

Day 6 - Data Elf-iltration

Scenario

Task 11 [Day 6] Data Elf-iltration



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"McElferson! McElferson! Come quickly!" yelled Elf-ministrator.

"What is it Elf-ministrator?" McElferson replies.

"Data has been stolen off of our servers!" Elf-ministrator says!

"What was stolen?" She replied.

"I... I'm not sure... They hid it very well, all I know is something is missing" they replied.

"I know just who to call" said McElferson...

Check out the supporting material [here](#).

Challenge and supporting material created by [Sq00ky](#).

it seems like the data has been stolen here, & we've the network capture packet file let's use the wireshark to examine it

the holidaythief.pcap file content

holidaythief.pcap						
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help						
Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>						
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	367	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
2	0.000001	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	367	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
3	0.100775	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	376	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
4	0.306821	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	376	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
5	0.308378	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	431	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
6	0.511772	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	431	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
7	0.516947	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	441	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
8	0.716679	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP	441	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
9	1.762003	2604:6000:1103:4192...	2604:6000:1103:4192...	DNS	155	Standard query 0xaafe A 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com
10	1.762445	2604:6000:1103:4192...	2604:6000:1103:4192...	DNS	155	Standard query 0x3b9a AAAA 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com
11	1.794783	192.168.1.107	1.1.1.1	DNS	135	Standard query 0x3b9a AAAA 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com
12	1.794784	192.168.1.107	1.1.1.1	DNS	135	Standard query 0xaafe A 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com
13	1.828551	2604:6000:1103:4192...	2604:6000:1103:4192...	DNS	229	Standard query response 0x3b9a No such name AAAA 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com
14	1.841119	2604:6000:1103:4192...	2604:6000:1103:4192...	DNS	229	Standard query response 0xaafe No such name A 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com

let's check the DNS queries & see whether the threat actor used this data exfiltration technique or not

if we can see here we found something suspicious here especially the dns query here ...holidaythief.com ?

9	1.762003	2604:6000:1103:4192...	2604:6000:1103:4192...	DNS	155	Standard query 0xaafe A 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com
10	1.762445	2604:6000:1103:4192...	2604:6000:1103:4192...	DNS	155	Standard query 0x3b9a AAAA 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com
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14	1.841119	2604:6000:1103:4192...	2604:6000:1103:4192...	DNS	229	Standard query response 0xaafe No such name A 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com
15	1.859414	2604:6000:1103:4192...	2604:6000:1103:4192...	DNS	90	Standard query 0x52e3 A google.com
16	1.859710	192.168.1.107	8.8.8.8	DNS	70	Standard query 0xa630 A google.com

source -> dest ip

hop limit: 64

Source Address: 2604:6000:1103:4192:6238:e0ff:fed7:8acb

Destination Address: 2604:6000:1103:4192:cc15:cc7f:2cd1:5fff

dns query, the subdomain part seems quite weird here it's hex encoded form let's convert it to ascii

- ▼ Queries
 - > 43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931.holidaythief.com: type A, class IN
 - > Authoritative nameservers

& we've found the exfiltrated data here that passed to the threat actor using DNS data exfiltration technique

Paste hex numbers or drop file

43616e64792043616e652053657269616c204e756d6265722038343931

Character encoding

ASCII

↺ Convert

✕ Reset

↕ Swap

Candy Cane Serial Number 8491


Question: What data was exfiltrated via DNS?
-Candy Cane Serial Number 8491

let's check the http protocol traffics & we've found a GET request on the christmaslists.zip file


http						
No.		Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
→	http2	2494 192.168.1.107	192.168.1.105	HTTP	480	GET / HTTP/1.1
←	http3	35 8.406185 192.168.1.105	192.168.1.107	HTTP	472	HTTP/1.0 200 OK (text/html)
	45 8.568523	192.168.1.107	192.168.1.105	HTTP	533	GET /christmaslists.zip HTTP/1.1
	48 8.572200	192.168.1.105	192.168.1.107	HTTP	1405	HTTP/1.0 200 OK (application/zip)
	103 12.032858	192.168.1.107	192.168.1.105	HTTP	528	GET /TryHackMe.jpg HTTP/1.1
	130 12.051620	192.168.1.105	192.168.1.107	HTTP	1455	HTTP/1.0 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)

let's export the zip file and see the content


select export object -> HTTP



select the christmaslist.zip to be exported



content of the zip file, now we want to find the item that timmy wanted for christmas



