

Pyrex Journal of Political Science and International Relations
Vol 1 (2) pp. 007-012 August, 2015
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Review Paper

Politics of Foreign Policy on National Security: an Analysis of Nigeria - United States Relations over Boko Haram Insurgency

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Accepted 15th August, 2015

A basic assumption emitted by foreign policy experts gives the impression that each nation engages in foreign policy to protect its national interest. In view of this, each nation guides its interest jealously while prying on others. Therefore, this work addresses itself to the implication of the United States' sudden interest on security assistance to Nigeria over the dreaded challenge of Boko Haram in view of the fact that such assistance had earlier been denied. The paper points out that, although the incessant terrorist acts in Nigeria reveal sub-optimal capacity on the part of the Nigerian state for counter terrorism, a foreign policy of coordinated military operation of neighboring countries, is more proactive and more protective security conscious than the cosmetic outcomes which US assistance may bring. The paper accentuates the need for the government of the Nigerian State to embrace the development of technology, and argues that the role of the US should be properly defined and situated possibly on procurement of weapons and intelligence, if it must intervene.

Key words: Boko-Haram, Foreign Assistance, Neighbours, Politics, National Security.

INTRODUCTION

The formulation and utilization of foreign policy differs from country to country, each, according to its level of knowledge, development, peculiarities, as well as national interest. Thus, some countries use foreign policy for technological development such as Singapore, acquire raw materials for processing by their domestic industries, such as Japan, expand their economies and control the global market, such as the United States, China, and so on. Yet, some use foreign policy for political celebrations, neglecting their domestic empowerment. Some realist theorists, who believe in the relevance of power in the international system, inform us that foreign policy can be used to make changes or alter the environment of other states. This is why Hain (2001:121) sees foreign policy as a "system of activities evolved by States for changing the behavior of other states, and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment". This fact was also recognized by North edge (1968: 15) that sees foreign policy as a product of interaction between internal and external forces.

The foregoing described uses of foreign policy, show glaringly that it can be applied as an instrument of political struggle among states for the control of the international system. To this end, politics is the key composer of foreign policy, if it would have strategic relevance. This can be conspicuously seen in the 'Washington Consensus' where a group of states engaged in psycho-political maneuvers to

condition the political and economic conditions of some states in the international order, especially the weak ones. The 'Washington Consensus' is born out of the neo-liberal foreign policy of the economic north (advanced countries) who are senior partners in modeling the instruments of the international economic interchange, involving neoliberal institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization. This group of international institutions has assumed the role of supervising, monitoring and controlling political and economic development in peripheral countries of the world, on behalf of the sponsoring States. Of course, the impacts of the erstwhile Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and the conditionalities either imposed directly or indirectly are still being felt in poor countries.

Since foreign policy is a means to an end, then each state is confronted with a rational choice situation, given the fact that the international system is a contested terrain. This also implies that the foreign policy miscalculations of a state could lead to colossal losses. It is at this point that frivolous approaches have to be avoided. This is the way most states see foreign policy, and not just as spontaneous reaction to issues and events. It is against this backdrop that this paper examines Nigeria's foreign policy towards security aid with regard to Boko Haram insurgency in the North- Eastern Nigeria. The paper proceeds with two claims:

- (i) That, the U.S security aid, at best would produce cosmetic results, in view of the nature of U.S's foreign policy history.
- (ii) That, Nigeria's proactive counter terrorism response to the Boko Haram insurgency would be the arrangement with the Country's immediate neighbors and addressing the causes.

The discourse is carried out against the backdrop of the rational choice theory to Nigeria's foreign policy direction, in its quest of dealing with the insurgency. As a tool of analysis, the rational choice theory was first used in the field of economics before it started gaining popularity in political circles. It sees the people or individuals that make up the state system as the motivational forces of change in any society. Accordingly therefore, it follows that Nigeria's foreign policy interest in the technical assistance offered by this foreign countries should focus on the knowledge aspect, in which the country's armed forces would receive as much tactical knowledge as possible from the security aid of these countries to empower them against present and future terrorist incidences. The rational Choice presents us with the argument that, in pursuit of their preferences, states act within specific goals of advantages that express their preferences (Orji, 2008). To this extent, the choices made by actors in the international system are the choices that best help them achieve their objectives, given all relevant factors beyond their control.

