

Behavioral Time Allocation

Overconfidence and Uncertainty Aversion in Time-Performance Tradeoffs

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- Focus on more intuitive decision tasks in milliseconds time
- In economics, decision times mostly informative “byproduct” in binary choice (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2021; Chabris et al., 2009; Fudenberg et al., 2018; Oud et al., 2016)

This Project

time as key input in a salient time-performance tradeoff in a “cognitive visual search task”

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Hypotheses:

- Over(under)confident agents take less (more) time
- Uncertainty averse (seeking) agents take more (less) time

Simple model

Experiment

Individual choice experiment with 91 participants

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Features

1. Stage I: Individual measures of
 - Performance
 - Subjective beliefs about performance (“overconfidence”)
 - Within-domain uncertainty aversion
2. Stage II: Endogenous time choice in salient time-performance tradeoff

Cognitive Visual Search Task

14	17	31	34
19	35	16	41
37	38	15	36
30	42	28	22

Cognitive Visual Search Task


14	17	31	34
19	35	16	41
37	38	15	36
30	42	28	22

Advantages:

- performance increasing in t
- precise estimates of time-dependent performance possible (large number of repetitions)

Measuring Performance

Seconds remaining:




14	17	31	34
19	35	16	41
37	38	15	36
30	42	28	22

Correct Answer: 100 points

Wrong Answer: 0 points

- 50 tasks with 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 seconds each
- Fit time-dependent three-parameter performance function (Dean et al., 2007) Performance function Performance fit


Performance Functions



Measuring Beliefs

Assessment 1: 4 seconds

- $\forall t \in (2, 3, 4, 5, 6)$



Belief Weighting Functions




Figure 1: This plot shows the estimated parameters from a Goldstein & Einhorn two parameter weighting function. The left panel uses pooled data from all participants and plots the resulting average function. The right panel shows the individual estimates.

Measuring Certainty Equivalents

4 seconds Decision Time					
Payout scheme A			Payout scheme B		
If correct:		If wrong:	If correct or wrong:		
1.	100 points	0 points	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	0 points
2.	100 points	0 points	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	5 points
3.	100 points	0 points	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	10 points
4.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	15 points
5.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	20 points
6.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	25 points
7.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	30 points
8.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	35 points
9.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	40 points
10.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	45 points
11.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	50 points
12.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	55 points
13.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	60 points
14.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	65 points
15.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	70 points
16.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	75 points
17.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	80 points
18.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	85 points
19.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	90 points
20.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	95 points
21.	100 points	0 points	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	100 points

- $\forall t \in (2, 3, 4, 5, 6)$
- Decision in randomly drawn row determines payoff scheme (for 10 tasks each)

NCE Weighting Functions





Figure 2: This plot shows the estimated parameters from a Goldstein & Einhorn two parameter weighting function. The left panel uses pooled data from all participants and plots the resulting average function. The right panel shows the individual estimates.

SPT: Cost of Time δ

$$\Pi(t) = \begin{cases} Y - \delta * t & \text{if correct} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



SPT: Two modes

Prospective


- Decide **ex-ante** on time for *all* subsequent tasks (40)
- Single decision

SPT: Two modes

Prospective

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- Single decision

0 seconds
(150 points)



5.0 seconds (0
points)

Seconds selected	4.2
Payoff if solved correctly	24.0 points
Payoff if solved incorrectly	0 points

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Simultaneous

- Decide individually **while solving** tasks (40)
- Mean time taken

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Points remaining:




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Simultaneous

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- Mean time taken

Points remaining:



- 4 time choices per individual (2 modes \times 2 costs)

Time decisions





Figure 3: This graph shows the time selected in the prospective mode and mean time taken (μ) in the simultaneous mode for both costs of time. p-values from pairwise t-tests.

Time decisions: Regression



Panel model with individual random effects, Cluster robust standard errors, clustered on the individual level

Distance from “optimal” action




Figure 4: This graph shows (time choice – t^*) in all four conditions. P-values from a t-test of the mean being equal to 0. μ provides the mean.

Conclusion

- Large heterogeneity in time choices, performance, beliefs about performance and within-domain uncertainty attitudes

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 - in addition, overconfidence and uncertainty aversion predict *prospective*, but *not simultaneous* time choices

Conclusion

- Large heterogeneity in time choices, performance, beliefs about performance and within-domain uncertainty attitudes
- Facing a time-performance tradeoff
 - the cost of time and indiv. performance predict time choices
 - in addition, overconfidence and uncertainty aversion predict *prospective*, but *not simultaneous* time choices
- In a high (low) cost-of-time environment, participants choose “too much” (“too little”) time

Thank you!

