diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/aes/bsaes-x86_64.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/aes/bsaes-x86_64.s
@@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ L$enc_sbox:
 	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm7
 	pshufd	$78,%xmm3,%xmm1
 	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm8
-
 	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm2
 	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm6
 	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm5
@@ -798,148 +797,86 @@ L$dec_sbox:
 	decl	%r10d
 	jl	L$dec_done
 
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm4,%xmm14
-	movdqa	%xmm5,%xmm9
-	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm4
-	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm5
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm15,%xmm7
-	movdqa	%xmm6,%xmm12
-	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm6
-	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm15
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm0,%xmm8
-	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm15
-	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm0
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm3,%xmm10
-	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm5
-	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm4
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm2,%xmm13
-	movdqa	%xmm1,%xmm11
-	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm2
-	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm1
-	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm2
-	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm3
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm12,%xmm12
-
-	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm6
-	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm4
-	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm6
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm9,%xmm9
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm4
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm6
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm4
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm11,%xmm11
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm14
-	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm6
-
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm15,%xmm7
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm2,%xmm13
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm7
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm4,%xmm14
+	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm13
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm0,%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm14
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm5,%xmm9
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm8
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm3,%xmm10
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm9
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm15
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm0
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm1,%xmm11
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm10
 	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm5
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm7,%xmm7
-	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm15
-	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm15
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm8,%xmm8
-	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm5
-	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm15
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm9,%xmm9
-	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm5
-	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm1
-	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm0
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm10,%xmm10
-	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm2
-	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm2
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm5
-	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm14
-
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm3
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm11,%xmm11
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm3
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm6,%xmm12
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm11
 	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm12
 
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm14
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm12,%xmm12
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm14
-
-
-	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm6
 	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm2
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm13,%xmm13
-	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm15
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm2
-	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm15
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm14,%xmm14
-
-	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm5
-	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm6
-	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm4
-	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm5
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm6
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm4
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm1
 	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm6
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm7,%xmm7
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm4
-	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm4
+	pshufd	$147,%xmm15,%xmm7
+	pshufd	$147,%xmm0,%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm15
+	pshufd	$147,%xmm5,%xmm9
 	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm0
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm8,%xmm8
-
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm2
-	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm3
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm9,%xmm9
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm15
-	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm13
-	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm5
-
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm1
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm3
+	pshufd	$147,%xmm3,%xmm10
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm5
+	pshufd	$147,%xmm1,%xmm11
+	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm3
+	pshufd	$147,%xmm6,%xmm12
 	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm1
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm11,%xmm11
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm1
-	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm13
-
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm12,%xmm12
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm13,%xmm13
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm14,%xmm14
-	pshufd	$147,%xmm10,%xmm10
-
+	pshufd	$147,%xmm2,%xmm13
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm6
+	pshufd	$147,%xmm4,%xmm14
+	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm4
 
-	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm8
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm7
-	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm8
-	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm5
+	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm8
 	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm7
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm8
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm13
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm8
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm15,%xmm15
+	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm9
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm0,%xmm0
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm12
+	pxor	%xmm7,%xmm15
+	pxor	%xmm6,%xmm13
 	pxor	%xmm8,%xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm2
-	pxor	%xmm0,%xmm11
-	pxor	%xmm10,%xmm1
-	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm10
-	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm3
-	pxor	%xmm15,%xmm9
-	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm10
-	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm12
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm9
-	pxor	%xmm13,%xmm12
-	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm13
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm11
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm1,%xmm7
 	pxor	%xmm2,%xmm14
-
-	movdqa	%xmm7,%xmm15
-	movdqa	%xmm8,%xmm0
-	movdqa	%xmm9,%xmm1
-	movdqa	%xmm10,%xmm2
-	movdqa	%xmm11,%xmm3
-	movdqa	%xmm12,%xmm4
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm6,%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm5,%xmm10
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm3,%xmm1
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm10
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm4,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm4,%xmm11
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm2,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm11,%xmm7
+	pshufd	$78,%xmm5,%xmm2
+	pxor	%xmm12,%xmm8
+	pxor	%xmm1,%xmm10
+	pxor	%xmm14,%xmm6
+	pxor	%xmm3,%xmm13
+	movdqa	%xmm7,%xmm3
+	pxor	%xmm9,%xmm2
 	movdqa	%xmm13,%xmm5
-	movdqa	%xmm14,%xmm6
+	movdqa	%xmm8,%xmm4
+	movdqa	%xmm2,%xmm1
+	movdqa	%xmm10,%xmm2
 	movdqa	-16(%r11),%xmm7
 	jnz	L$dec_loop
 	movdqa	-32(%r11),%xmm7

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/aes/aes-x86_64.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/aes/aes-x86_64.asm
@@ -1395,8 +1395,8 @@ $L$cbc_picked_te::
 	jb	$L$cbc_slow_prologue
 	test	rdx,15
 	jnz	$L$cbc_slow_prologue
-
-
+	bt	r10d,28
+	jc	$L$cbc_slow_prologue
 
 
 	lea	r15,QWORD PTR[((-88-248))+rsp]

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/aes/bsaes-x86_64.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/aes/bsaes-x86_64.asm
@@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ $L$enc_sbox::
 	pxor	xmm7,xmm11
 	pshufd	xmm1,xmm3,04Eh
 	pxor	xmm8,xmm12
-
 	pxor	xmm2,xmm10
 	pxor	xmm6,xmm14
 	pxor	xmm5,xmm13
@@ -798,148 +797,86 @@ $L$dec_sbox::
 	dec	r10d
 	jl	$L$dec_done
 
-	pshufd	xmm14,xmm4,093h
-	movdqa	xmm9,xmm5
-	pxor	xmm4,xmm6
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm6
-	pshufd	xmm7,xmm15,093h
-	movdqa	xmm12,xmm6
-	pxor	xmm6,xmm15
-	pxor	xmm15,xmm0
-	pshufd	xmm8,xmm0,093h
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm5
-	pxor	xmm15,xmm2
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm3
-	pshufd	xmm10,xmm3,093h
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm15
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm4
-	pxor	xmm4,xmm2
-	pshufd	xmm13,xmm2,093h
-	movdqa	xmm11,xmm1
-	pxor	xmm2,xmm1
-	pxor	xmm1,xmm3
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm4
-	pxor	xmm2,xmm12
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm9
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm11
-	pshufd	xmm12,xmm12,093h
-
-	pxor	xmm6,xmm4
-	pxor	xmm4,xmm7
-	pxor	xmm6,xmm8
-	pshufd	xmm9,xmm9,093h
-	pxor	xmm4,xmm12
-	pxor	xmm6,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm4,xmm14
-	pshufd	xmm11,xmm11,093h
-	pxor	xmm14,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm6,xmm4
-
+	pshufd	xmm7,xmm15,04Eh
+	pshufd	xmm13,xmm2,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm7,xmm15
+	pshufd	xmm14,xmm4,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm13,xmm2
+	pshufd	xmm8,xmm0,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm14,xmm4
+	pshufd	xmm9,xmm5,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm8,xmm0
+	pshufd	xmm10,xmm3,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm9,xmm5
+	pxor	xmm15,xmm13
+	pxor	xmm0,xmm13
+	pshufd	xmm11,xmm1,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm10,xmm3
 	pxor	xmm5,xmm7
-	pshufd	xmm7,xmm7,093h
-	pxor	xmm15,xmm8
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm8
-	pxor	xmm15,xmm9
-	pshufd	xmm8,xmm8,093h
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm9
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm9
-	pxor	xmm15,xmm14
-	pshufd	xmm9,xmm9,093h
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm10
-	pxor	xmm1,xmm10
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm10
-	pshufd	xmm10,xmm10,093h
-	pxor	xmm2,xmm11
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm11
-	pxor	xmm2,xmm14
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm12
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm11
-	pxor	xmm14,xmm12
-
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm14
-	pshufd	xmm11,xmm11,093h
-	pxor	xmm1,xmm14
+	pxor	xmm3,xmm8
+	pshufd	xmm12,xmm6,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm11,xmm1
 	pxor	xmm0,xmm14
+	pxor	xmm1,xmm9
+	pxor	xmm12,xmm6
 
