# Unintentional Unalignment: Likelihood Displacement in Direct Preference Optimization

#### **Noam Razin**

Princeton Language and Intelligence Princeton University

Venue

Date




## **Collaborators**



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Adithya Bhaskar



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


Boris Hanin



# Language Models


**Language Model (LM):** Neural network trained on large amounts of text data to produce a **distribution over text** 



 $\theta$  - parameters

# Language Models

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To ensure LMs generate safe and helpful content, they are aligned via finetuning

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#### **Supervised Finetuning (SFT)**

Minimize cross entropy loss over labeled inputs

**Data Format:** 





prompt x

desired response y

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#### **Limitations of SFT:**



Hard to formalize human preferences through labels

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#### **Limitations of SFT:**

- Hard to formalize human preferences through labels
- (5)) Obtaining high-quality responses is expensive

# Finetuning LMs via Preference Data


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#### **Preference-Based Finetuning**

Train the LM to produce preferred responses based on pairwise comparisons




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Obtaining preference data can be easier than high-quality responses

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF; Ouyang et al. 2022)

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- Often suffers from instabilities (e.g. vanishing gradients; R et al. 2024)
- (5)) Expensive in terms of memory and compute

**Q:** Why not directly train the LM over preference data?


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Direct Preference Learning (e.g. DPO; Rafailov et al. 2023)




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


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Intuitively,  $\pi_{\theta}$  ( $\mathbf{y}^+|\mathbf{x}$ ) should increase and  $\pi_{\theta}$  ( $\mathbf{y}^-|\mathbf{x}$ ) should decrease

However, the probability of preferred responses often decreases!

(Pal et al. 2024; Yuan et al. 2024, Rafailov et al. 2024, Tajwar et al. 2024, Pang et al. 2024, Liu et al. 2024)

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#### **Likelihood Displacement**



#### **Benign**

z is similar in meaning to  $y^+$ 

#### **Catastrophic**

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Limited understanding of why likelihood displacement occurs and its implications



Likelihood displacement can be catastrophic and lead to surprising failures in alignment



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Mitigating likelihood displacement via data filtering



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
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





Prior Work (e.g. Tajwar et al. 2024, Pal et al. 2024)

Attributed likelihood displacement to:

model capacity



dataset size



token overlap



**Q:** What is the simplest setting in which likelihood displacement occurs?

**Setting:** Train via DPO over a single prompt with single token responses

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Prompt contains a statement from the Persona dataset (Perez et al. 2022)

**Example:** Is the following statement something you would say? "Doing bad things is sometimes necessary in order to accomplish important goals"

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Prompt contains a statement from the Persona dataset (Perez et al. 2022)

**Example:** Is the following statement something you would say? "Doing bad things is sometimes necessary in order to accomplish important goals"

Preferred and dispreferred responses are synonyms of "Yes" or "No"

Example: "Yes", "Sure", "No", "Never"

**Setting:** Train via DPO over a single prompt with single token responses

Model	$\mathbf{y}^{+}$	$\mathbf{y}^{-}$
OLMo-1B	Yes	No
	No	Never
Gemma-2B	Yes	No
Gelillia-2D	No	Never
Llama-3-8B	Yes	No
Liailia-3-0D	Sure	Yes

**Setting:** Train via DPO over a single prompt with single token responses

Model	$\mathbf{y}^{+}$	$\mathbf{y}^{-}$	$\pi_{ heta}(\mathbf{y}^+ \mathbf{x})$ Decrease
OLMo-1B	Yes	No	$0.69 \ (0.96 \rightarrow 0.27)$
	No	Never	$0.84 \ (0.85 \rightarrow 0.01)$
Gemma-2B	Yes	No	$0.22 \ (0.99 \rightarrow 0.77)$
	No	Never	$0.21 \ (0.65 \rightarrow 0.44)$
Llama-3-8B	Yes	No	$0.96 \ (0.99 \rightarrow 0.03)$
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
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① Likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, even in the simplest of settings


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
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
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


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


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**Preference Dataset:** Unsafe prompts from SORRY-Bench (Xie et al. 2024)



For over 70% of prompts both responses are refusals (resembles "No" vs "Never" experiments)



① Likelihood displacement leads to unintentional unalignment!

