#### **Behavioral Time Allocation**

Overconfidence and Uncertainty Aversion in Time-Performance Tradeoffs

Experiment: Stage II

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- Focus on more intuitive decision tasks in miliseconds time
- In economics, decision times mostly informative "byproduct" in binary choice

## This Project

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• Salient time-performance tradeoff in a "cognitive visual search task"

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Salient time-performance tradeoff in a "cognitive visual search task"

#### Behavioral hypotheses:

- Over(under)confident agents take less (more) time
- Uncertainty averse (seeking) agents take more (less) time



# Experiment

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• Individual choice experiment with 91 participants, prereg. at AEA RCT, carried out in June/July 2021

### Experiment

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#### **Features**

- 1. Stage I: Individual measures of
  - Performance
  - Subjective beliefs about performance
  - Within-domain uncertainty aversion
- 2. Stage II: Endogenous time choice in salient time-performance tradeoff

Experiment: Stage II

14	17	31	34
19	35	16	41
37	38	15	36
30	42	28	22


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#### Main advantages:

- performance increasing in *t*
- precise estimates of time-dependent performance possible (large number of repetitions)


### Measuring Performance



• 50 tasks with 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 seconds each

 Fit time-dependent three-parameter performance function (Dean et al., 2007) Performance function (Performance fit)

### Performance Functions




# Measuring Beliefs

Motivation

#### Assessment 1: 4 seconds

•  $\forall t \in (2, 3, 4, 5, 6)$ 



### **Belief Weighting Functions**




Figure 1: This plot shows the estimated parameters from a Goldstein & Einhorn two parameter weighting function. The left panel uses pooled data from all participants and plots the resulting average function. The right panel shows the individual estimates.

### Measuring Certainty Equivalents

Payout scheme A   Payout scheme B   If correct: If wrong:	4 seconds Decision Time					пе
1. 100 points	Payout scheme A				Payout scheme B	
2. 100 points		If correct:	If wrong:			If correct or wrong:
3. 100 points	1.	100 points	0 points	•	0	0 points
4. 100 points	2.	100 points	0 points	•	0	5 points
5.         100 points         0 points         0         20 points           6.         100 points         0 points         0         25 points           7.         100 points         0 points         0         30 points           8.         100 points         0 points         0         35 points           10.         100 points         0 points         0         40 points           10.         100 points         0 points         0         50 points           11.         100 points         0 points         0         50 points           12.         100 points         0 points         0         55 points           13.         100 points         0 points         0         60 points           14.         100 points         0 points         0         65 points           15.         100 points         0 points         0         70 points           16.         100 points         0 points         0         80 points           17.         100 points         0 points         0         80 points           19.         100 points         0 points         0         90 points           20.         100 points         0 points	3.	100 points	0 points	•	0	10 points
6. 100 points	4.	100 points	0 points	0	•	15 points
7. 100 points	5.	100 points	0 points	0	•	20 points
8. 100 points	6.	100 points	0 points	0	•	25 points
9. 100 points	7.	100 points	0 points	0	•	30 points
10.         100 points         0 points         0         45 points           11.         100 points         0 points         0         50 points           12.         100 points         0 points         0         55 points           13.         100 points         0 points         0         60 points           14.         100 points         0 points         0         65 points           15.         100 points         0 points         0         70 points           16.         100 points         0 points         0         80 points           17.         100 points         0 points         0         80 points           18.         100 points         0 points         0         85 points           19.         100 points         0 points         0         90 points           20.         100 points         0 points         0         95 points	8.	100 points	0 points	0	•	35 points
11.         100 points         0 points         0         50 points           12.         100 points         0 points         0         55 points           13.         100 points         0 points         0         60 points           14.         100 points         0 points         0         65 points           15.         100 points         0 points         0         70 points           16.         100 points         0 points         0         80 points           17.         100 points         0 points         0         80 points           18.         100 points         0 points         0         85 points           19.         100 points         0 points         0         90 points           20.         100 points         0 points         0         95 points	9.	100 points	0 points	0	•	40 points
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14.         100 points         0 points         ○         65 points           15.         100 points         0 points         ○         70 points           16.         100 points         0 points         ○         75 points           17.         100 points         0 points         ○         80 points           18.         100 points         0 points         ○         85 points           19.         100 points         0 points         ○         90 points           20.         100 points         0 points         ○         95 points	12.	100 points	0 points	0	•	55 points
15.         100 points         Opoints         O         To points           16.         100 points         O points         O         To points           17.         100 points         O points         O         80 points           18.         100 points         O points         O         85 points           19.         100 points         O points         O         90 points           20.         100 points         O points         O         95 points	13.	100 points	0 points	0	•	60 points
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	19.	100 points	0 points	0	•	90 points
21. 100 points	20.	100 points	0 points	0	•	95 points
	21.	100 points	0 points	0	•	100 points

