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**December 2014
RWP14-057**

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The Political Legacy of American Slavery^{*}

Avidit Acharya,[†] Matthew Blackwell,[‡] and Maya Sen[§]

November 21, 2014

Abstract

We show that contemporary differences in political attitudes across counties in the American South trace their origins to slavery's prevalence more than 150 years ago. Whites who currently live in Southern counties that had high shares of slaves in 1860 are more likely to identify as a Republican, oppose affirmative action policies, and express racial resentment and colder feelings toward blacks. These results cannot be explained by existing theories, including the theory of racial threat. To explain these results, we offer evidence for a new theory involving the historical persistence of racial attitudes. We argue that, following the Civil War, Southern whites faced political and economic incentives to reinforce racist norms and institutions. This produced racially conservative political attitudes, which in turn have been passed down locally across generations. Our results challenge the interpretation of a vast literature on racial attitudes in the American South.

JEL Classification Codes: N32, N91, O17

Key words: slavery, institutions, norms, persistence, development

^{*}We thank Stephen Ansolabehere, David Broockman, Cathy Cohen, Stanley Engerman, Gerald Gamm, Hein Goemans, Justin Grimmer, Steven Hahn, Jennifer Hochschild, Gary King, Corrine McConnaughy, Clayton Nall, Alexandra Pagano, Kevin Quinn, Karthick Ramakrishnan, Marc Ratkovic, John Roemer, Daria Roithmayr, Cyrus Samii, Ken Shotts, Brandon Stewart, and seminar participants at BU, Columbia, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard Law School, Princeton, Rochester, Stanford, Warwick, UC-Berkeley, UC-Riverside, UPenn, and USC for comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Michael Haines, Eitan Hersh, and Heather O'Connell for sharing their data with us.

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1 Introduction

For the first 250 years of American history, white landowners, predominantly from the South, enslaved more than four million individuals of African descent. This “peculiar institution,” as it was sometimes called, defined the social, economic, and political landscape of the American South throughout this period. Slavery was so crucial to the South that one Georgia newspaper editor wrote, “negro slavery is the South, and the South is negro slavery” (cited in [Faust, 1988](#)). Yet despite slavery’s prominence in shaping American history, and despite volumes written by historians on its consequences, social scientists have largely overlooked how America’s slavery might continue influence its *contemporary* politics. Given recent findings on the long-term consequences of events and institutions from the distant past ([Dell, 2010](#); [Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011](#); [Acemoglu, García-Jimeno and Robinson, 2012](#); [Voigtländer and Voth, 2012](#); [Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013](#)), it would be surprising if such a fundamental aspect of American history had no persistent impact on American politics.

In this paper, we estimate the effect of the local prevalence of slavery—an institution that was abolished nearly 150 years ago—on present-day political attitudes in the American South. Drawing on a sample of more than 36,000 Southern whites, we show that whites who currently live in counties that had high concentrations of slaves in 1860 are on average more conservative and express colder feelings toward African Americans than whites who live elsewhere in the South. That is, the larger the number of slaves in his or her county of residence in 1860, the greater the probability that a white Southerner today will identify as a Republican, express opposition to affirmative action, and express colder feelings towards African Americans. We show that these differences are robust to accounting for a variety of factors, including geography and mid-19th century economic conditions and politics. These results also strengthen when we instrument for the prevalence of slavery using geographic variation in cotton growing conditions. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to demonstrate quantitatively the lasting effects of slavery’s prevalence on contemporary political attitudes in the United States.

Existing theories of American political behavior cannot explain our results. For example, given the correlation between slavery in 1860 and contemporary shares of black population, we consider the possibility that white racial attitudes vary with contemporaneous proportions of black population today—the central finding of the literature on racial threat ([Key, 1949](#); [Blalock, 1967](#); [Blumer, 1958](#)). However, when we estimate the direct effect of slavery on contemporary attitudes, we find that contemporary shares of

black population explain very little of slavery's effects. In addition, we also test various other explanations, including the possibility that slavery's effects are driven exclusively by pre-Civil War racism, post-Civil War population shifts, or persistent inequality between African-Americans and whites. We find no evidence that these other factors can fully account for our results.

To explain our results, we therefore present a new theory of the persistence of racial attitudes, which focuses on events that took place in the decades after the Civil War. We argue that emancipation was a cataclysmic event that undermined Southern whites' political and economic power. As suggested by [Key \(1949\)](#) and [Du Bois \(\[1935\] 1999\)](#), the sudden enfranchisement of blacks was politically threatening to whites, who for centuries had enjoyed exclusive political power. In addition, emancipation undermined whites' economic power by abruptly increasing black wages, raising labor costs, and threatening the viability of the Southern agricultural economy ([Du Bois, \[1935\] 1999](#); [Alston and Ferrie, 1993](#)). Taken together, these political and economic changes gave Southern white elites an incentive to promote anti-black sentiment in their local communities by encouraging violence towards blacks, racist attitudes, and the institutionalization of racist policies such as Black Codes and Jim Crow laws ([Roithmayr, 2010](#)). This intensified white racism in former slaveholding areas, and produced racially conservative political attitudes that have been passed down locally, one generation to the next.

We provide empirical support for this theory by showing that areas of the South that were the earliest to eliminate the political and economic incentives for anti-black violence—for example, by adopting new technologies such as tractors that reduced the demand for black farm labor—are also the areas in which slavery's long term effects have most attenuated. Furthermore, as evidence for cultural transmission being an important pathway for the inter-generational transfer of attitudes, we show that a group that recently settled in the American South—the children of immigrants—do not meaningfully vary in political attitudes across former slaveholding and non-slaveholding counties the way other Southern whites do.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we motivate our hypothesis that the historical prevalence of slavery affects modern-day political attitudes. We discuss our data in Section 3, and present our core results linking the prevalence of slavery in 1860 and contemporary attitudes in Section 4. In Section 5, we consider and provide evidence against three main competing theories. In Section 6, we provide evidence in favor of our theory of historical persistence, paying close attention to post-Reconstruction era

political and economic incentives. Section 7 concludes by discussing the broader implications of our research for scholarship in American political behavior.

2 How Slavery May Affect Attitudes Today

We orient our analysis toward the Southern “Black Belt” (or the “Cotton Belt”), the hook-shaped swath of land that was the locus of antebellum slavery (Figure 1). Scholars have noted that the whites of the Black Belt were particularly prominent in Southern politics and are more conservative than whites elsewhere in the South. As V.O. Key wrote, it is “the whites of the black belts who have the deepest and most immediate concern about the maintenance of white supremacy,” and “if the politics of the South revolves around any single theme, it is that of the role of the black belts” (Key, 1949). Furthermore, these parts of the South have had an enormous influence on national politics. Members of Congress from these areas held influential positions, effectively exercising veto power during the development of the welfare state in the 1920s and 30s (Katznelson, Geiger and Kryder, 1993). Given these facts, the question we are interested in is: Why did whites in the Black Belt become so much more racially and politically conservative than whites elsewhere in the South?

2.1 Postbellum Incentives for Oppression and the Persistence of Political Attitudes

Our hypothesis is that the political and racial attitudes of the Black Belt diverged from other parts of the South after the abolition of slavery. After emancipation in 1865, Southern whites faced two interrelated threats. The first was political. The abrupt enfranchisement of blacks threatened white control over local politics (Du Bois, [1935] 1999; Key, 1949; Kousser, 1974). This gave whites in former slaveholding counties an incentive to promote an environment of violence and intimidation against the new freedmen, with the purpose of disfranchising them (Du Bois, [1935] 1999; Kousser, 1974). Since black populations were greatest in former slaveholding counties, it was in these counties that the Southern elite exerted greater efforts toward repression and violence (Kousser, 1974).¹ Such repression both required and supported social norms

¹ Although they set up local formal and informal institutions such as Jim Crow laws, it was through violence that white Southerners initially repressed blacks. This violence was often organized, and perpetrated by groups like the Ku Klux Klan, and it manifested itself in the many lynchings that took place after emancipation (Du Bois, [1935] 1999).




Figure 1: Estimated proportion slave in 1860 by county.

that put blacks in an inferior position to whites (Myrdal, 1944; Logan, 1954; Du Bois, [1935] 1999). Importantly, whereas institutionalized slavery only required the support of the white political and economic elite, widespread repression and political violence required the involvement of entire communities (Du Bois, [1935] 1999) and was achieved via a cooperative strategy among whites to subjugate blacks (Roithmayr, 2010).

The second threat to white elites was economic. The emancipation of slaves after the Civil War was a major shock to the Southern economy: unlike in the slavery period, blacks now had to be paid (closer to) market wages (Higgs, 1977). Furthermore, emancipation brought blacks the freedom over the amount of labor they supplied, and ex-slaves quite understandably chose to work less than they had under slavery (Ransom and Sutch, 2001). This both reduced the labor supply and increased labor costs sharply, threatening the Southern agricultural economy (Du Bois, [1935] 1999; Alston and Ferrie, 1993).² Whites therefore had an incentive to establish new forms of labor

²Some of these concerns were mitigated by the sharecropping system that became pervasive in the

coercion that could replace slavery.

To this end, white landowners encouraged violence against blacks, as well as other social practices that could be used to lower black wages, control black labor, and suppress black mobility (Alston and Ferrie, 1993; Blackmon, 2008; Lichtenstein, 1996). For example, Wiener (1978, p. 62) describes how “planters used [Ku Klux] Klan terror to keep blacks from leaving the plantation regions, to get them to work, and keep them at work, in the cotton field.” In fact, even poor whites were complicit with the landowning elite, and would engage in and support violent acts towards blacks, even though such violence could presumably lower white wages as well (Blackmon, 2008).³ Whites used violence to enforce extra-legal restrictions on black landownership and black education as well, leading African Americans to become more economically dependent on whites, increasing the labor supply available to white landowners, and lowering black wages (Ransom and Sutch, 2001; Kousser, 1974; Wright, 1986). Crucially, the denial of economic and political rights to African Americans in the postbellum period was illegal due to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, so these norms required local enforcement. In contrast, these norms were crucial parts of state law in the antebellum period. We argue that this shift encouraged white elites to use local violence and coercion to control black labor.

This violence intensified racially hostile attitudes, which expanded across local white communities in a manner consistent with existing theories of the diffusion of political opinions from elites to the public (e.g., Zaller, 1992; DeGroot, 1974).⁴ These attitudes were then passed down from one generation to the next through both cultural and institutional channels, for example membership to organizations like the Ku Klux Klan

post-bellum period. Under this system, white landowners divided up large plantations into smaller farm units and rented these farms out to families for a fixed share of the crop. This did align the incentives of the planters and the laborers to some extent (Ransom and Sutch, 2001, p.88-89), but these arrangements do not reduce the incentives of planters to further bolster their position in the labor market.