-	pxor	xmm14,xmm12
-	pshufd	xmm12,xmm12,093h
-	pxor	xmm14,xmm13
-
-
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm2
+	pxor	xmm5,xmm14
+	pxor	xmm3,xmm13
+	pxor	xmm1,xmm13
+	pxor	xmm6,xmm10
 	pxor	xmm2,xmm11
-	pshufd	xmm13,xmm13,093h
-	pxor	xmm15,xmm7
-	pxor	xmm2,xmm12
-	pxor	xmm15,xmm9
-	pshufd	xmm14,xmm14,093h
-
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm6
-	pxor	xmm6,xmm8
-	pxor	xmm4,xmm7
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm7
-	pxor	xmm6,xmm12
-	pxor	xmm4,xmm12
+	pxor	xmm1,xmm14
 	pxor	xmm6,xmm14
-	pshufd	xmm7,xmm7,093h
-	pxor	xmm4,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm6
+	pxor	xmm4,xmm12
+	pshufd	xmm7,xmm15,093h
+	pshufd	xmm8,xmm0,093h
+	pxor	xmm15,xmm7
+	pshufd	xmm9,xmm5,093h
 	pxor	xmm0,xmm8
-	pshufd	xmm8,xmm8,093h
-
-	pxor	xmm2,xmm14
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm9
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm9
-	pshufd	xmm9,xmm9,093h
-	pxor	xmm15,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm13,xmm10
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm2
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm13
-
-	pxor	xmm1,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm12
+	pshufd	xmm10,xmm3,093h
+	pxor	xmm5,xmm9
+	pshufd	xmm11,xmm1,093h
+	pxor	xmm3,xmm10
+	pshufd	xmm12,xmm6,093h
 	pxor	xmm1,xmm11
-	pshufd	xmm11,xmm11,093h
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm1,xmm14
-	pxor	xmm13,xmm10
-
-	pshufd	xmm12,xmm12,093h
-	pshufd	xmm13,xmm13,093h
-	pshufd	xmm14,xmm14,093h
-	pshufd	xmm10,xmm10,093h
-
+	pshufd	xmm13,xmm2,093h
+	pxor	xmm6,xmm12
+	pshufd	xmm14,xmm4,093h
+	pxor	xmm2,xmm13
+	pxor	xmm4,xmm14
 
-	pxor	xmm0,xmm6
-	pxor	xmm8,xmm6
-	pxor	xmm7,xmm12
-	pxor	xmm8,xmm12
-	pxor	xmm5,xmm7
+	pxor	xmm8,xmm15
 	pxor	xmm7,xmm4
-	pxor	xmm8,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm13,xmm14
+	pxor	xmm8,xmm4
+	pshufd	xmm15,xmm15,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm9,xmm0
+	pshufd	xmm0,xmm0,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm12,xmm1
+	pxor	xmm15,xmm7
+	pxor	xmm13,xmm6
 	pxor	xmm0,xmm8
-	pxor	xmm2,xmm11
-	pxor	xmm11,xmm0
-	pxor	xmm1,xmm10
-	pxor	xmm10,xmm5
-	pxor	xmm3,xmm9
-	pxor	xmm9,xmm15
-	pxor	xmm10,xmm14
-	pxor	xmm12,xmm3
-	pxor	xmm9,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm12,xmm13
-	pxor	xmm13,xmm1
+	pxor	xmm11,xmm3
+	pshufd	xmm7,xmm1,04Eh
 	pxor	xmm14,xmm2
-
-	movdqa	xmm15,xmm7
-	movdqa	xmm0,xmm8
-	movdqa	xmm1,xmm9
-	movdqa	xmm2,xmm10
-	movdqa	xmm3,xmm11
-	movdqa	xmm4,xmm12
+	pshufd	xmm8,xmm6,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm10,xmm5
+	pshufd	xmm1,xmm3,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm10,xmm4
+	pshufd	xmm6,xmm4,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm11,xmm4
+	pshufd	xmm3,xmm2,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm7,xmm11
+	pshufd	xmm2,xmm5,04Eh
+	pxor	xmm8,xmm12
+	pxor	xmm10,xmm1
+	pxor	xmm6,xmm14
+	pxor	xmm13,xmm3
+	movdqa	xmm3,xmm7
+	pxor	xmm2,xmm9
 	movdqa	xmm5,xmm13
-	movdqa	xmm6,xmm14
+	movdqa	xmm4,xmm8
+	movdqa	xmm1,xmm2
+	movdqa	xmm2,xmm10
 	movdqa	xmm7,XMMWORD PTR[((-16))+r11]
 	jnz	$L$dec_loop
 	movdqa	xmm7,XMMWORD PTR[((-32))+r11]
@@ -1640,7 +1577,7 @@ $L$xts_enc_prologue::
 	push	r15
 	lea	rsp,QWORD PTR[((-72))+rsp]
 	mov	r10,QWORD PTR[160+rsp]
-	mov	r11d,DWORD PTR[168+rsp]
+	mov	r11,QWORD PTR[168+rsp]
 	lea	rsp,QWORD PTR[((-160))+rsp]
 	movaps	XMMWORD PTR[64+rsp],xmm6
 	movaps	XMMWORD PTR[80+rsp],xmm7
@@ -2120,7 +2057,7 @@ $L$xts_dec_prologue::
 	push	r15
 	lea	rsp,QWORD PTR[((-72))+rsp]
 	mov	r10,QWORD PTR[160+rsp]
-	mov	r11d,DWORD PTR[168+rsp]
+	mov	r11,QWORD PTR[168+rsp]
 	lea	rsp,QWORD PTR[((-160))+rsp]
 	movaps	XMMWORD PTR[64+rsp],xmm6
 	movaps	XMMWORD PTR[80+rsp],xmm7

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/bn/x86_64-mont5.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/bn/x86_64-mont5.asm
@@ -827,8 +827,8 @@ $L$gather::
 	lea	rcx,QWORD PTR[8+rcx]
 	sub	rdx,1
 	jnz	$L$gather
-	movaps	XMMWORD PTR[rsp],xmm6
-	movaps	XMMWORD PTR[16+rsp],xmm7
+	movaps	xmm6,XMMWORD PTR[rsp]
+	movaps	xmm7,XMMWORD PTR[16+rsp]
 	lea	rsp,QWORD PTR[40+rsp]
 	DB	0F3h,0C3h		;repret
 $L$SEH_end_bn_gather5::

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-elf-gas/aes/aes-586.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-elf-gas/aes/aes-586.s
@@ -2252,6 +2252,8 @@ AES_cbc_encrypt:
 	jb	.L015slow_way
 	testl	$15,%ecx
 	jnz	.L015slow_way
+	btl	$28,(%eax)
+	jc	.L015slow_way
 	leal	-324(%esp),%esi
 	andl	$-64,%esi
 	movl	%ebp,%eax

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-elf-gas/x86cpuid.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-elf-gas/x86cpuid.s
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid:
 	movzbl	%cl,%esi
 	incl	%esi
 	movl	$1,%eax
+	xorl	%ecx,%ecx
 	.byte	0x0f,0xa2
 	btl	$28,%edx
 	jnc	.L002generic
@@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid:
 	andl	$4095,%edi
 .L003nocacheinfo:
 	movl	$1,%eax
+	xorl	%ecx,%ecx
 	.byte	0x0f,0xa2
 	andl	$3220176895,%edx
 	cmpl	$0,%ebp

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-macosx-gas/aes/aes-586.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-macosx-gas/aes/aes-586.s
@@ -2219,6 +2219,8 @@ L014picked_te:
 	jb	L015slow_way
 	testl	$15,%ecx
 	jnz	L015slow_way
+	btl	$28,(%eax)
+	jc	L015slow_way
 	leal	-324(%esp),%esi
 	andl	$-64,%esi
 	movl	%ebp,%eax

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-macosx-gas/x86cpuid.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-macosx-gas/x86cpuid.s
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ L_OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid_begin:
 	movzbl	%cl,%esi
 	incl	%esi
 	movl	$1,%eax
+	xorl	%ecx,%ecx
 	.byte	0x0f,0xa2
 	btl	$28,%edx
 	jnc	L002generic
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ L001intel:
 	andl	$4095,%edi
 L003nocacheinfo:
 	movl	$1,%eax
+	xorl	%ecx,%ecx
 	.byte	0x0f,0xa2
 	andl	$3220176895,%edx
 	cmpl	$0,%ebp

