Codice malware

```
)040286F
                             ; samDesired
         push
00402871
                             ; ulOptions
0040287C call esi; RegOpenKeyExW 040287E test eax, eax
)0402880 jnz short loc_4028C5
00402882
)0402882 loc 402882:
               ecx, [esp+424h+Data]
)0402882 lea
00402886
                            ; lpString
       push
               ecx
               bl, 1
00402887
        mov
00402889 call ds:lstrlenW
0040288F
               edx, [eax+eax+2]
                             ; cbData
00402893
        push
               edx
               edx, [esp+428h+hKey
00402894
               eax, [esp+428h+Data
00402898
                             ; lpData
)040289C push
              eax
)040289D push
                               dwType
)040289F
         push
)04028A1 lea
               ecx, [esp+434h+ValueName]
                             ; lpValueName
)04028A8 push
        push
)04028A9
                             ; hKey
               ds:RegSetValueExW
004028AA
```

Spiegazione:

Il Malware ottiene la persistenza attraverso le key dei processi modificandole a suo favore da alcune stringhe si nota dove si vuole connettere e quale key cerca

Il Client utilizzato è:

3 riga

Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run

Codice 2

```
.text:00401150
text:00401150 ; DWORD _stdcall StartAddress(LPV0ID)
.text:00401150 StartAddress proc near
                                                              ; DATA XREF: sub_401040+ECTo
.text:00401150
                                   push
.text:00401151
                                   push
                                            edi
.text:00401152
                                                              ; dwFlags
                                   push
text:00401154
                                   push
                                            0
                                                              ; 1pszProxyBypass
.text:00401156
.text:00401158
                                                              ; lpszProxy
; dwAccessType
                                   push
                                            8
                                   push
.text:0040115A
                                            offset szAgent
                                                                           Explorer 8.0"
                                            ds:InternetOpenA
edi, ds:InternetOpenUrlA
esi, eax
.text:0040115F
.text:00401165
                                   call
                                   mov
.text:0040116B
.text:0040116D
.text:0040116D loc_40116D:
                                                              ; CODE XREF: StartAddress+301j
.text:0040116D
                                            80000000h
                                                              ; dwFlags
; dwHeadersLength
.text:0040116F
.text:00401174
                                   push
                                   push
.text:00401176
                                   push
                                                                1pszHeaders
.text:00401178
.text:0040117D
                                   push
                                            offset szUrl
                                                                              malware12coM
                                                             ; hInternet
                                   push
                                            edi ; InternetOpenUrlA
.text:0040117E
                                   call
.text:00401180
                                   jmp
                                            short loc_40116D
.text:00401180 StartAddress
                                   endp
.text:00401180
```

Nella 2 foto abbiamo la funzione dove la chiamata viene effettuata dal malware verso un link/URL