³Blackmon (2008) describes instances during the postbellum period in which these whites would falsely accuse blacks of not paying back a debt, and then use the court system and “peonage” practices to exact payments from them. He also describes the perverse incentives created by convict leasing for other similar false accusations, which led to very high levels of incarceration in the post-Reconstruction decades.

⁴The political and economic incentives for racial violence and oppression is likely to have produced racially hostile attitudes among whites through psychological and other channels. For example, white might have developed racially hostile attitudes to minimize the “cognitive dissonance” associated with engaging in racially-targeted violence towards blacks. Theories in social psychology, beginning with the work of Festinger (1962), would suggest that engaging in violence could produce hostile attitudes among members of the perpetrating group, towards the victim group, if individuals from the perpetrating group seek to minimize such dissonance.

(KKK), public support for segregationist policies, and support for the implementation of Jim Crow laws. The intergenerational transfer of such preferences and attitudes is consistent both with theories of inter-generational socialization that are rooted in the works of [Boyd and Richerson \(1988\)](#) and [Bisin and Verdier \(2000\)](#) in cultural anthropology and economics, and [Campbell et al. \(1980\)](#) and [Jennings and Niemi \(1968\)](#) in political science.⁵ Our argument is not that these were completely isolated communities, with beliefs were passed down without modification, but, rather, that we can still detect some part of the divergence that developed in the postbellum period, despite the multitude of other social and economic changes that occurred in the South. In sum, our theory is that the political and economic incentives following emancipation led to the persistence of racially conservative political attitudes. Importantly, our argument is *not* that racism did not exist before the Civil War, but that postbellum incentives exacerbated the political differences between former slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas.

Our argument is consistent with a growing literature demonstrating attitudinal persistence in other contexts (see [Nunn, 2012](#), for an overview). For example, [Nunn and Wantchekon \(2011\)](#) show that Africans whose ancestors were targeted by slave traders have higher levels of mistrust today than other Africans. [Voigtländer and Voth \(2012\)](#) find that anti-Semitic pogroms during the Black Death predict anti-Semitism and support for the Nazi party in the 20th century. [Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn \(2013\)](#) show that areas of the world that adopted the plow in their agriculture in the distant past are areas in which attitudes towards women are less favorable today. Our paper shares much in common with this literature. For example, common to both our paper and the work of [Voigtländer and Voth \(2012\)](#) is the idea that violence can create persistently hostile cultural and political attitudes among members and descendants of the perpetrating group towards the victim group, and common to our work and that of [Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn \(2013\)](#) is the idea that geographic conditions (plow-suitability in their case and cotton suitability in ours) shaped cultural, political, and economic incentives, which in turn drive *attitudes*.

⁵Of course, in our theory, it is socio-political *attitudes*, rather than *partisanship*, that are passed down from parent to children. This makes our theory consistent with the partisan realignment that took place in the 1960s, given the assumption that partisanship depends at least in some part on attitudes.

2.2 Other Hypotheses

Other theories may also explain why slavery is predictive of current-day political attitudes. As [Key \(1949\)](#) suggested, one possibility is that the prevalence of slavery has led to high concentrations of African Americans still living in parts of the South. These high concentrations of African Americans today could in turn threaten white dominance, resulting in whites contemporaneously adopting more conservative political beliefs. The literature supporting this idea of “racial threat” is voluminous.⁶ For example, [Glaser \(1994\)](#) finds evidence linking high concentrations of blacks and negative white attitudes toward civil rights or African American politicians. [Giles and Buckner \(1993\)](#) find a strong relationship between black concentrations and whites’ support for racially conservative candidates such as David Duke (these findings are, however, challenged by [Voss, 1996](#)). However, none of these authors make the quantitative link between modern-day concentrations of African Americans and slavery. More importantly, the literature has not considered the possibility that slavery could be an *independent* predictor of modern-day attitudes and could therefore be a major omitted variable in studies of racial threat in the South.

We also consider several other hypotheses. For example, a substantial literature addresses the fact that whites’ attitudes are driven by education, income gaps between blacks and whites, urban-rural differences, and other contextual factors, and not simply high concentrations of minorities (e.g., [Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000](#); [Baybeck, 2006](#); [Hopkins, 2010](#)). Some previous work has even highlighted the connection between slavery and these contemporary factors. For example, [O’Connell \(2012\)](#) demonstrates that areas of the South that had high numbers of slaves have greater economic inequality between blacks and whites today. Similarly, [Nunn \(2008\)](#) finds a negative relationship between the prevalence of slavery and contemporary income in the South, and [Mitchener and McLean \(2003\)](#) find a negative relationship between slavery and modern-day labor productivity. While these papers suggest that slavery might affect contemporary attitudes indirectly through contemporary factors such as economic inequality and prosperity, we find in Section 5 that slavery has a *direct* effect on contemporary attitudes that does not work through these and other channels.⁷ We also consider the

⁶Early studies showed, for example, that modern-day black concentrations predict white support for segregationist candidates such as George Wallace (e.g., [Wright Jr, 1977](#); [Black and Black, 1973](#); [Birdsall, 1969](#)), racially hostile white attitudes ([Giles, 1977](#); [Blalock, 1967](#); [Pettigrew, 1957](#)), negative attitudes on school desegregation ([Ogburn and Grigg, 1956](#)), and higher incidence of lynchings ([Reed, 1972](#)).

⁷Other work on the lasting effects of slavery outside the United States also focuses on the direct economic impact of extractive institutions. For example, [Dell \(2010\)](#) shows that a colonial forced labor system

possibility that the link between slavery and contemporary white attitudes could be driven by the fact that former slaveholding areas are more rural today, or that former slaveholding areas were more likely to have incurred greater costs associated with the Civil War, making them more anti-federal government. We also consider the possibility that geographic sorting may also explain our results. For example, it could be that more racially conservative people have migrated into former slaveholding areas, while racial liberals have left. Finally, we consider the possibility that Southern counties varied according to pre-Civil War wealth, geography, and social and political beliefs, and that these—and not post-bellum incentives arising out of the abolition of slavery—are the sources of modern-day variation in white attitudes.

We find very limited empirical support for these alternative hypotheses. Therefore, although much of the literature focuses on contemporary or individual-level factors in explaining political beliefs, our evidence is in favor of the cultural and institutional persistence of historical, rather than contemporary, forces. We now turn to exploring these links.

3 Data

Our main explanatory variable and proxy for slavery's prevalence is the proportion of each county's 1860 population that was enslaved, as measured by the 1860 U.S. Census. Although slave counts were taken before 1860, we use measures from 1860 because they represent the last record of slave counts before chattel slavery was abolished in 1865. Overall, we have in our data approximately four million slaves, constituting 32% of the Southern population. Since county boundaries have shifted since 1860, we rely on the work of O'Connell (2012), who has mapped the 1860 Census boundaries onto modern-day boundaries and provides slave proportion by modern county. Figure 1 depicts the data.⁸

in South America has led to lower levels of modern-day household consumption and childhood growth, and Acemoglu, García-Jimeno and Robinson (2012) find that slavery in colonial gold mines in Colombia is associated with modern-day poverty and reduced school enrollment and vaccination rates. While extractive institutions like slavery have been shown to affect modern economic indicators in many contexts (see Nunn, 2009, for an overview), our focus in this paper is on the persistence of *political attitudes* shaped by slave institutions.

⁸Admittedly, our measure takes slave institutions as homogeneous when they were hardly so. Slaves in the Black Belt mostly worked on cotton farms, while coastal plantations focused on tobacco and other crops. These differences could be important, but we do not investigate them here.

We analyze three county-level outcome measures, all of which come from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a large survey of American adults ([Ansolabehere, 2010](#)). We pool CCES data from the 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 surveys to create a combined data set of over 157,000 respondents. We subset these data to the former Confederate States,⁹ and to self-identified whites, leaving us with more than 36,000 respondents across 1,224 of the 1,317 Southern counties. In addition to the CCES, we also investigate one individual-level outcome from waves of the American National Election Survey (ANES) from 1984 until 1998, a time period where the ANES used both consistent sampling and also included county-level identification for respondents. After again restricting the sample to Southern whites, we have an ANES sample of 3,049 individuals across 63 counties in the South. This makes the ANES more restricted in its geographic coverage, but it contains valuable direct questions on the subjective evaluation of racial groups.

Our four outcome measures of interest are as follows.

Partisanship. This is the proportion of whites in each county who identified as Democrats. Such partisan identification could reflect not only explicit racial attitudes (including attitudes toward Barack Obama in the later surveys), but may also reflect race-related beliefs on a variety of policy issues, including redistribution, education, crime, etc. We construct this measure from a standard seven-point party identification question on the CCES. We operationalize the party variable as whether an individual identified at all with the Democratic party (1 if Democrat; 0 otherwise).

We use survey data as opposed to voter registration data because primaries in many Southern states are open. Coupled with the dramatic changes in partisanship in the South over the last 40 years, this means voter registration data are unreliable measures of current partisan leanings. Finally, survey data allows us to focus on the partisanship of whites voters only.

Support for affirmative action. This is the proportion of whites who say that they support affirmative action, a policy seen by many as helping minorities, possibly at the expense of whites. All of the CCES surveys ask respondents whether they support or

⁹This includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Kentucky was officially neutral during the Civil War, but contained significant pro-Confederacy factions and was claimed by the Confederacy.

oppose affirmative action policies, which are described as “programs [that] give preference to racial minorities and to women in employment and college admissions in order to correct for discrimination” (2008 CCES). Although the question wording differs across years, we have no reason to believe that these slight variations in wording affect our analysis. We construct the outcome variable by using the four-point scale, from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose” affirmative action. The final variable is an indicator representing whether the respondent demonstrated any level of support for affirmative action (1 for support; 0 otherwise).

Racial resentment. This is the proportion of whites who express “racial resentment” (or symbolic racism). As defined by Kinder and Sears (1981), racial resentment “represents a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline.” Kinder and Sanders (1996), among others, have shown that racial resentment is predictive of whites’ attitudes on a variety of race-related issues, including crime, education, busing, and welfare. We measure racial resentment using a CCES question directly related to slavery that asks respondents, on a five-point scale, whether they agree that “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” Stronger disagreement indicates greater racial resentment.¹⁰

White-black thermometer difference. In many years, the ANES contains “feeling thermometer” questions, which ask respondents to evaluate their feelings about various candidates, politicians, and groups on a scale from 0 to 100.¹¹ For most years, the ANES asked respondents to rate racial groups, such as whites and blacks. As a measure of relative racial hostility, we take the difference between the respondents’ feeling thermometer ratings toward whites and their feeling thermometer ratings towards blacks.