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/aes/aes-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/aes/aes-586.asm
@@ -2241,6 +2241,8 @@ $L014picked_te:
 	jb	$L015slow_way
 	test	ecx,15
 	jnz	$L015slow_way
+	bt	DWORD PTR [eax],28
+	jc	$L015slow_way
 	lea	esi,DWORD PTR [esp-324]
 	and	esi,-64
 	mov	eax,ebp

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/bf/bf-686.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/bf/bf-686.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	bf-686.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/bn/x86-mont.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/bn/x86-mont.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	../openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/bn/x86.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/bn/x86.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	../openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/camellia/cmll-x86.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/camellia/cmll-x86.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	cmll-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/cast/cast-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/cast/cast-586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	cast-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/des/crypt586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/des/crypt586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	crypt586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/des/des-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/des/des-586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	des-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/md5/md5-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/md5/md5-586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	../openssl/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/rc5/rc5-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/rc5/rc5-586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	rc5-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/ripemd/rmd-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/ripemd/rmd-586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	../openssl/crypto/ripemd/asm/rmd-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/sha/sha1-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/sha/sha1-586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	sha1-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/sha/sha256-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/sha/sha256-586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	sha512-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/sha/sha512-586.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/sha/sha512-586.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	sha512-586.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/x86cpuid.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x86-win32-masm/x86cpuid.asm
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ TITLE	x86cpuid.asm
 IF @Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF @Version LT 800
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ $L_OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid_begin::
 	movzx	esi,cl
 	inc	esi
 	mov	eax,1
+	xor	ecx,ecx
 	cpuid
 	bt	edx,28
 	jnc	$L002generic
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ $L001intel:
 	and	edi,4095
 $L003nocacheinfo:
 	mov	eax,1
+	xor	ecx,ecx
 	cpuid
 	and	edx,3220176895
 	cmp	ebp,0

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES b/deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES
@@ -2,9 +2,31 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+  *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid 
+     handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+     Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+     (CVE-2013-4353)
+
+  *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+     structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+     to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+     avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+     Safari on OS X.  Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+     several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them.  The bug
+     is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+     10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+     [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
  Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
 
-  *)
+  *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+     supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+     [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
 
  Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
 
@@ -404,6 +426,63 @@
        Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
      [Steve Henson]
 
+ Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia K�sper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia K�sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     (This is a backport)
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
+
+  [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
+  OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
  Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
 
   *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
@@ -1394,14 +1473,94 @@
   *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
      [NTT]
 
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia K�sper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia K�sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     (This is a backport)
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 
+     'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+     int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by 
+     rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
  Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
 
   *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
      Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
      Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
      preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
      [Antonio Martin]
-  
+
  Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
 
   *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/Configure b/deps/openssl/openssl/Configure
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-ben-no-opt",	"gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-ben-strict",	"gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
-"debug-bodo",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"debug-bodo",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
 "debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.1e
+VERSION=1.0.1f
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.1
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
 			FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
 			export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
 		fi; \
-		$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto build-shared; \
+		$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto  CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
+		touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
 	else \
 		echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
 		exit 1; \

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile.org b/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile.org
@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
 			FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
 			export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
 		fi; \
-		$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto build-shared; \
+		$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto  CC=$${CC:-$(CC)} build-shared; \
+		touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
 	else \
 		echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
 		exit 1; \

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/NEWS b/deps/openssl/openssl/NEWS
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/README b/deps/openssl/openssl/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/Makefile
@@ -577,14 +577,15 @@ openssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
 openssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
 openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
 openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+openssl.o: openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
 passwd.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 passwd.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
 passwd.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/apps.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/apps.h
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
 			do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
 			OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); ENGINE_cleanup(); \
 			CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
+			RAND_cleanup(); \
 			ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup();} while(0)
 #  else
 #    define apps_startup() \
@@ -198,6 +199,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
 			do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
 			OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); \
 			CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
+			RAND_cleanup(); \
 			ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup(); } while(0)
 #  endif
 #endif

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/openssl.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/openssl.c
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
 #include "apps.h"
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
     int maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
     int twopass = 0;
     int keytype = 0;
-    int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+    int cert_pbe;
     int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
     int ret = 1;
     int macver = 1;
@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
     apps_startup();
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    if (FIPS_mode())
+	cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+    else
+#endif
+    cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+
     enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
     if (bio_err == NULL ) bio_err = BIO_new_fp (stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
 

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c
@@ -178,13 +178,6 @@ typedef unsigned int u_int;
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #endif
 
-/* Use Windows API with STD_INPUT_HANDLE when checking for input?
-   Don't look at OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS for this, since it is always defined if
-   OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS is defined */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) && defined(STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
-#define OPENSSL_USE_STD_INPUT_HANDLE
-#endif
-
 #undef PROG
 #define PROG	s_client_main
 
@@ -1611,10 +1604,10 @@ SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(con, ids);
 					tv.tv_usec = 0;
 					i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,(void *)&writefds,
 						 NULL,&tv);
-#if defined(OPENSSL_USE_STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
-					if(!i && (!((_kbhit()) || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0))) || !read_tty) ) continue;
-#else
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
 					if(!i && (!_kbhit() || !read_tty) ) continue;
+#else
+					if(!i && (!((_kbhit()) || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0))) || !read_tty) ) continue;
 #endif
 				} else 	i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,(void *)&writefds,
 					 NULL,timeoutp);
@@ -1819,10 +1812,10 @@ printf("read=%d pending=%d peek=%d\n",k,SSL_pending(con),SSL_peek(con,zbuf,10240
 			}
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
-#if defined(OPENSSL_USE_STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
-		else if ((_kbhit()) || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0)))
-#else
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
 		else if (_kbhit())
+#else
+		else if ((_kbhit()) || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0)))
 #endif
 #elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
 		else if (_kbhit())

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/config b/deps/openssl/openssl/config
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
 			    libc=/usr/lib/libc.so
 			else					# OpenBSD
 			    # ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we
-			    libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
+			    libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
 			fi
 			case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in
 			*ELF*)	OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/Makefile
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ ia64cpuid.s: ia64cpuid.S;	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E ia64cpuid.S > $@
 ppccpuid.s:	ppccpuid.pl;	$(PERL) ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 pariscid.s:	pariscid.pl;	$(PERL) pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 alphacpuid.s:	alphacpuid.pl
-	$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+	(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+	$(PERL) alphacpuid.pl > $$preproc && \
+	$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
 
 testapps:
 	[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (	if echo $(SDIRS) | fgrep ' des '; \

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -2054,8 +2054,8 @@ ()
 	&test	($s2,15);
 	&jnz	(&label("slow_way"));
 					if (!$x86only) {
-	#&bt	(&DWP(0,$s0),28);	# check for hyper-threading bit
-	#&jc	(&label("slow_way"));
+	&bt	(&DWP(0,$s0),28);	# check for hyper-threading bit
+	&jc	(&label("slow_way"));
 					}
 	# pre-allocate aligned stack frame...
 	&lea	($acc,&DWP(-80-244,"esp"));

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl
@@ -1015,7 +1015,8 @@
 		$SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,8,",$1,31-$2)
 		:            sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,8,",$1,63-$2)/e;
 
-	s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	s/,\*/,/			if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	s/\bbv\b(.*\(%r2\))/bve$1/	if ($SIZE_T==8);
 	print $_,"\n";
 }
 close STDOUT;
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
@@ -1684,8 +1684,8 @@ ()
 	jb	.Lcbc_slow_prologue
 	test	\$15,%rdx
 	jnz	.Lcbc_slow_prologue
-	#bt	\$28,%r10d
-	#jc	.Lcbc_slow_prologue
+	bt	\$28,%r10d
+	jc	.Lcbc_slow_prologue
 
 	# allocate aligned stack frame...
 	lea	-88-248(%rsp),$key

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -83,9 +83,9 @@
 # Add decryption procedure. Performance in CPU cycles spent to decrypt
 # one byte out of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is:
 #
-# Core 2	11.0
-# Nehalem	9.16
-# Atom		20.9
+# Core 2	9.83
+# Nehalem	7.74
+# Atom		19.0
 #
 # November 2011.
 #
@@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ sub MixColumns {
 # modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last]
 my @x=@_[0..7];
 my @t=@_[8..15];
+my $inv=@_[16];	# optional
 $code.=<<___;
 	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[0], @t[0]	# x0 <<< 32
 	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[1], @t[1]
@@ -497,17 +498,29 @@ sub MixColumns {
 	pxor	@t[4], @t[0]
 	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[2], @x[6]
 	pxor	@t[5], @t[1]
-
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$inv);
 	pxor	@t[3], @x[4]
 	pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
 	pxor	@t[6], @x[3]
 	 movdqa	@t[0], @x[2]
 	pxor	@t[2], @x[6]
 	 movdqa	@t[1], @x[7]
 ___
+$code.=<<___ if ($inv);
+	pxor	@x[4], @t[3]
+	pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[6]
+	 movdqa	@t[0], @x[3]
+	pxor	@t[2], @x[6]
+	 movdqa	@t[6], @x[2]
+	 movdqa	@t[1], @x[7]
+	 movdqa	@x[6], @x[4]
+	 movdqa	@t[3], @x[6]
+___
 }
 
