization classifies international uses of force as legitimate

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<sup>10</sup>Though IO bureaucrats can also play a role in some instances; see ([Johnson, 2014](#)).

or illegitimate, delineates the acceptable realm of state action, and provides the normative underpinning for the postwar international order (Barnett, 1997). The UN’s approval of an action signals to a global audience that the action was just, or at least that it was not in violation of the norms that constitute legitimate state behavior.

I contend that the Global Compact, as a UN-sponsored initiative, shares the legitimization function of its parent institution. For firms, membership in the initiative sends a signal to stakeholders that the UN approves of the firms’ operations (or at least of their plans for improvement); even though the actual provisions of the Global Compact are unlikely to be salient among certain civil society groups, the UN name is the key factor. With UN approval comes the implication that the firm is a legitimate actor under the current international order, which the UN plays a key role in upholding.

This legitimization function is likely to be particularly important for firms when they are deciding whether to respond to an alleged human rights or environmental violation. This is a fraught decision; if firms ignore non-salient stakeholder concerns, they may boil over into widely-publicized crises (Bartley and Child, 2014) which negatively impact firm value (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017; Henisz, Dorobantu and Narley, 2014). However, by responding publicly, firms guarantee that the allegations will become more salient and thus open themselves up to potential backlash. The risk is that civil society groups will identify the alleged transgressions as indicators that the firm is operating in bad faith, and that the firm will lose its social contract to operate (Ruggie, 2013). UNGC member firms, however, can draw on the legitimacy of the UN in order to frame their actions as minor deviations from a socially responsible course rather than being indicative of their type. For example, mining firm GCM Resources wrote in one of their public responses that “GCM continues to embrace, support and enact, within its sphere of influence, these UNGC principles - all of which are consistent with the core values of GCM.”<sup>11</sup>

The ability to leverage the legitimacy of the UN name lowers the cost to firms of issuing

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<sup>11</sup><https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/gcm-response-un-statement-phulbari-mar-20-2012.pdf>

public responses, as it allows them to soften the reputational impact of increasing the allegations’ salience. Thus, the primary observable implication is as follows:


**H1:** Firms who are member to the UN Global Compact should be more responsive to stakeholder concerns than non-members.

## 4 Research Design

To test my hypothesis empirically, I rely on data from the Business and Human Rights Research Center (BHRRC)’s company response dataset. As noted previously, the BHRRC is an NGO that requests formal responses from firms who have been accused of misconduct by civil society groups; since 2004, the organization has approached firms 3,846 times and published all responses (and nonresponses) on their website. A few aspects of the BHRRC company response data make it ideal for testing responsiveness. First, the BHRRC exclusively approaches firms regarding claims to which the firms have not yet responded, and thus all responses are original (and nonresponse is not due to firms already having addressed the issue). This also means that the BHRRC data does not include responses to major scandals, as firms typically respond to these issues unprompted. Second, the claimants in the BHRRC data are largely small NGOs, labor unions, or other civil society groups in the host country. These groups do not typically have the ability to make their voices heard internationally, and thus their allegations can be considered non-salient. Third, the responses are published in full on the BHRRC’s website, satisfying the requirement that responses be public.

My dependent variable, then, is simply a binary indicator of whether or not a firm issued a response to the claim levied against it. The key independent variable, UNGC membership, is also a binary indicator of whether or not the firm was a member of the UNGC on the date that the response was requested. Because firms who join the Global Compact agree to implement reforms throughout their supply chains and corporate structures, firms are also coded as members of the initiative if their parent firm is a member.

Figure 1: Number of claims per firm (*Forbes Global 2000* firms only)



Following recent studies ([Bennie, Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2007](#); [Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2010](#)), I limit my sample to firms on the *Forbes 2000* list of the world's 2,000 largest publicly traded companies. In addition to capturing the population of interest (large companies with multinational operations and supplier networks), the fact that all companies on the *Forbes* list are public eliminates a potential confounder. Further, approximately 39% of all claims in the BHRRC data (1,515 out of 3,846) are levied towards one of these firms, which still allows me substantial degrees of freedom with which to work.