¹⁰This question only appeared on the 2010 CCES. Using this measure in tandem with other racial resentment-type questions yields similar results.

¹¹As an example, the 1984 ANES gave respondents the following instructions:

I’ll read the name of a person and I’d like you to rate the person using the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the person and that you don’t care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward that person.




Figure 2: Bivariate relationships between proportion slave in 1860 and the four outcome measures with a linear fit in red. All four relationships are significant at $p < 0.05$ significance levels.

Thus, a positive difference would indicate that respondents have warmer feelings towards whites as opposed to blacks. Only using black thermometer scores yields similar results, but we use the difference in case slavery has an overall effect on racial group thermometer ratings.

Appendix Table A.1 reports summary statistics for these and other data that we use in the paper. Figure 2 depicts the bivariate relationships between proportion slave in 1860 and the four outcome measures from the CCES and ANES. It shows clear negative relationships between slave prevalence and proportion Democrat and support for affirmative action, and clear positive relationships with racial resentment and thermometer score differences. These relationships are suggestive; we now turn to estimating the causal effects of slave prevalence on these outcome measures.

4 Slavery's Effects on Contemporary Outcomes

We begin by reporting in Table 1 the baseline estimates of slavery's effect on the three CCES outcomes conditional on various controls. All regressions in this table, and throughout the paper, are weighted least squares (WLS) with the within-county sample size as weights, unless otherwise indicated.

In all but our first model, we include state-level fixed effects to address the possibility that states adopted different policies that could have influenced slave shares in 1860 and could affect our outcome variables in ways unrelated to slavery. In addition, we control for factors that may have been predictive of proportion slave in 1860. These "1860 covariates," unless otherwise noted, come from the 1860 U.S. Census, and address possible differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding counties. First, because wealthier counties could have had more or fewer slaves, we control for economic indicators from 1860. These include (i) the log of the total county population, (ii) the percent of farms in the county smaller than 50 acres, (iii) the inequality of farmland holdings as measured by the Gini coefficient for landownership (Nunn, 2008), and (iv) the log of total farm value per capita in the county. Second, because counties may have had different norms about slavery, we include controls for (v) the proportion of total population in 1860 that is free black. We also include a proxy for pro-slavery sentiment just before 1860, which is (vi) the proportion of the county voting Democrat in the 1856 election.¹² We also control for characteristics related to trade and commerce,

¹²The Democratic party was the pro-slavery party during this time period. Replacing the 1856 election with other antebellum elections does not change the results.

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action	Racial Resent.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.187** (0.024)	-0.131** (0.046)	-0.137** (0.039)	0.531** (0.200)
State Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates		✓	✓	✓
N	1,214	769	769	663
R ²	0.046	0.178	0.125	0.115

*p < .05; **p < .01

Table 1: Effects of slavery on white partisan identification, support for affirmative action, and racial resentment. All models are WLS, with within-county sample size as weights. Standard errors in parentheses.

including separate indicators for whether the county had access to (vii) rails and (viii) waterways. Finally, to account for any remaining spatial variation, we control for (ix) the log of the county acreage, (x) the ruggedness of the county terrain (Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014), and (xi) the latitude and longitude of the county, as well as their squared terms.

Column (1) of Table 1 presents the simple WLS relationship between slavery and white partisan identification. Columns (2) - (4) further include state-level fixed effects as well as the 1860 covariates described above. The conditional effects of slavery are meaningful and significant for all three CCES outcome variables.¹³ To illustrate, a 20 percentage-point increase in the slave proportion (roughly a one standard-deviation change) is associated with a 2.6 percentage-point decrease in the share of whites who currently identify as Democrats, a 2.7 percentage-point decrease among those who currently support affirmative action, and a 0.11 point increase on the racial resentment scale. Each of these represent approximately a 0.12 standard deviation change in the outcomes. Overall, these results are clear: slave prevalence in 1860 has an effect on the political attitudes of Southern whites today.

In the baseline estimates of Table 1, we analyze our outcome data at the county level because our explanatory variable (proportion slave in 1860) is a county-level measure.

¹³Results from a permutation-based Mantel test on the residuals of these models gives no indication of spatial autocorrelation after conditioning on our geographic covariates (Barrios et al., 2012). The one-sided *p*-values for positive spatial autocorrelation in models (2), (3), and (4) are 0.91, 0.58, and 0.49, respectively.

However, we show in Appendix Table A.2 that respondent-level analyses with additional respondent-level controls and standard errors clustered at the county level point to the same conclusions. While these results may be contaminated by post-treatment bias, they are consistent with the county-level analyses. We also show in Appendix Table A.3 that using a different measure of slavery, the number of slaves per slaveholder in a county in 1860, generates very similar results. Importantly, since we control for both the share of small farms in the county and the inequality in land holdings, it is unlikely that this is simply a “plantation” effect—that is, this is not simply due to areas with more slaves also having larger farms.

	Prop Slavery	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cotton Suitability	0.289** (0.036)			
Prop. Slave, 1860		−0.537** (0.172)	−0.221 [†] (0.133)	1.657* (0.829)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Florida Excluded	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,128	1,084	1,084	905
F Statistic	74.531*** (df = 19; 1108)			
Model	2SLS First Stage	2SLS Second Stage	2SLS Second Stage	2SLS Second Stage

[†] p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01

Table 2: Instrumental variables estimate of the effect of slavery on white partisan identification, views on affirmative action, and racial resentment, using suitability for growing cotton as the instrument. Column (1) is the first stage. All models exclude Florida, for which the first-stage is extremely weak. Models that include Florida are presented in Appendix Table A.4.

4.1 Instrumental Variables Analysis

There are two potential concerns with the above analysis. First, the 1860 slave data are historical and may be measured with error. Second, we may have inadequately controlled for all of the pre-treatment covariates that simultaneously affect slave proportion in 1860 and political attitudes today, which would result in omitted variable bias. To allay these concerns, we therefore present results from an alternative specification that

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	South	North	South	North	South	North
FAO Cotton Suitability	-0.136** (0.040)	0.022 (0.038)	-0.056 [†] (0.033)	0.081* (0.036)	0.376* (0.179)	-0.0003 (0.164)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,084	474	1,084	474	905	395
R ²	0.154	0.293	0.084	0.114	0.058	0.208

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table 3: Reduced form relationships between cotton suitability white attitudes in the South excluding Florida (columns (1), (3), and (5)) and in the Non-South (columns (2), (4), and (6)).

instruments for slave proportion in 1860 with county-level measures of the environmental suitability for growing cotton. We constructed these measures using data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).¹⁴ We exclude Florida from this particular analysis due to an extremely weak first-stage relationship in that state. (The weaknesses in the first-stage relationship is shown in column (1) of Appendix Table A.4.) Indeed, large swaths of the interior of Florida are suitable for growing cotton, but saw relatively little development due in part to conflict with the Seminole. Other parts of the state also suitable for the growth of cotton were not settled until later, even as late as the early 20th century. We note that the results are qualitatively the same when we include Florida (Appendix Table A.4, columns (2) - (4)), but there is a striking increase in the uncertainty of the estimates.

Table 2 presents our instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the effects of proportion slave on the three outcome measures using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model with state-fixed effects, log of the county size, ruggedness of the terrain, latitude and longitude, and their squared terms included as controls in both stages. Column (1) presents the strong first-stage relationship between cotton suitability and proportion slave. Columns (2) - (4) present the second stage estimates of the effect of propor-

¹⁴These measures represent the maximum potential cotton yield based on soil, climate, and growing conditions. The estimates are based on climate averages from 1961 to 1990 and a “intermediate” level of inputs, which refers to the effort required to extract the resource. We omit suitability for other crops, such as tobacco, because they have no relationship with slavery conditional on cotton suitability.

tion slave on the outcome measures. The results show second-stage estimates that are stronger than our baseline estimates, reported in Table 1.

For our IV approach to serve as a plausible identification strategy, cotton suitability must have an effect on contemporary attitudes exclusively through slavery, an assumption that may not be satisfied. For example, cotton suitability could determine how rural a county is today, which in turn could affect political attitudes. While the exclusion restriction is an untestable assumption, we assess its plausibility using a falsification test motivated by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). We first estimate the reduced-form relationship between cotton suitability and contemporary beliefs both within and outside of the South—that is, in the North. The ban on slavery in the North means that cotton suitability cannot affect political attitudes through slavery. Any relationship between cotton suitability and political attitudes in the North would be a direct effect of cotton suitability on political attitudes.

We present the results of this falsification test in Table 3. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the reduced-form relationship between cotton suitability and the three outcome measures in the South, showing that the estimated effects are significant. On the other hand, columns (2), (4), and (6) show that there is no consistent relationship between cotton suitability and political attitudes outside the South. The relationship is only significant for affirmative action, but in this case the result in the opposite direction: higher cotton suitability leads to higher levels of support. If anything, such a positive relationship would bias our results in the conservative direction. Thus, the exclusion restriction appears reasonable in this case, lending credibility to our causal estimates.

4.2 Difference in Thermometer Ratings for Whites versus Blacks

We also investigated the effect of slavery on the fourth outcome variable, the difference in thermometer scores. These scores represent a more direct measure of views on racial groups, although the geographic coverage of this measure is, as we noted above, poor. Recall that this measure is the difference between an ANES respondent's 0 to 100 "thermometer" rating of whites as a group and the same respondent's 0 to 100 "thermometer" rating of blacks as a group. Thus, a more racially hostile viewpoint would be a larger difference between these two responses. We apply the same models from the CCES outcomes for this outcome, except here at the individual-level with clustered standard errors at the county level.

Table 4 presents the results of this analysis and shows that, across all specifications

	White Thermometer - Black Thermometer (-100 to 100)			
	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	26.847** (3.689)	16.197** (4.665)	31.821* (13.122)	37.254* (15.658)
Clustered SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State/Year Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls			✓	✓
1860 Covariates			✓	
N	1,658	1,658	1,117	1,326
R ²	0.031	0.125	0.164	0.129
First-stage t-statistic				31.48**

†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table 4: Effect of slavery on difference between ANES feeling thermometer scores for whites and blacks. All analyses are at the individual level with standard errors clustered at the county level.

