



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Financial Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jfecScale and skill in active management[☆]Luboš Pástor^{a,c,d}, Robert F. Stambaugh^{b,c}, Lucian A. Taylor^{b,*}^a University of Chicago, 5807 S. Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, IL 60637, USA^b University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA^c NBER, USA^d CEPR, United Kingdom

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 14 January 2014

Received in revised form

23 June 2014

Accepted 26 July 2014

JEL classification:

G11

G23

J24

Keywords:

Returns to scale

Skill

Active management

Mutual funds

ABSTRACT

We empirically analyze the nature of returns to scale in active mutual fund management. We find strong evidence of decreasing returns at the industry level. As the size of the active mutual fund industry increases, a fund's ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines. At the fund level, all methods considered indicate decreasing returns, though estimates that avoid econometric biases are insignificant. We also find that the active management industry has become more skilled over time. This upward trend in skill coincides with industry growth, which precludes the skill improvement from boosting fund performance. Finally, we find that performance deteriorates over a typical fund's lifetime. This result can also be explained by industry-level decreasing returns to scale.

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[☆] We are grateful for comments from Yakov Amihud, Jonathan Berk, John Cochrane, Randolph Cohen, Mark Grinblatt, Ravi Jagannathan, Ron Kaniel, Leonid Kogan, Juhani Linnainmaa, Binying Liu, Toby Moskowitz, Andrew Patton, Martin Schmalz, Tim Simin, Sunil Wahal, Russ Wermers, Youchang Wu, Scott Yonker, and the audiences at the 2013 AIM Investment Center Conference on Institutional Investment at the University of Texas, 2013 Inquire-Europe conference, 2013 Northern Finance Association conference, 2014 Western Finance Association meetings, 2014 European Finance Association meetings, 2014 Spring National Bureau of Economics Research Asset Pricing Meeting, 2014 Jackson Hole Finance Conference, 2014 Duke University-University of North Carolina Asset Pricing Conference, 2014 Spring Q Group meeting, 2014 Rothschild Caesarea Center Conference, 2014 European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets in Gerzensee, Switzerland, as well as the University of Chicago, University of Houston, University of Melbourne, University of Notre Dame, University of Oklahoma, University of Pennsylvania, University of Queensland, Rice University, University of Rochester, Stockholm University, University of Toronto, Washington University in St. Louis, University of Western Australia, and Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU). We are also grateful to Yeguang Chi for superb research assistance. This research was funded in part by the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, the Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research, and the Terker Family Research Fellowship.

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1. Introduction

The performance of active mutual funds has been of long-standing interest to financial economists.¹ The extent to which an active fund can outperform its passive benchmark depends not only on the fund's raw skill in identifying investment opportunities but also on various constraints faced by the fund. One constraint discussed prominently in recent literature is decreasing returns to scale. If scale impacts performance, skill and scale interact. For example, a more skilled large fund can underperform a less skilled small fund. Therefore, to learn about skill, we must understand the effects of scale.

What is the nature of returns to scale in active management? The literature has advanced two hypotheses. The first one is fund-level decreasing returns to scale: as the size of an active fund increases, the fund's ability to outperform its benchmark declines (e.g., Perold and Salomon, 1991; Berk and Green, 2004). The second hypothesis is industry-level decreasing returns to scale: as the size of the active mutual fund industry increases, the ability of any given fund to outperform declines (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2012). Both hypotheses have been motivated by liquidity constraints. At the fund level, a larger fund's trades have a larger impact on asset prices, eroding the fund's performance. At the industry level, as more money chases opportunities to outperform, prices move, making such opportunities more elusive. Consistent with such liquidity constraints, evidence is mounting that trading by mutual funds is capable of exerting meaningful price pressure in equity markets.²

Both hypotheses are plausible alternatives to a null hypothesis of constant returns to scale, due to imperfect liquidity of financial markets. Moreover, these alternative hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. A fund's performance could depend on both the size of the fund and the size of the fund's competition, as proxied by industry size. If funds were to follow exactly the same investment strategy, their performance would likely depend more on their combined size than on their individual sizes, whereas the opposite would be true if the funds' strategies were completely unrelated. The reality is between the two extremes, and the relative merits of the two hypotheses must be evaluated empirically. The fund-level hypothesis has been tested in a number of recent studies, with mixed results.³ We provide the first evidence regarding the industry-level hypothesis, to our knowledge. We also

reexamine the fund-level hypothesis by using cleaner data and econometric techniques that avoid inherent biases.

One of the challenges in estimating the effect of fund size on performance is the endogeneity of fund size. If size were randomly assigned to funds, one could simply run a panel regression of funds' benchmark-adjusted returns on lagged fund size, and the ordinary least squares (OLS) slope estimate would correctly measure the effect of size on performance. Alas, size is unlikely to be randomly paired with funds. For example, larger funds could be run by managers with higher skill (e.g., Berk and Green, 2004). Skill could be correlated with both size and performance, yet we cannot control for skill as it is unobservable. As a result, the simple OLS estimate of the size-performance relation is likely to suffer from an omitted-variable bias.

The omitted-variable bias can be eliminated by including fund fixed effects in the regression model. These fixed effects absorb the cross-sectional variation in performance that is due to differences in skill across funds. This fixed effect approach cleanly identifies the effect of fund size on performance in the setting of Berk and Green (2004), but it applies more generally as long as fund skill is time-invariant. Unfortunately, while adding fund fixed effects removes one bias, it introduces another. This second bias results from the positive contemporaneous correlation between changes in fund size and unexpected fund returns. In general, a nonzero correlation between a regressor's innovations and the regression disturbances introduces a finite-sample bias in OLS estimates (Stambaugh, 1999), and this bias extends to the fixed effects setting (Hjalmarsson, 2010).

To address the second bias, we develop a recursive demeaning procedure that closely builds on the methods of Moon and Phillips (2000) and Hjalmarsson (2010). This procedure runs a panel regression of forward-demeaned returns on forward-demeaned fund size, while instrumenting for the latter quantity by its backward-demeaned counterpart. The resulting estimator eliminates the bias, as proved by Hjalmarsson and confirmed in our simulation analysis. Our simulations also highlight the bias in both OLS estimators, with and without fund fixed effects. In addition to being biased, the OLS estimators heavily over-reject the null hypothesis of no returns to scale even when this hypothesis is true.

Our empirical analysis relies on a cross-validated dataset of actively managed US equity mutual funds. We reconcile the key data items in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Morningstar databases, building on the work of Berk and van Binsbergen (2014). Our dataset covers 3,126 funds from 1979 through 2011, a period during which the mutual fund industry grew dramatically.

We begin our analysis by using panel data to estimate the slope coefficient of fund performance regressed on lagged fund size. OLS regressions both with and without fund fixed effects deliver negative estimates that are statistically significant but relatively small in magnitude. Moreover, both estimates are likely to be biased, as noted earlier. To avoid the biases in OLS, we apply the recursive demeaning procedure. The estimates of fund-level returns to scale are again negative, but they become statistically

¹ See, for example, Jensen (1968), Ferson and Schadt (1996), Carhart (1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Wermers (2000), Pástor and Stambaugh (2002), Cohen, Coval, and Pástor (2005), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 2008), Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006), Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010), Fama and French (2010), etc.

² For example, Edelen and Warner (2001) find that aggregate flow into equity mutual funds has an aggregate impact on market returns. Wermers (2003), Coval and Stafford (2007), Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012), and Lou (2012) also find significant price impact associated with mutual fund trading. Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2007) report that trading costs are a major source of diseconomies of scale for mutual funds.

³ See, for example, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Pollet and Wilson (2008), Yan (2008), Ferreira, Kewani, Miguel, and Ramos (2013a, 2013b), and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2013).

insignificant. Overall, we find mixed evidence of decreasing returns to scale at the fund level. The estimates are invariably negative, but our tests do not have enough power to establish statistical significance.

At the industry level, we find consistent evidence of decreasing returns to scale. Using the same panel regressions, we find a negative relation between industry size and fund performance. When we include both fund size and industry size in the regression, the slope on fund size is negative but insignificant in the bias-free specification, whereas industry size is negative and significant. In addition, we find that the negative relation between industry size and fund performance is stronger for funds with higher turnover and volatility as well as small-cap funds. These results seem sensible because funds that are aggressive in their trading, and funds that trade illiquid assets, see their high trading costs reap smaller profits when competing in a more crowded industry.

The evidence of industry-level decreasing returns to scale has important implications for our assessment of fund skill. We measure skill by the estimated fund fixed effect from our panel regression. This fixed effect is essentially equal to the average benchmark-adjusted gross fund return (i.e., the usual gross alpha) that is further adjusted for any potential fund-level and industry-level returns to scale. We find that the average fund's skill has increased substantially over time, from 24 basis points (bps) per month in 1979 to 42 bps per month in 2011. The improvement in skill is steeper among the better-skilled funds. For example, the 90th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of skill grows from 98 bps to 123 bps per month. In short, active funds have become more skilled over time.

This improvement in skill has failed to boost fund performance, though, judging by the non-trending average benchmark-adjusted gross fund return. How can we reconcile the upward trend in skill with no trend in performance? Our explanation combines industry-level decreasing returns to scale with the observed steady growth in industry size. We argue that the growing industry size makes it harder for fund managers to outperform despite their improving skill. The active management industry today is bigger and more competitive than it was 30 years ago, so it takes more skill just to keep up with the rest of the pack.

The upward trend in skill cannot be driven by rising skill within funds, because our measure of a fund's skill is constant over the fund's lifetime. Instead, the trend suggests that the new funds entering the industry are more skilled, on average, than the existing funds. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that younger funds outperform older funds in a typical month. We sort funds into portfolios based on their age and find that funds aged up to three years outperform those aged more than ten years by a statistically significant 0.9% per year, based on gross benchmark-adjusted returns. Funds aged between three and six years also outperform the oldest funds. The young-minus-old portfolio differences are smaller when measured in net returns, suggesting that the younger funds capture a portion of their higher skill by charging higher fees.

The negative age-performance relation holds not only across funds but also within funds. We find that

performance deteriorates over a typical fund's lifetime. This result does not seem to be due to the incubation bias (Evans, 2010) because the performance decline continues well beyond the first few years of the fund's existence. Instead, this erosion in fund performance seems to be driven by industry growth during the fund's lifetime. As the fund ages, the industry keeps growing, and the sustained entry of skilled competitors hurts the fund's performance. Consistent with this argument, we find that the negative relation between a fund's age and its performance disappears after we control for industry size.

In fact, after controlling for industry size, the within-fund age-performance relation turns positive. This result, which is only marginally statistically significant, suggests that skill could improve as funds grow older, perhaps because fund managers learn on the job. Such learning, if present, mitigates the performance erosion associated with growing industry size. When we modify our skill measure to allow for learning on the job, we find an upward trend in skill that is even steeper than before, reinforcing our prior conclusions.

Taken together, our results are consistent with the following narrative. New funds entering the industry tend to be more skilled than the incumbent funds, perhaps due to better education or greater command of new technology. As a result of their superior skill, the new funds tend to outperform their benchmarks as well as older funds. As these funds grow older, though, their performance suffers as a result of the continued growth in industry size, which is associated with steady arrival of skilled competition. Learning on the job could alleviate the negative impact of growing industry size on performance, but it does not eliminate it.

Our measure of a fund's skill is the gross alpha earned on the first dollar invested in the fund, with no other funds present in the industry. We seek to measure the fund's ability to identify profitable investment opportunities before they are eroded by decreasing returns to scale. In contrast, traditional measures of skill such as alpha or the Sharpe ratio do not separate the effects of scale. Fund size does play a role in the measure of Berk and van Binsbergen (2014) but that measure quantifies a different dimension of skill: dollar value added by the fund. We attempt to measure the fund's expected benchmark-adjusted return while taking into account the adverse effects of both fund scale and industry scale.

Our evidence of rising skill in the active mutual fund industry is consistent with the evidence of Philippon and Reshef (2012), who analyze the finance industry defined more broadly, including also banking, insurance, venture capital, private equity, and hedge funds. Philippon and Reshef find that the levels of education, wages, and the complexity of tasks performed by employees in the finance industry have increased steadily since 1980 relative to the rest of the private sector. Our data and our measure of skill are different from those used by Philippon and Reshef. Our evidence of skill rising with fund age, or learning by doing, is similar to the contemporaneous evidence of Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2013), who find that mutual fund managers perform better on their investments in sectors in which they have more experience. The authors assume

that managers gain experience about a given sector by being invested in the sector during a quarter in which that sector earns the lowest return among all sectors. In contrast, we measure experience by fund age, and we find learning by doing only after controlling for industry size.

While our focus on industry-level returns to scale is novel, others have investigated returns to scale at the fund level. [Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik \(2004\)](#) find a negative relation between fund return and lagged fund size, consistent with fund-level decreasing returns. The negative relation is strongest among small-cap funds, leading the authors to conclude that the adverse scale effects are related to liquidity. [Yan \(2008\)](#) reaches the same conclusion based on more direct measures of liquidity: bid–ask spread and market impact. Yan finds a stronger negative size–performance relation for funds that hold less liquid portfolios, as well as for growth funds and high-turnover funds, which tend to demand immediacy. Further support for liquidity-related diminishing returns comes from [Bris, Gulen, Kadiyala, and Rau \(2007\)](#), who analyze mutual funds that have closed to new investment, and from [Pollet and Wilson \(2008\)](#), who examine the response of mutual funds to asset growth.⁴

The prior evidence of fund-level decreasing returns to scale is not pervasive across funds. [Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos \(2013b\)](#) analyze the performance of active equity mutual funds in 27 countries. They find diseconomies of scale for US funds but not for non-US funds. In fact, the latter funds seem to exhibit increasing returns to scale. Even in the US, the negative size–performance relation seems to obtain only for the subset of funds most affected by illiquidity. For example, [Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik \(2004\)](#) find that this relation is significantly negative only for small-cap funds. [Yan \(2008\)](#) finds the negative relation only among funds with the least liquid holdings, while [Bris, Gulen, Kadiyala, and Rau \(2007\)](#) find it only among funds with large inflows.