I also control for a number of potentially confounding factors. First, as [Figure 1](#) shows, the majority of firms in the sample are approached by the BHRRC at least twice. It is possible that firms become more likely to respond to the organization the more that they interact with them over time; thus, I control for the number of prior claims alleged against a firm. I also take firm size into account, as it could be the case that larger firms are more

likely to join the UNGC and more likely to respond to allegations. To gauge firm size, I use data on firms’ total assets from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database and FTSE Russell’s Mergent Online database.

Further, it is important to control for the domestic political climate in both the host state and the firm’s home state. Firms from states with strong civil society group presence may be more responsive; firms who face allegations from stakeholders in states with weak civil society groups may be less responsive. To proxy for this, I use the `v2csrepress` variable from the V-Dem dataset ([Coppedge et al., 2018](#)) which measures the extent to which governments repress domestic civil society groups on a scale of -4 (most repressive) to 4 (least repressive). To measure home state civil society repression, I use the value of the `v2csrepress` variable for the state in which the firm is headquartered. To measure host state civil society repression, I do the same but for the state in which the alleged infraction occurred. A number of claims involve multiple host states, or even entire continents; in such cases, I take the average of each implicated state’s civil society repression score in the year that the claim was made. Because higher values indicate less repression, I refer to this variable as “civil society freedom”.

Finally, I include year, sector (2-digit NAICS), and firm fixed effects in some models to address temporal, industry, and firm-level dynamics.

## 4.1 Estimation

I use two different modeling approaches to estimate the effect of UNGC membership on firm responsiveness. First, I run a series of a pooled logistic regressions using firm, sector, and year-level fixed effects. Second, I use an instrumental variables approach in order to mitigate potential selection bias.

## 5 Results and Discussion

### 5.1 Logit Models

**Table 1** displays the results of six logistic regression models of firm response on UNGC membership. As predicted, the UNGC membership variable is positive and significant across specifications. To demonstrate that the significance of the UNGC membership variable is not an artifact of arbitrary covariate selection, I first report the bivariate model (Lenz and Sahn, 2018). The UNGC variable remains positive, significant, and of similar magnitude when controls are added in models 2 and 3. Models 4, 5, and 6 introduce year, sector, and firm-level fixed effects in different combinations. The firm-level fixed effects absorb much of the variation in the dependent variable, and none of the control variables achieve significance when they are included. However, the UNGC membership variable remains positive and statistically significant in both models. The variable is substantively significant as well: in model 5, UNGC member firms are 15.9% [10.7%, 21.1%] more likely to respond to claims than nonmembers (see **Figure 2**). Additional model specifications are available in the appendix.

We cannot conclude from these results that the relationship between UNGC membership and responsiveness is a causal one; it could be the case, for example, that an unobserved confounder (a change in CEOs' preferences for corporate social responsibility, perhaps) is driving both firms' responsiveness and their decision to join the Global Compact. While these results are suggestive, further evidence is necessary in order to provide strong support for my theory. However, in this case the correlational relationship between UNGC membership and responsiveness is interesting regardless of causality. Note that membership and responsiveness are positively correlated even when firm-level variation is accounted for: this means that the relationship between the two variables holds even within the same firm over time. This means that, even if there were an unobserved confounder driving changes in responsiveness and changes in UNGC membership status, that confounder is still moving




Table 1: Logit models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Responded to claim = 1					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UNGC Member	1.236*** (0.134)	1.124*** (0.140)	1.231*** (0.156)	1.303*** (0.197)	2.191*** (0.737)	2.255*** (0.757)
Prior Claims		0.080*** (0.017)	0.071*** (0.018)	0.041* (0.023)	0.058 (0.044)	0.060 (0.046)
Total Assets (log)		−0.081* (0.043)	−0.101** (0.049)	0.038 (0.085)	0.173 (0.367)	0.131 (0.377)
CS Freedom (home state)			0.340*** (0.080)	0.230** (0.110)	−0.311 (0.441)	−0.498 (0.504)
CS Freedom (host state)			0.013 (0.057)	0.043 (0.073)	0.115 (0.106)	0.139 (0.115)
Constant	0.720*** (0.079)	1.957** (0.766)	1.569* (0.859)	15.815 (2,399.545)	−2.131 (19,396.470)	−0.723 (19,364.420)
Year FE				✓	✓	✓
Sector FE				✓		✓
Firm FE					✓	✓
Observations	1,515	1,460	1,264	1,008	1,264	1,008
Log Likelihood	−754.092	−707.008	−587.867	−399.066	−278.997	−230.677
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,512.184	1,422.016	1,187.735	876.131	1,323.995	983.355