(including IV), there is a significant and positive relationship between proportion slave and anti-black attitudes as measured by the difference in thermometer scores. A difference of 0.2 in proportion slave is associated with an increase of 6 points in the relative difference in how whites view whites versus how they view blacks on the feeling thermometer scale (roughly 0.24 standard deviations of the dependent variable). While this is a very small sample and the geographic coverage is limited, we arrive at qualitatively similar conclusions regarding the long-term impact of slavery on direct racial attitudes. Furthermore, these results very likely underestimate the true effects in light of the possibility of social desirability bias. These results indicate that slave proportions affect racial attitudes and attitudes on race-related policies, as much as they affect non-racial political attitudes. These results are also consistent with results presented in Section 6.1, where we show a positive relationship between the prevalence of slavery and the prevalence of modern-day hate crimes targeted at blacks. Overall, our results show racial hostility extending into the modern period.

4.3 Non-Racially Oriented Outcomes

As an additional placebo test that what we are uncovering corresponds to racial attitudes, as opposed to more conservative attitudes or attitudes about social issues in general, we investigate whether slave prevalence has an effect on other political atti-

tudes, such as views on fiscal issues and social policy. Appendix Table A.5 shows that slave prevalence has a positive effect on fiscal conservatism across specifications and no consistent effect on attitudes concerning the environment, gay marriage, or abortion. Respondents in high-slave counties are more likely to support spending cuts to balance the budget as opposed to tax increases. While there is some evidence for a relationship between proportion slave and views on gay marriage and abortion in the OLS models, these results are not robust to our IV identification strategy, unlike all of the results for racially oriented attitudes. This suggests that the effect of slavery concentrations on contemporary political attitudes is not one rooted in general conservatism; rather, it appears to be limited to views on race and other issues that may be determined in some part by racial attitudes, such as government spending (see, e.g., [Lee and Roemer, 2006](#)).

4.4 Matching Adjacent Counties

Although our analyses so far control for a number of historical and geographic covariates it remains possible that our results are driven by differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas not fully captured by these covariates. For instance, it could be that the “upland” regions of northern Alabama and Georgia differed systematically from the Black Belt (as suggested by [Kousser, 2010](#)). To test the robustness of our results to these potential confounders, we restrict our sample to the set of neighboring counties that are on either side of a cutoff of 50% slave in 1860 (Figure A.1 of Appendix B). This enables us to compare the effects of slavery across counties that are geographically and perhaps also politically, economically, and culturally similar (as [Banerjee and Iyer, 2005](#), do with Indian districts). It also drops certain former high slave counties that are in regions where all of the neighbors are also high slave areas—for example, the Mississippi Delta (compare Figure A.1 with Figure 1). Columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 5 show that the results for all three of our CCES outcomes are robust to restricting our analysis to only these neighboring counties, even though this removes more than half of the counties in our original sample. Thus, even within fairly geographically concentrated areas, there are strong, statistically significant differences between counties with higher and lower past concentrations of slaves.¹⁵

¹⁵The results are substantively similar when we use different cutoffs below and above 50% (Appendix Table A.6). The conclusions are also the same when, rather than using the 50% cutoff, we take in our sample only those counties that border a county in which proportion slaves differs by more than 20 percentage points.

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.197*		-0.200**		0.810*	
	(0.078)		(0.068)		(0.366)	
Slave State		0.124		0.124		-0.111
		(0.079)		(0.080)		(0.353)
State Fixed Effects	✓		✓		✓	
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
50% Threshold Match	✓		✓		✓	
North-South Match		✓		✓		✓
N	326	105	326	105	271	100
R ²	0.313	0.364	0.201	0.153	0.249	0.111

*p < .05

Table 5: Columns (1), (3) and (5) show results of regressions with state fixed effects and 1860 covariates for those counties that border a county in which proportion slave lies on the other side of the 50% threshold. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show difference between slave-state counties with few slaves (< 3% of 1860 population) and non-Southern counties, matched on geography, farm value per capita, and total population. Coefficients are from a regressions on the matched data, that include a dummy variable for “slave state” as well as the 1860 covariates. All models are WLS with county sample sizes as weights.

4.5 Counterfactual Comparisons to the North

If the effects that we estimate are genuinely attributable to the local prevalence of slavery, then we should see no difference in our outcomes between areas of the South that were free of slaves and areas in other parts of the country that also did not have slaves, such as counties in the North. In addition, if no such differences exist, then that would provide evidence against the alternative theory that it is the institutional *legality* of slaveholding, rather than the *local prevalence* of slavery, that is driving our results.¹⁶ Making these comparisons with the North also enables us to address what we consider to be the appropriate counterfactual, which is what contemporary political attitudes in the South would have been had slavery been as non-prevalent in the South as it was in the North.

We therefore examine differences between Southern counties with very few slaves

¹⁶Some parts of the North did not outlaw slavery, but its prevalence was never as high as in the Southern Black Belts. Moreover, slavery outside the South was outlawed by the mid-19th century.

in 1860 and non-Southern counties with no slaves in 1860. To do this, we restrict the data to counties in slave states where fewer than 3% of the county population was enslaved,¹⁷ and then match these counties to similar counties in non-slave states on geography (latitude/longitude), county size, farm value per capita, mixed-race population, and total county population.¹⁸ Thus, we compare counties from Southern states with very few slaves to counties in the North where slavery was against the law. We regress each of our three CCES outcome variables on the 1860 covariates as well as on a dummy variable for the county being in a slave state. Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 5 show these results and confirm that there exists no difference between the Southern counties and the non-Southern counties beyond the effect of local slave prevalence. This provides evidence that the local prevalence of slavery, rather than state laws permitting the ownership of slaves, drives our results.

5 Alternative Explanations for Slavery's Effect

We now examine several alternative theories that could explain our findings. We consider six possible explanations: racial threat, urban-rural differences, Civil War destruction, antebellum racism, geographic sorting, and contemporary income inequality between blacks and whites, which could lead to statistical discrimination. We examine two other explanations – Civil War destruction and rural/urban differences – in the Supplemental Information. We find limited support for these factors. We therefore present evidence in Section 6 for what we believe is the more likely explanation concerning post-Civil War political and economic incentives.

5.1 Racial Threat (Contemporary Black Concentrations)

A seemingly plausible explanation for our results is that slave prevalence affects contemporary political attitudes through its effect on contemporary black concentrations. The local prevalence of slavery has produced high concentrations of blacks in the modern-day Black Belt, which, according to the theory of racial threat, would cause whites' views to become more racially hostile. This is an observation that was made by Key (1949)

¹⁷This analysis is fairly robust to the choice of cut-off; for example, choosing only counties in slave states that had up to 5% enslaved resulted in a comparable analysis.

¹⁸We use coarsened exact matching (CEM) on these variables, employing the default cut-points (Iacus, King and Porro, 2012, 2009). To avoid biasing our results, we drop Maryland and Missouri from the Northern sample since both had non-trivial slavery in 1860. Replicating this analysis with propensity score matching or genetic matching does not substantively change the results (available upon request).

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, Direct Effect	-0.141** (0.045)	-0.131* (0.061)	-0.139** (0.039)	-0.131** (0.048)	0.536** (0.200)	0.524* (0.249)
Prop. Black, 2000	0.197** (0.050)		0.043 (0.044)		-0.245 (0.218)	
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bootstrapped SEs		✓		✓		✓
N	769	769	769	769	663	663
R ²	0.194	0.177	0.126	0.106	0.117	0.111
Model	WLS	Seq. g-est.	WLS	Seq. g-est.	WLS	Seq. g-est.

*p < .05; **p < .01

Table 6: Effects of slavery on white attitudes net the effect of the contemporary proportions of African Americans. Columns (1), (3), and (5) simply include proportion black in the year 2000 as an additional control to the baseline specification from Table 1. Columns (2), (4), and (6) use sequential g-estimation of [Vansteelandt \(2009\)](#).

and then developed by the expansive literature on racial threat (e.g., [Orey et al., 2011](#); [Giles and Buckner, 1993](#)). At first glance, the racial threat mechanism does provide a possible competing explanation: the correlation of percent slave in 1860 with percent black in 2000 is 0.77.

To address this issue, we check how much of our baseline results can be explained by contemporary black concentrations. We do so in two ways. First, we include the mediator (here, proportion black in 2000 as measured by the 2000 U.S. Census) as a covariate in the baseline specification, along with the treatment of interest (percent slave in 1860). This analysis is shown in Table 6, columns (1), (3), and (5). The coefficient on proportion slave in 1860 remains significant and actually strengthens, suggesting that its direct effect does not operate through proportion black in 2000.

These estimates, however, could suffer from post-treatment bias ([Rosenbaum, 1984](#)); after all, the modern geographic distribution of blacks is a direct consequence of the prevalence of slavery ([Key, 1949](#)). Including a mediator in a model biases the estimates unless there are no unmeasured confounders for the effect of the intermediate variable on the outcome. Furthermore, if some of those confounders are affected by proportion slave, then including them will bias the estimation of the direct effect of proportion slave ([Petersen, Sinisi and van der Laan, 2006](#)). We address these concerns by using

a method developed in biostatistics by [Vansteelandt \(2009\)](#). This method enables us to calculate the controlled direct effect of slavery, which is the effect of slavery on our outcomes if we were to fix the modern-day concentration of African Americans at a particular level. To implement the method, we use a two-stage estimator, called the sequential g-estimator, that estimates controlled direct effects when we have a set of covariates that satisfy selection on the observables (or no unmeasured confounders) for the intermediate variable ([Vansteelandt, 2009](#)).¹⁹ The exact procedure is as follows. We first estimate the effect of contemporary black concentration on white views today, controlling for all of our covariates including the additional covariates in footnote 19. We then transform the dependent variable by subtracting this effect. Finally, we estimate the effect of proportion slave on this transformed variable, which gives us the controlled direct effect of proportion slave in 1860.

Estimates from this analysis are reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 6.²⁰ Compared to the baseline estimates of Table 1 and the potentially biased estimates in columns (1), (3), and (5), these results demonstrate that contemporary percent black has little influence on slavery's effect on any of the outcomes. Indeed, the direct effects of slave proportion are similar to those in Table 1 and are still highly significant. Moreover, once we account for slavery in 1860, contemporary black concentrations appear to have the opposite effect that racial threat theory would predict for Southern white attitudes. Finally, with the full controls from the first stage of the sequential g-estimator, the effect of proportion black today is no longer significant (Appendix Table A.7). Thus, we see no evidence that slavery's effects operate via contemporary black concentrations.