- $\forall t \in (2, 3, 4, 5, 6)$
- Decision in randomly drawn row determines payoff scheme (for 10 tasks each)

### NCE Weighting Functions





Figure 2: This plot shows the estimated parameters from a Goldstein & Einhorn two parameter weighting function. The left panel uses pooled data from all participants and plots the resulting average function. The right panel shows the individual estimates.

### SPT: Cost of Time $\delta$

$$\Pi(t) = \begin{cases} Y - \delta * t & \text{if correct} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



#### **Prospective**

- Decide **ex-ante** on time for *all* subsequent tasks (40)
- Single decision

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- Mean time taken

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5.0 seconds (0 points)

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
- Decide ex-ante on time for all subsequent tasks (40)
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5.0 seconds (0 points)

#### **Simultaneous**

- Decide individually while solving tasks (40)
- Mean time taken



4 time choices per individual (2 modes × 2 costs)

#### Time decisions





Figure 3: This graph shows the time selected in the prospective mode and mean time taken  $(\mu)$  in the simultaneous mode for both costs of time. p-values from pairwise t-tests.

### Time decisions: Regression



Panel model with individual random effects, Cluster robust standard errors, clustered on the individual level

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### Distance from "optimal" action




Figure 4: This graph shows (time choice  $-t^*$ ) in all four conditions. P-values from a t-test of the mean being equal to 0.  $\mu$  provides the mean.



#### **Regarding Research Question:**

- In Speed-Performance tradeoffs:
  - time choices can be explained by (i) the cost of time and (ii) indiv. performance in the task

Experiment: Stage II

• in addition, (iii) overconfidence and (iv) uncertainty aversion also explain prospective, but not simultaneous time choices

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- In a high (low) cost-of-time environment, participants choose "too much" ("too little") time

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- in addition, (iii) overconfidence and (iv) uncertainty aversion also explain prospective, but not simultaneous time choices
- In a high (low) cost-of-time environment, participants choose "too much" ("too little") time
- Very special setting: room for behavioral effects potentially much higher in more "realistic" settings

## Thank you!

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# Time-Performance Tradeoffs: Simple theory

• Generally:

$$t^* = \operatorname{argmax}_t R(t) = B(t) - C(t) \tag{1}$$

• Our setting:

$$t^* = \operatorname{argmax}_t \mathbb{E}[R(t)] = p(t) \times (Y - \delta \times t)$$
 (2)

Behavioral channels:

$$t^{b} = \operatorname{argmax}_{t} \mathbb{E}[R(t)] = w(\tilde{p}(t)) \times (Y - \delta \times t)$$
(3)

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### Hypotheses

Based on the rational account, two hypotheses emerges:

- 1. A more performant (worse) agent chooses less (more) time:  $p(t) \uparrow \rightarrow t^* \downarrow$ ,  $p(t) \downarrow \rightarrow t \uparrow$
- 2. If the cost of time increases (decreases), an agents chooses less (more) time:  $\delta \uparrow, t^b \downarrow, \delta \downarrow, t^b \uparrow$ .