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Figure 2: Average marginal effects (Model 5)



both variables in the same direction. This is the opposite of what we would expect if firms were “bluewashing,” or using their UN affiliation to mask their poor social performance.

## 5.2 Instrumental Variables

When attempting to gauge the effects of membership in an organization on members’ actions, one must always confront the issue of selection. While I can control for observable confounders, firms who select into the UNGC may be systematically different than non-joiners on some unobservable metric (latent CSR propensity, etc) that leads to biased inferences. To address this issue quantitatively, I use an instrumental variables approach.

I use two instruments for UNGC membership in my analysis: the proportion of Global 2000 firms from firm  $i$ ’s home country that were UNGC members at time  $t - 1$ , and the proportion of Global 2000 firms from firm  $i$ ’s sector (measured at the NAICS 2-digit level) that were UNGC members at time  $t - 1$ . These instruments draw on the logic of diffusion;

Table 2: Instrumental variables regression models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Responded to claim = 1					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UNGC Member	0.261*** (0.049)	0.234*** (0.052)	0.203*** (0.055)	0.263*** (0.066)	1.814 (1.868)	1.486 (1.682)
Prior claims		0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.0001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)
Total assets (log)		−0.013* (0.007)	−0.016** (0.008)	0.010 (0.012)	0.106 (0.126)	0.091 (0.125)
CS freedom (home state)			0.066*** (0.014)	0.033** (0.017)	−0.068 (0.070)	−0.093 (0.076)
CS freedom (host state)			0.003 (0.009)	0.008 (0.010)	0.017 (0.015)	0.021 (0.016)
Constant	0.643*** (0.027)	0.858*** (0.126)	0.776*** (0.134)	0.803* (0.444)	−2.311 (3.547)	−1.681 (3.348)
Year FE				✓	✓	✓
Sector FE				✓		✓
Firm FE					✓	✓
Observations	1,509	1,455	1,260	1,005	1,260	1,005
R <sup>2</sup>	0.054	0.070	0.102	0.145	0.085	0.104
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.068	0.099	0.112	−0.307	−0.205
Res. Std. Error	0.403	0.398	0.389	0.368	0.468	0.428

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

through a variety of mechanisms (learning, imitation, etc), scholars of international politics have demonstrated that norms, behaviors, and ideas often spread from an actor to her geographical/institutional/organizational neighbors (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Gilardi, 2012; Greenhill, 2010). In past studies of the determinants of UNGC membership, the presence of national and sector-level diffusion processes has been demonstrated (Berliner and Prakash, 2012; Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). Further, the instruments I use are the same as those used by Berliner and Prakash (2015) in order to determine the effect of UNGC membership on firm-level social responsibility outcomes, as I do here.

Table 2 presents the results of six instrumental variables regression models fit using two-stage least squares (2SLS),<sup>12</sup> each with the same set of controls and fixed effects as the corresponding logit model from Table 1. Models 1 through 4 look highly similar to the non-instrumental variables results: the coefficient on the UNGC member variable is positive and statistically significant, even when controlling for year and sector fixed effects. When firm-level fixed effects are added in models 5 and 6, however, the variable remains positive but loses its statistical significance. This is not entirely surprising: only 39 of the 420 firms that appear in the data have been approached by the BHRRC as both members and nonmembers of the UNGC, resulting in relatively little within-unit variation in the key independent variable. Combined with the reduced degrees of freedom that result from the inclusion of hundreds of firm dummies, wider confidence intervals are to be expected.