-sub InvMixColumns {
+sub InvMixColumns_orig {
 my @x=@_[0..7];
 my @t=@_[8..15];
 
@@ -661,6 +674,54 @@ sub InvMixColumns {
 ___
 }
 
+sub InvMixColumns {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+
+# Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to
+#
+# | 0e 0b 0d 09 |   | 02 03 01 01 |   | 05 00 04 00 |
+# | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 |
+# | 0d 09 0e 0b |   | 01 01 02 03 |   | 04 00 05 00 |
+# | 0b 0d 09 0e |   | 03 01 01 02 |   | 00 04 00 05 |
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	# multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[0], @t[0]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[6], @t[6]
+	pxor	@x[0], @t[0]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[7], @t[7]
+	pxor	@x[6], @t[6]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[1], @t[1]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[7]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@x[1], @t[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[3], @t[3]
+	pxor	@x[2], @t[2]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[0]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[4], @t[4]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[3]
+	 pxor	@t[0], @x[2]
+	 pxor	@t[1], @x[3]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[5], @t[5]
+	pxor	@x[4], @t[4]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[1]
+	 pxor	@t[2], @x[4]
+	pxor	@x[5], @t[5]
+
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[2]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[3]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[4]
+	 pxor	@t[3], @x[5]
+	 pxor	@t[4], @x[6]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[4]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
+	 pxor	@t[5], @x[7]
+___
+	&MixColumns	(@x,@t,1);	# flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6
+}
+
 sub aesenc {				# not used
 my @b=@_[0..7];
 my @t=@_[8..15];
@@ -2028,6 +2089,8 @@ sub bitslice_key {
 #	const unsigned char iv[16]);
 #
 my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=@XMM[13..15];
+$arg6=~s/d$//;
+
 $code.=<<___;
 .globl	bsaes_xts_encrypt
 .type	bsaes_xts_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/armcap.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/armcap.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ unsigned int _armv7_tick(void);
 
 unsigned int OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
 	{
-	if (OPENSSL_armcap_P|ARMV7_TICK)
+	if (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_TICK)
 		return _armv7_tick();
 	else
 		return 0;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
 	int pad=0,ret,i,neg;
 	unsigned char *p,*n,pb=0;
 
-	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0);
+	if (a == NULL) return(0);
 	neg=a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
 	if (a->length == 0)
 		ret=1;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -566,7 +566,6 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
 	mbflag = tag2nbyte[type];
 	if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
 	mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
-	memset(&stmp, 0, sizeof(stmp));
 	stmp.data = NULL;
 	stmp.length = 0;
 	ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -906,8 +906,8 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
 	memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len));
 	ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &sockopt_len);
 	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
-	
-	for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
+
+	for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
 	     p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + sockopt_len;
 	     p += sizeof(uint8_t))
 		{
@@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 			ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen);
 			OPENSSL_assert(ii >= 0);
 
-			for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
+			for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
 				 p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + optlen;
 				 p += sizeof(uint8_t))
 				{

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile
@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ ppc-mont.s:	asm/ppc-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 ppc64-mont.s:	asm/ppc64-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 
 alpha-mont.s:	asm/alpha-mont.pl
-	$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+	(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+	$(PERL) asm/alpha-mont.pl > $$preproc && \
+	$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
 
 # GNU make "catch all"
 %-mont.s:	asm/%-mont.pl;	$(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
 	bnez	$at,1f
 	li	$t0,0
 	slt	$at,$num,17	# on in-order CPU
-	bnezl	$at,bn_mul_mont_internal
+	bnez	$at,bn_mul_mont_internal
 	nop
 1:	jr	$ra
 	li	$a0,0

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
@@ -140,10 +140,10 @@
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
 	$LD	$t1,0($a0)
 	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -200,10 +200,9 @@
 	$ADDU	$v0,$ta2
 	sltu	$at,$ta3,$at
 	$ST	$ta3,-$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ADDU	$v0,$at
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
 
 	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
 	nop
@@ -300,10 +299,10 @@
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_mul_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
 	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
 	$LD	$ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -341,10 +340,9 @@
 	$ADDU	$v0,$at
 	sltu	$ta3,$v0,$at
 	$ST	$v0,-$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ADDU	$v0,$ta3,$ta2
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$ta3,$ta2
 
 	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
 	nop
@@ -429,10 +427,10 @@
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_sqr_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$MULTU	$t0,$t0
 	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
 	$LD	$ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -463,11 +461,10 @@
 	mflo	$ta3
 	mfhi	$ta2
 	$ST	$ta3,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ST	$ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
 
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
+	$ST	$ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
 
 	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
 	nop
@@ -547,10 +544,10 @@
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$at,$a3,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$at,.L_bn_add_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_add_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$LD	$ta0,0($a2)
 	subu	$a3,4
 	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -589,11 +586,10 @@
 	$ADDU	$t3,$ta3,$v0
 	sltu	$v0,$t3,$ta3
 	$ST	$t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
 	
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
 
 	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
 	nop
@@ -679,10 +675,10 @@
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$at,$a3,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$at,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_sub_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$LD	$ta0,0($a2)
 	subu	$a3,4
 	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -722,11 +718,10 @@
 	$SUBU	$t3,$ta3,$v0
 	sgtu	$v0,$t3,$ta3
 	$ST	$t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
 
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
 
 	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
 	nop
@@ -840,8 +835,9 @@
 	sltu	$ta0,$a1,$a2
 	or	$t8,$ta0
 	.set	noreorder
-	beqzl	$at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
+	beqz	$at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
 	$SUBU	$v0,1
+	$ADDU	$v0,1
 	.set	reorder
 .L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done:
 	.set	noreorder
@@ -902,7 +898,8 @@
 	and	$t2,$a0
 	$SRL	$at,$a1,$t1
 	.set	noreorder
-	bnezl	$t2,.+8
+	beqz	$t2,.+12
+	nop
 	break	6		# signal overflow
 	.set	reorder
 	$SLL	$a0,$t9
@@ -917,7 +914,8 @@
 	$SRL	$DH,$a2,4*$BNSZ	# bits
 	sgeu	$at,$a0,$a2
 	.set	noreorder
-	bnezl	$at,.+8
+	beqz	$at,.+12
+	nop
 	$SUBU	$a0,$a2
 	.set	reorder
 

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 # of arithmetic operations, most notably multiplications. It requires
 # more memory references, most notably to tp[num], but this doesn't
 # seem to exhaust memory port capacity. And indeed, dedicated PA-RISC
-# 2.0 code path, provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
+# 2.0 code path provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
 # it's ~10% better for shortest key length and ~10% worse for longest
 # one.
 #
@@ -988,6 +988,8 @@ sub assemble {
 	# assemble 2.0 instructions in 32-bit mode...
 	s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($BN_SZ==4);
 
+	s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
+
 	print $_,"\n";
 }
 close STDOUT;
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 ($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx");	$a=$lo;
 ($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi");

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -901,8 +901,8 @@
 	jnz	.Lgather
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
-	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
-	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
 	lea	0x28(%rsp),%rsp
 ___
 $code.=<<___;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c
@@ -286,26 +286,25 @@ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void)
 	}
 
 
-static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top, int max)
+static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top, int max)
 	{
 	int i;
-	BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
 
 #ifdef BN_DEBUG
 	OPENSSL_assert(top <= max);
 #endif
-	for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
-		*_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
-	for (i = (max) - (top); i != 0; i--)
-		*_tmp1++ = (BN_ULONG) 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+		dst[i] = src[i];
+	for (; i < max; i++)
+		dst[i] = 0;
 	}
 
-static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top)
+static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top)
 	{ 
 	int i;
-	BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
-	for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
-		*_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+		dst[i] = src[i];
 	}
 