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Time-Performance Tradeoffs: Simple theory

- Generally:

$$t^* = \operatorname{argmax}_t R(t) = B(t) - C(t) \quad (1)$$

- Our setting:

$$t^* = \operatorname{argmax}_t \mathbb{E}[R(t)] = p(t) \times (Y - \delta \times t) \quad (2)$$

- Behavioral channels:

$$t^b = \operatorname{argmax}_t \mathbb{E}[R(t)] = w(\tilde{p}(t)) \times (Y - \delta \times t) \quad (3)$$

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Hypotheses

Based on the rational account, two hypotheses emerges:

1. A more performant (worse) agent chooses less (more) time: $p(t) \uparrow \rightarrow t^* \downarrow$,
 $p(t) \downarrow \rightarrow t \uparrow$
2. If the cost of time increases (decreases), an agents chooses less (more) time:
 $\delta \uparrow, t^b \downarrow, \delta \downarrow, t^b \uparrow$.

In addition, the *behavioral* explanation suggest the following additional channels:

3. An over(under)confident agent chooses less (more) time: $\tilde{p}(t) > p(t) \rightarrow t^b \downarrow$,
 $\tilde{p}(t) < p(t) \rightarrow t^b \uparrow$
4. An over(under)weighting agent chooses less (more) time: $w(\tilde{p}(t)) > \tilde{p}(t) \rightarrow t^{b'} \downarrow$,
 $w(\tilde{p}(t)) < \tilde{p}(t) \rightarrow t^{b'} \uparrow$

Time decisions as inattentive decisions

- Implemented time decision t^b as intermediate action between rational action t^* and some default choice t^d , which is *independent* on any deliberation.

$$t^b = m_t t^* + (1 - m_t) t^d$$

- t^* depends on “true” expected reward function
 $t^* = \operatorname{argmax} E[Y] = \operatorname{argmax} p(t) * (Y - \delta \times t)$
- Inattention in estimates about $p(t)$ main drivers of m_t .
- Two distinct channels how $p(t)^b \neq p(t)$ enters the decision process:
- Inattentive estimates about agent-specific characteristic
 $x_a^b = m_{x_a} x_a + (1 - m_{x_a}) x_a^d$ Hence $p(t, x_a) = m_{p_a} p(t, x_a) + m_{p_a} p(t)^d$ generating
“over/under confidence”
- Conditional on some estimate x_a^b , agents are likely to be inattentive to the true
 $p(t|x_a^b)^b$ as $p(t|x_a^b) = m_p * p(t|x_a^b) + (1 - m_p) * p^d$, where p^d is some *time-invariant*
default value. This generate non-standard subjective probability weighting.

The Belief Measure

- We define the median of the belief distribution of participant i at time t as $b^{\text{med}}(t)$
 - We fit a two parameter gamma distribution if a participant choose more than 1 bin and obtain moments from the fitted distribution
 - We calculate moments of a isosceles trapezoid distribution if participants choose only 1 bin
- We furthermore construct a measure of overconfidence, defined as:

$$\text{overconfidence}_i := \sum_{t=2}^6 \begin{cases} b^{\text{med}}(t) - \widehat{p^l(t)} & \text{if } b^{\text{med}}(t) < \widehat{p^l(t)} \\ 0 & \text{if } \widehat{p^l(t)} < b^{\text{med}}(t) < \widehat{p^u(t)} \\ b^{\text{med}}(t) - \widehat{p^u(t)} & \text{if } b^{\text{med}}(t) > \widehat{p^u(t)} \end{cases}$$

- This measure is scaled by its own SD to facilitate interpretation

Decision screen in prospective planning condition

Section 3: Decision time (Phase 1)


The **exchange factor**, which indicates by how much your reward is reduced per second of decision time you plan more, is: **30 points per second**.

Please decide now how much decision time you would like to have for this exchange factor!
(Click on the slider to see the selection point).



Here you can **simulate** the consequences of your decisions from the slider. By clicking on the "start timer" button you start the familiar time display with the time you have selected. Feel free to test different configurations for different times.

Simulation decision time:



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Decision screen in simultaneous condition

Round 1: Task 1

Points remaining:



62	68	47	50
75	65	59	54
48	60	70	71
53	61	63	45

Correct Answer: 72 points

Wrong Answer: 0 points

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Performance




- We estimate an individuals performance function following McElree & Carrasco (1999) and Dean et al. (2007), i.e.

$$\widehat{p(t)} = \beta(1 - e^{-(t-\delta)/\lambda})$$

- 95% Wilson score CIs for each t are calculated to estimate the upper ($\widehat{p^u(t)}$) and lower ($\widehat{p^l(t)}$) bound of performance
- Optimizing $\max_t (\widehat{p(t)} * (Y - \delta * t)) \quad \forall \delta \in \{10, 30\}$, t^* is obtained
- Using $\widehat{p^u(t)}$ and $\widehat{p^l(t)}$ instead of $\widehat{p(t)}$ and maximizing provides upper and lower bounds for t^*



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Optimization



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Learning Effects Marginal Effect



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Learning Effects - Regression

Table 1: Learning over time

	Learning over time
	Performance
Round	0.0002 (0.990)
Time	2.659 (7.170)
I(Time^2)	-0.373 (-3.738)
I(Time^3)	0.022 (2.653)
Constant	-5.309 (-12.297)
individual dummies	Yes
Observations	22,750
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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