The finding of fund-level diminishing returns is also not universal among prior studies. Early evidence from [Grinblatt and Titman \(1989\)](#) is mixed, depending on how one measures fund returns. More recently, [Reuter and Zitzewitz \(2013\)](#) recognize the endogeneity of fund size and the resulting difficulty in identifying the causal impact of size on performance. To generate exogenous variation in size, these authors exploit a discontinuity in fund flows across Morningstar star ratings. They note that small differences in fund performance can cause discrete changes in Morningstar ratings, which then produce sharp changes in fund size. After applying their regression discontinuity approach to US funds, they find no evidence of fund-level diseconomies of scale. We address the endogeneity of fund size in a different way, namely, by including fund fixed effects to account for heterogeneity in skill. We also show how to obtain unbiased estimates of the size–performance relation in such a setting.

⁴ Some evidence also exists of decreasing returns to scale outside open-end mutual funds. For example, [Kaplan and Schoar \(2005\)](#) and [Lopez de Silanes, Phalippou, and Gottschalg \(2015\)](#) find such evidence for private equity funds, [Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai \(2008\)](#) for hedge funds, and [Wu, Wermers, and Zechner \(2013\)](#) for closed-end funds.

The paper is organized as follows. [Section 2](#) discusses the econometric biases associated with estimating the size–performance relation at the fund level. It also presents a bias-free recursive demeaning procedure and evaluates its effectiveness in simulations. [Section 3](#) describes our mutual fund dataset. [Section 4](#) presents our empirical results. We first analyze the nature of returns to scale (fund level vs industry level), followed by the determinants of the size–performance relation. We then examine the evolution of fund skill and the relation between fund performance and fund age. [Section 5](#) concludes.

2. Methodology

Estimating the effect of fund size on performance is a challenge because size is determined endogenously. [Section 2.1](#) explains why the simple regression approach taken in a number of studies is likely to deliver biased estimates. Adding fund fixed effects removes this bias ([Section 2.2](#)), but it introduces another one ([Section 2.3](#)). [Section 2.4](#) presents a recursive demeaning (RD) estimator that eliminates both biases. [Section 2.5](#) uses simulations to illustrate the bias in OLS estimators, as well as the RD estimator's ability to avoid the bias.

2.1. The omitted-variable bias

Let R_{it} denote the benchmark-adjusted return of fund i in period t , and let q_{it-1} denote the fund's size at the end of period $t-1$. A simple approach to investigating fund-level returns to scale is to use panel data across funds and periods to estimate the regression model

$$R_{it} = \alpha + \beta q_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

If size were random across funds, independent of manager skill, the OLS estimate of β would successfully identify the effect of size on performance. A negative estimate of β would indicate decreasing returns to scale. However, independence of fund size and skill is unlikely. For example, larger funds could be paired with higher-skill managers if such managers perform better and attract more flow, or if larger funds can afford to hire better managers. Skill is thus likely to be related to both R_{it} and q_{it-1} , causing an omitted-variable bias in the pooled regression equation (1). If the correlation between skill and fund size is positive, omitting skill from the regression imparts a positive bias in the estimate of β ; if the correlation is negative, so is the bias. This bias has been noted in the literature, for example, by [Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik \(2004\)](#) and [Reuter and Zitzewitz \(2013\)](#). Applying the omitted-variable bias formula (e.g., [Angrist and Pischke, 2009](#)), the bias is equal to the effect of skill on performance, which is positive, times the slope of skill on fund size.

Given the potential bias, we prefer not to base our inference about the size–performance relation on regression equation (1), while recognizing that previous studies have nevertheless done so. For example, [Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos \(2013a, 2013b\)](#) estimate a pooled OLS panel regression of fund performance on size, as in Eq. (1), and [Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik \(2004\)](#) and [Yan \(2008\)](#) estimate the same pooled model using the Fama–MacBeth approach.

2.2. Fund fixed effects and relation to Berk and Green (2004)

Fortunately, the omitted-variable bias can be eliminated by including a fund fixed effect, denoted by a_i , so that Eq. (1) is replaced by

$$R_{it} = a_i + \beta q_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (2)$$

The fund fixed effects soak up any variation in performance due to cross-sectional differences in fund skill, as long as that skill is constant over time. Identification in the fixed effect model comes from variation over time within a fund, not from variation across funds.

The simple regression model in Eq. (2) can be motivated, for example, by the model of Berk and Green (2004). That model assumes fund-level diseconomies of scale, which imply $\beta < 0$ in Eq. (2). This statement requires a clarification.

The model of Berk and Green (2004) is often misunderstood to imply no predictability in fund returns. No predictability would then imply $\beta = 0$ in Eq. (2) because fund size, like any other variable, would be useless in predicting fund returns. For example, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2012) write that “Berk and Green (2004) argue that there is no predictability” (p. 38) and that fund size could predict returns only if Berk and Green’s investors were slow to move capital in response to returns (p. 33). Reuter and Zitzewitz (2013, p. 2) argue that the Berk and Green model implies that “fund size will be uncorrelated with future returns, thereby frustrating standard approaches to estimate diseconomies of scale.”

Contrary to this interpretation, the Berk and Green model does not imply that fund returns are unpredictable in the data, or that $\beta = 0$. Instead, it implies $\beta < 0$ in Eq. (2). An important difference exists between the subjective distribution of next period’s returns, perceived by investors in real time, and the objective distribution, analyzed by an econometrician who uses the full sample. From the subjective perspective of Berk and Green’s investors, future fund returns are unpredictable, but they are predictable in historical data. While investors perceive no relation between fund size and the fund’s future return in real time, the true relation—one examined by an econometrician analyzing historical data—is negative. Berk and Green’s investors would also observe a negative size-performance relation if they were to look backward, as econometricians, to analyze historical data.⁵

This difference between the objective and subjective size-performance relations stems from the unobservability of fund skill. Berk and Green’s investors cannot observe the true skill of fund i , which corresponds to a_i in our Eq. (2). Equivalently, they cannot observe the fund’s alpha.⁶ As Berk and Green’s investors update their beliefs about skill, their perception of skill fluctuates even though true skill is

time-invariant. At any time t ,

$$\text{perceived skill}_{it} = \text{true skill}_i + \text{noise}_{it}. \quad (3)$$

In the limit as $t \rightarrow \infty$, perceived skill converges to true skill, but in any finite sample, the two quantities generally differ. Fund size depends on perceived skill, not true skill, because Berk and Green’s investors allocate their capital based on their perceptions of skill. As a result, fund size is generally suboptimal in that it differs from the size based on the fund’s true skill. As investors update their beliefs by observing fund returns, perceived skill fluctuates, producing fluctuations in fund size. Those changes in fund size negatively impact the true expected fund return due to diseconomies of scale. Whenever a fund’s perceived skill exceeds its true skill, the fund exceeds its optimal size and its expected future return is lower. Conversely, when perceived skill is below true skill, the fund is smaller and its expected return is higher. As a result, the objective size-performance relation is negative.

Our fixed effect approach cleanly identifies the effect of fund size on performance in the context of the Berk and Green model. In that model, true skill is constant and investors are fully rational in updating their beliefs and reallocating capital across funds. As a result, all of the time series variation in fund size is driven by the random noise in Eq. (3), which reflects surprises in fund returns. More generally, if a fund’s size fluctuates for any reason while the fund’s skill is constant, the fixed effect approach implies that $\beta < 0$ in Eq. (2) whenever the fund’s true alpha (as opposed to perceived alpha) is decreasing in fund size.

While this subsection is about estimating fund-level returns to scale, the same logic applies to variation in industry size in our subsequent industry-level analysis. Whenever the industry’s perceived alpha exceeds its true alpha, the industry is larger than optimal, and its expected future return is lower if there are decreasing returns to scale.

2.3. The finite-sample bias

Unfortunately, eliminating the omitted-variable bias associated with Eq. (1) by including fund fixed effects as in Eq. (2) introduces a second bias if the latter specification is estimated with OLS. The omitted-variable bias exists even in large samples, whereas this second bias arises in finite samples through the channel discussed by Stambaugh (1999). To understand the latter bias in the OLS fixed effects estimator $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$, consider first the OLS estimator $\hat{\beta}_i$, the estimator of β in Eq. (2) using the data for just a single fund i . As shown by Stambaugh (1999), $\hat{\beta}_i$ in that simple predictive regression is downward biased when the regression disturbance ε_{it} in Eq. (2) is positively correlated with the innovation in q_{it} . This positive correlation arises in our setting for two reasons. The first is a mechanical link between ε_{it} and q_{it} . A high fund return in period t corresponds to an increase in the fund’s asset values and, thus, to a higher fund size at the end of that period. The second is the performance-flow relation. A high return during period t attracts new money into the

⁵ Berk and Green (2004) do not distinguish between the investor’s and econometrician’s perspectives when stating “condition (3) clearly implies that there is no predictability or persistence in funds’ excess returns” (p. 1275), so a misinterpretation by readers is understandable.

⁶ The alpha of fund i at time t equals $\alpha_{it} = E_t(R_{it+1}) - a_i + \beta q_{it}$. Berk and Green’s investors can observe β and q_{it} , so the unobservability of a_i is equivalent to the unobservability of α_{it} .

fund, also contributing to a higher fund size at the end of that period.

To see intuitively why $\hat{\beta}_i$ is negatively biased, suppose $a_i = \beta = 0$ and there is a two-period sample ($t=1, 2$) with no net flow. Given the positive correlation between ε_{it} and q_{it} , we have $q_{i1} < q_{i0}$ if $\varepsilon_{i1} < 0$, and $q_{i1} > q_{i0}$ if $\varepsilon_{i1} > 0$. Because in either scenario ε_{i2} is zero on average, the higher of the two $q_{i,t-1}$ values will tend to precede the lower of the two ε_{it} values (which are equal to R_{it} as $a_i = \beta = 0$). In other words, a fund that outperforms by chance (i.e., $\varepsilon_{i1} > 0$) grows in size (i.e., $q_{i1} > q_{i0}$), but its future performance is expected to be worse [because $E(\varepsilon_{i2}) = 0$]. Conversely, a fund that underperforms by chance shrinks in size, but its future performance is expected to be better. This effect produces a spurious negative relation between changes in fund size and future fund performance. This is a small-sample problem because the tendency for a sample's highest values of $q_{i,t-1}$ to precede its lowest values of R_{it} even when $\beta = 0$ is strongest in small samples. As sample length grows, a given level of $q_{i,t-1}$ eventually gets paired with as many high values as low values of R_{it} .

Now consider the OLS estimator $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$. It is straightforward to show that $\hat{\beta}_{FE} = \sum_{i=1}^N w_i \hat{\beta}_i$, where $\sum_{i=1}^N w_i = 1$ and all w_i are positive.⁷ Thus, the negative bias in $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$ is essentially just the weighted average of the negative biases in each of the $\hat{\beta}_i$ values. As a result of this negative bias, the OLS fixed effects estimator can detect decreasing returns to scale even when there are none.

2.4. Recursive demeaning

Fortunately, an estimator exists that allows fund fixed effects while avoiding the finite-sample bias. To understand this estimator, it is useful to begin with an alternative explanation of the source of the bias in the OLS FE estimator. This explanation as well as our implementation of the estimator that avoids the bias largely follows Hjalmarsson (2010).

The OLS estimator of β in Eq. (2) is equivalent to the OLS estimator for the demeaned model $\tilde{R}_{it} = \beta \tilde{q}_{it-1} + \tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}$, where \tilde{R}_{it} , \tilde{q}_{it-1} , and $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}$ are equal to R_{it} , q_{it-1} , and ε_{it} minus their full-sample time series means at the fund level. That is, $\tilde{\beta}_{FE} = (\sum_{t,i} \tilde{q}_{it-1}^2)^{-1} (\sum_{t,i} \tilde{q}_{it-1} \tilde{R}_{it})$, and thus

$$\hat{\beta}_{FE} - \beta = \left(\sum_{t,i} \tilde{q}_{it-1}^2 \right)^{-1} \left(\sum_{t,i} \tilde{q}_{it-1} \tilde{\varepsilon}_{it} \right). \quad (4)$$

The bias in $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$ arises because, even though q_{it-1} and ε_{it} have zero correlation, \tilde{q}_{it-1} and $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}$ do not, as a result of which the second factor in Eq. (4) has nonzero expectation. Because a fund's full-sample time series mean is subtracted when computing the demeaned series, the value of \tilde{q}_{it-1} depends on observations after period $t-1$. In particular, a high value of q_{it} increases the time series mean, which decreases \tilde{q}_{it-1} . Therefore, \tilde{q}_{it-1} is negatively correlated with the innovation in q_{it} , which in turn is

positively correlated with ε_{it} . Recall that the latter correlation is the source of the bias. The effect of that correlation in the context of Eq. (4) is a negative correlation between \tilde{q}_{it-1} and $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{it}$, which produces a negative expectation for the second factor, resulting in the negative bias in $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$.

