SC DETECTION CIRCUIT

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OUTLINE

1. Side Channel Attacks (SCA) – Countermeasures to detection
2. Power Side Channel Attack (PSCA) and threat model
3. System and Circuit design
    1. First Tapeout (July 2021)
    2. Second Tapeout (July 2022)
    3. Simulation Results
4. Results

SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS

- Threat to devices handling sensitive information (Smart cards, servers, AES, DES, etc.)
- Countermeasure against SCA work towards making the device robust to against side channel attacks [1-4]
- Detection circuits for power side channel attacks (P-SCA) focus on detection of an attack in real time - machine learning [5]-[6], Ring oscillator [7]
- Detection circuit can be improve by decreasing the number of required sensors, sensing the resistor insertion at PCB level.

POWER SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS (PSCA) AND THREAT MODEL

- **How is a P-SCA conducted?**

1. Insertion of a sense resistor in the power supply of the device.
2. Send plain text to the device
3. Collect large number of traces during encryption process
4. Use statistical methods to extract the secret key.
5. Statistical operation include Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Correlational Power Analysis (CPA) etc.

THREAT MODEL



Fig 1:Threat model

SYSTEM LEVEL DESIGN & CIRCUIT TOPOLOGY



Fig 2: System and Circuit topology

PHI1 AND PHI2 FOR SC CIRCUIT



$$Q_x = -(I_{array}.R_{sense})(n).C_1$$

$$Q_x = -V_{out}(n + 1/2).C_2$$

Fig 3: Circuit operation in different phases

METRICS

Sampling rate = 200KHz

Charge redistribution and conversion

$$-V_{in}C_1 = -Vout\left(n+\frac{1}{2}\right)C_2$$

Output is a scaled and delayed version of input

$$V_{out}\left(n+\frac{1}{2}\right) = \frac{C_1}{C_2}.V_{in}(n)$$



Fig 4: Sensing operation a) Circuit configuration b) Timing waveform

AMPLIFIER



a) b)

$Gain = (gm_n + gm_p)R_{ocas}.(gm_n + gm_p)R_{out}$

Trade speed with power efficiency, keep gain similar

Bandwidth = 16MHz with PM 89°

Figure 5: Operational amplifier used in SC amplifier a) Folded Cascode b) Two-stage OTA

COMPARATOR



Fig 6: Strong arm clocked comparator, Baker. J [8]



Fig 7: Dynamic Bias comparator, Bindra H. [9]

RELATIONSHIP OF NOISE WITH CIRCUIT

According to normal Z distribution table;

$$\overline{\sigma^2} = \overline{\sigma_{THA}^2} + \overline{\sigma_{comp}^2}$$

The equation represents the following parameters:

μ_0 = Threshold without sense resistor R_{sns}

μ_1 = Threshold with sense resistor R_{sns}

R_{sns} = Sense resistor

σ = Total noise distribution

G = Gain of the track and hold circuit

I_{array} = Excitation current used in the system

$$\mu_0 = G \cdot \Delta V = G \cdot I_{array} R_S$$

$$\mu_1 = G \cdot \Delta V' = G \cdot I_{array}(R_S + R_{sns})$$

$$\mu_0 - \mu_1 \geq 2 \times 1.645\sigma = 3.29\sigma$$

$$R_{sns} \geq \frac{3.29\sigma}{G.I_{array}}$$

NOISE ANALYSIS

- $f(\alpha, \beta)$ for 95% confidence level = 3.29
- I_{array} 100 = μA
- Total noise distribution from SC circuit and comparator σ = 1.07mV
- Gain of the track and hold circuit G = 30

$$\sigma = \sqrt{G^2\sigma_{THA,in}^2 + \sigma_{comp}^2}$$

$$R_{SNS,min} = \frac{f(\alpha, \beta)}{I_{array}} \sqrt{\sigma_{THA,in}^2 + \frac{\sigma_{comp}^2}{G^2}}$$

We get $R_{sns} \geq \frac{3.29 \times 33\mu V}{100\mu} A = 1.08\Omega$

RESULTS

TYPICAL CORNER SIMULATION – 1ST ITERATION



a)



b)

Fig 8: a) Detection time and b) Detection accuracy

AFTER NOISE ANALYSIS– 2ND ITERATION



Fig 9: a) Transient Noise at the output of OTA and b) Noise distribution at the output of OTA

COMPARATOR NOISE

Comparator Noise degrades sensitivity $R_{SCA,min}$





Fig 10: Comparator Noise performance

TAPEOUT 1



a b

Fig 11: a) Chip layout in the simulator b) Die photo

BONDING DIAGRAM





Fig 12: 40 pin CLCC package for the first iteration

PCB DESIGN



a)



b)



c)

Fig 13: PCB design for test chip in EAGLE a) Schematic b) Board layout c) Fabricated board

RESULT

- PCB designed, signal at the input, and the tunable current array works.
- An additional latch at the end of the comparator output caused the problem at the output.
- Noise is a problem; can we use data-driven noise reduction to further improve performance?

LEARNINGS FROM FAILURE - 1

- Create test modes to test various points in the chip – Created test modes for second tapeout
- Removed the latch at the end to resolve the ESD problem.
- Investigate DDNR for the second tapeout, add a digital block to take more than one sample, and improve the confidence level. This can reduce false positive detection.

DATA DRIVEN NOISE REDUCTION



a)



Date-driven Noise Reduction (DDNR)

b)



c)

Fig 14: Finite state machine for DDNR b) System level update c) Comparison with majority voting scheme

DDNR SIMULATION RESULT



Fig 15: Simulation result with digital DDNR block

TAPEOUT 2



a) SC02 Chip Layout



b) Die photo

Fig 16 : Second tapeout with corrections

PCB PLAN - 2







Test modes

a) b) c)

Fig 17: PCB for second chip a) Schematic b) Board layout c) Fabricated PCB

TESTMODES

Table 4: Test Mode Operation

B_2	B_1	B_0	**Testmode**	**AMUX1**	**AMUX2**	**Goal**
0	0	0	TM0	NC	NC	Normal operation
0	0	1	TM1	$V_{OUT,OTA}$	V_{C2}	Input/output of OTA accessible; external feedback on PCB
0	1	0	TM2	$V_{OUT,OTA}$	RDY_{INT}	$V_{OUT,OTA}$ in unity feedback; test comparator, V_{CMI}, and $V_{Threshold}$ accessible
0	1	1	TM3	$V_{OUT,OTA}$	Fast	Set Fast threshold; $V_{OUT,OTA}$ accessible
1	0	0	TM4	NC	Fast	Normal operation; observe Fast
1	0	1	TM5	NC	$Fast_{EXT}$	Fast accessible

Table 1: Table of test modes for the second iteration

MEASUREMENT AND CONCLUSION

- Duty cycling the current gives the expected waveform and values.
- The result couldn't be verified with DDNR due to a failure in detection.
- This concluded the project, and we proceeded to secure the conversion. PSCA analysis of secure ADC's.
- The associated journal submissions are available in the directory.



Fig 19 : Iforce variation with Temperature

MEASUREMENT SETUP



Fig 18: Measurement setup for the board with sources and oscilloscope

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