The results of instrumental variables analysis provide some limited support for the legitimization hypothesis: the UNGC member variable is positive in all models, and statistically significant in four of six. However, the instrumental variables results provide support for the across-unit relationship between UNGC membership and responsiveness rather than the within-unit relationship. To strengthen my case for the presence of the latter, I now examine the language of firms' responses prior to and after joining the Global Compact.

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<sup>12</sup>Though my key independent and dependent variables are binary, 2SLS remains consistent. See Angrist and Krueger (2001).

## 6 Evidence from Response Documents

In this paper, I have argued that UNGC membership allows firms to coopt the UN's legitimacy, lessening the reputational costs of responsiveness relative to its benefits. Theoretically, this legitimacy boost should make responding to allegations less costly for firms regardless of the content of their responses. However, if the legitimacy mechanism that I suggest is truly at work, we should expect UNGC member firms to draw attention to their membership in their response documents at least some of the time. In this section, I highlight three instances in which firms drew upon the legitimacy of the UN in their response documents.

### 6.1 Maersk

In 2007, the BHRRC made its first contact with Danish transportation/logistics giant Maersk regarding the company's membership in the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC). The EUCCC had taken a position against a proposed Chinese labor law reform, which various labor groups and unions (including the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Worker's Federation) argued would improve the quality of labor rights in China; these groups called on the multinationals who were members of the EUCCC to denounce the organization's opinion or leave the group altogether. Maersk, who was not a UNGC member in 2007, did not respond to the BHRRC's request for response.

The next time the BHRRC approached Maersk was in 2010, regarding an unanswered claim brought forth by the International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF). The group, an NGO that works to support transport workers and their local unions, alleged that workers of a Maersk-contracted firm had physically assaulted union dockworkers in Mumbai. Unlike the previous approach, Maersk (who had since joined the UNGC in 2009) issued a public response to ITF's claims. In the response, the firm made it clear that they were aware of the violent acts and that they were being addressed: "Since we... received confirmation the

incidents (referred to in the article) took place we have been working with all parties involved - which includes the ITF - towards a solution which would respect the interests of all.”<sup>13</sup>

In the final paragraph of their response, Maersk wrote: “As AP Møller-Maersk we have signed up to the UN Global Compact. As part of this we are continuously working to ensure correct standards in the area of labour rights for all business units in our Group.” Note that this statement communicates very little other than the fact that Maersk is associated with the Global Compact, a UN initiative. Maersk’s UNGC membership is not directly germane to the substantive content of the response, so why mention it? I argue that Maersk was drawing upon the legitimization function of the UNGC, citing its UN affiliation in order to signal that - while the company may be responsible for human rights violations from time to time - it is not a bad actor in international politics and it retains the right to do business internationally. Maersk’s ability to leverage the legitimacy of the UN, which it lacked in 2007 but had gained by 2010, may have played a key role in the firm’s decision to respond to the BHRRC’s second request but not to the first one.

## 6.2 ING Group

In January, 2006, the BHRRC approached ING Group (Dutch banking/finance multinational) regarding a report released by a Belgian NGO called Netwerk Vlaanderen (now FairFin). In the 76 page report,<sup>14</sup> the NGO detailed a large number of links between ING’s investments and various labor and human rights abuses, including investments in public works projects in Burma which were allegedly built using forced labor. ING, not a UNGC member at the time, did respond to the BHRRC’s request; however, their response consisted of a single sentence: “ING has kindly accepted the invitation of Netwerk-Vlaanderen to discuss the outcome of their report.”<sup>15</sup> Thus, while the firm did issue a public response to the

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<sup>13</sup>See full text at <https://www.business-humanrights.org...port-workers-in-mumbai#c102601>

<sup>14</sup>The full text of which can be found here: [https://issuu.com/netwerk\\_vlaanderen/docs/dossier-where-do-you-draw-the-line](https://issuu.com/netwerk_vlaanderen/docs/dossier-where-do-you-draw-the-line)

<sup>15</sup><https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/ING-response-Network-Vlaanderen-24-Jan-2006.pdf>

BHRRRC, the public response only served to inform readers that ING would be addressing the issue privately. While such a response is perhaps more socially responsible than no response at all, it is not an example of responsiveness because the firm did not respond to the allegations themselves in a public and transparent way.