If q_{it-1} were instead backward-demeaned by a mean computed using only fund i 's observations prior to period $t-1$, instead of the fund's full-sample mean, then that demeaned value of $q_{i,t-1}$ would be uncorrelated with ε_{it} . Such backward demeaning, applied recursively through time, forms the basis for the instrumental variable estimator we employ to eliminate the bias. While demeaning in a recursive fashion adds noise compared to demeaning with a fund's less noisy full-sample mean, applying such an approach in a panel setting nevertheless yields reliable inferences by aggregating information across a large cross section of funds.

In applying the recursive demeaning estimator, we expand the fixed effects model to include a vector of regressors, x_{it-1} , that potentially include lagged size, q_{it-1} :

$$R_{it} = a_i + \beta' x_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (5)$$

Following the notation of Moon and Phillips (2000), we define the recursively backward-demeaned regressors, \bar{x}_{it-1} , for $t=2, \dots, T_i$, as

$$\bar{x}_{it-1} = x_{it-1} - \frac{1}{t-1} \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} x_{is-1}. \quad (6)$$

Similarly, recursively forward-demeaned variables are

$$\bar{x}_{it-1} = x_{it-1} - \frac{1}{T_i - t + 1} \sum_{s=t}^{T_i} x_{is-1} \quad (7)$$

and

$$\bar{R}_{it} = R_{it} - \frac{1}{T_i - t + 1} \sum_{s=t}^{T_i} R_{is}. \quad (8)$$

Substituting these definitions into Eq. (5) makes the fixed effects a_i drop out:

$$\bar{R}_{it} = \beta' \bar{x}_{it-1} + \bar{\varepsilon}_{it}, \quad (9)$$

where $\bar{\varepsilon}_{it}$ is defined in a manner analogous to \bar{R}_{it} .

We estimate regression equation (9) by using the instrumental variables (IV) approach. When x_{it-1} includes fund size (q_{it-1}), we instrument for \bar{q}_{it-1} by using \bar{q}_{it-1} . We treat the elements of x_{it-1} other than fund size, such as industry size or fund turnover, as exogenous regressors, because their innovations are not plausibly correlated with the fund's benchmark-adjusted return. When x includes only fund size, the IV estimator of regression equation (9) is simply

$$\hat{\beta}_{RD} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{t=2}^{T_i} \bar{q}_{it-1} \bar{q}'_{it-1} \right)^{-1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{t=2}^{T_i} \bar{R}_{it} \bar{q}'_{it-1} \right). \quad (10)$$

This estimator is the same as in Hjalmarsson (2010), except that we backward-demean our instrument. (This backward demeaning is necessary in our setting because, unlike the regressor in Hjalmarsson's setting, our regressor, fund size, does not have zero mean.) Because the estimator in Eq. (10) is an IV estimator, we can implement

⁷ Specifically, $w_i = T_i \hat{\sigma}_{q_i}^2 / \sum_{j=1}^N T_j \hat{\sigma}_{q_j}^2$, where T_i is the number of observations for fund i and $\hat{\sigma}_{q_i}^2$ is the sample variance of q_{it} . See Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2014).

it via two-stage least squares. We first regress \bar{q}_{it-1} on q_{it-1} , and then we regress \bar{R}_{it} on the fitted values from the first-stage regression. Neither regression includes an intercept.

To be a valid instrument for \bar{q}_{it-1} , q_{it-1} must satisfy the relevance and exclusion conditions (e.g., Roberts and Whited, 2013). The relevance condition requires that \bar{q}_{it-1} and q_{it-1} be significantly related in the first-stage regression. Because \bar{q}_{it-1} and q_{it-1} are both derived from q_{it-1} [see Eqs. (6) and (7)], they indeed tend to be closely related.⁸ The exclusion condition requires that $E[\bar{\varepsilon}_{it}|q_{it-1}] = 0$, meaning the instrument is unrelated to the innovation in the dependent variable. This condition is likely to hold as well, because the backward-looking information in q_{it-1} is unlikely to be helpful in predicting the forward-looking return information in $\bar{\varepsilon}_{it}$. In contrast, $E[\bar{\varepsilon}_{it}|\bar{q}_{it-1}] \neq 0$ in the OLS FE estimator, as discussed above. This distinction is the reason $\hat{\beta}_{RD}$ eliminates the bias in $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$.

2.5. Simulation exercise

We use simulations to illustrate the bias in the OLS estimators, with and without fixed effects, as well as the unbiased nature of the RD estimator. After simulating data in which we know the true relation between returns and fund size, we check whether the estimators are able to recover the true relation. To gauge the estimators' size and power, we simulate data both with and without decreasing returns to scale.

The first step is to simulate panel data on funds' returns and size. Our simulations include the two correlations that make the OLS and OLS FE estimators biased: one between size and skill across funds, and another between size and returns over time. We simulate benchmark-adjusted fund returns from Eq. (2). We simulate fund size as

$$\frac{q_{it}}{q_{it-1}} - 1 = c + \gamma R_{it} + v_{it}. \quad (11)$$

Parameter $\gamma > 0$ captures the positive time series correlation between returns and fund size, which induces a bias in the OLS FE estimator. Eqs. (2) and (11) imply that higher-ability funds tend to grow larger due to their higher average returns. The resulting positive cross-sectional correlation between skill and size leads to a bias in the OLS estimator.

⁸ For most funds in our data, \bar{q}_{it-1} and q_{it-1} are positively related in the first-stage regression. Some funds, however, exhibit a negative relation when we fit this regression through the origin, due to trends in their size. We exclude a small number of these trending funds—less than 2% of observations in Table 3, for example—to prevent them from weakening the first-stage relation. Specifically, we run two regressions for each fund: we regress \bar{q}_{it-1} on q_{it-1} , both with and without an intercept. We exclude funds that have both a negative slope in the first regression and an intercept in the second regression whose absolute value is above a threshold. We choose this threshold in each model to exclude as few funds as possible while delivering a positive first-stage relation as well as a first-stage Angrist and Pischke (2009) *F*-statistic above 10. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) show that the bias from weak instruments is small when the *F*-statistic is above 10. We apply this procedure to all variables that depend on q_{it-1} when we implement RD.

To obtain some guidance regarding the parameter values, we run the regression equation (11) on our data, which we describe in Section 3. We choose $c = 0.0039$ and $\text{Std}(v) = 0.0566$, which are the OLS estimates of these parameters. The point estimate of γ is 0.92. We consider three different values: $\gamma = 0.8, 0.9$, and 1.0 . We consider four plausible values of β : $0, -1 \times 10^{-5}, -3 \times 10^{-5}$, and -10×10^{-5} . These values produce a wide dispersion in the simulated outcomes. The value of $\beta = -1 \times 10^{-5}$ implies that a \$100 million increase in fund size decreases expected returns by 0.1% per month. We set $\text{Std}(\varepsilon) = 0.0225$, which is the estimate obtained from Eq. (2) by using the OLS FE estimator. We simulate a_i, ε_{it} , and v_{it} as independent draws from normal distributions. We draw each fund's skill a_i from a normal distribution with mean 0.2% per month and standard deviation 0.5% per month. These values are close to those we estimate later in the paper. We set funds' starting size to \$250 million, roughly our sample median. We construct ten thousand samples of simulated panel data for three hundred funds over one hundred months.⁹ In each sample, we estimate $\hat{\beta}_{OLS}, \hat{\beta}_{FE}$, and $\hat{\beta}_{RD}$.

Table 1 shows the estimation results. Panels A and B show the means and medians of the β estimates across simulated samples. As expected, the simple OLS estimates tend to be too high, while the OLS FE estimates tend to be too low. For example, even when the simulated data exhibit no returns to scale (i.e., the true $\beta = 0$), simple OLS estimates indicate increasing returns to scale and the OLS FE estimates indicate decreasing returns to scale. Bias is typically more severe for simple OLS than for OLS FE. Bias in the OLS FE estimates is typically larger when the contemporaneous relation between returns and size (γ) is stronger, as expected. The RD estimator produces essentially no bias. For instance, when $\beta = 0$, both the mean and median RD estimates round to 0.00 for all three values of γ . For $\beta \neq 0$, the mean and median RD estimates are also very close to the true values.

Panel C of Table 1 shows the fraction of simulations in which we reject the null hypothesis, $\beta = 0$, at the 5% confidence level. Both the OLS and OLS FE estimators almost always produce false positives, rejecting the null in 98% to 100% of simulations when the null is true. In contrast, the RD estimator has approximately the right size, rejecting a true null 6% of the time in the 5% test. The RD estimator also possesses nontrivial power to reject the null when the null is false. For example, when $\beta = -3 \times 10^{-5}$, RD rejects the null of $\beta = 0$ about 20% of the time. The OLS estimators reject the same null almost 100% of the time, but they do so regardless of whether the null is true or not.

To summarize, both OLS estimators are biased and much too eager to reject the null of no returns to scale even when the null is true. In contrast, the RD estimator

⁹ We simulate uncorrelated benchmark-adjusted fund returns, but there is some cross-sectional dependence in our actual data, as noted in Section 3. Therefore, we simulate data on fewer funds than in our actual sample, so that the simulated and actual data exhibit similar amounts of independent variation.

Table 1

Simulation exercise comparing ordinary least squares (OLS), OLS fixed effect (OLS FE), and recursive demeaning (RD) estimators.

We simulate ten thousand samples of mutual fund gross returns (R) and size (q). Simulated returns follow $R_{it} = a_i + \beta q_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}$, and size follows $q_{it}/q_{it-1} - 1 = c + \gamma R_{it} + v_{it}$. In each sample, we estimate β using the OLS, OLS FE, and RD estimators. Panel A (B) shows means (medians) of the β estimates across the simulated samples. Panel C shows the fraction of samples in which we reject the null hypothesis $\beta = 0$.

$\beta (\times 10^5)$	OLS, no FE			OLS with FE			RD		
	$\gamma=0.8$	$\gamma=0.9$	$\gamma=1.0$	$\gamma=0.8$	$\gamma=0.9$	$\gamma=1.0$	$\gamma=0.8$	$\gamma=0.9$	$\gamma=1.0$
<i>Panel A: Mean estimated $\beta (\times 10^5)$</i>									
0	0.85	0.84	0.82	-0.39	-0.38	-0.37	0.00	0.00	0.00
-1	0.30	0.37	0.42	-1.69	-1.73	-1.77	-0.97	-0.87	-1.03
-3	-0.96	-0.78	-0.62	-4.17	-4.28	-4.37	-2.34	-3.00	-3.08
-10	-7.51	-7.38	-7.27	-10.81	-10.82	-10.83	-10.03	-10.02	-10.02
<i>Panel B: Median estimated $\beta (\times 10^5)$</i>									
0	0.85	0.84	0.82	-0.39	-0.38	-0.37	0.00	0.00	0.00
-1	0.30	0.37	0.42	-1.68	-1.73	-1.76	-1.02	-1.01	-1.01
-3	-0.96	-0.78	-0.62	-4.17	-4.27	-4.37	-2.95	-2.95	-2.95
-10	-7.51	-7.38	-7.27	-10.81	-10.82	-10.83	-10.01	-10.01	-10.01
<i>Panel C: Fraction rejecting the null hypothesis ($\beta=0$)</i>									
0	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.06	0.06	0.06
-1	0.77	0.90	0.96	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.13	0.14	0.16
-3	1.00	0.99	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.21	0.20	0.19
-10	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

has virtually no bias, nontrivial power, and approximately the right size.

3. Data

The data come from CRSP and Morningstar. The sample contains 3,126 actively managed domestic equity-only mutual funds from the United States between 1979 and 2011. A Data Appendix on our websites supplements the information below.

We require that funds appear in both CRSP and Morningstar, which offers several benefits. First, it allows us to check data accuracy by comparing the two databases, as detailed below. Second, Morningstar assigns each fund a category (e.g., large growth, Japan stock, muni California intermediate), which helps us classify funds. Finally, Morningstar designates a benchmark portfolio to each fund category and provides benchmark returns. Because Morningstar chooses benchmarks based on funds' holdings instead of their reported objective, the Morningstar benchmark does not suffer from the cherry-picking bias of [Sensoy \(2009\)](#). We start the sample in 1979, the first year in which Morningstar provides benchmark returns. We merge CRSP and Morningstar using funds' tickers, CUSIPs, and names. We check the accuracy of each match by comparing assets and returns across the two databases.

We use keywords in the Morningstar Category variable to exclude bond funds, money market funds, international funds, funds of funds, industry funds, real estate funds, target retirement funds, and other non-equity funds. We also exclude funds identified by CRSP or Morningstar as index funds, as well as funds whose name contains the word "index." We exclude fund-month observations with expense ratios below 0.1% per year, since it is extremely unlikely that any actively managed funds would charge such low fees. Finally, we exclude fund-month observations with lagged fund size below \$15 million in 2011

dollars. A \$15 million minimum is also used by [Elton, Gruber, and Blake \(2001\)](#), [Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik \(2004\)](#), [Yan \(2008\)](#), and others.

[Berk and van Binsbergen \(2014\)](#) carry out a major data project to address problems with the CRSP mutual fund data. We apply many of Berk and van Binsbergen's data-cleaning steps, stopping short of those that require manual searches of data from Bloomberg or the Securities and Exchange Commission. To be conservative, we require that CRSP and Morningstar agree closely on the two key variables in our analysis: returns and fund size. First, we follow Berk and van Binsbergen in reconciling return data between CRSP and Morningstar. Returns differ across the two databases by at least 10 bps per month in 3.1% of observations. By applying Berk and van Binsbergen's algorithm we reduce the discrepancy rate to 0.6%. We set the remaining return discrepancies to missing. Similarly, total assets under management (AUM) differ between CRSP and Morningstar in 7.3% of observations, even allowing for rounding errors.¹⁰ The average of these discrepancies is \$12.3 million. AUM differs by at least \$100,000 and 5% across databases in 1.0% of observations. We set these AUM values to missing; otherwise we use CRSP's value.