 #if BN_BITS2 == 64
@@ -451,8 +450,9 @@ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	 */
 	mask  = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)bn_sub_words(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_192[0],BN_NIST_192_TOP);
 	mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
+	res   = c_d;
 	res   = (BN_ULONG *)
-	 (((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
+	 (((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_192_TOP;
 	bn_correct_top(r);
@@ -479,8 +479,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	int	top = a->top, i;
 	int	carry;
 	BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d;
-	BN_ULONG buf[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
-		 c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
+	union	{
+		BN_ULONG	bn[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
+		unsigned int	ui[BN_NIST_224_TOP*sizeof(BN_ULONG)/sizeof(unsigned int)];
+		} buf;
+	BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
 		*res;
 	PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
 	union { bn_addsub_f f; PTR_SIZE_INT p; } u;
@@ -519,18 +522,18 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	/* copy upper 256 bits of 448 bit number ... */
 	nist_cp_bn_0(c_d, a_d + (BN_NIST_224_TOP-1), top - (BN_NIST_224_TOP-1), BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 	/* ... and right shift by 32 to obtain upper 224 bits */
-	nist_set_224(buf, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
+	nist_set_224(buf.bn, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
 	/* truncate lower part to 224 bits too */
 	r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP-1] &= BN_MASK2l;
 #else
-	nist_cp_bn_0(buf, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+	nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 #endif
 
 #if defined(NIST_INT64) && BN_BITS2!=64
 	{
 	NIST_INT64		acc;	/* accumulator */
 	unsigned int		*rp=(unsigned int *)r_d;
-	const unsigned int	*bp=(const unsigned int *)buf;
+	const unsigned int	*bp=(const unsigned int *)buf.ui;
 
 	acc  = rp[0];	acc -= bp[7-7];
 			acc -= bp[11-7]; rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32;
@@ -565,13 +568,13 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	{
 	BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
 
-	nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
+	nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
 	carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
-	nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
+	nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
 	carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
-	nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
+	nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
 	carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
-	nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
+	nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
 	carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 
 #if BN_BITS2==64
@@ -606,7 +609,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	/* otherwise it's effectively same as in BN_nist_mod_192... */
 	mask  = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_224[0],BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 	mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
-	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+	res   = c_d;
+	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
 	 ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_224_TOP;
@@ -805,7 +809,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 
 	mask  = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_256[0],BN_NIST_256_TOP);
 	mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
-	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+	res   = c_d;
+	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
 	 ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_256_TOP;
@@ -1026,7 +1031,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 
 	mask  = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_384[0],BN_NIST_384_TOP);
 	mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
-	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+	res   = c_d;
+	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
 	 ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_384_TOP;
@@ -1092,7 +1098,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 
 	bn_add_words(r_d,r_d,t_d,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
 	mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)bn_sub_words(t_d,r_d,_nist_p_521,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
-	res  = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)t_d&~mask) |
+	res  = t_d;
+	res  = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
 	 ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d,res,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_521_TOP;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
@@ -179,14 +179,14 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
 	return(len);
 	}
 
-void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t size)
+void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t size)
 	{
 	size_t i;
 	if (in)
 		{
 		out += size - 1;
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
-			*in++ = *out--;
+			*out-- = *in++;
 		}
 	else
 		{

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ int	BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
 char *	BUF_strdup(const char *str);
 char *	BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
 void *	BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
-void	BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
+void	BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
 
 /* safe string functions */
 size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst,const char *src,size_t siz);

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key)
 		if (!pstr)
 			return 0;
 		pstr->length = i2d_ECParameters(ec_key, &pstr->data);
-		if (pstr->length < 0)
+		if (pstr->length <= 0)
 			{
 			ASN1_STRING_free(pstr);
 			ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k)
 	if (group == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (EC_GROUP_method_of(group)->group_set_curve != ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve
+	if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+	    NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
 	    || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] == 0)))
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
@@ -107,7 +108,8 @@ int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1,
 	if (group == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (EC_GROUP_method_of(group)->group_set_curve != ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve
+	if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+	    NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
 	    || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0) && (group->poly[4] == 0)))
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -480,10 +480,10 @@ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) !=
 	    EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b)))
 		return 1;
-	/* compare the curve name (if present) */
+	/* compare the curve name (if present in both) */
 	if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) &&
-	    EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) == EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
-		return 0;
+	    EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
+		return 1;
 
 	if (!ctx)
 		ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new();
@@ -993,12 +993,12 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN
 	if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0)
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return 0;
+		return -1;
 		}
 	if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth))
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
-		return 0;
+		return -1;
 		}
 	return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
 	}

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
 	{
 	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rdrand_id) ||
 	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rdrand_name) ||
+            !ENGINE_set_flags(e, ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL) ||
 	    !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, rdrand_init) ||
 	    !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &rdrand_meth) )
 		return 0;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ files:
 links:
 	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
 	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST)
-	[ ! -f $(TESTDATA) ] || cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test
+	@[ -f $(TESTDATA) ] && cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test && echo "$(TESTDATA) -> ../../test/$(TESTDATA)"
 	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS)
 
 install:

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -366,8 +366,11 @@ int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count,
 
 void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+	if (ctx)
+		{
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+		}
 	}
 
 /* This call frees resources associated with the context */

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -842,7 +842,10 @@ static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 			gctx->ctr = NULL;
 			break;
 			}
+		else
 #endif
+		(void)0;	/* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+
 		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
 		CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f)AES_encrypt);
 #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
@@ -1083,14 +1086,17 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 			xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt;
 			}
 
-		vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len/2,
+		    vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len/2,
 						ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
-		xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt;
+		    xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt;
 
-		xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
-		break;
-		}
+		    xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+		    break;
+		    }
+		else
 #endif
+		(void)0;	/* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+
 		if (enc)
 			{
 			AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -328,10 +328,11 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 
 				if (res!=SHA_CBLOCK) continue;
 
-				mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+				/* j is not incremented yet */
+				mask = 0-((inp_len+7-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
 				data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
 				sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
-				mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+				mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-72)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
 				pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
 				pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
 				pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 static int des_ede_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 			      const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
 {
-	if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
+	while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
 		{
 		DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
 			       &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 	printf("\n");
 	}
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
+	while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
 		{
 		DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
 			     &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 static int des_ede_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 			      const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
 {
-	if (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
+	while (inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK)
 		{
 		DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, 
 			       &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3,

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -85,19 +85,24 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
 	unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
 	int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
 	unsigned long i = 1;
-	HMAC_CTX hctx;
+	HMAC_CTX hctx_tpl, hctx;
 
 	mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
 	if (mdlen < 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx_tpl);
 	p = out;
 	tkeylen = keylen;
 	if(!pass)
 		passlen = 0;
 	else if(passlen == -1)
 		passlen = strlen(pass);
+	if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
+		{
+		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	while(tkeylen)
 		{
 		if(tkeylen > mdlen)
@@ -111,27 +116,44 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
 		itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
 		itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
 		itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
-		if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)
-			|| !HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen)
-			|| !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4)
-			|| !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
+		if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl))
 			{
+			HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen)
+		    || !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4)
+		    || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
+			{
+			HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
 			HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 			return 0;
 			}
+		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 		memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
 		for(j = 1; j < iter; j++)
 			{
-			HMAC(digest, pass, passlen,
-				 digtmp, mdlen, digtmp, NULL);
+			if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl))
+				{
+				HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
+			    || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL))
+				{
+				HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
+				HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+				return 0;
+				}
+			HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 			for(k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
 				p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
 			}
 		tkeylen-= cplen;
 		i++;
 		p+= cplen;
 		}
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl);
 #ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2
 	fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n");
 	h__dump (pass, passlen);

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile
@@ -53,7 +53,10 @@ ghash-x86_64.s:	asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
 ghash-sparcv9.s:	asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl $@ $(CFLAGS)
 ghash-alpha.s:	asm/ghash-alpha.pl
-	$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+	(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+	$(PERL) asm/ghash-alpha.pl > $$preproc && \
+	$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
+
 ghash-parisc.s:	asm/ghash-parisc.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/ghash-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-alpha.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-alpha.pl
@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@
 	ldq	$Xlo,8($Xi)
 	ldq	$Xhi,0($Xi)
 
-	br	$rem_4bit,.Lpic1
-.Lpic1:	lda	$rem_4bit,rem_4bit-.Lpic1($rem_4bit)
+	bsr	$t0,picmeup
+	nop
 ___
 