Thus, the rational choice theory as emphasized by Orji begins with the assumption that self interest is the cornerstone of political behaviour. In this case, states self interest is what is usually regarded as national interest in the foreign policy domain. This paper is not interested in blaming neither the United States nor France or any other country for offering to assist Nigeria at this moment, but to analyze some foreign policy implications on the part of Nigeria. There are clear indications that information needed to deal with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is obscure as the issue is absorbed into the complications of politics and religion which have intervened, thus, making the understanding of the Boko Haram insurgency so blurred and diffused. By implication therefore, the diffusion surrounding the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency appear to be a difficult problem for the Nigerian state and even the foreign interveners. The discourse is contained in five sections. After the first section which introduces the discourse and the problematic, section two creates an understanding of the Boko Haram insurgency. Section three examines the question of U.S security aid to Nigeria. In section four, the implication of the U.S security aid is discussed. Section five discusses the alternative insurgency policy and concludes the discourse.

Understanding the Boko Haram Insurgency

Archival information published in the Punch Newspaper of 7th May, 2014 gave what could be regarded as the steady growth of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It stated that, the first step to understanding Boko Haram, is to understand the history and composition of the North-East zone of Nigeria encompassing Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi, Yobe, and Gombe states, where Boko Haram operations have all along been largely rooted. This zone according to the account was the enamel of the ancient Bornu Empire run in line with the constitution of Medina. This Bornu Sultanate, largely of Kanuri extraction, maintained its distinct identity from the Sokoto Caliphate of the Hausa/Fulani even as they came under the British control in 1903.

Historically, it has been noted along these lines that the Kanuri's resisted the influence of the Sokoto Caliphate because of their suspicion of western education as a tool of behavioral modification which was embraced by the Northern rulers and forced on the Kanuri. The Kanuris since then felt dissatisfied with the gullibility of the Sokoto Caliphate, particularly over its tolerance western civilization. The dissatisfaction of the Kanuris continued following the persistent incursion of Christian missionaries' socialization in many parts of the North. The suspicion of the Kanuri over Western education, Christianity accentuated by colonialism, gave rise to a fundamental group among other resistances led by Mohammed Marwa, usually known as Maitasine.

In 1980, Maitasine master minded a riot over which thousands of deaths were recorded. The emergence of Boko Haram has in view of its agenda proved sufficiently that the terrorist actions of the sect is an appendage of the Islamic fundamentalist group founded by Mohammed Marwa (Maitasine) and of course, Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 which set out to propagate the Kanuri agenda on the rejection of western education. The Kanuri course and fundamentalism only became expanded or escalated following the convergence of interest between the Boko Haram terrorist group now led by Abubakar Shekau, which is the name beared by whoever leads the group. Shekau radicalized the group, just as the group has links with the terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab in the Islamic Magreb, including Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan.

If thinking is drawn as to how Boko Haram insurgents came about access to sophisticated weapons such as anti air craft, explosive bombs, techniques of suicide bombing and other weapons used in the asymmetrical war between the group and the Nigerian state, then it would be obvious that there is an ensuing international conspiracy in the episode of the insurgency. The international conspiracy theory tells us that devil theorists exist in the international system who specialize in the production of weapons systems and who also engage in inciting societies of the world to carry arms against one another, while they engage in the sale of arms as war profiteers. Of course, it is abundantly clear that Boko Haram and other terrorist groups acquire sophisticated weapons from the metropolitan countries, some of which are condemning the group openly. Perhaps, the various accounts given for the emergence and sustenance of Boko Haram make it imperative for this paper to undertake the analysis of the basic character of the Nigerian State.

The Nigerian state, from colonial to post colonial, has been operating below state capacity. This is due to the fact that ethnic politics in Nigeria has since the amalgamation of both the Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914 continued to be an impediment to a coherent national system. The amalgamation did not allow the various ethnic groups in the country to engage in gradual processes of aggregation or integration but rather, the various ethnic groups were forcefully and grossly amalgamated by the colonial masters. Thus, the evolution of the Boko Haram terrorist sect can be understood when we look at the resistances that envelop the parallels of the Kanuri ethnic group over the domination of the Hausa/Fulani and other peoples of the country for which they do not share commonality. The premature amalgamation for the emergence of the Nigerian nation-state contradicts what Carens (not dated) regards as the determinants of a nation-state. For Carens:

The establishment of a nation is determined by the sharing of commonalities in language, culture and traditions, and by a range of national groups which have engendered habits of cooperation among one another over time.