We depart from Berk and van Binsbergen's sample construction somewhat, because we use different Morningstar data. Berk and van Binsbergen purchase every monthly data update from Morningstar starting in January 1995. We use Morningstar's most recent historical file, which includes data back to 1924. While Berk and van Binsbergen use the union of CRSP and Morningstar, we use the intersection, which allows us to cross-check all observations' accuracy across the two sources. Besides

¹⁰ Berk and van Binsbergen report a discrepancy rate of 16%. One potential reason for their higher rate is that they use monthly data updates from Morningstar, whereas we use Morningstar's single historical database. Morningstar could have corrected errors from the monthly updates when compiling them into the historical database.

being significantly less expensive, our Morningstar data include useful additional variables such as CUSIP (which we use to merge CRSP and Morningstar), Category (which we use to categorize funds and assign benchmarks), and FundID (which we use to aggregate share classes).¹¹

We now define the variables used in our analysis. Summary statistics are in Table 2.

Our measure of fund performance is *GrossR*, the fund's monthly benchmark-adjusted gross return. We use gross instead of net returns because our goal is to measure a manager's ability to outperform a benchmark, not the value delivered to clients after fees. *GrossR* equals the fund's net return plus its monthly expense ratio minus the return on the benchmark index portfolio designated by Morningstar. We take expense ratios from CRSP because Morningstar is ambiguous about their timing. The average of *GrossR* is +5 bps per month, and the average benchmark-adjusted net return is –5 bps per month.

The benchmark against which we judge a fund's performance is the index portfolio selected for each fund category by Morningstar. For example, for large-cap growth funds, the benchmark is the Russell 1000 Growth Index. Such an index-based adjustment is likely to adjust for fund style and risk more precisely than the commonly used loadings on the three Fama-French factors. The Fama-French factors are popular in mutual fund studies because their returns are freely available, unlike the Morningstar benchmark index data. Yet the Fama-French factors are not obvious benchmark choices because they are long-short portfolios whose returns cannot be costlessly achieved by mutual fund managers. In addition, Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2013) argue that the Fama-French model produces biased assessments of fund performance. The same authors recommend using index-based benchmarks and find that such benchmarks better explain the cross section of mutual fund returns. We follow this advice.

We construct *GrossR* by subtracting the index benchmark return from the fund's gross return, effectively assuming that the fund's benchmark beta is equal to one. This simple approach, which judges an active fund by its ability to beat its benchmark, is very popular in investment practice. In addition, this approach circumvents the need to address the estimation error in mutual fund betas. This error is modest for most but not all funds. In standard benchmark regressions for all funds in our sample, the mean standard error of OLS beta estimates is 0.05, and the 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles are 0.08, 0.14, and 0.38, respectively. That is, for 5% of all funds, the 95% confidence interval for beta is more than 0.56 wide (\pm two standard errors), which is imprecise. A natural way to deal with estimation error is Bayesian shrinkage, in which the OLS estimate is shrunk toward its prior mean.¹² Instead of

implementing formal shrinkage, we consider its two polar cases, for simplicity. First, we set all fund betas equal to one, a natural shrinkage target because the average mutual fund beta is close to one. Second, we set fund betas equal to their OLS estimates. To avoid using very imprecise beta estimates for short-lived funds under the second approach, we replace OLS betas of funds with track records shorter than 24 months by the average beta of funds in the respective Morningstar category. We report the former set of results in detail but find that the latter results lead to the same conclusions.¹³

The average pairwise correlation in *GrossR* between funds belonging to the same Morningstar Category is 0.15. To account for these cross-sectional correlations in our subsequent regressions, we cluster standard errors by Morningstar Category \times month. The average correlation between funds from different categories is only 0.04. Therefore, we do not cluster by month to avoid adding noise to standard errors. In our RD specifications we also cluster by fund because recursive demeaning can potentially induce serial correlation within funds.

FundSize corresponds to q_{it-1} in Section 2. *FundSize* equals the fund's AUM at the end of the previous month, inflated to December 2011 dollars by using the ratio of the total market value of all CRSP stocks in December 2011 to its value at the end of the previous month. The advantage of this inflator is that it makes *FundSize* capture the size of the fund relative to the universe of stocks that the fund can buy, a reasonable way to measure the limitations on a fund due to its size. There is considerable dispersion in *FundSize*: The inner-quartile range is \$84 million to \$921 million.

The top panel of Fig. 1 shows the number of funds in our sample over time. The number of funds with non-missing returns increases from 145 in 1979 to 1,574 in 2011. Comparing the black and blue lines, some observations are lost because of missing expense ratios or benchmark returns. The sawtooth pattern in the red line shows that many funds report AUM only quarterly or yearly before March 1993, which we denote with a vertical dashed line. The middle panel shows another change around March 1993: CRSP and Morningstar report similar expense ratios starting in 1993, but they often disagree before then. We also see large jumps in expense ratios in both databases before 1993. Overall, the data appear to be more reliable starting in March 1993. For this reason, we use the period from March 1993 to December 2011 as our main sample. We also report results from the extended sample that begins in January 1979. Because there are fewer funds and more missing values before 1993, extending the sample back to 1979 increases its size by only 11%.

IndustrySize is the sum of AUM across all funds in our sample, divided by the total market value of all stocks (i.e., the sum of *FundSize* across all sample funds, up to a constant). It is the fraction of total stock market capitalization that the

¹¹ Many mutual funds offer multiple share classes, which represent claims on the same underlying assets but have different fee structures. Different share classes of the same fund have the same Morningstar FundID. We aggregate all share classes of the same fund. Specifically, we compute a fund's AUM by summing AUM across the fund's share classes, and we compute the fund's returns, expense ratios, and turnover by asset-weighting across share classes. We take the fund's age to be the maximum age across the fund's share classes.

¹² Examples of beta shrinkage include Vasicek (1973) and Pástor and Stambaugh (1999, 2002).

¹³ In fact, our main results, including those in Tables 3 and 7, are stronger in the unreported beta-adjusted results. We also find very similar results when we set the benchmark betas of all funds equal to 0.92, which is the betas' cross-sectional mean (their median is 0.94). The results are also very similar when we use the Fama-French three-factor model as a benchmark. All of these results are available upon request.

Table 2

Summary statistics.

This table shows summary statistics for our sample of active equity mutual funds from 1979 to 2011. The unit of observation is the fund-month. All returns and expense ratios are in units of fraction per month. Net return is the return received by investors. Benchmark-adjusted net return equals net return minus the return on Morningstar's chosen benchmark portfolio. *GrossR* is the benchmark-adjusted net return plus 1/12th of the annual expense ratio. *FundSize* is the fund's total assets under management (AUM) aggregated across share classes, divided by the total stock market capitalization in the same month, then multiplied by the total stock market capitalization at the end of 2011. *IndustrySize* is the sum of all funds' AUM divided by the total stock market capitalization in the same month, imputing *FundSize* when missing. *Turnover* is in units of fraction per year. *1(SmlCap)* is an indicator for a small-cap fund, as defined by Morningstar's Category variable. *Std(AbnRet)* is the standard deviation of a fund's abnormal returns, defined as residuals from a regression of excess gross fund returns on excess benchmark portfolio returns. *FundAge* is the number of years since the fund's first offer date. *FamilySize* is the sum of *FundSize* across funds in the same family. *SectorSize* is the sum of AUM (in nominal dollars) across all funds within a given sector, divided by the total market value of all Center for Research in Security Prices stocks belonging to that sector. The first version uses the nine sectors in Morningstar's 3 × 3 StyleBox. The second version uses three sectors: small-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap.

Variable	Number of fund-months	Mean	Standard deviation	Percentile				
				1st	25th	50th	75th	99th
Net return	365,182	0.0069	0.0529	−0.1518	−0.0197	0.0103	0.0371	0.1320
Benchmark-adjusted net return	345,921	−0.0005	0.0234	−0.0642	−0.0106	−0.0009	0.0091	0.0680
Benchmark-adjusted gross return (<i>GrossR</i>)	314,580	0.0005	0.0229	−0.0627	−0.0095	0.0001	0.0100	0.0680
Expense ratio	334,767	0.0010	0.0004	0.0003	0.0008	0.0010	0.0012	0.0021
<i>FundSize</i> (in millions of 2011 dollars)	319,454	1,564	5,779	16	84	265	921	24,371
<i>IndustrySize</i>	381,192	0.1334	0.0441	0.0232	0.1227	0.1391	0.1714	0.1833
<i>Turnover</i>	364,957	0.8478	0.5674	0.0660	0.4471	0.7304	1.0919	2.8521
<i>1(SmlCap)</i>	340,061	0.1939	0.3954	0	0	0	0	1
<i>Std(AbnRet)</i>	367,495	0.0183	0.0084	0.0056	0.0125	0.0171	0.0222	0.0473
<i>FundAge</i> (years)	377,876	13.16	14.27	0.17	3.92	8.58	16.17	69.00
<i>FamilySize</i> (in millions of 2011 dollars)	315,894	61,821	149,667	23	1,768	12,181	46,217	825,507
<i>SectorSize</i> (version 1)	339,762	0.1561	0.0989	0.0220	0.0908	0.1290	0.2004	0.4788
<i>SectorSize</i> (version 2)	339,762	0.1390	0.0681	0.0210	0.1106	0.1318	0.1564	0.3550

sample's mutual funds own at that time. When computing *IndustrySize*, we fill in missing values of *FundSize* by taking the fund's most recent reported size and updating it by using interim realized total fund returns.¹⁴ The red line in the top panel of Fig. 1 shows that without this adjustment, we would obtain a downward-biased, sawtooth pattern in *IndustrySize* before March 1993. The bottom panel of Fig. 1 plots *IndustrySize* over time. It starts at 2.4% in January 1979, peaks at 18.6% in July 2008, and finishes at 16.8% in December 2011.

The variables defined above—*GrossR*, *FundSize*, and *IndustrySize*—are the main variables used in our empirical analysis of returns to scale. The remaining variables from Table 2 are defined in Section 4, when they are first introduced.

4. Empirical results

This section presents our empirical results. We first investigate the nature of returns to scale, at both the fund level and industry level, and explore the determinants of the size-performance relation. We then examine the evolution of fund skill and the relation between fund performance and fund age.

¹⁴ We assume no flows in or out of the fund since its last reported AUM. For example, if the fund's size was \$100 a month ago and the fund then experiences a 10% total return, we impute the current size of \$110. To avoid imputing an AUM for a dead fund, we impute only if the fund reports a return during the given month. We do not look more than 12 months back for a non-missing AUM. Imputing fund size introduces measurement error in *IndustrySize*, but such error would be worse if we were to simply set the missing fund sizes to zero. We fill in missing values of fund size only when computing *IndustrySize*. We do not do so when we use *FundSize* on its own, so there should be no measurement error in *FundSize*.

4.1. Fund-level returns to scale

To investigate returns to scale at the fund level, we run panel regressions of fund *i*'s benchmark-adjusted gross return in month *t*, *GrossR*(*i*, *t*), on the fund's size at the end of the previous month, *FundSize*(*i*, *t* − 1). We test the null hypothesis that the slope on *FundSize* is zero. We consider three approaches: plain OLS, OLS with fund fixed effects (OLS FE), and recursive demeaning (RD). All three approaches are discussed in detail in Section 2. Simple OLS corresponds to Eq. (1), OLS FE to Eq. (2), and RD to Eq. (10). We report the results in the first three columns of Table 3. Panel A reports the results from our main sample (1993–2011); Panel B focuses on the extended sample (1979–2011).

In the pooled OLS specification, the estimated coefficients on *FundSize* are negative, with *t*-statistics around −2, but the coefficient values are economically small in both the main and extended samples. Consider a \$100 million increase in fund size, which is substantial as it represents almost a 40% increase in the size of the median fund in our sample (Table 2). The coefficient estimates indicate that such an increase in size is associated with a decrease in expected fund performance of only 0.00014% per month, or 0.17 bps per year. While this coefficient is precisely estimated, it is also likely to be biased, as explained earlier. For example, if skill and size are positively correlated in the cross section, the economic significance of the OLS estimate is understated. Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) make a similar observation when obtaining significantly negative estimates under this specification.

In the OLS FE specification, the negative coefficients on *FundSize* are highly statistically significant, with *t*-statistics




Fig. 1. Sample properties. The top panel shows how the number of funds with non-missing observations changes over time. The black line plots the number of funds that have a non-missing cross-checked net return. The blue line plots the number of funds that also have a non-missing Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) expense ratio and Morningstar benchmark return. The red line plots the number of funds that also have non-missing cross-checked *FundSize*. The dashed vertical line in the top two panels marks March 1993. The middle panel shows the time series of average CRSP and Morningstar expense ratios, in percent per year, for funds that have expense ratios from both sources. The bottom panel shows *IndustrySize*, the sum of funds' assets under management divided by the total market value of CRSP stocks. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)

of about -9 . However, this estimated relation could be spurious because the OLS FE estimator is negatively biased, as explained earlier. Moreover, despite this negative bias, the estimated OLS FE coefficients remain modest, indicating that a \$100 million increase in fund size lowers the expected return by less than 0.0017% per month, or about 2 bps per year. We thus see mixed evidence of fund-level decreasing returns coming from the two OLS procedures, both of which produce biased estimates.

