

# Anatomy of a STARK


## Anatomy of a STARK, Part 5: A Rescue-Prime STARK

This part of the tutorial puts the tools developed in the previous parts together to build a concretely useful STARK proof system. This application produces a STARK proof of correct evaluation of the Rescue-Prime hash function on a secret input with a known output. It is concretely useful because the resulting non-interactive proof doubles as a post-quantum signature scheme.

### Rescue-Prime

**Rescue-Prime** is an arithmetization-oriented hash function, meaning that it has a compact description in terms of AIR. It is a sponge function constructed from the Rescue-XLIX permutation  $f_{\text{RXLIX}} : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^m$ , consisting of several almost-identical rounds. Every round consists of six steps:

1. Forward S-box. Every element of the state is raised to the power  $\alpha$ , where  $\alpha$  is the smallest invertible power.
2. MDS. The vector of state elements is multiplied by a matrix with special properties.
3. Round constants. Pre-defined constants are added to every element of the state.
4. Backward S-box. Every element of the state is raised to the power  $\alpha^{-1}$ , which is the integer whose power map is the inverse of  $x \mapsto x^\alpha$ .
5. MDS. The vector of state elements is multiplied by a matrix with special properties.
6. Round constants. Pre-defined constants are added to every element of the state.



The rounds are *almost* identical but not quite because constants are different in every rounds. While the Backward S-box step seems like a high degree operation,

Once the Rescue-XLIX permutation is defined, one obtains Rescue-Prime by instantiating a sponge function with it. In this construction, input field elements are absorbed into the top  $r$  elements of the state in between permutations. After one final permutation, the top  $r$  elements are read out. The Rescue-Prime hash digest consists of these  $r$  elements.



- Furthermore, the input to the hash computation will be a single field element. So in particular, there will be only one round of absorbing and one application of the permutation.

The Rescue-Prime [paper](#) provides a nearly complete reference implementation. However, the code here is tailored to this one application.

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```
self.round_constants = [FieldElement(v, self.field) for v in [10979758935699315327977538331866
22820955900114355144222324832454
26806570341117507762848324759622
25014578629479310330371287650973
15407792598648894396046384275381
20435111991682398903226296606340
57645879694647124999765652767459
10259511070209448059707229051734
85474390402060953238965247602744
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14403053317130920196971556932351
26450872243290657206637321658326
22822825100935314666408731317941
33847779135505989201180138242500
14601928459310067359003664020862
51518045467620803302456472369449
73980612169525564135758195254813
31385101081646507577789564023348
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23320623552000086538251046002993
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19199940390616847185791261689448
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23970159143769923596250553611388
17960711445525398132996203513667
21947563597282592084930017902696
23003861106193195090131641372834
14944681490699419681440381176738
```

25535582028106779796087284957910  
93289417880348777872263904150910  
47794802862111969844512383842308  
20876224164132836934759800949450  
34228805619823025763071411313049  
15826163946006067936812298460724  
65048656051037025727800046057154  
13408288547776619894729309556570  
23967684755547703714152865513907  
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24805732445613858920110710030270  
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17781267625420146897635247199202  
21137413617037619862821357708402  
10578571244551877573283063426067  
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12684821636117316049784444421480  
22264167580742653700039698161547  
23427590865863485892991884292379  
18940981129458969702879685602315  
75017033107075630953974011872571  
14494534486035107558657512948957  
26199115261693345516943712125431  
18450316039330448878816627264054

```

def hash( self, input_element ):
    # absorb
    state = [input_element] + [self.field.zero()] * (self.m - 1)

    # permutation
    for r in range(self.N):

        # forward half-round
        # S-box
        for i in range(self.m):
            state[i] = state[i]^self.alpha
        # matrix
        temp = [self.field.zero() for i in range(self.m)]
        for i in range(self.m):
            for j in range(self.m):
                temp[i] = temp[i] + self.MDS[i][j] * state[j]
        # constants
        state = [temp[i] + self.round_constants[2*r*self.m+i] for i

        # backward half-round
        # S-box
        for i in range(self.m):
            state[i] = state[i]^self.alphainv
        # matrix
        temp = [self.field.zero() for i in range(self.m)]
        for i in range(self.m):
            for j in range(self.m):
                temp[i] = temp[i] + self.MDS[i][j] * state[j]
        # constants
        state = [temp[i] + self.round_constants[2*r*self.m+self.m+i]