The Nigerian nation-state lacks the ingredients stated by Carens and this has rendered the Nigeria's 53 years of existence after independence as an atomistic State, perpetually in conflict with itself due to forceful incorporation of the groups into a nation-state of strange 'bedfellows'.

Apart from the amalgamation perspective, other explanations such as religious extremism, also explain the characteristics inherent in the Boko Haram insurgency. For instance, the religious thesis holds that Boko Haram hates Christianity and Christianity led western education which the sect considers as Haram 'forbidden' to Islam. Within this context is the thinking that the terrorist acts of Boko Haram is the struggle to eliminate or resist Christian western education. But as the struggle progresses, indications are beginning to emerge that the insurgents are also after a section of Muslims whose criticism they consider is not helpful to their course. The high point of these acts was their demand that former President Jonathan should convert from Christianity to Islam. The burning and destruction of churches, and the abduction of innocent Chibok Secondary School girls of which about ninety percent of them were Christians, testifying ultimately the hatred of the sect of Christianity.

One of the most recent theories which negate the pax armamenta thinking i.e. obtaining peace through arms or weapon utilization is the perspective of economic governance. The adherents of the economic governance perspective hold that the high rate of unemployment and the continuing rate of lack of proactive policy direction of building socio-economic prosperity have increased the tendency for the vulnerable classes of the Nigerian state particularly the youth to engage in carrying arms to get what they want. The impacts of this, according to Ogaba (2013: 282-299) played out in the Northern Nigeria's relative poverty and underdevelopment relative to the rest of the country. Development strategy analysts are beginning to suggest that the government of the Nigerian state should direct its focus on reforming the empowerment of Nigerians by developing the non-oil sectors and fiscal responsibility as a way of facilitating the growth and human development indices such as job creation, improved health and education. Though this thinking is about preventive mechanisms that could have been adopted, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Nigerians generally want big money at the shortest possible time and may not be enticed predominantly using slow economic policy which usually characterizes conventional work and remuneration, probably because of the prevailing corrupt practices in the country.

The indoctrination drive among the sect members has been the driving wheels for sustaining and intensifying the activities of the group. This can be seen in the Quran teaching and historical memories such as the Jihad which constitute the ideational factors which shape the behavior of believers, as well as the discriminatory and destructive actions passed on from one generation of Muslims to the other. For instance, the Islamic belief or teaching that when you are killed in the course of fighting for Allah, then you are dying a 'Saheed' or 'Martyr' This is to give encouragement to their believers. Most of what is contained in the literature of Boko Haram is the mobilization of the sect members along this line of thought.

Some analysts argue that the steady growth of the Boko Haram sect is due to the weak state of Nigeria. For Alli (2013: 112-148), citing Akude (2007:2), a state is considered weak

when it lacks the capacity to control public order within its territory, unable to consistently control its borders, cannot reliably maintain viable public institutions, and sanction deviation from the norm, and execute sanctions among others. He argued that, all these variables that are lacking in the Nigerian state are further absorbed in a larger framework of corrupt practices and conspiracy engineering existing among political elites in the country. This was accentuated by Iwara (2010: 545-565), when he argued that, Corruption and conspiracy have split and decimalized the political order to the extent that political leaders point accusing fingers to their opponents just as they do not have the moral high ground and consensus to fathom solutions for common national challenges. Both domestic and external concerns acknowledge the fact that politics of national consensus is elusive in Nigeria. The high level of corruption has weakened national institutions, including the military. For instance, the United States' Under-Secretary of State for Security, Democracy and Human Rights, Sarah Sewall was quoted by The Punch, May 24 2014, p.3, to have said that:

Despite Nigeria's \$5.8bn security budget for 2014, corruption and incompetence have made it impossible for her to rescue the over 200 school girls abducted by Boko Haram on April 14 ...Corruption prevents supplies as basic as bullets and transport vehicles from reaching the frontlines of the struggle against Boko Haram.

The weaknesses of the Nigerian state can above all be seen in the way the country is perceived by her neighbors. To some of the neighboring countries, Nigeria is like a giant with clay legs (Omole 2008:6). This is in spite of Nigeria's good-will of promoting good neighborliness. Since independence, in 1960, Nigeria has been preoccupied with a foreign policy of Afro-centrism over which Africa has remained the centre piece of her foreign policy. This foreign policy thrust informs Nigeria's focus on issues that affect Africa and Blacks in the Diaspora. It is also a major reason why Nigerian played a major role in bringing peace to such countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau under the auspices of the Economic Cooperation for West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peace enforcement operations. This situation is not unconnected with the wrongful use of foreign policy, which is why the country is seen to be weak. The weakness of the Nigerian State, coupled with its postcolonial character, reveals gaps of statehood which affects its bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

It is along these gaps in the life of the Nigerian state that it is feared that the lack of clear lines of responsibility and reporting systems that it looks suspect that the government of the Nigerian State would manage aid in the security sector to the advantage of the country, given the limitations of reverse flows of past experience on foreign aid in the country. The question is whether Nigeria has the absorptive capacity for United States' aid intervention on the Boko Haram insurgency.