To avoid these biases, we apply the bias-free RD procedure from Section 2.4. The estimated effect of fund size on performance is no longer statistically significant, with t -statistics of -0.6 (Column 3 of Table 3). The estimate from Panel A indicates that a \$100 million increase in fund size depresses performance by 0.0022% per month, or 2.5 bps per year. In Panel B, the same increase in fund size depresses performance by only 1.3 bps per year.

In sum, we find mixed evidence of decreasing returns to scale at the fund level. The biased OLS procedures

indicate a negative relation between a fund's size and its performance. The unbiased RD procedure also produces negative point estimates, but it is unable to reject the null of no relation at the usual confidence levels. This inability to reject could reflect insufficient power of our RD test because a negative size-performance relation seems plausible a priori. All three procedures produce estimates of the size-performance relation that are modest in economic terms. We show later that these findings are unaffected by using manager fixed effects instead of fund fixed effects, as well as by including controls such as industry size, sector size, family size, fund age, and fund turnover.

4.2. Industry-level returns to scale

To explore potential returns to scale at the industry level, we run panel regressions of $GrossR(i, t)$ on $IndustrySize(t-1)$. We consider the same panel regression

Table 3

Relation between size and fund performance.

The dependent variable in each regression model is *GrossR*, the fund's benchmark-adjusted gross return. *FundSize* is the fund's total assets under management (AUM) at the end of the previous month, inflated to millions of 2011 dollars using the total market cap of stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. *IndustrySize* is the total AUM of all active equity mutual funds divided by the total market cap of all stocks in CRSP. The ordinary least squares fixed effect (OLS FE) estimator includes fund fixed effects. The recursive demeaning (RD) estimator recursively forward-demeans all variables and instruments for forward-demeaned *FundSize* using backward-demeaned *FundSize*. We multiply the slopes on *FundSize* by 10^6 to make them easier to read. The reported slopes on *FundSize* thus equal the change in *GrossR*, in units of basis points per month, associated with a \$100 million increase in *FundSize*. Heteroskedasticity-robust *t*-statistics clustered by sector \times month are in parentheses. We also cluster by fund in the RD specifications.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Panel A: Main sample (March 1993–December 2011)</i>									
<i>FundSize</i>	−0.0137 (−1.87)	−0.168 (−9.38)	−0.220 (−0.62)				−0.0147 (−2.02)	−0.148 (−9.09)	−0.425 (−1.25)
<i>IndustrySize</i>				−0.0169 (−1.93)	−0.0326 (−3.60)	−0.0326 (−2.49)	−0.0165 (−1.90)	−0.0295 (−3.27)	−0.0277 (−2.14)
Constant	0.000503 (2.18)			0.00304 (2.10)			0.00300 (2.09)		
Number of observations	275,847	275,847	270,556	283,046	283,046	283,046	275,847	275,847	270,556
Estimator	OLS, no FE	OLS FE	RD	OLS, no FE	OLS FE	RD	OLS, no FE	OLS FE	RD
<i>Panel B: Extended sample (January 1979–December 2011)</i>									
<i>FundSize</i>	−0.0139 (−1.98)	−0.126 (−9.09)	−0.107 (−0.64)				−0.0161 (−2.30)	−0.103 (−7.91)	−0.268 (−1.69)
<i>IndustrySize</i>				−0.00671 (−1.92)	−0.0164 (−4.34)	−0.0165 (−2.66)	−0.00943 (−1.86)	−0.0165 (−3.15)	−0.0179 (−2.09)
Constant	0.000506 (2.28)			0.00144 (2.58)			0.00189 (2.26)		
Number of observations	290,150	290,150	285,350	314,580	314,580	314,580	290,150	290,150	285,350
Estimator	OLS, no FE	OLS FE	RD	OLS, no FE	OLS FE	RD	OLS, no FE	OLS FE	RD

approaches as before: OLS, OLS FE, and RD. The results are in Columns 4 through 6 of Table 3.

In the plain OLS specification, the estimated coefficient on *IndustrySize* is negative and marginally significant, with *t*-statistics of -1.9 in both panels. This evidence is suggestive of decreasing returns to scale at the industry level. However, because the plain OLS specification does not allow for differences in skill across funds, we cannot treat this evidence as conclusive.

To allow for differences in skill, we add fund fixed effects (see Column 5 of Table 3). The evidence of decreasing returns to scale then becomes stronger. The estimated coefficients on *IndustrySize* roughly double, and the *t*-statistics drop to -3.6 in Panel A and -4.3 in Panel B.¹⁵ The effect is not only statistically but also economically significant. For example, a 1 percentage point increase in *IndustrySize* is associated with a sizable decrease in fund performance: 0.0326% per month, or almost 40 bps per year, in the main sample.¹⁶ In the extended sample, the effect is smaller but still substantial, about 20 bps per year.

¹⁵ To calculate standard errors, we cluster by sector \times month to allow for potential correlation of benchmark-adjusted fund returns across funds, as explained in Section 3. We do not cluster by fund in this OLS FE specification because there is very little serial correlation within funds. The first ten residual autocorrelations are all smaller than 0.05 in absolute value. If we were to add clustering by fund to address the serial correlation in the residuals, the *t*-statistics on *IndustrySize* would change from -3.60 to -3.58 in Panel A and from -4.34 to -4.24 in Panel B.

¹⁶ *IndustrySize* is the total AUM of active funds divided by the stock market capitalization. According to Table 2, changing *IndustrySize* by 1% represents movement of about one-fifth of the interquartile range, one-seventh of the median, and 1/16 of the 98th percentile range. Because *IndustrySize* rose by 14.4% in our 33-year sample, a 1% increase in *IndustrySize* occurs in about 2.3 years, on average.

The RD estimates of the relation between *GrossR* and *IndustrySize* are shown in Column 6 of Table 3. The point estimates are virtually identical to those in Column 5, and even though the *t*-statistics are smaller, the relation remains statistically significant. As noted in Section 2.4, *IndustrySize* can instrument for itself in the RD procedure because it is not plagued by the bias-inducing correlation between the error term and the regressor in Eq. (2). In particular, there is no reason to believe that innovations in *IndustrySize* are correlated with the benchmark-adjusted returns of any given fund.¹⁷ Therefore, the RD procedure in this case is simply the OLS regression of forward-demeaned *GrossR* on forward-demeaned *IndustrySize*. Because there is no need for a backward-demeaned instrument, forward demeaning is unnecessary as well. We report the results from the RD procedure only for comparison with the other approaches. The relation between *GrossR* and *IndustrySize* is better captured by the OLS FE results in Column 5.

In Columns 7 through 9 of Table 3, we run the multiple regression of *GrossR*(*i*, *t*) on both *FundSize*(*i*, *t* − 1) and *IndustrySize*(*t* − 1) under all three approaches. We consider two null hypotheses: that the slope coefficient on *FundSize* is zero, and that the slope on *IndustrySize* is zero. We find that the slope on *FundSize* is negative and significant under the first two approaches, but its significance disappears in the bias-free RD approach. The slope on *IndustrySize* remains negative and significant, and its magnitude is

¹⁷ The R-squared from a panel regression of fraction changes in *IndustrySize* on benchmark-adjusted fund returns is only 0.006. The R-squared is almost 20 times larger, 0.110, if we replace *IndustrySize* with *FundSize* in the regression. We winsorize the regressor at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

similar to the estimate in Column 5 in which *FundSize* is excluded.

The multiple regression with both fund size and industry size as regressors relates to a natural question: Don't industry-level decreasing returns imply fund-level decreasing returns? After all, if the scale of the typical fund increases, so does the scale of the industry. If the latter hurts performance, must not the former? Or, if a single fund were to grow to a large fraction of the industry, changes in that fund's own scale should then have similar effects to changes in the industry's scale. This seeming lack of separation between fund-level and industry-level decreasing returns is resolved by running the multiple regression. With the multiple regression, industry-level decreasing returns to scale do not imply fund-level decreasing returns to scale. The coefficient on fund size in the multiple regression reveals whether fund scale matters, conditional on industry scale. A zero coefficient on fund size would be consistent with a fund's scale not mattering, because the multiple regression already controls for the contribution of even a very large fund's size to that of the industry.

The negative relation between fund performance and industry size emerges not only from the panel regressions in Table 3 but also from simple fund-by-fund regressions. For each fund i , we run the time series regression of $GrossR(i, t)$ on $IndustrySize(t-1)$. In our main sample, we find that 62% of the funds' OLS slope estimates are negative and 9% (4%) are negative and significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) two-sided confidence level. In the extended sample, the results are very similar: 61% of the estimates are negative, and 10% (4%) are significantly negative at the 5% (1%) confidence level.

To summarize, we find a strong negative relation between fund performance and industry size. This relation, which is both economically and statistically significant, is consistent with the presence of decreasing returns to scale at the industry level.

Table 3 presents results from three different methods, only one of which, RD, removes the bias inherent in estimating fund-level returns to scale. Unless noted otherwise, from now on we report only the bias-free results based on RD for any panel regression that involves *FundSize* (Tables 5, 6, and 7). When the regression includes no variable involving *FundSize*, so that the bias is not an issue, we report the OLS FE results.

4.3. A closer look at industry size

In Fig. 1, *IndustrySize* trends upward for most of the sample period. This trend is nonmonotonic. For example, *IndustrySize* decreases in the late 1990s as well as from 2009 to 2011, but it is clearly present. Is *IndustrySize* simply capturing a time trend? To address this question, we define a time trend variable as the number of months elapsed since January 1979. When we run an OLS FE panel regression of *GrossR* on the linear time trend, indeed we find a significantly negative relation, as shown in Column 2 of Table 4. To separate time from *IndustrySize*, we include both variables on the right-hand side of the OLS FE regression. We find that *IndustrySize* retains its

significantly negative slope coefficient in the main sample, and the coefficient's estimated value becomes substantially more negative: -0.0852 , compared with -0.0326 when the time trend is excluded (compare Columns 1 and 3 of Panel A of Table 4). In contrast, the sign of the estimated coefficient on the time trend flips from negative to positive. Fund performance is thus negatively related to *IndustrySize* instead of being a simple linear function of time.

Industry size fluctuates over time as a result of changes in the number of active mutual funds and changes in the average fund size. Which of the two components drives the negative relation between industry size and fund performance? To answer this question, we define two new variables: *Number of Funds*, which is a count of the sample funds operating in the given month, and *Average Fund Size*, which is the average AUM across all sample funds in that month, inflated to current dollars. We perform this inflation by dividing the average AUM by the total stock market capitalization in the same month and then multiplying by the total stock market capitalization at the end of 2011. *IndustrySize* equals *Number of Funds* times *Average Fund Size* divided by a constant, namely, the total stock market capitalization at the end of 2011.

Table 4 shows that both components of *IndustrySize* contribute to the negative size-performance relation. When the new variables are included individually in our OLS FE panel regression, *Average Fund Size* exhibits a significantly negative relation with *GrossR* and *Number of Funds* is insignificant. When the two variables are included together, though, both of them enter with significantly negative coefficients. Interestingly, both variables lose their statistical significance when *IndustrySize* is also included in the regression (see the last two columns of Table 4). This result suggests that *IndustrySize* does a good job of capturing the joint effect of its two components on fund performance.

4.4. Determinants of the size-performance relation

In this subsection, we take a closer look at the size-performance relation by analyzing its dependence on fund characteristics. We examine three characteristics that have some a priori relevance for the size-performance relation: a small-cap indicator, volatility, and turnover.

The first characteristic, $1(SmlCap)$, is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the fund is classified by Morningstar as a small-cap fund (i.e., a fund trading small-capitalization stocks) and zero otherwise. About 19% of our funds are small-cap funds. The second characteristic, *Turnover*, is the fund's average annual turnover. We obtain turnover data from CRSP if available and from Morningstar otherwise. To remove some implausible outliers, we winsorize turnover at its 1st and 99th percentiles. Median *Turnover* is 73% per year. The third characteristic, *Std(AbnRet)*, is the standard deviation of a fund's abnormal returns, expressed as a fraction per month. Abnormal returns are the residuals from the regression of the fund's excess gross returns on excess benchmark returns.

Why could these characteristics affect the size-performance relation? The effect of scale on a fund's performance is likely to depend on the liquidity of the fund's assets. Lower

Table 4

Properties of the relation between industry size and fund performance.