but it required credential to access the file, let's use john the ripper to crack it


extract the zip file hash

```
(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/Desktop/research]
$ /usr/sbin/zip2john christmaslists.zip > zipHash
ver 1.0 efh 5455 efh 7875 christmaslists.zip/christmaslistdan.tx PKZIP Encr: 2b chk, TS_chk, cmplen=91,
decmlen=79, crc=FF67349B
ver 2.0 efh 5455 efh 7875 christmaslists.zip/christmaslistdark.txt PKZIP Encr: 2b chk, TS_chk, cmplen=91
, decmlen=82, crc=5A38B7BB
ver 2.0 efh 5455 efh 7875 christmaslists.zip/christmaslistskidyandashu.txt PKZIP Encr: 2b chk, TS_chk, c
mplen=108, decmlen=116, crc=BCA00B27
ver 2.0 efh 5455 efh 7875 christmaslists.zip/christmaslisttimmy.txt PKZIP Encr: 2b chk, TS_chk, cmplen=1
05, decmlen=101, crc=7069EA51
NOTE: It is assumed that all files in each archive have the same password.
If that is not the case, the hash may be uncrackable. To avoid this, use
option -o to pick a file at a time.
```

now use john the ripper to crack it & we've found the credential for it

```
(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/Desktop/research]
$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt zipHash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (PKZIP [32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
december (christmaslists.zip)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2020-11-28 10:56) 100.0g/s 819200p/s 81920
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked password
Session completed
```

checking timmy christmas item wishlist using the credential, seems like timmy want to be PenTester uh

 christmaslisttimmy.txt - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

```
Dear Santa,  
For Christmas I would like to be a PenTester! Not the Bic kind!  
Thank you,  
Little Timmy.
```

-PenTester

if we still remember that we can hide some files within an image file too using steganography technique

here the TryHackMe.jpg was kinda sus

48	holidaythief.com	application/zip	1175 bytes	christmaslists.zip
130	holidaythief.com	image/jpeg	31kB	TryHackMe.jpg

let's use steghide to extract the content of the file without credentials & voila! we've extracted the christmasmonster.txt

```
(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/Desktop/research]  
$ steghide extract -sf TryHackMe.jpg  
Enter passphrase:  
wrote extracted data to "christmasmonster.txt".
```

the content of the text file

```
(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/Desktop/research]
$ cat christmasmonster.txt

ML                                     ARPAWOCKY
                                     RFC527

    Twas brillig, and the Protocols
        Did USER-SERVER in the wabe.
    All mimsey was the FTP,
        And the RJE outgrabe,

    Beware the ARPANET, my son;
        The bits that byte, the heads that scrat
    Beware the NCP, and shun
        the frumious system patch,

    He took his coding pad in hand;
        Long time the Echo-plex he sought
```

did some googleFu here & we found that the following text was belong to RFC 527

RFC Editor

RFC 527

ARPAWOCKY, MAY 1973

File formats:



Status:

UNKNOWN

Author:

R. Merryman

Stream:

[Legacy]

Cite this RFC: [TXT](#) | [XML](#)

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For the definition of Status, see [RFC 3076](#).

Network Working Group
Request for Comments: 527

R. Merryman (UCSD-C
6/22/

ARPAWOCKY

Twas brillig, and the Protocols
Did USER-SERVER in the wabe.
All mimsey was the FTP,
And the RJE outgrabe,

Beware the ARPANET, my son;
The bits that byte, the heads that scratch;
Beware the NCP, and shun
the frumious system patch,

He took his coding pad in hand;
Long time the Echo-plex he sought.
When his HOST-to-IMP began to limp
he stood a while in thought,

And while he stood, in uffish thought,
The ARPANET, with IMPish bent,
Sent packets through conditioned lines,
And checked them as they went,

One-two, one-two, and through and through
The IMP-to-IMP went ACK and NACK,
When the RFXM came, he said "I'm game",
And sent the answer back,

Then hast thou joined the ARPANET?
Oh come to me, my bankrupt boy!
Quick, call the NIC! Send RFCs!
He chortled in his joy.

Twas brillig, and the Protocols
Did USER-SERVER in the wabe.
All mimsey was the FTP,
And the RJE outgrabe.

D.L. COVILL
May 1973

Question: What was hidden within the file?
-RFC527