5.2 Rural versus Urban Counties

Another plausible explanation for our findings is that large slaveholding counties tend to be more rural today than counties that have smaller slave proportions, maybe because they had plantations and other large farms. Our results might therefore reflect the simple fact that rural counties tend to be more conservative than urban counties ([Frank, 2004](#); [Bartels, 2006](#); [Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2006](#)).

¹⁹Drawing on the usual controls in the racial threat literature, the additional variables we include to satisfy the the selection on observables assumption are log population in 2000, unemployment in 2000, percent of individuals with high school degrees in 1990, and log median income in 2000. These results assume no interaction between proportion slave and contemporary proportion black, but weakening this assumption does not change the findings.

²⁰To account for the added uncertainty of the two-step nature of sequential g-estimation, we report bootstrapped standard errors.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.109*	-0.136**	-0.165**	-0.141**	0.601**	0.545**
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.221)	(0.200)
Civil War Destruction		-0.010		-0.007		0.055
		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.048)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Rural Counties Only	✓		✓		✓	
N	716	768	716	768	610	662
R ²	0.158	0.182	0.101	0.128	0.122	0.122

†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table 7: The effects of slavery after eliminating large urban centers and controlling for Civil War destruction. All models are WLS with within-county sample size as weights.

To examine this possibility, we remove from our dataset all counties with 1860 populations greater than 14,000, which is the fourth quartile for all Southern counties in 1860. Thus, we remove one quarter of counties that have been historically the most urban. Removing these counties hardly changes the estimated effects of slavery, as indicated in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 7. In fact, the magnitudes of the effects of slavery on each of the three outcome measures actually increase, and the effects remain significant. Our results are therefore unlikely to be attributable to the sparse populations of former slaveholding counties.²¹

5.3 Civil War Destruction

A third possibility is that slaveholding counties were more adversely affected by the Civil War (1861–1865). The damage to infrastructure and the loss of life resulting from the War was extensive and affected the South's agricultural areas disproportionately (Goldin and Lewis, 1975).²² This could affect our analysis in two ways. First, in light of the federal government's role in the war, whites in war-torn slave counties perhaps

²¹ An alternative strategy is to restrict our attention to counties that are rural today as opposed to rural counties in 1860. This approach, however, potentially suffers from post-treatment bias since the prevalence of slavery in 1860 could affect population density today. Mindful of this possibility, we include such an analysis in the Appendix, noting that the results are consistent with those of Table 7. Similar results are obtained when controlling for modern-day county population as opposed to 1860 county population.

²² The correlation between proportion slave in 1860 and our measure of the Civil War's impact (described below) is positive at 0.23.

became more resentful of the federal government, which in turn they express through resentment toward blacks. Second, it may be that the Civil War disrupted the social fabric of these communities, aggravating racial strife in the process (Collier et al., 2013).

In either case, we would expect the effects of slavery to diminish once we control for Civil War destruction. Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 7 therefore control for U.S. Census measurements of the percentage drop in the average value of farms in the county between 1860 and 1870, which is a proxy for Civil War destruction.²³ As Table 7 indicates, slavery's effects on our three outcome measures are hardly affected by the inclusion of this variable. Furthermore, in results not presented here, we find that even when we include an interaction term between proportion slave and Civil War destruction, the interaction is not significant.

5.4 Antebellum Social and Political Attitudes

We argued that the demise of slavery intensified the political differences between former slaveholding and non-slaveholding counties, but it could be that racial hostility was significantly greater in former slaveholding counties than in other counties even in the antebellum period. Jordan (1968), for example, argues that the origins of racial attitudes actually predate 1860 and may even go as far back as the start of the African slave trade in the 16th century. It is possible that slavery began to affect whites' feelings towards blacks beginning in the antebellum period.²⁴

We consider two possibilities. The first is that racist attitudes motivated some Europeans to seek out Africans for the slave trade, and become slaveowners. That is, racism predated or developed jointly with the origins of race-based slavery. Slave prevalence in the cotton-suitable areas of the American South would therefore be indicative of pre-existing racially hostile attitudes. The second possibility is that the act of having slaves caused whites to become more racist, and that this happened well before 1860. This could be due to the set of complementary social practices and cultural norms needed to justify slavery as an institution. For our purposes, either of these two channels could

²³We assume that ignorability is satisfied here for both slavery and Civil War destruction with the same set of covariates, which would make the effect on the slave variable the controlled direct effect. We believe that this is a more plausible assumption than that made with respect to contemporary black population. The reason is because conditioning on 1860s covariates is likely to result in an accurate estimate of which counties suffered more destruction during the Civil War, but would probably not be sufficient to separately identify the effect of black concentrations in the 20th century.

²⁴We note an extensive socio-historical literature on this topic (e.g., Foner, 2011; Jordan, 1968; Du Bois, [1935] 1999). We do not engage the nuances of this longstanding scholarly discussion; rather, our purpose is to highlight that any of these antebellum theories could be explaining our results.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.163*	-0.175**	-0.104 [†]	-0.150*	0.749**	0.688**
	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.267)	(0.230)
Prop Slave, 1830	0.041		-0.083		0.032	
	(0.059)		(0.053)		(0.234)	
Prop Slaveholder, 1860		0.991 [†]		0.280		-3.596
		(0.591)		(0.509)		(2.586)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	456	769	456	769	398	663
R ²	0.236	0.181	0.159	0.125	0.191	0.118

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table 8: Effect of slavery when adjusting for proxies of antebellum attitudes. All models are WLS with within-county sample size as weights.

explain our findings if such antebellum attitudes were passed down through successive generations. However, as a first piece of evidence against this alternative hypothesis, we note that our results are robust to the inclusion of social and political covariates from 1860 (discussed above). In results presented above, for example, our effects are robust to controlling for the presence of freed blacks in the county, which we consider to be a strong indicator of antebellum racial attitudes. In addition, as we discuss in Section 6, the effects of slavery on another outcome, Presidential vote share, appear only after the conclusion of the Civil War—evidence that racial attitudes became politically salient (and started affecting political attitudes and behavior) only in the postbellum period.

To address these hypotheses, we conduct two further analyses. First, to test whether antebellum slavery has an effect on our outcome variables, we include proportion slave in 1830 as a control. The logic is as follows. If negative racial attitudes led whites to acquire slaves, then proportion slave in 1830 serves as a good proxy for areas where negative racial attitudes were most intense. That is, counties with more slaves in 1830 would have been those counties that had more racially hostile whites. Under the assumption that racial attitudes only affect slavery in 1860 through their effects on previous levels of slavery, this analysis effectively controls for differences in antebellum racism. These results, reported in in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 8, are largely consistent with our baseline models, albeit with greater uncertainty. The larger standard errors are consistent with the fact that the proportions of slaves in 1830 and in

1860 are highly correlated. The estimated effects for proportion Democrat and racial resentment increase, while the effect size for affirmative action decreases. By and large, though, these results are similar to the baseline results.

The second possibility involving antebellum attitudes is that slave-ownership itself caused whites to be more racially hostile. If so, then the fraction of the population that was *slave-owning*, not the fraction enslaved, should drive our results. Thus, counties with more slaveowners in 1860 should be more racially hostile today than other counties, holding constant the proportion of slaves in 1860. To check this, we include in columns (2), (4), and (6) in Table 8 controls for the proportion of the county that owned slaves in 1860 as measured by the 1860 Census.²⁵ The estimated effect of proportion slave hardly changes. While these tests cannot rule out all possible antebellum explanations, they do cast doubt on antebellum factors being the main drivers behind our results.

5.5 Geographic Sorting

The fifth possibility is that population sorting explains our results. For example, racially hostile whites from other parts of the South (or elsewhere) may have migrated to former slave counties during the last 150 years. Analogously, whites who hold more racially tolerant beliefs may have continually left former slaveholding areas. We address this sorting hypothesis in several ways.

Historical Migration Analysis. If geographic sorting is an important determinant of why and where people move, our interpretation of the results as reflecting the importance of the historical events following the Civil War might be overstated. To investigate this possibility, we look into patterns of migration in a five-year snapshot from 1935-1940, drawing on the public use micro-sample (PUMS) of the 1940 U.S. Census (Ruggles et al., 2010). This year of the census is unique in that it provides the county in which a person resided in 1935 and in 1939. Thus, we can identify migrants and their patterns of migration at the individual level. These data allow us to investigate if migrants into or out of former slave areas were somehow distinct from other migrants. If perpetual sorting plays an important role in our results, we would expect to see differences between high-slave migrants and migrants from or to other areas. To

²⁵The results are similar if slave-owning is measured either as a (1) share of the total population, (2) share of the total white population, (3) share of the total white male population, or (4) as the number of slave owners per family.




Figure 3: Characteristics of out-migrants and in-migrants compared to non-migrants for high-slave and low-slave counties, where migration took place between 1935 and 1940. In the left panel, each point is the estimated difference between non-migrants and out-migrants from high-slave areas (black dots) and between non-migrants and out-migrants from low-slave areas (red triangles), conditional on 1860 covariates of the individual's 1935 county of residence. The right panel is the same for in-migration, conditional on 1860 covariates of the individual's 1940 county of residence.

test for differences among *out-migrants*, we adopted the following strategy: we ran a regression of various individual characteristics on out-migration status, the proportion of slaves in the respondent's 1935 county of residence, and the interaction between the two. We also included the 1860 covariates and state fixed effects for the 1935 counties. The interaction in this regression measures the degree to which differences between out-migrants and those who didn't migrate varies as a function of proportion slave. For *in-migration*, we take a similar approach but replace the characteristics of the 1935 county of residence with the characteristics of the 1939 county of residence.

Figure 3 depicts the results from this analysis, and shows the differences between

migrants and non-migrants across a number of characteristics.²⁶ The figure depicts how these effects vary by proportion slave. For continuous outcomes, the effects are in terms of standard deviations; for binary outcomes, they are in terms of differences in proportions. With age, for example, this figure shows that both out-migrants and in-migrants are significantly younger compared to those who remained in their counties. However, the key point is that this pattern is the *same* for low and high-slave counties. Thus, migrants into or out of high-slave counties are not any younger than migrants from or to other counties.

This pattern holds more generally: migrants in the 1935-1940 period are distinct from non-migrants, but those differences are fairly constant across proportion slave in the county. Migrants are younger, more likely to be male, more highly educated, earn higher wages, and more likely to have both of their parents born in the US. Again, our key point is that these differences are largely the same for high-slave and low-slave counties. Even where there are statistically significant differences (e.g., out-migrant wages, out-migrant nativity, and out-migrant sex), the differences between high and low slave counties are miniscule. Furthermore, in the case of wages, the results indicate that wealthier people were leaving high-slave areas, but these migrants are the most likely to be conservative; and, conservatives leaving high-slave areas actually cuts against our observed patterns. These results, while being tied to a specific five-year period in American history, provide suggestive evidence that the differences we are seeing are not due to geographic sorting alone.

