Introduction to Web

University of Illinois

ECE 422/CS 461 – Spring 2016

What is the Web?

- A platform for deploying applications, *portably* and *securely*

client

server

Web security: two tales

- Web browser: (client side)
  - Attacks target browser security weaknesses
  - Result in:
    - Malware installation (keyloggers, botnets)
    - Document theft from corporate network
    - Loss of private data

- Web application code: (server side)
  - Runs at web site: banks, e-merchants, blogs
  - Written in PHP, ASP, JSP, Ruby, …
  - Many challenges: XSS, CSRF, SQL injection

A historical perspective

- The web is an example of “bolt-on security”
- Originally, the web was invented to allow physicists to share their research papers
  - Only textual web pages + links to other pages; no security model to speak of
- Then we added embedded images
  - Crucial decision: a page can embed images loaded from another web server
- Then, Javascript, dynamic HTML, AJAX, CSS, frames, audio, video, ...
- Today, a web site is a distributed application

HTML

- Hypertext markup language (HTML)
  - Describes the content and formatting of Web pages
  - Rendered within browser window
- HTML features
  - Static document description language
  - Supports linking to other pages and embedding images by reference
  - User input sent to server via forms
- HTML extensions
  - Additional media content (e.g., PDF, video) supported through plugins
  - Embedding programs in supported languages (e.g., JavaScript, Java) provides dynamic content that interacts with the user, modifies the browser user interface, and can access the client computer environment

HTTP protocol

- HTTP is
  - widely used
  - Simple
  - Stateless

URLs

- Global identifiers of network-retrievable documents
- Example:

http://www.unc.edu:81/class?name=cs535#homework



What is the difference between URL and URI?

Are URLs case-sensitive?

HTTP Protocol



Dynamic Web Pages

- Rather than static HTML, web pages can be expressed as a program, say written in *Javascript*:

```
<title>Javascript demo page</title>

<font size=30>
Hello, <b>
<script>
var a = 1;
var b = 2;
document.write("world: ", a+b, "</b>");
</script>
```

DOM Tree: Document Object Model



- "The Document Object Model is a platform- and language-neutral interface that will allow programs and scripts to dynamically access and update the content, structure and style of documents."

JavaScript

- Powerful web page *programming language*
- Scripts are embedded in web pages returned by web server
- Scripts are executed by browser. Can:
  - Alter page contents
  - Track events (mouse clicks, motion, keystrokes)
  - Read/set cookies
  - Issue web requests, read replies
- *(Note: despite name, has nothing to do with Java!)*

JavaScript

- Scripting language interpreted by the browser
- Code enclosed within <script> … </script> tags
- Defining functions:

```
<script type="text/javascript">
    function hello() { alert("Hello world!"); }
</script>
```

- Event handlers embedded in HTML

```
<img src="picture.gif" onMouseOver="javascript:hello()">
```

- Built-in functions can change content of window

```
window.open("http://umich.edu")
```

- Click-jacking attack

```
<a onMouseUp="window.open('http://www.evilsite.com')"
href="http://www.trustedsite.com/">Trust me!</a>
```

Confining the Power of JavaScript Scripts

- Given all that power, browsers need to make sure JS scripts don't abuse it
- For example, don't want a script sent from hackerz.com web server to read cookies belonging to bank.com ...
- ... or alter layout of a bank.com web page
- ... or read keystrokes typed by user while focus is on a bank.com page!

Security on the web

- Risk #1: we don't want a malicious site to be able to trash my files/programs on my computer
  - Browsing to awesomevids.com (or evil.com) should not infect my computer with malware, read or write files on my computer, etc.
- Defense: Javascript is sandboxed;
  try to avoid security bugs in browser code;
  privilege separation; automatic updates; etc.

Security on the web

- Risk #2: we don't want a malicious site to be able to spy on or tamper with my information or interactions with other websites
  - Browsing to evil.com should not let evil.com spy on my emails in Gmail or buy stuff with my Amazon account
- Defense: the **same-origin policy**
  - A security policy grafted on after-the-fact, and enforced by web browsers
  - Intuition: each web site is isolated from all others

Same-origin policy

- Each site is isolated from all others



Same-origin policy

- Multiple pages from same site aren't isolated



Same-origin policy

- Granularity of protection: the *origin*
- Origin = protocol + hostname (+ port)

- Javascript on one page can read, change, and interact freely with all other pages from the same origin