#### **Main Contributions**



Likelihood displacement can be catastrophic and lead to surprising failures in alignment



Theory: Likelihood displacement is driven by the model's embedding geometry



Mitigating likelihood displacement via data filtering

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
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
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
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**Assumption:** For simplicity, consider hidden embeddings as trainable parameters

(Suanshi et al. 2021, Zhu et al. 2021, Mixon et al. 2022, Ji et al. 2022, Tirer et al. 2023)

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- $\{ \mathbf{W_{y^+}, W_{y^-}} \}$  Intuition: similar preferences cause likelihood displacement
- $\langle \mathbf{W}_{\mathbf{z}}, \mathbf{W}_{\mathbf{y}^+} \mathbf{W}_{\mathbf{y}^-} \rangle$  for tokens  $\mathbf{z} \neq \mathbf{y}^+, \mathbf{y}^-$

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Explains why likelihood displacement can be catastrophic even in simple settings

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$$\sum_{k=1}^{|\mathbf{y}^{+}|} \sum_{k'=1}^{|\mathbf{y}^{-}|} \alpha_{k,k'}^{-} \cdot \left\langle \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}_{< k}^{+}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}_{< k'}^{-}} \right\rangle - \sum_{k=1}^{|\mathbf{y}^{+}|} \sum_{k'=1}^{|\mathbf{y}^{+}|} \alpha_{k,k'}^{+} \cdot \left\langle \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}_{< k}^{+}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}_{< k'}^{+}} \right\rangle$$

preferred-dispreferred alignment preferred-preferred alignment

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preferred-dispreferred alignment

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 $\alpha_{k,k'}^-, \alpha_{k,k'}^+ \in [-2,2]$  are determined by the model's next-token distributions

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**Empirical Observation:**  $\alpha_{k,k'}^-, \alpha_{k,k'}^+$  coefficients are mostly positive

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$$CHES_{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{y}^{+}, \mathbf{y}^{-}) := \left\langle \underbrace{\sum_{k=1}^{|\mathbf{y}^{+}|} \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}_{< k}^{+}}}_{\mathbf{y}^{+} \text{ embeddings}}, \underbrace{\sum_{k'=1}^{|\mathbf{y}^{-}|} \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}_{< k'}^{-}}}_{\mathbf{y}^{-} \text{ embeddings}} \right\rangle - \left\| \sum_{k=1}^{|\mathbf{y}^{+}|} \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}_{< k}^{+}} \right\|^{2}$$

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\*The CHES score is model-dependent

① Our theory indicates that a higher CHES score leads to more likelihood displacement

#### **Main Contributions**



Likelihood displacement can be catastrophic and lead to surprising failures in alignment



Theory: Likelihood displacement is driven by the model's embedding geometry




Mitigating likelihood displacement via data filtering

**Q:** How indicative is the CHES score of likelihood displacement?


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\*Similar results for OLMo-1B, Gemma-2B models and AlpacaFarm dataset


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**Q:** How indicative is the CHES score of likelihood displacement?



25

50

Preference Similarity (Percentile)

75

100


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**Edit Distance Similarity** (Pal et al. 2024)

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Llama-3-8B over UltraFeedback




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**Q:** How indicative is the CHES score of likelihood displacement?




\*Similar results for OLMo-1B, Gemma-2B models and AlpacaFarm dataset





**Edit Distance Similarity** (Pal et al. 2024)


Hidden Embedding Similarity

① CHES score identifies training samples causing likelihood displacement, whereas alternative measures do not











**Recall:** Unintentional unalignment due to likelihood displacement experiments



 Removing samples with high CHES scores mitigates unintentional unalignment, and goes beyond adding an SFT term to the loss

#### Which Samples Have a High CHES Score?



CHES score ranking falls in line with intuition: Samples with two refusal or two non-refusal responses tend to have a higher score than

samples with one of each



Likelihood displacement can be catastrophic and cause **unintentional unlignment** 



Likelihood displacement can be catastrophic and cause **unintentional unlignment** 



Theory & Experiments: Samples with **high CHES scores** lead to likelihood displacement



Likelihood displacement can be catastrophic and cause unintentional unlignment



Theory & Experiments: Samples with **high CHES scores lead to likelihood displacement** 



**Filtering out samples with high CHES score** can mitigate unintentional unalignment



Likelihood displacement can be catastrophic and cause unintentional unlignment



Theory & Experiments: Samples with **high CHES scores lead to likelihood displacement** 



**Filtering out samples with high CHES score** can mitigate unintentional unalignment



① Our work highlights the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which the CHES score may prove valuable

# Outlook

There are countless methods for aligning language models

RLHF

Ouyang et al. 2022

RAFT

Dong et al. 2023

IPO

Azar et al. 2023

**REBEL** 

Gao et al. 2024

KTO

Ethayarajh et al. 2024

**RLAIF** 

Bai et al. 2022

DPO

Rafailov et al. 2023

SLiC-HF

Zhao et al. 2023

SimPO

Meng et al. 2024

There are countless methods for aligning language models



Limited understanding of basic questions (e.g. loss landscape, optimization, generalization)

There are countless methods for aligning language models



Limited understanding of basic questions (e.g. loss landscape, optimization, generalization)

 Theory (mathematical or empirical) may be necessary for efficient and reliable alignment

There are countless methods for aligning language models



Limited understanding of basic questions (e.g. loss landscape, optimization, generalization)

Theory (mathematical or empirical) may be necessary for efficient and reliable alignment

Thank You!

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