The BHRRRC approached ING again in 2014, regarding a similar report issued by Amnesty International. The report detailed various human rights abuses committed by mining companies, and argued that ING was partially responsible due to its investments in the mining industry. ING, who joined the UNGC in December 2006 (just 10 months after the Network Vlaanderen claim), issued a public response to the report in which it acknowledged its funding of the mining companies in the report but denied funding the specific projects which had been associated with human rights violations.<sup>16</sup> Further, ING detailed its ESG (environmental, social, and governance) investment and loan screening criteria.

Notably, the first sentence of ING’s response to the Amnesty International report reads: “ING’s respect for human rights, and their integration into our business engagements, is guided by the standards established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the eight Core Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Global Compact of the United Nations.” The firm does not go on to identify the specific standards to which it is referring, nor does it explain which standards it is attempting to apply in relation to Amnesty International’s allegations. For ING, the main benefit of beginning its response by stating its UN affiliation is reputational. The UN is perceived as a legitimate authority in global governance, and thus ING can cite its membership in the UNGC to lend credence to claims such as “ING is an active advocate of respect for human rights.”<sup>17</sup> Without the ability to coopt the legitimacy of the UN, and thereby hedge against potential reputational costs of responding, ING may have once again decided to respond privately rather than publicly.

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<sup>16</sup>For full text, see <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/response-by-ing-re-investments-in-extractive-companies-linked-to-rights-abuses>

<sup>17</sup>Quoted from the response document.

## 6.3 G4S

Unlike Maersk and ING, British security services firm G4S has responded publicly every time it has been approached by the BHRRC. The firm was not a UNGC member when the NGO approached it the first time, but joined shortly after and was a member for all following claims. The case of G4S allows for the examination of how UNGC membership affects the language of a firm's responses, even when it does not drive the initial decision to respond.

The BHRRC first reached out to G4S in October 2010 regarding an article published on openDemocracy, an activism and social justice-focused online media site owned by the nonprofit openDemocracy Foundation for the Advancement of Global Education (Sambrook, 2010). The article begins with the story of Jimmy Mubenga, a man who was killed during the process of his deportation by three G4S security guards, and goes on to list several other alleged human rights abuses committed by the firm's employees. In its response, G4S stated that "each of the incidents [the author] refers to have been fully investigated by the relevant authorities and G4S itself." In addition, it detailed the U.K. government-approved training program that all G4S employees must complete.<sup>18</sup> The firm, not a member of the Global Compact at the time, did not mention any organization other than itself and the U.K. government in its response.

In 2012, the BHRRC approached G4S again, this time regarding the company's operations in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. In this instance, the BHRRC had found several groups (such as NGO Electronic Intifada and blog Laws of Rule) claiming that G4S was continuing to provide security services to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, in violation of international law and the group's own promises. In its response, the firm claimed that it had kept its promises to terminate its major security contracts in the West Bank, and that its continuing operations there were limited to providing security for banks/retail stores and performing maintenance on security systems. However, G4S claimed that while its contin-

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<sup>18</sup>Full text available here: <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/uk-opendemocracy-article-alleges-g4s-has-patchy-record-of-deaths-abuses-when-supplying-immigration-prison-services-to-govt#c55550>



uing operations do not violate international law, “...we also concluded that to ensure that our business practices remain in line with our own Business Ethics Policy; we would aim to exit a number of contracts which involved the servicing of security equipment at the barrier checkpoints, a prison and a police station in the West Bank.”<sup>19</sup>

In its 2012 response, G4S also reprinted in full a rough English translation of an article from the Danish UN Association, a group of Danish NGOs who wish to further various UN initiatives, titled “Positive that G4S joining the Global Compact and withdraws from Israeli jails and the wall in the West Bank.” The article includes a quote from Jørgen Estrup, chairman of the Danish UN Association: “It is a clear improvement that G4S has joined the Global Compact and developing a new human rights policy. United Nations Association would have liked to G4S completely withdrew from all activities of the illegal Israeli settlements, but we believe that there is a clear difference between G4S tasks for a supermarket and a prison or at the wall.”