Same-origin policy

- Browsers provide isolation for JS scripts via the Same Origin Policy (**SOP**)
- Simple version:
  - Browser associates web page elements (layout, cookies, events) with a given **origin** ≈ web server that provided the page/cookies in the first place
    - Identity of web server is in terms of its hostname, e.g., bank.com
- SOP = *only scripts received from a web page's origin have access to page's elements*
- **XSS: Subverting the Same Origin Policy**

SOP exercise

Check SOP against: http://www.example.com/dir/page.html

- http://www.example.com/dir/page2.html
- http://www.example.com/dir2/other.html
- http://username:password@www.example.com/dir2/other.html
- http://www.example.com:81/dir/other.html
- https://www.example.com/dir/other.html
- http://en.example.com/dir/other.html
- http://example.com/dir/other.html
- http://v2.www.example.com/dir/other.html

Security on the web

- Risk #3: we want data stored on a web server to be protected from unauthorized access
- Defense: server-side security

Shellshock
a.k.a. Bashdoor / Bash bug
(Disclosed on Sep 24, 2014)

Acknowledgement: slides from Prof. Bruce Maggs

Bash Shell

- Released June 7, 1989.
- Unix shell providing built-in commands such as cd, pwd, echo, exec, builtin
- Platform for executing programs
- Can be scripted

Environment Variables

Environment variables can be set in the Bash shell, and are passed on to programs executed from Bash

export VARNAME=“value”

(use printenv to list environment variables)

Stored Bash Shell Script

An executable text file that begins with

#!program

Tells bash to pass the rest of the file to program to be executed.

Example:

```
#!/bin/bash
STR="Hello World!"
echo $STR
```

Hello World! Example



Dynamic Web Content Generation

Web Server receives an HTTP request from a user.

Server runs a program to generate a response to the request.

Program output is sent to the browser.

Common Gateway Interface (CGI)

Oldest method of generating dynamic Web content (circa 1993, NCSA)

Operator of a Web server designates a directory to hold scripts (typically PERL) that can be run on HTTP GET, PUT, or POST requests to generate output to be sent to browser.

CGI Input

PATH_INFO environment variable holds any path that appears in the HTTP request after the script name

QUERY_STRING holds key=value pairs that appear after ? (question mark)

Most HTTP headers passed as environment variables

In case of PUT or POST, user-submitted data provided to script via standard input

CGI Output

Anything the script writes to standard output (e.g., HTML content) is sent to the browser.

Example Script (Wikipedia)

Bash script that evokes PERL to print out environment variables

```
#!/usr/bin/perl

print "Content-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n";
for my $var ( sort keys %ENV ) {
 printf "%s = \"%s\"\r\n", $var, $ENV{$var};
}
```

Put in file `/usr/local/apache/htdocs/cgi-bin/printenv.pl`

Accessed via `http://example.com/cgi-bin/printenv.pl`

Windows Web server running cygwin

http://example.com/cgi-bin/printenv.pl/foo/bar?var1=value1&var2=with%20percent%20encoding

```
DOCUMENT_ROOT="C:/Program Files (x86)/Apache Software Foundation/Apache2.2/htdocs“
GATEWAY_INTERFACE="CGI/1.1“
HOME="/home/SYSTEM"
HTTP_ACCEPT="text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8“
HTTP_ACCEPT_CHARSET="ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7"
HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING="gzip, deflate“
HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE="en-us,en;q=0.5“
HTTP_CONNECTION="keep-alive“
HTTP_HOST="example.com“
HTTP_USER_AGENT="Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0"
PATH="/home/SYSTEM/bin:/bin:/cygdrive/c/progra~2/php:/cygdrive/c/windows/system32:...“
PATH_INFO="/foo/bar“
QUERY_STRING="var1=value1&var2=with%20percent%20encoding
```

Shellshock Vulnerability

Function definitions are passed as environment variables that begin with ()

Error in environment variable parser: executes “garbage” after function definition.

Cygwin Bash Shell Shows Vulnerability



Exact syntax matters!

Alternatively



Crux of the Problem

- Any environment variable can contain a function definition that the Bash parser will execute before it can process any other commands.
- Environment variables can be inherited from other parties, who can thus inject code that Bash will execute.

Web Server Exploit

Send Web Server an HTTP request for a script with an HTTP header such as HTTP_USER_AGENT set to

```
'() { :;}; echo vulnerable'
```

When the Bash shell runs the script it will evaluate the environment variable HTTP_USER_AGENT and run the echo command

curl -H "User-Agent: () { :; }; echo vulnerable" http://example.com/