    # squeeze
    return state[0]

```

## Rescue-Prime AIR

The transition constraints for a single round of the Rescue-XLIX permutation are obtained by expressing the state values in the middle of the round in terms of the state values at the beginning, and again in terms of the state values at the end, and then equating both expressions. Specifically, let  $s_i$  denote the state values at the beginning of round  $i$ , let  $c_{2i}$  and  $c_{2i+1}$  be round constants, let  $M$  be the MDS matrix, and let superscript denote element-wise powering. Then the transition of a single round is captured by the equation:

$$M(s_i^\alpha) + c_{2i} = (M^{-1}(s_{i+1} - c_{2i+1}))^\alpha$$

To be used in a STARK, transition constraints cannot depend on the round. In other words, what is needed is a single equation that describes all rounds, not just the  $i$ th round. Let  $\mathbf{X}$  denote the vector of variables representing the current state (beginning of the round), and  $\mathbf{Y}$  denote the vector of variables representing the next

state (at the end of the round). Furthermore, let  $\mathbf{f}_{c_{2i}}(W)$  denote the vector of  $m$  polynomials that take the value  $c_{2i}$  on  $o^i$ , and analogously for  $\mathbf{f}_{c_{2i+1}}(W)$ . Suppose without loss of generality that the execution trace will be interpolated on the domain  $\{o^i | 0 \leq i \leq T\}$  for some  $T$ . Then the above family of arithmetic transition constraints gives rise to the following equation capturing the same transition conditions:

$$M(\mathbf{X}^\alpha) + \mathbf{f}_{c_{2i}}(W) = (M^{-1}(\mathbf{Y} - \mathbf{f}_{c_{2i+1}}(W)))^\alpha$$

The transition constraint polynomial is obtained by moving all terms to the left-hand side and dropping the equation to zero. Note that there are  $2m + 1$  variables, corresponding to  $m = w$  registers.

```
def round_constants_polynomials( self, omicron ):
    first_step_constants = []
    for i in range(self.m):
        domain = [omicron^r for r in range(0, self.N)]
        values = [self.round_constants[2*r*self.m+i] for r in range(
            univariate = Polynomial.interpolate_domain(domain, values)
            multivariate = MPolynomial.lift(univariate, 0)
            first_step_constants += [multivariate]
    second_step_constants = []
    for i in range(self.m):
        domain = [omicron^r for r in range(0, self.N)]
        values = [self.field.zero()] * self.N
        #for r in range(self.N):
        #    print("len(round_constants):", len(self.round_constants)
        #    values[r] = self.round_constants[2*r*self.m + self.m +
        values = [self.round_constants[2*r*self.m+self.m+i] for r in
        univariate = Polynomial.interpolate_domain(domain, values)
        multivariate = MPolynomial.lift(univariate, 0)
        second_step_constants += [multivariate]

    return first_step_constants, second_step_constants

def transition_constraints( self, omicron ):
    # get polynomials that interpolate through the round constants
    first_step_constants, second_step_constants = self.round_constar

    # arithmetize one round of Rescue-Prime
    variables = MPolynomial.variables(1 + 2*self.m, self.field)
    cycle_index = variables[0]
    previous_state = variables[1:(1+self.m)]
    next_state = variables[(1+self.m):(1+2*self.m)]
    air = []
    for i in range(self.m):
        # compute left hand side symbolically
        # lhs = sum(MPolynomial.constant(self.MDS[i][k]) * (previous
        lhs = MPolynomial.constant(self.field.zero())
        for k in range(self.m):
            lhs = lhs + MPolynomial.constant(self.MDS[i][k]) * (prev
        lhs = lhs + first_step_constants[i]
```

```

        # compute right hand side symbolically
        # rhs = sum(MPolynomial.constant(self.MDSInv[i][k]) * (next_
        rhs = MPolynomial.constant(self.field.zero())
        for k in range(self.m):
            rhs = rhs + MPolynomial.constant(self.MDSInv[i][k]) * (r
        rhs = rhs^self.alpha

        # equate left and right hand sides
        air += [lhs-rhs]

    return air

```

The boundary constraints are a lot simpler. At the beginning, the first state element is the unknown secret and the second state element is zero because the sponge construction defines it as such. At the end (after all  $N$  rounds or  $T$  cycles), the first state element is the one element of known hash digest  $[h]$ , and the second state element is unconstrained. Note that this second state element must be kept secret to be secure – otherwise the attacker can invert the permutation. This description gives rise to the following set  $\mathcal{B}$  of triples

$(c, r, e) \in \{0, \dots, T\} \times \{0, \dots, w - 1\} \times \mathbb{F}$ :

- $(0, 1, 0)$
- $(T, 0, h)$ .

```

def boundary_constraints( self, output_element ):
    constraints = []

    # at start, capacity is zero
    constraints += [(0, 1, self.field.zero())]

    # at end, rate part is the given output element
    constraints += [(self.N, 0, output_element)]

    return constraints

```

The piece of the arithmetization is the witness, which for STARKs is the execution trace. In the case of this particular computation, the trace is the collection of states after every round, in addition to the state at the very beginning.