What is so far clear from the conceptual mapping above is that Nigeria's capacity to tackle the insurgency is doubtful. It is also clear that there is no clear framework that would absorb the United States' intervention. It is also not clear whether the federal government under Buhari has extensively discussed the U.S intervention among stake holders and experts in the area of foreign relations. It is also not clear whether the federal government has abandoned the good will of Russia and China over the sale of weapons, which enabled the combined effort of the armed forces of Nigeria and her neighbors to battle the insurgents to create opportunity for the last general elections to

take place in the North-East Nigeria. The U.S all along has been paying lip service to the issue of the insurgents in Nigeria. It promised the same intervention under Jonathan, all to no avail. The current administration led by President Buhari has to weigh the options available to it such as the Russia and China on the one hand, and the U.S and others on the other hand, to avoid tactical errors on the issue of Boko Haram. It can be recalled that the U.S promise had hitherto raised the hopes of Nigerians, but several months after the so called security aid, became a nullity. Instead, the same U.S refused to sell weapons to the country for the struggle and accused the Nigerian military of human rights violation. The sudden inclination of the federal government led by President Buhari on the U.S, while jettisoning the Russia and China that were friends in need, raises fundamental questions such as: What kind of external assistance does the country need from U.S? What are the implications associated with the U.S latest promise of assistance, given the fact that US action is always predicated on the goal of reverse flows? In order to answer these questions, the paper historically examines United States foreign policy for external assistance to Nigeria.

The Question of U. S Security Assistance to Nigeria

Historically, United States (US) has not been engaged in security or military assistance in real terms with Nigeria before the current promise of engagement on the security challenges posed by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The US first promise to help Nigeria win the war against the Boko Haram insurgency was announced in clear terms during the celebration of the 238th independence anniversary on July 4th in Lagos by the Consul General Jeffrey Hawkins and his wife Annie, and the US Ambassador James Entoistle, who addressed a crowd promising that the US wanted Nigeria to win its war against terrorism. He went further to say that the 238th independence celebration provides another opportunity for robust improvement for US-Nigeria relations on such matters as free and fair elections, economic partnership, health, security cooperation and youth empowerment. For the Consul General Jeffrey Hawkins, US Security partnership with Nigeria and for him, that remains at the forefront of US work with Nigeria.

During the Nigerian Civil War which took place between 1967 and 1970, the US did not get itself engaged in the war as it considered the problem more of a British concern since Nigeria was colonized by Britain, and therefore Nigeria was the concern of the British concern, certainly under the vertical interactions relations which characterize the world order. However, with the volume of trade relations with Nigeria in the post colonial era, and US economic interest in Nigeria, information from the office of United States Trade representative, revealing that Nigeria is currently America's 35th largest goods trading partner, with \$18.2billion worth of trade in 2013 alone, and also that US foreign direct investment has been on the increase since 2011 (The Guardian, 11th July, 2014 p19), it is not surprising that the US is after all somehow feeling concerned about the insurgency in Nigeria. It appears that in view of these trade volumes, and investments, US could not afford to stay on the fence while Nigeria battles with her war of insurgency which is not seen to be entirely domestic but which has external dimensions and networks.

This possibly is why the US President Obama beckoned on the new President Buhari to see him for talks. It can be recalled that after the 9/11 2009 terrorist act led by the Late Osama Bin Laden, the US proclaimed a foreign policy to fight

terrorism not only in United States but also in other parts of the world.

United States was the first to declare Boko Haram as a terrorist group, while a section of Nigeria denied that the Sect was a terrorist group and felt that the US was unnecessarily tarnishing Nigeria's image. Of course, the turn of events in the country justified US description about the sect. Although the US's promise has not been clear to Nigerians, it is hoped that whatever assistance they may wish to render would not be too late and would be at a scale and magnitude that can end terrorist acts of the Boko Haram without adverse effects for Nigeria.