Contemporary Migration Analysis. We also present some suggestive evidence using data on between-county migration from 1995 to 2000 from the 2000 U.S. Census (Bureau, 2001). These data help us investigate the extent to which *contemporary*, as opposed to historical migration, explains our findings (see Dell, 2010, for a similar analysis). In order for geographic sorting to explain our results, two conditions must hold. The first is that there must be migration from low-slave areas to high-slave areas (or vice-versa); otherwise, there is no meaningful sorting of any kind. To test this condition, we use county-to-county migration data to calculate dyads of where people move to and from, measuring the absolute difference in the proportion 1860 slave between the departing and receiving county; this enables us to assess how much migration exists between low-slave and high-slave areas. Appendix Figure A.2 shows the relationship

²⁶See the IPUMS documentation at <https://usa.ipums.org/> for a complete description of these census measures.

between these flows and the difference in proportion slave, and it demonstrates that, as the slavery differential grows, the migrations between counties drops significantly. Thus, the vast majority of contemporary migration is within low-slave areas or within high-slave areas, not between.

The second condition for sorting to explain our findings is that racially conservative whites are moving into high-slave areas, racially liberal whites are moving out of high-slave areas, or some combination. Even if there is very little migration between low- and high-slave counties (as shown in Appendix Figure A.2), the distribution of political beliefs among these migrants could be so highly skewed so as to produce our results. (For example, perhaps all of the out-migrants from high-slave counties are racially liberal and all of the in-migrants to high-slave counties are racially conservative.) With regard to the first possibility, this seems unlikely to be the primary mechanism as it relies on racially hostile whites moving to areas with extremely large proportions of African Americans. For example, Farley et al. (1994), show that anti-black attitudes are correlated with stronger preferences for geographic segregation. More plausible is the exodus of racially liberal whites from former slave counties. To check this, again using contemporary data, we examine the relationship between the proportion slave in 1860 and out-migration in 1995-2000 census records. We find that proportion slave actually has a *negative* effect on contemporary out-migration (Appendix Table A.15). Thus, we have no evidence drawn from contemporary data for any of the necessary conditions behind a geographic sorting explanation.

Black Migration and the Children of Immigrants. As further evidence, we investigate the effect of slavery on the current-day attitudes of two groups that did experience mass migration: African Americans and immigrants. During the Northern Migration of the 1920s and 1940s thousands of African Americans left the rural South. If geographic sorting based on political/racial views were at work, we would expect to see blacks in former slave counties differ with regard to political attitudes compared to those living in non-slave areas. Likewise, with regard to immigrants, heavy in-country migration meant that millions of immigrants entered the U.S. between 1910 and 1940. If geographic sorting has played a role, we would expect to see children of immigrants having different views depending on whether they currently live in slave versus non-slave areas. In Table 9, we show that this is not the case for both groups. There are no systematic differences between black residents of former slave counties and former non-slave counties in terms of their partisan identification or their views on racial is-

	Prop Democrat logistic		Affirm. Action logistic		Racial Resentment OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.500 (0.378)	-0.708 (0.623)	-0.408 (0.450)	-0.695 (0.598)	-0.161 (0.367)	0.546 (0.650)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	Blacks	2nd Gen. Immigrants	Blacks	2nd Gen. Immigrants	Blacks	2nd Gen. Immigrants
N	5,082	1,965	5,077	1,960	1,649	606

*p < .1; **p < .05

Table 9: Effect of slavery on outcome measures for African-Americans and children of immigrants in the South.

sues; likewise, there are no systematic differences among those with one or more immigrant parents. We acknowledge that these tests are not definitive: whites may have moved for different reasons than did either blacks or immigrants. However, even if this is true, it presents an interesting consequence of slavery and an interesting channel of persistence.

Taken together, the evidence above suggests that geographic sorting is unlikely to be the exclusive explanation behind our results. Given this evidence, we conjecture that the movement of Americans has been for reasons mostly orthogonal to slavery in 1860, which would actually make our estimates of slavery's effect on contemporary attitudes conservative.

5.6 Inequality and Statistical Discrimination

The final alternative explanation that we consider is that contemporary (or historical) inequality between black residents and white residents, or other features of the local black communities, are the main drivers of contemporary differences in white attitudes. For instance [O'Connell \(2012\)](#) finds that slavery in 1860 predicts black-white income inequality today, using a OLS approach. Her results suggest that our findings could be explained by a simple theory of statistical discrimination ([Becker, 2010](#); [Arrow, 1998](#)) if the lower incomes of African Americans is what shapes attitudes towards

them, more generally. In addition, if poverty correlates with other traits (such as, for example, higher instances of crime) then we might expect this type of statistical discrimination to be even more pronounced.

We address this story of statistical discrimination with three analyses, all of which cast doubt on its explanatory power. First, in Appendix Table A.8, we show that the effect of slavery on black-white income inequality today is not robust to different empirical specifications. For example, we show that, while an OLS approach shows that slavery is positively correlated with inequality, our IV approach shows no such statistically significant relationship. We do not think this is an issue of statistical power because repeating the analysis for black-white inequality in 1940 wages shows that applying the IV strategy actually increases the magnitude of the effect of slavery on inequality. Thus, while there is evidence that slavery increased historical income inequality, there is much weaker evidence that this effect has persisted until today.

Second, we show that local income inequality is a weak predictor of our main outcome variables, and if anything, the effects are in the opposite direction as statistical discrimination theory would predict. In Appendix Table A.9, we show that inequality has a statistically significant relationship only with proportion Democrat and in this case, the relationship is actually positive. The relationships with support for affirmative action and racial resentment are small and not significant. Furthermore, the table also shows that including contemporary black-white income inequality into our baseline specification does not substantially change our estimates of the effects of slave prevalence.

Finally, we check an observable implication of the inequality account. If income inequality drives these effects, then the marginal effect of slavery on attitudes should vary in the income level of the respondent. For example, higher income respondents might be more responsive to the inequality mechanism, since the discrepancy between their income and that of the local black population is higher. In Appendix Table A.10, we show that there is no such interaction between respondent income and proportion slave. Taken together, these three analyses provide evidence that statistical discrimination and inequality are not the main drivers of our effects.

6 Evidence for Postbellum Oppression and the Persistence of Attitudes

If slavery's effects do not operate through the pathways we have excluded, then what explains our results? Our theory is that slave and non-slave areas began to diverge politically after the Civil War. The prevalence of slavery, coupled with the shock of its removal, created strong incentives for Southern whites to try to preserve both their political and economic power by promoting racially targeted violence, anti-black norms, and, to the extent legally possible, racist institutions.²⁷ This intensified racially hostile political attitudes, and these attitudes were passed on by elites to other members of the community, and then from parents to children, leading to a *historical persistence* of political attitudes.

In this section, we provide evidence for this theory.²⁸ We present four pieces of evidence for our argument. This includes evidence for (1) post-bellum racial violence, for which we present evidence on post-Reconstruction era lynchings, (2) the weakening of economic incentives for racial hostile attitudes that took place as a result of the movement toward agricultural mechanization in the 1930s, (3) the continued effect of slavery on partisanship over the last 150 years, and (4) indirect evidence for parent-to-child transmission of racial attitudes.

6.1 Postbellum Lynchings, the Status of Black Farmers and Contemporary Hate Crimes

A key component of our incentives-based explanation is that violence was used not only to disenfranchise blacks, but also to suppress their mobility and wages. Given this explanation, we would expect to see greater racist violence in former slaveholding counties. While we do not have measures of all forms of violent racism in the post-

²⁷The more general idea behind our theory is that when an entrenched social and economic institution like slavery is abruptly and forcibly abolished, previously powerful groups (ex-slave-owning white elite) seek to establish other local and informal institutions that serve a similar purpose to that of the previous, forcibly abolished formal institution (slavery). This idea is also discussed briefly in [Acemoglu et al. \(2011\)](#), who explain that when Napoleon's armies forcibly removed seigniorial institutions in Western Germany, local elites tried to set up informal institutions that served the same roles as the ones that were forcibly abolished.

²⁸In a companion working paper, [Acharya, Blackwell and Sen \(2013\)](#), we formalize the intuition behind our theory. A copy of the paper can be found at <http://www.matblackwell.org/files/papers/slaverytheory.pdf>.

	Lynchings (1)	Prop Democrat (2)	Affirm. Action (3)	Racial Resentment (4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	13.560** (4.661)	-0.203** (0.056)	-0.221** (0.048)	0.763** (0.245)
Tractors Change, 1930-1940		-0.433 (0.290)	-0.554* (0.248)	1.807 (1.267)
Tractors, 1930		-0.133 (0.189)	-0.206 (0.162)	0.205 (0.819)
Prop Slave × Tractors Change		2.253* (0.959)	2.200** (0.822)	-7.391 [†] (4.280)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	769	769	769	663
R ²	0.378	0.185	0.136	0.120
Specification	WLS-county area	WLS-sample size	WLS-sample size	WLS-sample size

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table 10: Intermediate effect of slavery on number of black lynchings per 100,000 blacks between 1882 and 1930 and how the effect of slavery varies by degree of mechanization, as measured by the number of tractors per 100,000 acres of land in 1940. The first column is WLS with the log of total county area as weights (and where county area is omitted from the 1860 covariates, though this has no effect on our analysis). The remaining columns are WLS with within-county sample size as weights.

Reconstruction era, we do have county-level measures of one extreme form of racial violence: lynchings (Beck and Tolnay, 2004).²⁹

In column (1) of Table 10, we confirm the hypothesis that the number of black lynchings per 100,000 blacks between 1882 and 1930 is greater in counties that had slave proportions in 1860, conditional on state-level fixed effects and our 1860 covariates. The relationship between slavery in 1860 and lynchings is strong and significant: a 10 percentage-point increase in slave proportion is associated with a 1.66 increase in lynchings per 100,000 blacks. This result is in line with our incentive-based theory: there is more racial violence in areas previously more reliant on slave labor. Furthermore, under our theory, black farmers should be worse off in former slave areas due to this greater local violence. Appendix Table A.12, drawing on data from the the 1925 Agricultural Census (Haines, 2010), shows that black farmers in former slave areas were indeed economically worse off than black farmers in other areas of the South.

²⁹These data include all states in our analysis except Texas and Virginia.