It is highly likely that G4S’ decision to reprint this article in its response was driven by its desire to benefit from the legitimacy of the UN. First, the article was produced by the UN Association, a group that has UN in its name but is not actually affiliated with the United Nations. Second, the article mentions G4S’ membership in the Global Compact multiple times, implying that it should be seen as evidence that the company is moving in a positive direction on human rights issues. Third, the article does not communicate any information about G4S’ activities in the West Bank that was not already included in the main part of the response document. The main takeaway of the article is that G4S has joined the UNGC, and that this move signals improvement in the firm’s orientation towards social responsibility. G4S may have hoped that stressing its UNGC membership would lend credence to its claim that its West Bank operations are not in violation of international law, or to its promise to exit further contracts in the West Bank.

It is noteworthy that, even though G4S had also issued a public response to the BHRRC

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<sup>19</sup>See full text here: [https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/company\\_responses/g4s-israel-apr-24-2012.pdf](https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/company_responses/g4s-israel-apr-24-2012.pdf)

prior to joining the Global Compact, it made sure to discuss its UN affiliation in detail once it gained one. This case - in which UNGC membership affected response language, but not the decision to be responsive - provides evidence that there is not simply some unobserved variable driving both firms' decision to join the UNGC and their decision to respond publicly. Rather, the ability to cite an affiliation with the UN is one factor that drives down the potential costliness of publicly responding to an alleged human/labor/environmental rights violation, and firms will do so whenever possible.

## 7 Conclusion

As private industry deepens its participation in global governance - through corporate social responsibility efforts, public-private partnerships, and so on - a pressing question in international politics is the extent to which firms are capable of playing roles traditionally reserved for governments. Of particular interest to scholars of human rights and environmental governance is the question of whether multinational firms are willing, or even able, to transcend the domestic regulatory environments in which they operate to implement transnational standards for the treatment of stakeholders and environmental sustainability.

Similar to states who join international initiatives such as the UNFCCC's Paris Agreement on climate change, firms are increasingly turning to public-private regulatory initiatives in order to signal their commitment to self-regulation. Like the Paris Agreement, however, such initiatives are often derided as window dressing; in this view, firms enjoy the reputational benefits of membership while failing to implement substantive reforms. Scholars critical of the UNGC, for example, label this practice "bluewashing" ([Berliner and Prakash, 2015](#)).

In this paper, I show that the positive reputational benefits associated with joining regulatory initiatives can actually induce firms to *improve* their social responsibility. First, I introduce responsiveness - the extent to which firms issue public responses to stakeholder allegations of human rights and environmental misconduct - as a meaningful measure of social

responsibility. I then argue that membership in private regulatory initiatives can increase firms' responsiveness via the legitimation function. Firms who join initiatives that are seen as possessing legitimate social purpose will be able to coopt that legitimacy; firms who are perceived as legitimate face lower reputational costs for taking accountability for (or at least publicly acknowledging) claims made against them, and thus are more likely to do so. Empirically, I examine the effects of membership in a shallow but highly legitimate initiative (the UNGC) on firms' responsiveness to concerns brought to them through the BHRRC. I find that membership in the initiative has a substantial positive effect on the probability that a firm responds to a given claim.

These results suggest that public-private regulatory initiatives, while no cureall for the negative externalities of international business, do have a part to play in the global governance regime. They also point to the multifaceted nature of the relationship between international organizations (such as the UN) and multinational corporations. Recent work examines the practice of "orchestration", in which both domestic and international governing bodies partner with private industry and civil society in order to implement policy with greater efficiency and greater authority ([Abbott et al., 2016](#); [Bäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017](#)). Less attention has been paid to the benefits that firms receive from association with international organizations in this way. In this paper, I identify legitimacy as an important nonmaterial resource that firms stand to gain through association with IOs. However, I do not seek to explain demand for legitimacy in this paper; future work should explore this topic.