 	&loop();
@@ -341,8 +341,8 @@
 	ldq	$Xhi,0($Xi)
 	ldq	$Xlo,8($Xi)
 
-	br	$rem_4bit,.Lpic2
-.Lpic2:	lda	$rem_4bit,rem_4bit-.Lpic2($rem_4bit)
+	bsr	$t0,picmeup
+	nop
 
 .Louter:
 	extql	$inhi,$inp,$inhi
@@ -436,11 +436,20 @@
 .end	gcm_ghash_4bit
 
 .align	4
+.ent	picmeup
+picmeup:
+	.frame	sp,0,$t0
+	.prologue 0
+	br	$rem_4bit,.Lpic
+.Lpic:	lda	$rem_4bit,12($rem_4bit)
+	ret	($t0)
+.end	picmeup
+	nop
 rem_4bit:
-	.quad	0x0000<<48, 0x1C20<<48, 0x3840<<48, 0x2460<<48
-	.quad	0x7080<<48, 0x6CA0<<48, 0x48C0<<48, 0x54E0<<48
-	.quad	0xE100<<48, 0xFD20<<48, 0xD940<<48, 0xC560<<48
-	.quad	0x9180<<48, 0x8DA0<<48, 0xA9C0<<48, 0xB5E0<<48
+	.long	0,0x0000<<16, 0,0x1C20<<16, 0,0x3840<<16, 0,0x2460<<16
+	.long	0,0x7080<<16, 0,0x6CA0<<16, 0,0x48C0<<16, 0,0x54E0<<16
+	.long	0,0xE100<<16, 0,0xFD20<<16, 0,0xD940<<16, 0,0xC560<<16
+	.long	0,0x9180<<16, 0,0x8DA0<<16, 0,0xA9C0<<16, 0,0xB5E0<<16
 .ascii	"GHASH for Alpha, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
 .align	4
 

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ sub assemble {
 		s/cmpb,\*/comb,/;
 		s/,\*/,/;
 	}
+	s/\bbv\b/bve/	if ($SIZE_T==8);
 	print $_,"\n";
 }
 

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/cbc128.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/cbc128.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 			unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block)
 {
 	size_t n;
-	union { size_t align; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp;
+	union { size_t t[16/sizeof(size_t)]; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp;
 
 	assert(in && out && key && ivec);
 
@@ -137,11 +137,13 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 				out += 16;
 			}
 		}
-		else {
+		else  if (16%sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */
 			while (len>=16) {
+				size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out, *iv_t=(size_t *)iv;
+
 				(*block)(in, out, key);
-				for(n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
-					*(size_t *)(out+n) ^= *(size_t *)(iv+n);
+				for(n=0; n<16/sizeof(size_t); n++)
+					out_t[n] ^= iv_t[n];
 				iv = in;
 				len -= 16;
 				in  += 16;
@@ -165,15 +167,16 @@ void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 				out += 16;
 			}
 		}
-		else {
-			size_t c;
+		else if (16%sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */
 			while (len>=16) {
+				size_t c, *out_t=(size_t *)out, *ivec_t=(size_t *)ivec;
+				const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
 				(*block)(in, tmp.c, key);
-				for(n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t)) {
-					c = *(size_t *)(in+n);
-					*(size_t *)(out+n) =
-					*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) ^ *(size_t *)(ivec+n);
-					*(size_t *)(ivec+n) = c;
+				for(n=0; n<16/sizeof(size_t); n++) {
+					c = in_t[n];
+					out_t[n] = tmp.t[n] ^ ivec_t[n];
+					ivec_t[n] = c;
 				}
 				len -= 16;
 				in  += 16;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/ccm128.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/ccm128.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		ctx->nonce.c[11] = (u8)(mlen>>(32%(sizeof(mlen)*8)));
 	}
 	else
-		*(u32*)(&ctx->nonce.c[8]) = 0;
+		ctx->nonce.u[1] = 0;
 
 	ctx->nonce.c[12] = (u8)(mlen>>24);
 	ctx->nonce.c[13] = (u8)(mlen>>16);

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/cts128.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/cts128.c
@@ -108,12 +108,8 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 	(*cbc)(in,out-16,residue,key,ivec,1);
 	memcpy(out,tmp.c,residue);
 #else
-	{
-	size_t n;
-	for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
-		*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
+	memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
 	memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
-	}
 	memcpy(out,out-16,residue);
 	(*cbc)(tmp.c,out-16,16,key,ivec,1);
 #endif
@@ -144,12 +140,8 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 #if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO)
 	(*cbc)(in,out-16+residue,residue,key,ivec,1);
 #else
-	{
-	size_t n;
-	for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
-		*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
+	memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
 	memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
-	}
 	(*cbc)(tmp.c,out-16+residue,16,key,ivec,1);
 #endif
 	return len+residue;
@@ -177,8 +169,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 
 	(*block)(in,tmp.c+16,key);
 
-	for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
-		*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = *(size_t *)(tmp.c+16+n);
+	memcpy(tmp.c,tmp.c+16,16);
 	memcpy(tmp.c,in+16,residue);
 	(*block)(tmp.c,tmp.c,key);
 
@@ -220,8 +211,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *o
 
 	(*block)(in+residue,tmp.c+16,key);
 
-	for (n=0; n<16; n+=sizeof(size_t))
-		*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = *(size_t *)(tmp.c+16+n);
+	memcpy(tmp.c,tmp.c+16,16);
 	memcpy(tmp.c,in,residue);
 	(*block)(tmp.c,tmp.c,key);
 
@@ -240,7 +230,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *o
 size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 			size_t len, const void *key,
 			unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
-{	size_t residue, n;
+{	size_t residue;
 	union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp;
 
 	assert (in && out && key && ivec);
@@ -257,8 +247,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 		out += len;
 	}
 
-	for (n=16; n<32; n+=sizeof(size_t))
-		*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
+	memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
 	/* this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0] */
 	(*cbc)(in,tmp.c,16,key,tmp.c+16,0);
 
@@ -275,7 +264,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 			size_t len, const void *key,
 			unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc)
-{	size_t residue, n;
+{	size_t residue;
 	union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp;
 
 	assert (in && out && key && ivec);
@@ -297,8 +286,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 		out += len;
 	}
 
-	for (n=16; n<32; n+=sizeof(size_t))
-		*(size_t *)(tmp.c+n) = 0;
+	memset(tmp.c,0,sizeof(tmp));
 	/* this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0] */
 	(*cbc)(in+residue,tmp.c,16,key,tmp.c+16,0);
 

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -941,15 +941,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		    size_t j=GHASH_CHUNK;
 
 		    while (j) {
+		    	size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+		    	const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
-			for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
-				*(size_t *)(out+i) =
-				*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+				out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
 			out += 16;
 			in  += 16;
 			j   -= 16;
@@ -961,15 +963,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		    size_t j=i;
 
 		    while (len>=16) {
+		    	size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+		    	const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
-			for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
-				*(size_t *)(out+i) =
-				*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+				out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i];
 			out += 16;
 			in  += 16;
 			len -= 16;
@@ -978,16 +982,18 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		}
 #else
 		while (len>=16) {
+		    	size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+		    	const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
-			for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
-				*(size_t *)(ctx->Xi.c+i) ^=
-				*(size_t *)(out+i) =
-				*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+				ctx->Xi.t[i] ^=
+				out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
 			GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
 			out += 16;
 			in  += 16;
@@ -1091,15 +1097,17 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 
 		    GHASH(ctx,in,GHASH_CHUNK);
 		    while (j) {
+		    	size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+		    	const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
-			for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
-				*(size_t *)(out+i) =
-				*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+				out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
 			out += 16;
 			in  += 16;
 			j   -= 16;
@@ -1109,32 +1117,37 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
 		if ((i = (len&(size_t)-16))) {
 		    GHASH(ctx,in,i);
 		    while (len>=16) {
+		    	size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+		    	const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
-			for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t))
-				*(size_t *)(out+i) =
-				*(size_t *)(in+i)^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
+			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
+				out_t[i] = in_t[i]^ctx->EKi.t[i];
 			out += 16;
 			in  += 16;
 			len -= 16;
 		    }
 		}
 #else
 		while (len>=16) {
+		    	size_t *out_t=(size_t *)out;
+		    	const size_t *in_t=(const size_t *)in;
+
 			(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
 			++ctr;
 			if (is_endian.little)
 				PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
 			else
 				ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
-			for (i=0; i<16; i+=sizeof(size_t)) {
-				size_t c = *(size_t *)(in+i);
-				*(size_t *)(out+i) = c^*(size_t *)(ctx->EKi.c+i);
-				*(size_t *)(ctx->Xi.c+i) ^= c;
+			for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i) {
+				size_t c = in[i];
+				out[i] = c^ctx->EKi.t[i];
+				ctx->Xi.t[i] ^= c;
 			}
 			GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
 			out += 16;
@@ -1669,6 +1682,46 @@ static const u8	IV18[]={0x93,0x13,0x22,0x5d,0xf8,0x84,0x06,0xe5,0x55,0x90,0x9c,0
 			0xa2,0x41,0x89,0x97,0x20,0x0e,0xf8,0x2e,0x44,0xae,0x7e,0x3f},
 		T18[]= {0xa4,0x4a,0x82,0x66,0xee,0x1c,0x8e,0xb0,0xc8,0xb5,0xd4,0xcf,0x5a,0xe9,0xf1,0x9a};
 