The dependent variable in all regressions is *GrossR*, the fund's benchmark-adjusted gross return. *Time Trend* is the number of months since January 1979. *IndustrySize* is the total assets under management (AUM) of all sample funds divided by the total market cap of all stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices database. *Average Fund Size* is the average AUM across all active equity mutual funds in a given month. We inflate *Average Fund Size* to current dollars by dividing by the total stock market capitalization in the same month, then multiplying by the total stock market capitalization at the end of 2011. *Number of Funds* is a count of the sample funds operating in the given month. *IndustrySize* equals *Number of Funds* times *Average Fund Size* divided by the total stock market capitalization at the end of 2011. We multiply the slopes on *Time Trend*, *Average Fund Size*, and *Number of Funds* by 10^6 to make them easier to read. All models include fund fixed effects and are estimated by ordinary least squares. Heteroskedasticity-robust *t*-statistics clustered by sector \times month are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Main sample (March 1993 – December 2011)</i>								
<i>IndustrySize</i>	−0.0326 (−3.60)		−0.0852 (−3.04)				−0.115 (−2.60)	−0.146 (−2.87)
<i>Time Trend</i>		−10.26 (−2.99)	23.89 (2.21)					15.35 (1.56)
<i>Average Fund Size</i>				−3.862 (−3.03)		−8.885 (−3.56)	4.315 (0.73)	4.249 (0.72)
<i>Number of Funds</i>					0.450 (0.83)	−4.031 (−3.23)	8.493 (1.61)	8.234 (1.57)
Number of observations	283,046	283,046	283,046	283,046	283,046	283,046	283,046	283,046
<i>Panel B: Extended sample (January 1979 – December 2011)</i>								
<i>IndustrySize</i>	−0.0164 (−4.34)		−0.0305 (−1.72)				−0.0629 (−1.93)	−0.0697 (−1.87)
<i>Time Trend</i>		−7.030 (−4.00)	7.102 (0.84)					4.137 (0.51)
<i>Average Fund Size</i>				−2.532 (−2.44)		−8.898 (−3.83)	−1.455 (−0.30)	−1.608 (−0.34)
<i>Number of Funds</i>					0.0184 (0.05)	−3.926 (−4.26)	3.516 (0.84)	3.352 (0.81)
Number of observations	314,580	314,580	314,580	314,580	314,580	314,580	314,580	314,580

liquidity implies a larger price impact for a trade of a given size. Therefore, lower liquidity is likely to make a fund's returns decrease in scale more steeply. This relation can in principle hold both at the fund level and at the industry level. It can hold at the fund level because a larger fund trades larger amounts, leading to a larger price impact. It can also hold at the industry level because, in a more crowded industry, there are likely to be more active funds chasing the same investment opportunities and pushing prices in the same direction.¹⁸ This logic suggests that if there are decreasing returns to scale at either the fund or industry level, they should be decreasing more steeply for both small-cap funds and high-turnover funds, both of which are likely to face larger total price impact costs.

Higher-volatility funds could also exhibit steeper decreasing returns to scale. The reason is that funds with more volatile benchmark-adjusted returns are effectively larger in terms of their trading. A fund's portfolio can be thought of as a combination of a (potentially levered) benchmark investment and a zero-cost long-short active portfolio whose return is uncorrelated with the benchmark return. Because benchmark exposure can be managed cheaply, the cost of managing the fund depends largely on the size of the active portfolio. Given this portfolio's zero-cost nature, a reasonable measure of its size is its dollar volatility, which is the product of the active portfolio's volatility and fund size. For example,

a "closet indexing" fund looks small by this metric, whereas an equal-size fund that takes big active bets looms larger. Funds with more volatile active portfolios are likely to face larger trading costs and, consequently, steeper decreasing returns to scale.

To examine these hypotheses, we run panel regressions analogous to those in Table 3, except that we add the interactions of both *FundSize* and *IndustrySize* with $1(SmlCap)$, *Turnover*, and $Std(AbnRet)$. The results are in Table 5 (main sample) and Table 6 (extended sample). In both tables, we find significant interactions between *IndustrySize* and fund characteristics, whereas the interactions that involve *FundSize* are never statistically significant. When $IndustrySize \times 1(SmlCap)$ is added to *IndustrySize* on the right-hand side (Column 4), it enters negatively and significantly, indicating that industry-level decreasing returns to scale are more pronounced for small-cap funds. Similarly, when $IndustrySize \times Std(AbnRet)$ and $IndustrySize \times Turnover$ are added to *IndustrySize* (Columns 5 and 6), both enter negatively and significantly, indicating steeper decreasing returns to scale for funds with higher volatility and higher turnover. When all three interaction terms are added at the same time (Column 7), their estimated slopes remain negative, and the volatility interaction is the most robust. The slope on $IndustrySize \times 1(SmlCap)$ loses statistical significance in both tables, but its magnitude remains about the same as in Column 4 of Table 6.

To summarize, Tables 5 and 6 show that the negative relation between industry size and fund performance is stronger for funds that have high volatility and high

¹⁸ Pástor and Stambaugh (2012) also argue that industry-level returns to scale are induced by illiquidity.

Table 5

Determinants of the size-performance relation, main sample (March 1993–December 2011).

This table adds regressors to the specifications in Table 3. $1(SmlCap)$ is an indicator for whether the fund is a small-cap fund. $Std(AbnRet)$ is the fund's standard deviation of residuals from a regression of excess gross returns (in fraction per month) on excess benchmark returns. $Turnover$ is the fund's average annual portfolio turnover. We instrument for all forward-demeaned quantities that involve $FundSize$ by using the backward-demeaned values. We multiply the slope on $FundAge$ by 1,000 to make it easier to read.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>FundSize</i>	−0.238 (−0.74)	−0.111 (−0.18)	0.0405 (0.08)				0.0881 (0.15)	0.206 (0.34)
<i>FundSize*1(SmlCap)</i>	1.304 (0.42)						−0.660 (−0.23)	0.249 (0.09)
<i>FundSize*Std(AbnRet)</i>		−11.41 (−0.30)					−28.69 (−0.83)	−31.18 (−0.89)
<i>FundSize*Turnover</i>			−0.319 (−0.61)				0.0106 (0.03)	−0.00319 (−0.01)
<i>IndustrySize</i>				−0.0242 (−2.34)	0.0547 (3.36)	−0.000687 (−0.06)	0.0617 (2.41)	0.0109 (0.30)
<i>IndustrySize*1(SmlCap)</i>				−0.0523 (−2.09)			−0.0342 (−1.03)	−0.0367 (−1.11)
<i>IndustrySize*Std(AbnRet)</i>					−4.533 (−4.80)		−3.476 (−2.92)	−3.529 (−2.97)
<i>IndustrySize*Turnover</i>						−0.0391 (−3.10)	−0.0218 (−1.65)	−0.0199 (−1.51)
<i>FundAge</i>								0.271 (1.97)
Number of observations	246,841	257,658	270,553	260,411	278,694	283,039	236,333	236,333

turnover. The relation is also marginally stronger for small-cap funds.

4.5. The evolution of fund skill

We now analyze fund skill. A natural measure of skill in our framework is the fund fixed effect from the panel regression equation (5), where the right-hand-side variables include *IndustrySize*, *FundSize*, and their interactions with fund characteristics. This measure of skill represents the average benchmark-adjusted gross fund return (i.e., the gross alpha) that is further adjusted for any potential fund-level and industry-level returns to scale. It is the expected value of *GrossR* when *FundSize* = *IndustrySize* = 0; that is, the gross alpha earned on the first dollar invested in the fund as well as in the industry. It is essentially the fund's alpha when the fund faces no competition from other funds or from its own dollars.

To estimate each fund's skill, we focus on the specification of regression equation (5) that includes *IndustrySize*, *FundSize*, and their interactions with all three fund characteristics (Column 7 of Table 6). We choose the coefficient estimates based on the extended sample because we plot the time series of fund skill over the extended sample. The results based on the estimates from the main sample (Column 7 of Table 5) are very similar.

Panel A of Fig. 2 shows how the cross-sectional distribution of fund skill varies over time. For each month in 1979 through 2011, the figure plots the average as well as the percentiles of the estimated fund fixed effects across all funds operating in that month. The plot shows a clear upward trend in the distribution of skill. For example, the mean fixed effect grows from 24 bps per month at the

beginning of the sample to 42 bps per month at the end. The growth is more pronounced at the top: The 90th percentile grows from 98 bps to 123 bps per month, whereas the 10th percentile is almost flat. This evidence suggests that funds have become more skilled over time, especially the above-average funds.¹⁹

Does this improvement in skill translate into better performance? The answer is no, according to Fig. 3. This figure plots two-year moving averages of equal-weighted average fund returns. The solid line shows the average benchmark-adjusted gross return (*GrossR*). This line does not exhibit any obvious trend, certainly not an upward trend, suggesting that fund performance has failed to improve over time.

How can we reconcile the upward trend in skill (Fig. 2) with the lack of a trend in performance (solid line in Fig. 3)? Major clues appear in two results discussed earlier: the upward trend in industry size (Fig. 1) and the negative relation between industry size and fund performance (Table 3). Taken together, these two results suggest that the growing industry size makes it more difficult for managers to outperform despite their improving skill. To illustrate this point, we plot one more line in Fig. 3. The dashed line is analogous to the solid line except that in each month t , it adds 0.0326 times ($IndustrySize_t - IndustrySize_0$), where $t=0$ denotes the beginning of our extended sample (i.e., January 1979). This adjustment represents compensation for the adverse

¹⁹ The upward trend in skill is also statistically significant. When we regress the average skill from Panel A of Fig. 2 on a linear time trend, the slope estimate is positive with a Newey-West t -statistic of 8.9.

Table 6

Determinants of the size–performance relation, extended sample (January 1979–December 2011).

This table is the same as Table 5 but uses data from January 1979 to December 2011.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>FundSize</i>	−0.0987 (−0.66)	0.0228 (0.03)	−0.316 (−0.30)				0.271 (0.42)	0.318 (0.49)
<i>FundSize*1(SmlCap)</i>	0.273 (0.13)						−1.402 (−0.70)	−0.959 (−0.49)
<i>FundSize*Std(AbnRet)</i>		−10.40 (−0.28)					−29.83 (−0.94)	−30.19 (−0.94)
<i>FundSize*Turnover</i>			0.207 (0.21)				0.0588 (0.20)	0.0360 (0.12)
<i>IndustrySize</i>				−0.0120 (−3.04)	0.0248 (2.92)	0.00541 (1.11)	0.0450 (2.35)	0.0194 (0.68)
<i>IndustrySize*1(SmlCap)</i>				−0.0348 (−2.67)			−0.0340 (−1.33)	−0.0360 (−1.41)
<i>IndustrySize*Std(AbnRet)</i>					−2.137 (−4.51)		−2.013 (−2.19)	−2.010 (−2.19)
<i>IndustrySize*Turnover</i>						−0.0287 (−4.45)	−0.0250 (−2.57)	−0.0249 (−2.56)
<i>FundAge</i>								0.151 (1.23)
Number of observations	261,349	273,881	285,347	291,869	310,228	314,573	252,292	252,292




Fig. 2. Distribution of fund skill over time. The figure plots each month's mean and percentiles of estimated fund skill across all funds operating during that month. Panel A measures skill by fund fixed effects estimated from the specification in Column 7 of Table 6. Panel B measures skill by $a_i + b \cdot \text{FundAge}_{it}$, where fixed effects a_i and $b = 0.000151$ are estimated from the specification in Column 8 of Table 6.

effect of the growing industry size on realized fund performance. The coefficient 0.0326 is minus the estimated slope from the regression of *GrossR* on fund fixed effects and *IndustrySize* (Column 5 in Panel A of Table 3). The gap between the two lines in Fig. 2 grows from zero in 1979 to almost 50 bps per month in 2011. These estimates suggest that average benchmark-adjusted fund returns in 2011 would have been almost 50 bps per month higher if industry size had counterfactually stayed at its 1979 level instead of growing, all else equal. Consistent with rising skill, the dashed line trends upward somewhat, especially between 1985 and 2000, when the estimated average skill increases the most.

What is the source of the upward trend in skill in Panel A of Fig. 2? We can rule out the explanation that a given

fund's skill improves over time because our measure of a fund's skill, the fund fixed effect, is time-invariant.²⁰ For that reason, the answer must involve changes in the composition of the fund universe. A natural explanation is that the new funds entering the industry are more skilled, on average, than the existing funds. The higher skill of the new arrivals could result from better education of the new managers, for example, or from their superior mastery of new technology. In addition to new funds being more skilled, it is possible that the funds exiting the

²⁰ In Section 4.6, we consider an extension in which a fund's skill can vary over the fund's lifetime. The resulting pattern in skill, plotted in Panel B of Fig. 2, is similar to that in Panel A.




Fig. 3. Average fund returns over time. The figure plots two-year moving averages of fund returns. The solid line shows equal-weighted average benchmark-adjusted gross returns (*GrossR*). The dashed line is the same as the solid line except that it adjusts funds' *GrossR* by adding $0.0326 \text{ times } (IndustrySize_t - IndustrySize_0)$, where $t=0$ denotes January 1979, the beginning of our sample. The value 0.0326 is minus the estimated slope from an ordinary least squares fixed effects regression of *GrossR* on fund fixed effects and *IndustrySize* (Table 3, Panel A, Column 5).

industry are less skilled, on average. However, this exit-based effect is unlikely to be the leading explanation of the growth in average skill, because fund entry has far exceeded exit over time (Fig. 1) and also because the growth in skill is more pronounced at the top (Panel A of Fig. 2).

To summarize, we find that funds have become more skilled over time, yet this improvement in skill has failed to boost fund performance. This evidence is consistent with the observed gradual growth in industry size, which has had an adverse effect on fund performance due to decreasing returns to scale.

4.6. Performance erosion over a fund's lifetime

If industry size grows while a fund's ability stays constant, then performance should erode over the fund's lifetime. To test this prediction, we run a panel regression of benchmark-adjusted gross fund returns (*GrossR*) on fund fixed effects as well as fund age dummy variables. For any given fund and age t , $t = 1, 2, \dots, 20$ years, the age dummy variable is equal to one in the fund's t -th year of operations and zero otherwise. We measure fund age, later referred to as *FundAge*, by the number of years since the fund's first offer date (from CRSP) or, if missing, since the fund's inception date (from Morningstar). We estimate this panel regression in our main sample and show the results in Fig. 4.²¹ Specifically, Fig. 4 plots the fund age fixed effects along with their 95% confidence interval. For any age t , $t = 1, 2, \dots, 20$ years, the age t fixed effect measures the difference between a fund of age t and the same fund at age > 20 years in terms of their average *GrossR*.