In addition, we also investigate the effect of slavery on the presence of hate crimes directed at African Americans from 1992 until 2010 ([United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010](#)). There are several concerns with contemporary hate crime statistics, the most severe of which is reporting discrepancy across jurisdictions.³⁰ Furthermore, we might expect that hate crimes are consistently under-reported in areas where racial views are more conservative. This might explain why, in Appendix Table A.14, we find mixed evidence for the effect of slavery on hate crimes with an OLS approach. With just state fixed effects, we find a positive relationship between slavery and the reporting of any hate crime and, with the additional 1860 controls, we find a negative relationship. With our IV approach, however, find the density of slavery leads to a higher likelihood of any hate crimes against blacks today. Given that the IV approach may mitigate some of the reporting issues inherent in the hate crimes database, we think this is suggestive evidence of a link between slavery and present-day racial attitudes.

6.2 The Mechanization of Southern Agriculture

Our explanation for the divergence in attitudes between different parts of the South relies on the fact that cotton was a labor-intensive crop, and that landowners used various tactics to gain an advantage in the labor market after the emancipation of slaves. Some of these tactics, including the convict leasing system and the racial violence to suppress black mobility, helped to fortify racial attitudes against any progress in race relations in the broader United States. A clear implication of this theory is that once the demand for farm labor drops due to exogenous technological development, the incentives for whites to interfere in the labor market lessen and thus the effects of slavery on attitudes should also diminish.

We test this hypothesis by showing that counties that mechanized earlier are those where the effects of slavery wane quicker. Following [Hornbeck and Naidu \(2014\)](#), we use the number of farming tractors as a proxy for mechanization.³¹ We interact the proportion of slaves in 1860 with the change in the number of tractors per 100,000 acres of agricultural land in the county between 1930 and 1940, which we collect from the 1930 and 1940 Agricultural Censuses ([Haines, 2010](#)). We then estimate the effect

³⁰For example, Tennessee reported 793 anti-black hate crimes over this time period, but Mississippi only reported just 22, even though the number of black residents is roughly the same in both states.

³¹Tractors were an early form of mechanization for the cotton industry, intended to replace mule-drawn plows ([Wiener, 1979](#)). Full-blown mechanization of cotton production via the cotton picker would not become widespread until after 1940.

of this interaction on our three outcome measures. To help identify the effects of this interaction, we additionally control for tractors in 1930. As Table 10 shows, the effects of slavery are weaker for counties where mechanization grew between 1930 and 1940. Though we cannot read the controlled direct effect of slavery off the regression coefficients in Table 10 due to post-treatment bias, we can use the sequential g-estimator described above to estimate the effect of slavery at various levels of mechanization. For example, where mechanization did not grow between 1930 and 1940, a 10 percentage-point increase in proportion slave leads to a 1.9 percentage-point drop in the percent of whites who identify as Democrat today. Where mechanization grew rapidly, with 0.07 more tractors per 100,000 acres (95th percentile), the same change in proportion slave leads to only a 0.34 percentage-point decrease in the percent Democrat and this decrease is not statistically significant at the typical levels.

We note two potential concerns with this test. First, the results could be consistent with a racial threat explanation—early mechanization led to decreases in the black population in these areas (as shown by Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014), thus diminishing racial threat. In Appendix Table A.11, however, we replicate the analysis using the declines in proportion black from 1920 to 1940 and 1970 and find that areas with larger declines have, if anything, larger effects associated with slavery. Thus, it seems unlikely that racial threat is driving the attenuating effects we see above. Second, it could be that more racially tolerant counties chose to mechanize early in order to rid themselves of the incentives for racial exploitation. However, as Table 10 shows, the number tractors is itself never independently predictive of political or racial attitudes and the change in mechanization has an insignificant effect for most values of proportion slave. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix Table A.13, there is no relationship between growth in tractors and either racial violence or inequality in wages between blacks and whites. This casts doubt that tractors are an indicator of racial attitudes. Moreover, as Hornbeck and Naidu (2014) argue, many of the counties that mechanized early were those affected by an exogenous shock, that of the Mississippi floods of 1927, and are thus *ex ante* similar to counties that mechanized later.

6.3 Tracing the Effects of Slavery on Presidential Vote Shares

If our explanation is persuasive, then we should see that the effects of slavery begin in the post-Reconstruction period and continue through the 20th century, possibly wearing off over time. Such a pattern would help adjudicate between our theory and an explanation purely rooted in antebellum racism, under which we would see political




Figure 4: Effect of proportion slave on vote for Democratic presidential candidate in the South over time. Each point is the effect of a 25 percentage-point increase in proportion slave from separate WLS models of county-level Democratic share of the presidential vote on proportion slave.

cleavages emerge both before and after the Civil War rather than primarily after.

To address this, we examine the relationship between proportion slave in 1860 and a long-standing historical measure of political attitudes, Presidential vote share. Until realignment in the 1960s and 70s, the Democratic Party was the racially conservative party, while the Republican Party was the racially progressive party (Key, 1949). Accordingly, we examine county-level Democratic share of the Presidential vote between 1844 and 1972, conditional on the full set of 1860 controls.³² To analyze the time trend, we calculate the WLS coefficient on the 1860 slavery variable for each Presidential vote. Thus, each point in Figure 4 represents a point estimate from a regression of county-level Democratic vote share on county proportion slave in 1860, conditional on the full set of covariates.

As the figure shows, there is little difference between slave and non-slave areas before the Civil War, conditional on the 1860 covariates. Thus, at least in terms of national party politics,³³ differences in white views emerge after the Civil War, which provides additional evidence against antebellum attitudes driving all of our findings. Second, the differences post-Civil War are obvious. The strong anti-Democratic bent of for-

³²Since election outcomes are not disaggregated by voter race, these data also include black voters. Blacks voted in large numbers following emancipation but were quickly disenfranchised between 1870 and 1900. Large scale re-enfranchisement did not occur until the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

³³We obtain similar results for Congressional elections. These results are available from the authors.

mer slave counties in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War appears due to the high turnout of newly freed blacks, which was as high as 90% (Kousser, 1974). However, as blacks were disenfranchised in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries (Kousser, 1974), the effect of slavery quickly swings to pro-Democratic. The effect reaches its peak in the 1920s and 1930s. By the 1960s, we see some early evidence of the South's movement toward the Republican party. Throughout, the difference in voting behavior between formerly large slaveholding counties and other counties is large and statistically significant.

6.4 Inter-generational Transmission of Beliefs

Our last empirical analysis concerns how racial attitudes have been passed down over time. One possibility is that racial attitudes are shaped contemporaneously by local institutions, for example schools and churches, which have themselves persisted. Another possibility is that racial attitudes have been passed down from parents to children, independent of external institutions such as schools and churches. These mechanisms have different implications. If inter-generational socialization (parent-to-child transmission) is in effect, then newcomers to the South should not meaningfully differ in their political attitudes across former slaveholding and non-slaveholding counties. The reason is because their ancestors did not leave there, and so could not differ meaningfully across these counties. On the other hand, if local institutions like schools and churches shape racial attitudes continuously through time, then we should expect those moving to former slaveholding counties to adopt similar attitudes as families living there for generations, because even the newcomers are exposed to the same institutions and environment as the older families.

To adjudicate between these explanations, we return to our results on the effect of slavery for the children of immigrants. Second-generation immigrants living in the South are exposed to current local institutions but are unlikely to have had the legacy of slavery passed down to them through their parents. The lack of an effect for these respondents (Table 9) provides suggestive evidence that the parent-to-child transmission mechanism is an important component of how slavery affects attitudes. Local institutions appear to play a more modest role by comparison. As such, this evidence provides some support that political *culture*, rather than exclusively institutions, plays an important role in explaining the persistent effects of American slavery.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown that an institution that was formally abolished nearly 150 years ago still has effects on attitudes today. Specifically, we show American slavery and its aftermath has had a direct impact on Southern whites' (1) partisan affiliation, (2) attitudes on affirmative action, (3) levels of racial resentment, and (4) attitudes toward blacks. We further show that our findings are robust to instrumenting for cotton suitability, lending credence this being a causal relationship. Our findings are also robust to include a wide variety of factors that could plausibly affect both the share of the population that was enslaved and also contemporary political attitudes. Importantly, our results point to the idea that *localized* prevalence of slavery is what is what drives the findings, as opposed to the idea that state-level patterns (or the simple legality of slavery at the state level) is the driving factor.

In addition, we rule out a variety of alternative mechanisms that could potentially drive our results, some related to slavery and others not. Specifically, we rule out an explanation that is popular within political science and sociology of "racial threat," or the idea that contemporary shares of the black (minority) population is what drives white (majority) group racial attitudes. When we take into account the post-treatment contemporary share of the black population using the appropriate methods, our results show that slavery continues to have a separate direct effect. We also provide strong suggestive evidence that our results are not exclusively due to geographic mobility over the course of the 20th century nor by a pre-Civil War difference in social or political attitudes. We further provide evidence via a North-South counterfactual analysis that areas within the U.S. South that had very few shares of enslaved people actually resemble quite closely the North in terms of these important outcomes.

Our results appear to suggest a separate causal channel attributable to the localized institution of slavery and of post-war incentives to maintain whites' superior social standing. Specifically, we have developed a theory that relies on the post-war landscape, one in which whites coordinated to provide an informal social infrastructure (and to the extent legally permissible an institutional one as well) to maintain economic and political power. Providing affirmative evidence of this particular causal channel is challenging; however, we show in this paper that we can trace cultural and repressive features stemming from slavery over time – for example, in consistently more conservative (for many years more Democrat) Presidential and Congressional vote shares, higher rates of lynching and radicalized violence, and decreased wealth concentrated

in black farms. As further evidence supporting this theory, we show that those areas of the U.S. South that were quick to mechanize and shift to tractor usage are also those areas in which the effect of slavery and its aftermath is the fastest to decline. In terms of the pathways of persistence, we have offered strong evidence that parent-to-child transmission represents at least one mechanism by which attitudes are passed down over time. However, we do not rule out that Southern institutions may also play a role in the cultural transmission.

Our research has substantial implications for the current study of historical persistence of attitudes, and of political attitudes in particular. Several important studies have demonstrated the persistence of culture and of social attitudes, for example, the persistence of attitudes like trust or anti-Semitism (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012). In our work, we have extended this line of inquiry toward understanding the persistence of explicitly political and policy oriented attitudes. The attitudes we study here strongly reflect on policy implementation, including policies on redistribution, integration, and equality. We have explored the origins of what makes parts of the U.S. South more conservative and, possibly in turn, those factors that have shaped American economic and policy development. Our findings at their broadest suggest that slavery and its aftermath were of significant consequence in shaping the culture and politics of the U.S. South, and possibly of the country as a whole.