The relations between Nigeria and the United States have always been largely political and lopsided, in favor of the US especially on economic interchange. Security relations between the two countries have been obscure. This can be explained using two historical events. The first was their failure to supply arms to Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War which took place between 1967 and 1970, and the second was during the crisis that later followed the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election cancellation, when Nigerians expected the intervention of the US to no avail. A third instance was the refusal of US to fulfil its promise of assistance to the regime of former President Jonathan over the Boko Haram insurgency.

It can be recalled that, the still ongoing terrorist acts perpetuated by Boko Haram compelled President Jonathan to seek external help from US and other world powers. Some of these countries including United States, paid lip service to the promises they made, particularly the recovery of the abducted Chibok secondary school girls who for several months have remained in captivity. It is therefore surprising that a country with the kind of foreign policy machinations like that displayed by the US over the Boko Haram insurgency would suddenly invite Nigeria's new President for talks over what it had jettisoned. What definitely is being pondered upon by foreign policy analysts and commentators is the outcome of the US new promise of assistance and what exactly the US is after in terms of what eventually would be the reverse flows from their pretensions. Certainly, there have to be implications either positive or negative. The question is whether Nigerians hopes on US are necessary.

Nigeria's diffusive Foreign Policy on National Security and the Implications for US Intervention

It is very unfortunate that Nigeria's demonstrated incapacity of statehood has made the country a perennial beggar nation. The Nigerian military which over the years has been acknowledged as a strong outfit especially given its efforts in peace keeping operations, has suddenly become weak with a number of noticeable deficits such as the weapons and the intelligence to prosecute a war of insurgency. Thus, the federal government of Nigeria has to swallow its pride as it beckons on world powers such as the United States of America, France and other willing nations to come to the aid of Nigeria in her quest to fight the Boko Haram, especially in the quest of rescuing the 219 Chibok secondary school girls held in captivity by Boko Haram. It does appear that the federal government is having a crisis of mission, as has not specifically identified the kind of help it needs from the donor-countries, especially from the US that has suddenly developed the interest to help Nigeria. The federal government under Jonathan was disappointed by the US after making the same promise. Jonathan's government then turned to China and Russia for the supply of weapons to the military which they

identified as the problem in the prosecution of the insurgency. The step taken by Jonathan, paid-off as that enabled the country to hold elections in the north-east, the area of the insurgency. The question is, if weapons are part of the problem, then why is the present regime appear not willing to sustain the relations with China and Russia? Or is Nigeria allowing herself to be a victim of the macro struggle between the US and China/Russia over interests in Nigeria or Africa? The implications of Nigeria's incapacity and the eventual ineptitude towards US sudden assistance have several implications:

There are usually implications that accompany any decision taken by the State. The first is that, the fact that military assistance involving field presence of personnel, means opening up the territory of the country for espionage by countries such as the US, whose assistance is unquestionable, and whose political and economic aggression is very high. The fact is that the US has not forced Nigeria to the assistance but that Nigeria does not care, so that, US is free to use that auspices for an interchange that may be in its favour using every advantage they have over Nigeria, including psycho-economic maneuvers. The question is whether Nigeria has the absorptive capacity for such external assistance which of course the government officially requested. In 2004, a study of foreign aid involving USAID in Nigeria, found that the country has weak absorptive capacity for USAID aid, because of the lack of clear lines of responsibilities among key operators, and reporting systems (Iwara 2004). These problems are still very much the vogue in Nigeria today.

The issues is that, factors which gave birth to Boko Haram are still very much present, such as poverty, as a result of improper economic governance and ethnic chauvinism, meaning the strategy of *pax amamenta* (using arms to seek peace), is not enough to end the insurgency, in spite of foreign or US intervention. Again, the US intervention may possibly push the insurgency to another level or conflict because Boko Haram hates the US more than Nigeria. So, if US indeed really want to help Nigeria, it should be rather involve itself in building the capacity of Nigeria beyond the current insurgency.

The very fact that the insurgency is involving both the Anglophone and Francophone countries, the US intervention may steer-up rivalries among big powers in the long run particularly those still interested in maintaining client States, dependency and policies of grandeur. Already as we can hear, France is interested in helping also, so is Britain. Metropolitan interest could encourage the repartitioning of Nigeria and her neighbours into a neo-dependence era. The involvement of the US may be envied by other world powers in a way that may strain the relations between Nigeria and some world powers.