Fig. 4 shows that fund performance declines over a typical fund's lifetime. This new result is almost monotonic for fund ages up to 12 years. The point estimates of the age fixed effects decline in an approximately linear fashion from 37 bps per month at age one to zero at age 12, after which they are roughly flat. These estimates are positive and statistically significant up to age six, indicating that up to this age, fund performance is significantly higher than it is at ages exceeding 20 years. Because the regression includes fund fixed effects, the decline observed in Fig. 4 represents a within-fund, not across-fund, pattern.²² In short, as funds get older, their performance tends to suffer.

Further support for this negative age-performance relation comes from a panel regression of *GrossR* on *FundAge*. Whereas Fig. 4 uses age fixed effects to measure the nonparametric relation between *GrossR* and age, the regression assumes a linear relation. We include fund fixed effects in the regression, as before, to focus on the variation in performance over a given fund's lifetime. The results are presented in Column 1 of Table 7. Again, we find a negative and significant age-performance relation, with t -statistics equal to -3.0 in the main sample and -4.0 in the extended sample. The point estimate of the slope coefficient on *FundAge* in the main sample indicates that one additional year of age reduces the fund's gross benchmark-adjusted return by 1.23 bps per month, or 15 bps per year.

One potential concern is that the negative relation between fund age and performance could be driven by the incubation bias documented by Evans (2010). Incubation is a strategy that some families follow to initiate new funds. A family might start multiple funds privately, with a limited amount of capital. At the end of an evaluation period, it could open only some of these funds, often those with better performance, to the public. Evans finds that the incubated funds outperform the non-incubated funds during the incubation period.

Our age result does not seem to be driven by the incubation bias. First of all, our \$15 million fund size screen eliminates many incubated funds. More important, Evans (2010) reports that "removing the first three years of return data for all funds eliminates the bias" (p. 1584). Motivated by this finding, we re-run the regression of *GrossR* on *FundAge* after excluding the returns of funds younger than three years. The results, which are reported in Column 4 of Table 7, are similar to those from Column 1 in which all funds are included. The estimates remain statistically significant in both panels, and they are only slightly smaller in magnitude compared with the estimate in Column 1. In addition, recall from Fig. 4 that the estimates of the age fixed effects are positive and statistically significant up to age six. In the extended sample, the estimates are significantly positive up to age eight (not

²¹ The results based on the extended sample are very similar. They are not reported here.

²² Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Yan (2008), and Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2013b) control for fund age in their performance regressions. None of these studies finds a significant coefficient on fund age for US funds, but they do not include fund fixed effects. Their datasets are also different. For example, they do not use Morningstar data.




Fig. 4. Time series relation between fund age and fund performance. The figure plots fund age fixed effects in benchmark-adjusted gross returns (*GrossR*) along with their 95% confidence intervals. We obtain these fixed effects from a panel regression of *GrossR* on fund fixed effects and dummy variables for fund age = 1, 2, ..., 20 years. The age t fixed effect measures the average difference between *GrossR* for a fund of age t and the same fund at age 21+ years. Standard errors are clustered by sector \times month. The sample covers March 1993 to December 2011.

plotted). All of this evidence makes the incubation bias an unlikely explanation for our fund age result.

This result is also unlikely to be due to risk. Equity mutual funds' market betas are well known to be close to each other as well as close to one (e.g., [Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, 2004](#)), and any risk associated with size or value exposures is likely to be removed by our benchmark adjustment. Moreover, for risk to explain why funds tend to perform better when younger, risk exposure would have to decline with age. In contrast, [Chevalier and Ellison \(1999\)](#) argue that younger managers have an incentive to avoid risk because they are more likely to be fired for bad performance. Consistent with this argument, Chevalier and Ellison find that younger managers tend to hold less risky and more conventional portfolios.

Why, then, does fund performance erode over a typical fund's lifetime? Our results offer the following narrative. New funds entering the industry tend to be more skilled than the existing funds (Panel A of [Fig. 2](#)). Therefore, new funds tend to beat their benchmarks initially. However, as a given fund ages, the industry keeps growing ([Fig. 1](#)), and the continued arrival of skilled competition depresses the fund's performance ([Table 3](#)).²³

According to this narrative, fund performance erodes because the industry grows during the fund's lifetime. The negative age-performance relation should thus disappear after controlling for *IndustrySize*. To test this idea, we add *IndustrySize* on the right-hand side of the OLS FE regressions in [Table 7](#) (Columns 2 and 5). Indeed, we find that adding *IndustrySize* annihilates the negative relation between *GrossR* and *FundAge*. While *IndustrySize* enters

with a negative coefficient, the slope on *FundAge* is no longer significantly negative. In fact, it turns marginally positive. We reach the same conclusions when we control for *FundSize* (Columns 3 and 6) and also when we add interactions of *IndustrySize* and *FundSize* with fund characteristics (Column 8 of [Tables 5](#) and [6](#)). These results lend further support to the narrative from the previous paragraph.²⁴

The negative relation between fund age and performance and its disappearance after controlling for *IndustrySize* are among our most important findings. Less important but also noteworthy is the result that the estimated slope on fund age turns positive after controlling for *IndustrySize*. This result is marginally significant in the main sample (with t -statistics ranging from 2.02 to 2.19 in Panel A of [Table 7](#) and $t = 1.97$ in Column 8 of [Table 5](#)), but it is never significant in the extended sample. If this result is real, it suggests that skill improves as funds grow older, perhaps due to fund managers' learning on the job. Such learning, if present, mitigates the performance erosion associated with the growth in *IndustrySize* over a typical fund's lifetime.

Our main measure of fund skill, which is plotted in Panel A of [Fig. 2](#), is constant over a fund's lifetime. To allow for potential learning-on-the-job effects, we construct an alternative measure of skill that can vary with fund age. We continue to define skill as the expected value of *GrossR* when *FundSize* = *IndustrySize* = 0, but instead of using the coefficient estimates from Column 7 of [Table 6](#) as before, we use the estimates from Column 8 of [Table 6](#), which includes *FundAge* among the regressors. Our alternative skill measure is thus equal to the fund fixed effect from Column 8 plus the fund's age multiplied by 0.000151, which is the estimated slope on fund age in Column 8. Under this measure, for each additional year of a fund's age, the fund's skill grows by 1.51 bps per month, or 18 bps per year.

Panel B of [Fig. 2](#) shows the time evolution of this alternative skill measure. Similar to our main measure in Panel A, the alternative measure exhibits a clear upward trend. In fact, this trend is stronger and more consistent than in Panel A. This makes sense because skill in Panel B grows not only due to the changing fund composition as in Panel A, but also due to learning on the job for each fund. We do not want to overemphasize this result, though, because the learning-on-the-job effect hinges on a coefficient estimate that is not clearly significant, as explained earlier. With that caveat, Panel B reinforces our earlier conclusion that the active management industry has become more skilled over time.

4.7. Age-based investment strategies

The most natural explanation for the growth in skill in Panel A of [Fig. 2](#) is that the new funds entering the industry are more skilled than the existing funds, on average. This explanation predicts that younger funds

²³ Consistent with this argument, [Wahal and Wang \(2011\)](#) find that the entry of new funds with similar holdings exerts downward pressure on the incumbent funds' fees, performance, and survival rates.

²⁴ Also supporting the narrative is the fact that if we add *IndustrySize* as a control on the right-hand side of the regression underlying [Fig. 4](#), the downward trend in the figure disappears and none of the age fixed effects is significantly positive. The results are not plotted, to save space.

Table 7

Time-series relation between fund age and fund performance.

This table shows results from estimating a panel model with dependent variable *GrossR*, the fund's benchmark-adjusted gross return. *FundAge* is the number of years since the fund's first offer date. *IndustrySize* is the total assets under management (AUM) of all active equity mutual funds divided by the total market cap of all stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. *FundSize* is the fund's total AUM at the end of the previous month, inflated to millions of 2011 dollars using the total market cap of stocks in CRSP. Specifications that do not include *FundSize* use the ordinary least squares fixed effect (OLS FE) estimator; those that do include *FundSize* use the recursive demeaning (RD) estimator. The first three columns in each panel use all observations; the last three columns use only funds that are at least three years old. We multiply the slopes on *FundAge* by 1,000 to make them easier to read. *t*-statistics clustered by sector \times month are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Main sample (March 1993–December 2011)</i>						
<i>FundAge</i>	−0.123 (−3.00)	0.283 (2.19)	0.277 (2.10)	−0.102 (−2.37)	0.281 (2.19)	0.267 (2.02)
<i>IndustrySize</i>		−0.0845 (−3.02)	−0.0794 (−2.77)		−0.0799 (−2.86)	−0.0746 (−2.60)
<i>FundSize</i>			−0.264 (−0.78)			−0.259 (−0.77)
Number of observations	283,046	283,046	270,556	248,050	248,050	238,426
Fund ages	All	All	All	≥ 3 years	≥ 3 years	≥ 3 years
<i>Panel B: Extended sample (January 1979–December 2011)</i>						
<i>FundAge</i>	−0.0845 (−4.00)	0.0832 (0.82)	0.152 (1.28)	−0.0729 (−3.43)	0.0934 (0.93)	0.153 (1.29)
<i>IndustrySize</i>		−0.0302 (−1.70)	−0.0440 (−2.11)		−0.0298 (−1.69)	−0.0417 (−2.01)
<i>FundSize</i>			−0.220 (−1.48)			−0.204 (−1.39)
Number of observations	314,580	314,580	285,350	277,381	277,381	252,222
Fund ages	All	All	All	≥ 3 years	≥ 3 years	≥ 3 years

should outperform older funds in a typical month. In this subsection, we test this prediction and find empirical support for it.

This supporting evidence is particularly favorable to our explanation because it suggests that the composition effect that we emphasize is stronger than the learning-on-the-job effect, which pulls in the opposite direction. Learning on the job makes older funds perform better, so, if this effect were strong enough, it would invalidate the above prediction. Our evidence suggests that this opposing effect is not strong enough. Despite its potential presence, we find that younger funds tend to outperform older funds, which supports the idea that the newly entering funds tend to be more skilled than the incumbents.

To test the above prediction, we examine age-based investment strategies. Each month, we assign funds to four portfolios based on fund age: [0, 3], (3, 6], (6, 10], and > 10 years. We calculate the portfolios' equal-weighted average benchmark-adjusted gross and net returns over the following month, at the end of which we rebalance. Table 8 shows the average returns of the age-sorted portfolios, along with return differences across the portfolios.

Table 8 shows that younger funds tend to outperform older funds, especially based on gross returns. All six young-minus-old differences in gross returns are positive, and four of them are statistically significant. The youngest funds (age ≤ 3 years) outperform the oldest funds (age > 10 years) by a statistically significant 7.2 bps per month, or 0.9% per year, in the main sample. While the returns of the youngest funds could be boosted by the incubation bias, the funds aged between three and six years, which are immune to this bias according to Evans (2010), also outperform the oldest funds, by the statistically significant

amount of over 0.5% per year. For the extended sample, the return difference between the (3, 6] and > 10 portfolios is even larger than that between the [0, 3] and > 10 portfolios (9.6 bps versus 7.5 bps per month), suggesting that the incubation bias is not responsible for our results. For that sample, even the return difference between the (6, 10] and > 10 portfolios is statistically significant. Finally, an *F*-test, whose *p*-values are reported in the last column of Table 8, rejects the null hypothesis that the average benchmark-adjusted returns are equal across the four age-sorted portfolios. We thus conclude that younger funds tend to outperform older funds based on gross benchmark-adjusted returns.

Based on net returns, the young-minus-old portfolio differences tend to be smaller. The point estimates are positive in five of the six cases, but they are statistically significant only between the [0, 3] and > 10 portfolios. Therefore, we cannot reliably conclude that investors buying young funds outperform those buying old funds. The younger funds appear to be able to capture some of their higher skill by charging higher fees. The average annual expense ratios in the four age-sorted portfolios in our main sample are 1.35% (youngest funds), 1.30%, 1.27%, and 1.17% (oldest funds).

The age results in Table 7 are obtained from regressions that include fund fixed effects. Therefore, those earlier results compare the performance of a typical fund at different ages. In contrast, Table 8 compares the performance of young and old funds in a typical month. The negative age-performance relation thus seems to hold not only within but also across funds. Both the within-fund and across-fund performance differences are consistent with our narrative. The across-fund results rhyme well

Table 8

Investment strategies based on fund age.

This table shows average returns of portfolios containing mutual funds of different ages. *FundAge* is the number of years since the fund's first offer date. At the beginning of each month, we assign mutual funds to portfolios based on their age at the end of the coming month. Columns 2–5 show the portfolios' average equal-weighted benchmark-adjusted gross (*GrossR*) and net (*NetR*) returns, in percent per month. The next three columns show the average difference in benchmark-adjusted returns between portfolios. The last column contains the *p*-value from an *F*-test of whether the four age-sorted portfolios have the same average benchmark-adjusted return, clustering by calendar date.