```

def trace( self, input_element ):
    trace = []

    # absorb
    state = [input_element] + [self.field.zero()] * (self.m - 1)

    # explicit copy to record state into trace
    trace += [[s for s in state]]

```

*# permutation***for** *r* **in** `range(self.N)`:*# forward half-round**# S-box***for** *i* **in** `range(self.m)`:    `state[i] = state[i]^self.alpha`*# matrix*`temp = [self.field.zero() for i in range(self.m)]`**for** *i* **in** `range(self.m)`:    **for** *j* **in** `range(self.m)`:        `temp[i] = temp[i] + self.MDS[i][j] * state[j]`*# constants*`state = [temp[i] + self.round_constants[2*r*self.m+i] for i`*# backward half-round**# S-box***for** *i* **in** `range(self.m)`:    `state[i] = state[i]^self.alphainv`*# matrix*`temp = [self.field.zero() for i in range(self.m)]`**for** *i* **in** `range(self.m)`:    **for** *j* **in** `range(self.m)`:        `temp[i] = temp[i] + self.MDS[i][j] * state[j]`*# constants*`state = [temp[i] + self.round_constants[2*r*self.m+self.m+i]`*# record state at this point, with explicit copy*`trace += [[s for s in state]]`**return** `trace`

## STARK-based Signatures

A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system can be transformed into a signature scheme. The catch is that it must be capable of proving knowledge of a solution to a cryptographically hard problem. STARKs can be used to prove arbitrarily complex computational statements. However, the whole point of Rescue-Prime is that it generates cryptographically hard problem instances in a STARK-friendly way – concretely, with a compact AIR. So let's transform a STARK for Rescue-Prime into a signature scheme.

### Rescue-Prime STARK

Producing a prover and verifier for STARK for Rescue-Prime consists of little more than linking together existing code snippets.

**class** `RPSSS`:    **def** `__init__`( self ):



```

        self.field = Field.main()
        expansion_factor = 4
        num_colinearity_checks = 64
        security_level = 2 * num_colinearity_checks

        self.rp = RescuePrime()
        num_cycles = self.rp.N+1
        state_width = self.rp.m

        self.stark = Stark(self.field, expansion_factor, num_colinearity

def stark_prove( self, input_element, proof_stream ):
    output_element = self.rp.hash(input_element)

    trace = self.rp.trace(input_element)
    transition_constraints = self.rp.transition_constraints(self.sta
    boundary_constraints = self.rp.boundary_constraints(output_eleme
    proof = self.stark.prove(trace, transition_constraints, boundary

    return proof

def stark_verify( self, output_element, stark_proof, proof_stream ):
    boundary_constraints = self.rp.boundary_constraints(output_eleme
    transition_constraints = self.rp.transition_constraints(self.sta
    return self.stark.verify(stark_proof, transition_constraints, bo

```

Note the explicit argument concerning the proof stream. This needs to be a special object that simulates a *message-dependent* Fiat-Shamir transform, as opposed to a regular one.

## Message-Dependent Fiat-Shamir

In order to transform a zero-knowledge proof system into a signature scheme, a non-interactive proof must be tied to the document that is being signed. Traditionally, the way to do this via Fiat-Shamir is to define the verifier's pseudorandom response as the hash digest of the document concatenated with the entire protocol transcript up until the point where its output is required.

In terms of implementation, this requires a new proof stream object – one that is aware of the document for which the signature is to be generated or verified. The next class achieves just this.

```

class SignatureProofStream(ProofStream):
    def __init__( self, document ):
        ProofStream.__init__(self)
        self.document = document
        self.prefix = blake2s(bytes(document)).digest()

    def prover_fiat_shamir( self, num_bytes=32 ):
        return shake_256(self.prefix + self.serialize()).digest(num_byte

```

```
def verifier_fiat_shamir( self, num_bytes=32 ):
    return shake_256(self.prefix + pickle.dumps(self.objects[:self.

def deserialize( self, bb ):
    sps = SignatureProofStream(self.document)
    sps.objects = pickle.loads(bb)
    return sps
```

## Signature Scheme

At this point it is possible to define the key generation, signature generation, and signature verification functions that make up a signature scheme. Note that these functions are members of the Rescue-Prime STARK Signature Scheme ( RPSSS ) class whose definition started earlier.

```
# class RPSSS:
def keygen( self ):
    sk = self.field.sample(os.urandom(17))
    pk = self.rp.hash(sk)
    return sk, pk

def sign( self, sk, document ):
    sps = SignatureProofStream(document)
    signature = self.stark_prove(sk, sps)
    return signature

def verify( self, pk, document, signature ):
    sps = SignatureProofStream(document)
    return self.stark_verify(pk, signature, sps)
```

This code defines a *provably secure*<sup>1</sup>, *post-quantum* signature scheme that (almost) achieves a 128 bit security level. While this description sounds flattering, the scheme's performance metrics are much less so:

- secret key size: 16 bytes (yay!)
- public key size: 16 bytes (yay!)
- signature size: **~133 kB**
- keygen time: 0.01 seconds (acceptable)
- signing time: **250 seconds**
- verification time: **444 seconds**

There might be a few optimizations available that can reduce the proof's size, such as merging common paths when opening a batch of Merkle leafs. However, these optimizations distract from the purpose of this tutorial, which is to highlight and explain the mathematics involved.

In terms of speed, a lot of the poor performance is due to using Python instead of a

language that is closer to the hardware such as C or Rust. Python was chosen for the same reason – to highlight and explain the maths. But the biggest performance gain in terms of speed is going to come from switching to faster algorithms for key operations. This is the topic of the next and last part of the tutorial.

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1. More specifically, in the random oracle model, a successful signature-forgery gives rise to an adversary who breaks the one-wayness of Rescue-Prime with polynomially related running time and success probability. [↩](#)

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