In addition, the *behavioral* explanation suggest the following additional channels:

- 3. An over(under)confident agent chooses less (more) time:  $\tilde{p}(t) > p(t) \to t^b \downarrow$ ,  $\tilde{p}(t) < p(t) \to t^b \uparrow$
- 4. An over(unter)weighting agent chooses less (more) time:  $w(\tilde{p}(t)) > \tilde{p}(t) \to t^{b'} \downarrow$ ,  $w(\tilde{p}(t)) < \tilde{p}(t) \to t^{b'} \uparrow$

#### Time decisions as inattentive decisions

• Implemented time decision  $t^b$  as intermediate action between rational action  $t^*$  and some default choice  $t^d$ , which is *independent* on any deliberation.

$$t^b = m_t t^* + (1 - m_t) t^d$$

- t\* depends on "true" expected reward function
   t\* = argmax E[Y] = argmax p(t) \* (Y δ × t)
- Inattention in estimates about p(t) main drivers of  $m_t$ .
- Two distinct channels how  $p(t)^b \neq p(t)$  enters the decision process:
- Inattentive estimates about agent-specific characteristic  $x_a^b = m_{x_a}x_a + (1 m_{x_a})x_a^d$  Hence  $p(t, x_a) = m_{p_a}p(t, x_a) + m_{p_a}p(t)^d$  generating "over/under confidence"
- Conditional on some estimate  $x_a^b$ , agents are likely to be inattentive to the true  $p(t|x_a^b)^b$  as  $p(t|x_a^b) = m_p * p(t|x_a^b) + (1 m_p) * p^d$ , where  $p^d$  is some time-invariant default value. This generate non-standard subjective probability weighting.

#### The Belief Measure

- We define the median of the belief distribution of participant i at time t as  $b^{\text{med}}(t)$ 
  - We fit a two parameter gamma distribution if a participant choose more than 1 bin and obtain moments from the fitted distribution
  - We calculate moments of a isosceles trapezoid distribution if participants choose only 1 bin
- We furthermore construct a measure of overconfidence, defined as:

$$\text{overconfidence}_i := \sum_{t=2}^6 \begin{cases} b^{\text{med}}(t) - \widehat{p^l(t)} & \text{if} \quad b^{\text{med}}(t) < \widehat{p^l(t)} \\ 0 & \text{if} \quad \widehat{p^l(t)} < b^{\text{med}}(t) < \widehat{p^u(t)} \\ b^{\text{med}}(t) - \widehat{p^u(t)} & \text{if} \quad b^{\text{med}}(t) > \widehat{p^u(t)} \end{cases}$$

This measure is scaled by its own SD to facilitate interpretation

### Decision screen in prospective planning condition

#### Section 3: Decision time (Phase 1)

The exchange factor, which indicates by how much your reward is reduced per second of decision time you plan more, is: 30 points per second.

Please decide now how much decision time you would like to have for this exchange factor! (Click on the slider to see the selection point).




Here you can **simulate** the consequences of your decisions from the slider. By clicking on the "start timer" button you start the familiar time display with the time you have selected. Feel free to test different configurations for different times.

#### Simulation decision time:



### Decision screen in simultaneous condition

Round 1: Task 1



Wrong Answer: 0 points



### Performance


• We estimate an individuals performance function following McElree & Carrasco (1999) and Dean et al. (2007), i.e.

$$\widehat{p(t)} = \beta(1 - e^{-(t-\delta)/\lambda)})$$

- 95% Wilson score CIs for each t are calculated to estimate the upper  $(\widehat{p^u(t)})$  and lower  $(\widehat{p^l(t)})$  bound of performance
- Optimizing  $\max_t (\widehat{p(t)} * (Y \delta * t)) \quad \forall \ \delta \in \{10, 30\}, \ t^* \text{ is obtained}$
- Using  $\widehat{p^u(t)}$  and  $\widehat{p'(t)}$  instead of  $\widehat{p(t)}$  and maximizing provides upper and lower bounds for  $t^*$




## Optimization



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### Learning Effects Marginal Effect



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# Learning Effects - Regression

Table 1: Learning over time

	Learning over time
	Learning over time
	Performance
Round	0.0002
	(0.990)
Time	2.659
	(7.170)
I(Time^2)	-0.373
	(-3.738)
I(Time^3)	0.022
	(2.653)
Constant	-5.309
	(-12.297)
individual dummies	Yes
Observations	22,750
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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