	Average portfolio return for fund age				Average differences for fund age			<i>F</i> - test
	[0, 3]	(3, 6]	(6, 10]	> 10	[0,3] - (> 10)	(3,6] - (> 10)	(6,10] - (> 10)	<i>p</i> -value
<i>Panel A: Main sample (March 1993 – December 2011)</i>								
Average <i>GrossR</i>	0.084 (2.33)	0.056 (1.45)	0.020 (0.55)	0.012 (0.30)	0.072 (2.85)	0.043 (2.48)	0.008 (0.52)	0.014
Average <i>NetR</i>	–0.005 (–0.15)	–0.052 (–1.38)	–0.084 (–2.29)	–0.083 (–2.07)	0.077 (3.10)	0.031 (1.79)	–0.001 (–0.08)	0.008
<i>Panel B: Extended sample (January 1979 – December 2011)</i>								
Average <i>GrossR</i>	0.106 (2.14)	0.120 (2.58)	0.105 (2.41)	0.033 (1.03)	0.075 (1.77)	0.096 (2.75)	0.072 (2.63)	0.003
Average <i>NetR</i>	0.007 (0.18)	–0.018 (–0.46)	–0.033 (–0.86)	–0.057 (–1.78)	0.064 (2.69)	0.048 (1.77)	0.024 (1.06)	0.032

with the notion that the new funds entering the industry tend to be more skilled than the older funds. The within-fund results are consistent with the idea that as a fund grows older, its performance deteriorates as a result of industry growth and the related arrival of skilled competition.

4.8. Robustness

In this subsection, we examine the robustness of our main results regarding the nature of returns to scale. We summarize our results without tabulating them, to save space. Detailed results are presented in the Online Appendix, which is available on our websites.

First, we add family size to the right-hand side of the baseline regression specification from Table 3.²⁵ For any given fund, we compute *FamilySize* by adding up *FundSize* across all funds belonging to the fund's family, as classified by Morningstar. We add *FamilySize* to each regression specification in Table 3. The Fama-MacBeth regressions in Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) and Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2013b) are most comparable to our simple OLS estimates without fixed effects. Like those authors, we find a positive relation between returns and family size in those specifications, although the relation is mostly statistically insignificant. The relation flips to negative and usually insignificant when we include fund fixed effects. The coefficient on *FundSize* is negative but almost always insignificant in the relevant RD specifications. Finally, *IndustrySize* continues to enter with a significantly negative slope, as in Table 3. In short, the

addition of family size does not alter any of our conclusions.

The same conclusions continue to hold when we replace *FamilySize* with *FundAge*. From Table 7, when *FundAge* is included in the regression together with *IndustrySize* and *FundSize*, the coefficient on *FundSize* is negative but insignificant, whereas the coefficient on *IndustrySize* is significantly negative, just as in Table 3.

In addition to family size and fund age, we control for the state of the economy to capture any potential business-cycle variation in fund performance as well as industry size. We add two popular business-cycle variables to our regressions: a recession dummy, which is equal to one during a National Bureau of Economic Research recession and zero otherwise, and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index. Neither variable enters significantly in our regressions. In contrast, *IndustrySize* retains its significantly negative slope, supporting our conclusions.

Our conclusions remain unchanged also when we remove the largest observations of *FundSize* from our sample to alleviate a potential concern about outliers. Specifically, we delete all values of *FundSize* that exceed the 99th full-sample percentile (\$24.4 billion) and re-run our tests from Table 3. (Recall that we exclude fund sizes below \$15 million throughout, following prior literature.) While the negative slope coefficient on *FundSize* increases in magnitude, it remains statistically insignificant. The coefficient on *IndustrySize* remains negative and significant.

We also explore different functional forms of *FundSize*, specifically the natural logarithm of *FundSize* (under which a given percentage change in fund size has the same effect on performance whether the fund is large or small), the double logarithm of *FundSize*, and *FundSize* squared, in the baseline regression specification from Table 3. However, none of these additional functional forms of *FundSize* enter with a significant coefficient under the bias-free RD procedure in the counterpart of Table 3. In contrast, *IndustrySize* remains significant in all specifications in the main sample.

²⁵ The addition of *FamilySize* is motivated by Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), who find a positive relation between a fund's performance and the size of its fund family. Similarly, Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2013b) and Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2013) find a positive relation between family size and performance in international funds.

4.8.1. Manager-level analysis

Empirical studies of mutual funds typically explore data at the fund level.²⁶ Similarly, our main analysis assumes that skill is constant over time for each fund. For robustness, we now assume instead that skill is constant over time for a given manager. It is not clear a priori which assumption is more appropriate. The manager-level approach taken here allows a fund's skill to change if the fund changes managers. It also provides additional identifying variation from cases when a given manager works in multiple funds.

We obtain data on manager identities from Morningstar. We continue to use a fund-month panel, but we replace fund fixed effects with manager fixed effects. If a manager manages multiple funds in a given month, the same manager's fixed effect appears in multiple fund-month observations in that month. If a fund has multiple managers in a given month, we follow a simple seniority-based approach to assign the manager fixed effects.²⁷

We construct two manager-specific variables for each fund-month observation, *MgrSize* and *MgrAge*. *MgrSize* measures the fund's assets under management on a per-manager basis, aiming to capture the idea that a fund can deploy capital more easily if it has multiple co-managers. We consider two versions of *MgrSize*, taking into account the facts that a given manager can manage multiple funds and a given fund can have multiple managers. *MgrAge* measures the years of experience of the fund's managers. For each manager, we calculate two age measures: years since the manager joined the current fund, and years since he joined any fund in our sample. For each fund-month, we then average both of these age measures across the fund's managers as well as simply take the age of the fund's most senior manager, resulting in four different versions of *MgrAge*. A more detailed description of our manager-level variables is in the Online Appendix.

When we re-run our analysis in Table 3 with manager fixed effects, we obtain similar and even stronger results indicating industry-level decreasing returns to scale. *IndustrySize* has a significantly negative slope throughout, and both the coefficient's magnitude and its *t*-statistic are even more negative than in Table 3. Both *FundSize* and *MgrSize* have slope estimates that are negative but almost always insignificant, similar to Table 3. The results from Table 7 are also very similar when fund fixed effects are replaced with manager fixed effects. The slopes on *FundAge* and *MgrAge* are significantly negative, and their significance vanishes (and their signs usually flip to positive) after controlling for *IndustrySize*. To summarize, when we conduct the analysis at the manager level instead of the fund level, our conclusions continue to hold.

²⁶ Examples of the few exceptions that analyze manager-level data include Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Wu, Wermers, and Zechner (2013), and Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (2014).

²⁷ When there are multiple managers, we define the fund's manager to be the person who arrived at the fund first. If there is a tie, we take the person who stays at the fund longest. While sensible alternative approaches could also be used, this simple seniority-based approach is easy to implement as it requires only small modifications to our econometric methodology.

4.8.2. Sector size

If decreasing returns to scale are driven by competition with other funds, then funds in the same sector, which presumably follow similar investment strategies, should matter more than funds in other sectors. A fund's performance should, therefore, be more closely related to the size of the fund's sector than to the size of the entire industry. To evaluate this idea, we measure *SectorSize* by adding up fund sizes across all funds within a given sector, divided by the total market value of all stocks belonging to that sector.

We consider two versions of *SectorSize*. The first version uses the nine sectors corresponding to Morningstar's 3 × 3 stylebox (small growth, mid-cap value, etc.).²⁸ The number of funds in these sectors ranges from 126 in small value to 653 in large growth. The second version uses only three size-based sectors: large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap.²⁹ This simpler version of *SectorSize* is coarser than the first version, but it is immune to the difficulties associated with labeling funds as following value, growth, and blend styles.

We find that neither version of *SectorSize* exhibits a negative and significant relation with fund performance. While *FundSize* is insignificant throughout, *IndustrySize* is negative and significant. Interestingly, the addition of *SectorSize* makes the slope coefficient on *IndustrySize* even more negative compared with Table 3. These results suggest that decreasing returns to scale operate at the industry level instead of the sector level.

To summarize, while the idea of sector-level decreasing returns to scale seems sensible, we do not find support for it in the data. This negative result could very well stem from a measurement problem. Our proxies for sector size might not accurately measure the size of a fund's competition. For example, a mid-cap growth fund is likely to compete not only with funds classified as mid-cap growth but also with some large-cap growth funds and small-cap growth funds, all of which could potentially hold mid-cap stocks. In addition, given the disagreement among practitioners about what constitutes value and growth, a growth fund is likely to compete with many value funds and blend funds. Our simple measures of sector size could just be too noisy to be useful. A more accurate measurement of a fund's competition could reveal decreasing returns to scale operating at the sector level. We hope that such a task will be undertaken by future research.

²⁸ Details are in the Data Appendix. We allocate all CRSP stocks to the Morningstar 3 × 3 matrix using Ken French's 10 × 10 portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market. We use a 3–4–3 split for firm size and a 5–5 split for growth versus value. The three Morningstar size categories (small, mid-cap, and large) are mutually exclusive, and the blend category overlaps with both growth and value. For example, *SectorSize* for small-growth funds equals [size of small-growth funds + (1/2) size of small-blend funds] / [market capitalization of the 15 Fama-French portfolios in the bottom three size and bottom five book-to-market portfolios]. As another example, *SectorSize* for small-blend funds equals [size of all small-cap funds (blend + growth + value)] / [market capitalization of the 30 Fama-French portfolios in the bottom three size portfolios].

²⁹ For example, *SectorSize* for small-cap funds is the total size of all small-cap funds divided by the total market capitalization of all stocks in the bottom three Fama-French size deciles.

4.8.3. Alternative proxies for industry size

Our measure of industry size adds up the sizes of all active equity mutual funds. In reality, mutual funds compete not only with other mutual funds but also with many hedge funds and other institutional investors whose aggregate size is difficult to measure. To include those investors, we consider two rough alternative proxies for the aggregate industry size.

Our first proxy is one hundred minus the percent of US equity held directly by individuals, as reported in Table 1 of French (2008). This proxy measures the fraction of equity that is professionally managed, actively or passively, from 1980 to 2007. This fraction rises from 52.1% in 1980 to 78.5% in 2007. This proxy could be related to fund performance not only due to competition among active managers, as discussed earlier, but also through a mechanism in which individual investors play a special role. If we assume that individuals make worse trading decisions than professionals, the share of equity owned by individuals can be viewed as a proxy for the amount of mispricing in equity markets. An increase in the size of professional management coincides with a decrease in the individuals' share of equity, which reduces the pool of mispricing that can be exploited by active managers (Stambaugh, 2014). This mechanism can thus in principle induce a negative relation between fund performance and the size of aggregate professional management.

While the first proxy aims to capture the size of professional management, active or passive, our second proxy targets the broad notion of active management. The second proxy is equal to the first proxy minus the share of US equity that is passively managed in either index funds or exchange traded funds (ETFs). The ETF share is reported in French's Table 1. To estimate the share of index funds, we combine French's Tables 1 and 3. The latter table contains annual data for 1986 to 2006 covering defined benefit pension plans, defined contribution plans, public funds, and nonprofits.³⁰ French does not report percent invested passively for open-end mutual funds, so we collect those data from the Investment Company Institute Factbooks. The resulting proxy rises from 55.6% in 1986 to 59.4% in 2006. The two proxies are highly correlated over time (0.86).

The two proxies are noisy measures of aggregate industry size. The proxy data are available only at the annual frequency and only for a subset of our sample period, and they are not as clean as our mutual fund data. It seems clear that the two proxies capture their respective notions of aggregate industry size less precisely than *IndustrySize* captures the mutual fund segment of the active management industry.

To assess the robustness of our results regarding returns to scale, we replace *IndustrySize* by its expanded proxies and re-run the regressions in Table 3. We find that both proxies enter with significantly negative coefficients whether or not *FundSize* is included in the regression,

indicating decreasing returns to scale at the industry level. The industry slope estimates are similar in magnitude to those in Table 3, and the *t*-statistics range from -3.50 to -4.17 . The estimated slopes on *FundSize* are also negative but not statistically significant. Details of these results, as well as all other results in Section 4.8, are in the Online Appendix.

5. Conclusions

We empirically analyze the interaction between skill and scale in active mutual fund management. We identify two econometric biases that plague the OLS estimates of fund-level returns to scale. Our alternative bias-free estimates consistently point to decreasing returns to scale at the fund level, though we do not have enough power to establish their statistical significance. At the industry level, we find strong evidence of decreasing returns to scale. This negative relation between industry size and fund performance is stronger for funds with higher turnover and volatility as well as small-cap funds. Overall, our results strongly reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale in active management.

Our results on returns to scale shape our assessment of fund manager skill. We measure skill by the fund's gross alpha before its erosion by returns to scale. We find that the active management industry has become more skilled over time. Despite this rise in skill, average fund performance has failed to improve. These two facts can be reconciled by industry-level decreasing returns to scale: The observed steady growth in industry size has impeded funds' performance despite their improving skill. The growing industry size also helps explain our finding that performance typically declines over a fund's lifetime. We find that young funds tend to outperform their older peers, consistent with the new entrants being more skilled. However, as funds grow older, their performance tends to deteriorate due to continued industry growth and the associated arrival of skilled competition.

Our study raises interesting new questions. First, what are the sources of the observed upward trend in average skill? We suggest that this trend is driven mainly by new fund managers who are better educated or better acquainted with new technology, but we provide only indirect evidence. Second, what is the mechanism behind the negative relation between industry size and fund performance, which we refer to as industry-level decreasing returns to scale? We argue that a larger industry features more competition among active funds, which impedes the funds' performance. In addition, the rise of delegated asset management could have diminished active managers' profit opportunities by reducing individual equity ownership, a potential source of noise trading (Stambaugh, 2014). Third, does evidence exist of industry-level decreasing returns to scale in international data? For example, do active funds perform better in countries with smaller active management industries? Suggestive evidence is provided by Dyck, Lins, and Pomorski (2013), who find that active funds perform better outside the US, especially in emerging markets, in which active managers

³⁰ French obtained these data from Greenwich Associates. We have contacted Greenwich Associates in the hope of extending the data beyond 2006. Unfortunately, Greenwich Associates informed us that it no longer shares these data for academic purposes.

are likely to face less competition. We leave these challenges for future research.

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