This means that Nigeria and indeed sub Saharan Africa would be destabilized, and made a new theatre of war, second to that in the Middle East. We should not forget that the big powers (vultures' nations) go into engagements of military assistance only when they have strategic interest. For instance:

I. The reason why United States went into the Gulf crises was to defend U.S. wealth in the Gulf.

II. The French activities in Chad and its operations in the Congo in the early 1960s was to secure its francophone interests

Thus, Nigeria urgently requires a strategic foreign policy of selective external security assistance.

Nigeria's foreign policy for external assistance should reflect the following

There is need for Nigeria to develop a framework of external assistance on the war of insurgency, and clear lines of engagement, since the insurgency is becoming attractive. The field presence should be selective. The country should not open its doors to all the nations, but should have taxonomy of the situation with a view of selecting suitable countries to fill the gaps. It also follows that a command of the military and civilian intellectuals are put together like a movement, for the purpose of working together with the foreign technical experts in counter terrorism. The movement should be given the responsibility to absorb the expert knowledge made available by the foreign experts on terrorism. Subsequent effort should be made by the federal government to establish pedagogical relations with the countries whose expertise is still growing and whose relations with Nigeria are not too vertical. Flowing from this is the fact that a foreign policy of continuous strategic military training in countries that have the expertise such as Israel and US.

Second, it is high time Nigeria stepped up its citizen diplomacy, and making it one of the bases of her foreign policy. A government's concern for its citizens both at home and abroad would definitely increase the fraternal affinity and emotional attachment that its citizens would have for their country. For now, there are yawning gaps between the Nigerian state and the citizens, and this makes the citizenries to hate the state. For instance, many citizens hate the Nigerian State as a result of the inability of the government to deliver political goods and services to the citizens of the states. One of the theses of analysts over the development of insurgency involves economic governance which creates the gap between the people and the government. It is also a reason attributed to the lack of patriotism involving the contribution to development, so especially people laying down their lives for the country. For instance, many soldiers do not want to risk their lives to fight Boko Haram because families of the already recorded victims have not been reasonably compensated.

Third, it is important for the government to make a foreign policy of technological development its primacy. One of the reasons why Nigeria has been so handicapped in fighting the Boko Haram is the lack of technology that can supersede the one made available to the insurgents. For instance, the problem is not because the army does not have enough military men, but because of appropriate techniques and knowledge for counter insurgency is not available. This is so because the government has not taken technological development seriously. Agbu (2013: 250-261), noted that the previous efforts made by Nigeria on this subject were insufficient as they were cut up in low visionary level and poor implementation strategy profile. To Agbu, an appropriate science and technology programme for Nigeria ought to focus strategically in driving the country's objective of being ranked among the great countries of the world in line with Nigeria's vision of 20-20-20, adopted in 2011.

It is possible that Nigeria makes a foreign policy of technological acquisition in her relations instead of having such relations with the super powers, whose leisure and property rights laws have been impediments in previous relations. It is high time Nigeria starts making conscious efforts to acquire and sustain technology. Nigeria for instance needs technology to produce her own military hardware, necessary for national self defense and the development of supportive infrastructure.

Fourth and lastly, Nigeria's foreign policy for national security with regard to the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency is more realistic if it deals with the firming-up of relations with immediate neighbours who share geographical contiguity with it. The current negotiation should culminate in establishing a special armed force for insurgency in the sub-region.

Conclusion

State incapacity for international relations at the strategic developmental level has been a source of worry among Nigerians. This is sequel to the fact that in spite of bountiful natural resources in Nigeria, the country has failed to transmute its natural assets into national power. This incapacity has reached the extent that the Nigeria State is unable to provide its citizens with adequate security, employment for its teeming youth population, especially graduates of higher institutions and unable to confront other domestic challenges. The paper expresses worry over the uncoordinated manner in which the government is dealing with military aid offers by metropolitan powers.

To this end, the paper foresees a cosmetic outcome of the metropolitan assistance, since it is focused toward the effects of the insurgency, and not the fundamental causes. For instance, the issue of ethnic domination involving the Hausa/Fulani Sokoto Caliphate, and the Kanuri on the one hand and poverty in the North on the other hand, which have not been attended to in a profound manner. While the paper advises the federal government on the need to embrace technological development, to ensure that the Nigerian military

acquires necessary military hardware, it advocates the establishment of a sub-regional military outfit between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours for counter terrorism. The paper is of the thesis that the prevailing approach to fighting the insurgents would result in cosmetic outcomes, except accompanied by a framework of addressing the causality.

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