+/* Test Case 19 */
+#define K19 K1
+#define P19 P1
+#define IV19 IV1
+#define C19 C1
+static const u8 A19[]= {0xd9,0x31,0x32,0x25,0xf8,0x84,0x06,0xe5,0xa5,0x59,0x09,0xc5,0xaf,0xf5,0x26,0x9a,
+			0x86,0xa7,0xa9,0x53,0x15,0x34,0xf7,0xda,0x2e,0x4c,0x30,0x3d,0x8a,0x31,0x8a,0x72,
+			0x1c,0x3c,0x0c,0x95,0x95,0x68,0x09,0x53,0x2f,0xcf,0x0e,0x24,0x49,0xa6,0xb5,0x25,
+			0xb1,0x6a,0xed,0xf5,0xaa,0x0d,0xe6,0x57,0xba,0x63,0x7b,0x39,0x1a,0xaf,0xd2,0x55,
+			0x52,0x2d,0xc1,0xf0,0x99,0x56,0x7d,0x07,0xf4,0x7f,0x37,0xa3,0x2a,0x84,0x42,0x7d,
+			0x64,0x3a,0x8c,0xdc,0xbf,0xe5,0xc0,0xc9,0x75,0x98,0xa2,0xbd,0x25,0x55,0xd1,0xaa,
+			0x8c,0xb0,0x8e,0x48,0x59,0x0d,0xbb,0x3d,0xa7,0xb0,0x8b,0x10,0x56,0x82,0x88,0x38,
+			0xc5,0xf6,0x1e,0x63,0x93,0xba,0x7a,0x0a,0xbc,0xc9,0xf6,0x62,0x89,0x80,0x15,0xad},
+		T19[]= {0x5f,0xea,0x79,0x3a,0x2d,0x6f,0x97,0x4d,0x37,0xe6,0x8e,0x0c,0xb8,0xff,0x94,0x92};
+
+/* Test Case 20 */
+#define K20 K1
+#define A20 A1
+static const u8 IV20[64]={0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff},	/* this results in 0xff in counter LSB */
+		P20[288],
+		C20[]= {0x56,0xb3,0x37,0x3c,0xa9,0xef,0x6e,0x4a,0x2b,0x64,0xfe,0x1e,0x9a,0x17,0xb6,0x14,
+			0x25,0xf1,0x0d,0x47,0xa7,0x5a,0x5f,0xce,0x13,0xef,0xc6,0xbc,0x78,0x4a,0xf2,0x4f,
+			0x41,0x41,0xbd,0xd4,0x8c,0xf7,0xc7,0x70,0x88,0x7a,0xfd,0x57,0x3c,0xca,0x54,0x18,
+			0xa9,0xae,0xff,0xcd,0x7c,0x5c,0xed,0xdf,0xc6,0xa7,0x83,0x97,0xb9,0xa8,0x5b,0x49,
+			0x9d,0xa5,0x58,0x25,0x72,0x67,0xca,0xab,0x2a,0xd0,0xb2,0x3c,0xa4,0x76,0xa5,0x3c,
+			0xb1,0x7f,0xb4,0x1c,0x4b,0x8b,0x47,0x5c,0xb4,0xf3,0xf7,0x16,0x50,0x94,0xc2,0x29,
+			0xc9,0xe8,0xc4,0xdc,0x0a,0x2a,0x5f,0xf1,0x90,0x3e,0x50,0x15,0x11,0x22,0x13,0x76,
+			0xa1,0xcd,0xb8,0x36,0x4c,0x50,0x61,0xa2,0x0c,0xae,0x74,0xbc,0x4a,0xcd,0x76,0xce,
+			0xb0,0xab,0xc9,0xfd,0x32,0x17,0xef,0x9f,0x8c,0x90,0xbe,0x40,0x2d,0xdf,0x6d,0x86,
+			0x97,0xf4,0xf8,0x80,0xdf,0xf1,0x5b,0xfb,0x7a,0x6b,0x28,0x24,0x1e,0xc8,0xfe,0x18,
+			0x3c,0x2d,0x59,0xe3,0xf9,0xdf,0xff,0x65,0x3c,0x71,0x26,0xf0,0xac,0xb9,0xe6,0x42,
+			0x11,0xf4,0x2b,0xae,0x12,0xaf,0x46,0x2b,0x10,0x70,0xbe,0xf1,0xab,0x5e,0x36,0x06,
+			0x87,0x2c,0xa1,0x0d,0xee,0x15,0xb3,0x24,0x9b,0x1a,0x1b,0x95,0x8f,0x23,0x13,0x4c,
+			0x4b,0xcc,0xb7,0xd0,0x32,0x00,0xbc,0xe4,0x20,0xa2,0xf8,0xeb,0x66,0xdc,0xf3,0x64,
+			0x4d,0x14,0x23,0xc1,0xb5,0x69,0x90,0x03,0xc1,0x3e,0xce,0xf4,0xbf,0x38,0xa3,0xb6,
+			0x0e,0xed,0xc3,0x40,0x33,0xba,0xc1,0x90,0x27,0x83,0xdc,0x6d,0x89,0xe2,0xe7,0x74,
+			0x18,0x8a,0x43,0x9c,0x7e,0xbc,0xc0,0x67,0x2d,0xbd,0xa4,0xdd,0xcf,0xb2,0x79,0x46,
+			0x13,0xb0,0xbe,0x41,0x31,0x5e,0xf7,0x78,0x70,0x8a,0x70,0xee,0x7d,0x75,0x16,0x5c},
+		T20[]= {0x8b,0x30,0x7f,0x6b,0x33,0x28,0x6d,0x0a,0xb0,0x26,0xa9,0xed,0x3f,0xe1,0xe8,0x5f};
+
 #define TEST_CASE(n)	do {					\
 	u8 out[sizeof(P##n)];					\
 	AES_set_encrypt_key(K##n,sizeof(K##n)*8,&key);		\
@@ -1713,6 +1766,8 @@ int main()
 	TEST_CASE(16);
 	TEST_CASE(17);
 	TEST_CASE(18);
+	TEST_CASE(19);
+	TEST_CASE(20);
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
 	{
@@ -1743,11 +1798,16 @@ int main()
 			ctr_t/(double)sizeof(buf),
 			(gcm_t-ctr_t)/(double)sizeof(buf));
 #ifdef GHASH
-	GHASH(&ctx,buf.c,sizeof(buf));
+	{
+	void (*gcm_ghash_p)(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16],
+				const u8 *inp,size_t len)	= ctx.ghash;
+
+	GHASH((&ctx),buf.c,sizeof(buf));
 	start = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
-	for (i=0;i<100;++i) GHASH(&ctx,buf.c,sizeof(buf));
+	for (i=0;i<100;++i) GHASH((&ctx),buf.c,sizeof(buf));
 	gcm_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start;
 	printf("%.2f\n",gcm_t/(double)sizeof(buf)/(double)i);
+	}
 #endif
 	}
 #endif

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
@@ -29,10 +29,7 @@ typedef unsigned char u8;
 #if defined(__i386)	|| defined(__i386__)	|| \
     defined(__x86_64)	|| defined(__x86_64__)	|| \
     defined(_M_IX86)	|| defined(_M_AMD64)	|| defined(_M_X64) || \
-    defined(__s390__)	|| defined(__s390x__)	|| \
-    ( (defined(__arm__)	|| defined(__arm)) && \
-      (defined(__ARM_ARCH_7__)	|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_7A__) || \
-       defined(__ARM_ARCH_7R__)	|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_7M__)) )
+    defined(__s390__)	|| defined(__s390x__)
 # undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
 #endif
 