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## 8 Appendix

### 8.1 MSCI ESG ratings


Table 3: Logit models with MSCI ESG ratings

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Responded to claim = 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
UNGC Member	0.808** (0.367)	1.028** (0.425)	1.243*** (0.449)	1.593*** (0.589)
Prior claims	−0.021 (0.034)	−0.001 (0.040)	−0.024 (0.048)	0.026 (0.063)
Total assets	0.0004 (0.128)	0.075 (0.144)	0.098 (0.155)	0.321 (0.203)
ESG rating	0.894** (0.375)	0.666 (0.423)	1.251** (0.493)	0.753 (0.804)
CS freedom (home state)		0.101 (0.216)	0.088 (0.248)	0.342 (0.365)
CS freedom (host state)		0.231* (0.123)	0.191 (0.136)	0.198 (0.176)
Constant	0.932 (2.296)	−0.833 (2.651)	−0.785 (2.960)	13.834 (4,781.028)
Year FE:			✓	✓
Sector FE				✓
Observations	314	277	277	242
Log Likelihood	−148.376	−128.322	−120.227	−90.658
Akaike Inf. Crit.	306.751	270.644	276.455	249.315

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Figure 3: Average marginal effects for Model 4, [Appendix Table 1](#)



One concern with the main analysis may be that UNGC membership is simply a proxy for firm’s underlying strategy towards corporate social responsibility issues. To mitigate this concern, I use data on expert ratings of firms’ performance on ESG (environmental, social, and governance) issues from MSCI. Specifically, I control for firms’ ratings on “Human Rights Policies & Initiatives;” firms which experts identified as being better than average at drafting human rights policies, joining initiatives, and disclosing human rights related information were given a 1, all others were given a zero. Unfortunately, there are significant limitations to the MSCI data: first, they are only available through 2016, which prevents analysis of claims from 2017 and 2018. Second, MSCI has slowly expanded the universe of firms to which it assigns ratings over time. This means that, for most firms in the dataset, ratings were only

available from 2013 - 2016. As a result, there is extremely little within-firm variation in UNGC membership in the limited sample: only 9 of the 127 firms in the sample experience a change in UNGC membership, limiting the utility of within-unit comparisons.

Despite the limitations of the MSCI data, [Appendix Table 1](#) demonstrates that the accross-unit effect of UNGC membership on responsiveness is robust to controlling for expert ratings of the firm's human rights policies. [Appendix Figure 1](#) displays the marginal effects plot for model 4.

## 8.2 Robustness checks

Another potential concern with the main analysis is that, in running logit models with many firm-level fixed effects, my results may be biased due to the incidental parameters problem. To address this concern, I replicate [Table 1](#) using OLS. [Appendix Table 2](#) presents the results of six linear regression models, each estimated with the same set of controls as their counterparts in [Table 1](#) as well as robust standard errors clustered on the firm. The results are substantively very similar; the UNGC member variable remains positive, significant, and similar in magnitude to the results of the logit models estimated via maximum likelihood estimation.

Table 4: Main analysis: OLS results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Responded to claim = 1					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UNGC Member	0.203*** (0.021)	0.184*** (0.022)	0.193*** (0.024)	0.182*** (0.027)	0.146*** (0.048)	0.160*** (0.051)
Prior claims		0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Total assets (log)		−0.011 (0.007)	−0.015** (0.008)	0.010 (0.013)	0.006 (0.050)	0.002 (0.052)
CS freedom (home state)			0.068*** (0.016)	0.038* (0.019)	−0.033 (0.037)	−0.054 (0.042)
CS freedom (host state)			0.003 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)
Constant	0.673*** (0.017)	0.843*** (0.129)	0.762*** (0.137)	0.822*** (0.259)	0.683 (0.900)	0.818 (0.928)
Year FE				✓	✓	✓
Sector FE				✓		✓
Firm FE					✓	✓
Observations:	1,515	1,460	1,264	1,008	1,264	1,008
R <sup>2</sup> :	0.060	0.074	0.105	0.157	0.547	0.484
Adj. R <sup>2</sup> :	0.059	0.072	0.101	0.124	0.351	0.305

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01