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A Supplemental Information: Additional Tables and Figures

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Outcomes</i>					
Prop. Democrat	1,223	0.310	0.259	0.000	1.000
Support for Affirmative Action	1,223	0.220	0.229	0.000	1.000
Racial Resentment	1,022	3.810	0.937	1.000	5.000
<i>1860 Covariates</i>					
County Area, 2000	1,214	0.150	0.093	0.001	1.497
Ruggedness	1,131	44.882	50.282	2.106	334.972
Latitude, 2000	1,214	34.170	2.938	24.850	40.521
Longitude, 2000	1,214	-86.819	6.764	-106.235	-75.685
Gini Coefficient for Land Holdings, 1860	905	0.486	0.079	0.000	0.789
Prop. Democratic Vote, 1856	781	60.160	15.426	11.500	100.000
Prop. Small Farms (< 50 Acres), 1860	905	0.443	0.213	0.023	1.000
Total Population, 1860	917	10,666.210	9,509.694	42	174,491
Farm Value per Capita, 1860	905	195.513	128.338	0.501	966.004
Prop. Free Black, 1860	917	0.011	0.021	0.000	0.184
Rail Access, 1860	929	0.262	0.440	0	1
Water Acces, 1860	929	0.349	0.477	0	1
<i>Other Variables</i>					
Cotton Suitability	1,206	0.322	0.150	0.000	0.778
Prop. Black, 2000	1,214	0.170	0.173	0.000	0.846

Table A.1: Summary statistics for the baseline variables.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	logistic		logistic		OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.555*	-0.529*	-0.573*	-0.510*	0.570**	0.518**
	(0.247)	(0.249)	(0.231)	(0.235)	(0.200)	(0.189)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Covariates		✓		✓		✓
N	24,541	23,479	24,499	23,437	7,208	7,194
R ²					0.018	0.052
AIC	30,581.220	28,710.710	26,142.680	24,527.610		

† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01

Table A.2: Effects of slavery on individual white partisanship, support of affirmative action, and racial resentment. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county level.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Slaves per Slaveholder, 1860	-0.005**	-0.040**	-0.004**	-0.015	0.016*	0.119 [†]
	(0.002)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.070)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓		✓		✓	
N	768	867	768	867	662	744
R ²	0.177		0.119		0.113	

† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01

Table A.3: Effect of slavery on white partisan identification, views on affirmative action, and racial resentment with an alternative definition of slavery: slaves per slaveholder from the 1860 Census.

	Prop Slave OLS First Stage (FL only)	Prop Democrat 2SLS	Affirm. Action 2SLS	Racial Resentment 2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cotton Suitability	0.070 (0.404)			
Prop. Slave, 1860		-0.426** (0.154)	-0.157 (0.122)	0.814 (0.706)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,128	1,084	1,084	905
F Statistic	72.153*** (df = 21; 1106)			

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.4: Instrumental variables estimates including Florida. Florida first stage regression in column (1).

	Weighted Least Squares			
	Taxes vs. Spending (1)	Jobs vs. Environment (2)	Anti-Gay Marriage (3)	Pro-choice (4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	10.861** (2.613)	0.061 [†] (0.036)	0.151** (0.051)	-0.164** (0.046)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	754	764	766	769
R ²	0.098	0.078	0.141	0.264
	Instrumental Variables			
	Taxes vs. Spending (1)	Jobs vs. Environment (2)	Anti-Gay Marriage (3)	Pro-choice (4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	19.291* (8.225)	0.187 [†] (0.113)	-0.049 (0.160)	-0.197 (0.149)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,096	1,117	1,121	1,128
	Neighbor Matching			
	Taxes vs. Spending (1)	Jobs vs. Environment (2)	Anti-Gay Marriage (3)	Pro-choice (4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	17.075** (4.904)	0.077 (0.074)	0.126 (0.100)	-0.003 (0.090)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	318	324	325	326
R ²	0.163	0.130	0.189	0.222

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.5: Effect of slavery on other political attitudes. Taxes vs. Spending is a measure from 0 to 100 of what percentage of a budget imbalance should be eliminated with spending cuts (as opposed to tax increases). Jobs vs. Environment is a five-level measure of whether the jobs creation is more important than environmental concerns. Anti-Gay Marriage is the proportion of respondents in a county who support a constitutional ban on gay marriage. Pro-choice is the proportion of respondents in a county that report that abortion should always be legal.

Proportion Democrat					
	(1) 30%	(2) 40%	(3) 50%	(4) 60%	(5) 70%
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.122* (0.064)	-0.214*** (0.071)	-0.197** (0.078)	-0.219* (0.131)	-0.296* (0.173)
N	390	388	326	212	106
R ²	0.241	0.316	0.313	0.291	0.345
Support for Affirmative Action					
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.054 (0.052)	-0.158** (0.058)	-0.200** (0.068)	-0.419** (0.110)	-0.254 [†] (0.147)
N	390	388	326	212	106
R ²	0.116	0.174	0.201	0.253	0.324
Racial Resentment					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.389 (0.288)	0.507 (0.308)	0.810* (0.366)	0.803 (0.573)	0.254 (0.853)
N	342	333	271	173	86
R ²	0.148	0.241	0.249	0.381	0.384
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.6: Varying the cutoff for the neighbor matching analysis.

	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.108* (0.052)	-0.037 (0.046)	0.313 (0.238)
Prop. Black 2000	-0.007 (0.064)	-0.122* (0.056)	0.321 (0.283)
Log Population, 2000	0.015* (0.008)	0.021** (0.007)	-0.075* (0.034)
Percent High School Graduates, 1990	0.006* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.011* (0.005)
Unemployment, 1999	0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.048* (0.021)
Median Income, 2000	-0.167** (0.049)	-0.207** (0.043)	0.914** (0.225)
Black-White Income Ratio, 1990	0.061** (0.018)	0.033* (0.016)	-0.099 (0.083)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓
N	614	614	536
R ²	0.295	0.204	0.183

† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01

Table A.7: First stage estimates from the sequential g-estimation model of Table 6. Note that conditional on the past, proportion black today lacks explanatory power. While the estimates of proportion slave are insignificant in these models, their estimates possess large amounts of post-treatment bias due to the contemporary variables. Each model includes weights for the within-county sample size.

	log White-Black Wage Gap, 1940		log White-Black Income Gap, 1990	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.510** (0.186)	1.759** (0.662)	0.320** (0.077)	0.237 (0.289)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓		✓	
N	648	841	614	784
R ²	0.202	0.127	0.150	0.111

[†]p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table A.8: Effect of slavery on measures of inequality. Both measures come from the U.S. Census.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
log White-Black Income Ratio, 1990	0.049* (0.024)	0.114** (0.029)	0.022 (0.020)	0.072** (0.025)	-0.078 (0.105)	-0.248 [†] (0.129)
Prop. Slave, 1860		-0.171** (0.048)		-0.116** (0.041)		0.606** (0.212)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Controls		✓		✓		✓
N	903	614	903	614	777	536
R ²	0.175	0.232	0.079	0.161	0.044	0.142

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.9: Effect of slavery versus the effect of inequality, as measured by the log of the ratio of white to black income in 1990. This county-level data comes from the U.S. Census.

	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	logistic	logistic	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.370 (0.283)	-0.717* (0.287)	0.577* (0.254)
Income	-0.047** (0.008)	-0.058** (0.009)	0.022** (0.007)
Prop. Slave \times Income	-0.019 (0.023)	0.025 (0.026)	-0.006 (0.021)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓
Individual Covariates	✓	✓	✓
N	23,479	23,437	7,194
R ²			0.052
AIC	28,711.970	24,528.590	

† p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01

Table A.10: Interaction of slavery with income on individual white partisanship, views on affirmative action, and racial resentment.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.110*	-0.132*	-0.107*	-0.123*	0.295	0.192
	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.246)	(0.269)
Prop Black Decline, 1940-1920	0.749*		0.681*		-2.196	
	(0.346)		(0.298)		(1.536)	
Prop Black Decline, 1970-1920		0.177		0.280*		-0.263
		(0.150)		(0.129)		(0.656)
Prop Slave × Black Decline, 1940-1920	-1.417†		-1.420*		6.053†	
	(0.732)		(0.629)		(3.200)	
Prop Slave × Black Decline, 1970-1920		-0.269		-0.496*		1.799
		(0.293)		(0.251)		(1.271)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	769	768	769	768	663	662
R ²	0.183	0.179	0.131	0.130	0.121	0.121

†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.11: How the effect of slavery varies by declines in the black population in the twentieth century.

	Black Farm Tenant Share, 1925		Black Farm Owned Share, 1925		Black Farm Value, 1925	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.098	1.170**	-0.025	-0.745**	-4,516.086**	-5,064.579*
	(0.068)	(0.335)	(0.063)	(0.286)	(615.472)	(2,338.954)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓		✓		✓	
N	751	1,044	751	1,044	732	999
R ²	0.520		0.499		0.372	

†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.12: Effect of slavery on intermediate outcomes.

	Lynchings per 100,000 residents	Log Black-White Wage Ratio
	(1)	(2)
Tractor growth, 1930-1940	14.924 (21.886)	-1.051 (0.857)
Prop. Slave, 1860	11.994* (4.660)	-0.523** (0.186)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓
N	748	637
R ²	0.357	0.211

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.13: Association between tractor growth and racial disparities.

	Any Anti-Black Hate Crimes		
	OLS		IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.219** (0.078)	-0.248 [†] (0.144)	0.972* (0.398)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	
N	1,214	809	1,211
R ²	0.169	0.303	0.184

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.14: Effect of slavery on anti-black hate crimes. Dependent variable is the reporting of any hate crime in the county from 1992-2010. Hate crimes data comes [United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation \(2010\)](#). Results from a logistic regression instead of OLS for the first two columns are extremely similar.




Figure A.1: Sample of pairs of neighboring counties that fall on different sides of the 50% proportion slave cutoff.

A.1 Additional Evidence on Geographic Sorting

	In-migration (1)	Out-migration (2)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.044* (0.017)	-0.058** (0.020)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓
N	809	809
R ²	0.188	0.154

[†]p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Table A.15: Effect of slavery present-day migration.




Figure A.2: Relationship between county-to-county migration and the similarity of those counties on proportion slave. The darker the hexagon, the more county-dyads in that bin. The x-axis represents the absolute difference between the counties in term of proportion slave in 1860 and the y-axis represents the migration (1995–2000) from the sending county to the receiving county as a proportion of the sending county’s 2000 population.