@@ -101,8 +98,8 @@ typedef struct { u64 hi,lo; } u128;
 
 struct gcm128_context {
 	/* Following 6 names follow names in GCM specification */
-	union { u64 u[2]; u32 d[4]; u8 c[16]; }	Yi,EKi,EK0,len,
-						Xi,H;
+	union { u64 u[2]; u32 d[4]; u8 c[16]; size_t t[16/sizeof(size_t)]; }
+	  Yi,EKi,EK0,len,Xi,H;
 	/* Relative position of Xi, H and pre-computed Htable is used
 	 * in some assembler modules, i.e. don't change the order! */
 #if TABLE_BITS==8

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000105fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000106fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1f-fips 6 Jan 2014"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pariscid.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pariscid.pl
@@ -97,33 +97,33 @@
 	.PROC
 	.CALLINFO	NO_CALLS
 	.ENTRY
-	cmpib,*=	0,$len,Ldone
+	cmpib,*=	0,$len,L\$done
 	nop
-	cmpib,*>>=	15,$len,Little
+	cmpib,*>>=	15,$len,L\$ittle
 	ldi		$SIZE_T-1,%r1
 
-Lalign
+L\$align
 	and,*<>		$inp,%r1,%r28
-	b,n		Laligned
+	b,n		L\$aligned
 	stb		%r0,0($inp)
 	ldo		-1($len),$len
-	b		Lalign
+	b		L\$align
 	ldo		1($inp),$inp
 
-Laligned
+L\$aligned
 	andcm		$len,%r1,%r28
-Lot
+L\$ot
 	$ST		%r0,0($inp)
-	addib,*<>	-$SIZE_T,%r28,Lot
+	addib,*<>	-$SIZE_T,%r28,L\$ot
 	ldo		$SIZE_T($inp),$inp
 
 	and,*<>		$len,%r1,$len
-	b,n		Ldone
-Little
+	b,n		L\$done
+L\$ittle
 	stb		%r0,0($inp)
-	addib,*<>	-1,$len,Little
+	addib,*<>	-1,$len,L\$ittle
 	ldo		1($inp),$inp
-Ldone
+L\$done
 	bv		($rp)
 	.EXIT
 	nop
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
 	ldw		0($out),$tick
 	add		$diff,$tick,$tick
 	stw		$tick,0($out)
-Loop
+L\$oop
 	mfctl		%cr16,$tick
 	sub		$tick,$lasttick,$diff
 	copy		$tick,$lasttick
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@
 	add		$diff,$tick,$tick
 	stw		$tick,0($out)
 
-	addib,<>	-1,$cnt,Loop
+	addib,<>	-1,$cnt,L\$oop
 	addi		4,$out,$out
 
 	bv		($rp)
@@ -190,14 +190,14 @@
 	mfctl		%cr16,$tick
 	sub		$tick,$lasttick,$diff
 	copy		$tick,$lasttick
-Loop2
+L\$oop2
 	copy		$diff,$lastdiff
 	fdc		0($out)
 	ldw		0($out),$tick
 	add		$diff,$tick,$tick
 	stw		$tick,0($out)
 
-	addib,=		-1,$max,Ldone2
+	addib,=		-1,$max,L\$done2
 	nop
 
 	mfctl		%cr16,$tick
@@ -208,17 +208,18 @@
 
 	ldi		1,%r1
 	xor		%r1,$tick,$tick
-	addb,<>		$tick,$cnt,Loop2
+	addb,<>		$tick,$cnt,L\$oop2
 	shladd,l	$tick,2,$out,$out
-Ldone2
+L\$done2
 	bv		($rp)
 	.EXIT
 	add		$rv,$cnt,$rv
 	.PROCEND
 ___
 }
-$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
-$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm	if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm		if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
 print $code;
 close STDOUT;
 
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_info.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pe
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 			if (strcmp(name,PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0)
 			{
+			d2i=(D2I_OF(void))d2i_RSAPrivateKey;
 			if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) 
 				{
 				if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret,xi)) goto err;

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ sub ::file
 IF \@Version LT 800
 ECHO MASM version 8.00 or later is strongly recommended.
 ENDIF
-.686
+.486
 .MODEL	FLAT
 OPTION	DOTNAME
 IF \@Version LT 800

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c
@@ -90,7 +90,14 @@ PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
 
 	/* Set defaults */
 	if (!nid_cert)
+		{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (FIPS_mode())
+			nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+		else
+#endif
 		nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+		}
 	if (!nid_key)
 		nid_key = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
 	if (!iter)

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -380,8 +380,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
 	 * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
 	 * global 'md'.
 	 */
-
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	/* NB: in FIPS mode we are already under a lock */
+	if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
 	/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
@@ -460,7 +463,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
 
 	/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
 	crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
 	while (num > 0)
 		{
@@ -512,10 +518,16 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
 	MD_Init(&m);
 	MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
 	MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 	MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 	MD_Final(&m,md);
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
 	if (ok)

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
 #define RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES			 100
 
 /* Reason codes. */
+#define RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED			 104
 #define RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG			 102
 #define RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG			 103
 #define RAND_R_NO_FIPS_RANDOM_METHOD_SET		 101

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_err.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[]=
 
 static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[]=
 	{
+{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED),"dual ec drbg disabled"},
 {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG),"error initialising drbg"},
 {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG),"error instantiating drbg"},
 {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_NO_FIPS_RANDOM_METHOD_SET),"no fips random method set"},

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -269,6 +269,14 @@ int RAND_init_fips(void)
 	DRBG_CTX *dctx;
 	size_t plen;
 	unsigned char pers[32], *p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_ALLOW_DUAL_EC_DRBG
+	if (fips_drbg_type >> 16)
+		{
+		RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_INIT_FIPS, RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+#endif
+
 	dctx = FIPS_get_default_drbg();
         if (FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, fips_drbg_type, fips_drbg_flags) <= 0)
 		{

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl
@@ -307,7 +307,8 @@ sub foldedloop {
 	.STRINGZ "RC4 for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
 ___
 $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
-$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm	if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
 
 print $code;
 close STDOUT;
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -351,27 +351,27 @@ static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
 
 	if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
 		goto err;
-	if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: ") <= 0)
+	if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
 			goto err;
 	if (pss->saltLength)
 		{
 		if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
 			goto err;
 		}
-	else if (BIO_puts(bp, "20 (default)") <= 0)
+	else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0x14 (default)") <= 0)
 		goto err;
 	BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
 
 	if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
 		goto err;
-	if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: ") <= 0)
+	if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
 			goto err;
 	if (pss->trailerField)
 		{
 		if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
 			goto err;
 		}
-	else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0xbc (default)") <= 0)
+	else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
 		goto err;
 	BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
 

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
 	BN_CTX *ctx;
 	int r;
 	int ret=1;
+
+	if (!key->p || !key->q || !key->n || !key->e || !key->d)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+		return 0;
+		}
 
 	i = BN_new();
 	j = BN_new();

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -611,6 +611,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 			pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
 		else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
 			pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+		else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
+			pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
 		else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
 			pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
 		else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ sha256-armv4.S: asm/sha256-armv4.pl
 	$(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 
 sha1-alpha.s:	asm/sha1-alpha.pl
-	$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+	(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+	$(PERL) asm/sha1-alpha.pl > $$preproc && \
+	$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
 
 # Solaris make has to be explicitly told
 sha1-x86_64.s:	asm/sha1-x86_64.pl;	$(PERL) asm/sha1-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ sub BODY_40_59 {
 ___
 
 $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
-$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/,\*/,/gm		if ($SIZE_T==4);
+$code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
 print $code;
 close STDOUT;
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ ()
 	mov	%rdi,$ctx	# reassigned argument
 	mov	%rsi,$inp	# reassigned argument
 	mov	%rdx,$num	# reassigned argument
-	vzeroall
+	vzeroupper
 
 	shl	\$6,$num
 	add	$inp,$num
@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ ()
 	&Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
 
 $code.=<<___;
-	vzeroall
+	vzeroupper
 
 	add	0($ctx),$A			# update context
 	add	4($ctx),@T[0]