Online appendix for paper 'Populist attitudes and selective exposure to online news'

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1 Survey design and implementation

1.1 Recruitment from web tracking panels

The survey company *Netquest* maintains online access panels in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the U.S. From this pool of respondents, panelists who regularly respond to surveys are invited to also install the tracking tools on desktop and smartphones. If they consent to participate, panelists receive additional incentives in case they do not stop the tracking for longer than 7 days. Participants have the possibility to pause the tracking tools at any time. The tracking tools would then be interrupted for 15 minutes.

We invited samples of web tracking participants to our surveys. Priority was given to desktop users, since the tracking on desktop is more granular and allows for a precise measurement of media exposure. On desktop, full URLs are retrieved, whereas on Apple smartphones only the domain and duration are recorded. Since it is not meaningful to calculate AAPOR response rates for non-probability online panels, we report the "completion rates", i.e. "the proportion of those who completed the Web survey among all the eligible panel members who were invited to take the survey" (Callegaro and DiSogra 2008). The completion rates in the six surveys we use in this paper are in the range between 89% to 94%.

Table A1 shows the number of respondents with a desktop tracking per country and their median number of website visits. The number of respondents with a desktop tracking is lowest in Germany, where the survey company is still building its panel.

Table	A1:	Panel	statistics	per	country.

Country	# panelists	# visits (median)
France	1,460	14,726
Germany	984	8,792
Italy	1,453	11,209
Spain	1,349	7,791
UK	1,097	13,314
USA	1,386	13,590

1.2 Sample weights

The demographic composition of the web tracking samples deviates significantly from population margins for gender, education and age. We retrieved population margins from Eurostat, the U.S. Census Bureau and the CIA World Factbook for the latest year available. Depending on the country, we find differences for age, gender and education between the general population and tracking participants. This might be due to differences between the online population and the general population, but also because of the nature of the opt-in, non-probability recruitment of tracking participants. As in all linking studies, there is a trade-off between the level of detail in the data collection and the representativeness of the sample (Stier et al. 2019). When interpreting differences between our sample and census statistics, it also has to be kept in mind that it is not trivial to define a proper target population for comparison, as not everyone in the general population uses the internet and there is no high-quality demographic breakdown of internet users available for all countries.

In order to account for the peculiarities of the samples, we calculate weights for every country. To calculate weights and adjust the datasets accordingly, we used the functions rake() and trim() in the R package survey, which applies the iterative proportional fitting (IPF) technique to calculate weights. We trim weights at an upper bound of 4 to avoid overweighting specific individuals disproportionally.¹ After weighting, the sample of participants closely resembles the general population margins – but not perfectly due to the trimming (Tables A2, A3 and A4).

¹We repeated all analyses with untrimmed weights and the main results remained unchanged.

Table A2: Comparing unweighted and weighted data for gender.

Country	Gender	Sample N	Sample % (unweighted)	Sample % (weighted)	Population %
France	Female	803	0.55	0.51	0.51
France	Male	657	0.45	0.49	0.49
Germany	Female	500	0.51	0.51	0.51
Germany	Male	484	0.49	0.49	0.49
Italy	Female	844	0.58	0.52	0.51
Italy	Male	609	0.42	0.48	0.49
Spain	Female	703	0.52	0.51	0.51
Spain	Male	646	0.48	0.49	0.49
UK	Female	577	0.53	0.51	0.51
UK	Male	520	0.47	0.49	0.49
USA	Female	911	0.66	0.51	0.51
USA	Male	475	0.34	0.49	0.49

Table A3: Comparing unweighted and weighted data for level of education.

Country	Education	Sample N	Sample % (unweighted)	Sample % (weighted)	Population %
France	Low	75	0.05	0.18	0.25
France	Intermediate	753	0.52	0.47	0.43
France	High	632	0.43	0.35	0.32
Germany	Low	232	0.24	0.20	0.20
Germany	Intermediate	533	0.54	0.55	0.55
Germany	High	219	0.22	0.25	0.25
Italy	Low	154	0.11	0.32	0.40
Italy	Intermediate	673	0.46	0.47	0.43
Italy	High	626	0.43	0.21	0.17
Spain	Low	371	0.28	0.41	0.41
Spain	Intermediate	406	0.30	0.25	0.25
Spain	High	572	0.42	0.34	0.34
UK	Low	49	0.04	0.17	0.20
UK	Intermediate	556	0.51	0.42	0.41
UK	High	492	0.45	0.40	0.39
USA	Low	55	0.04	0.09	0.10
USA	Intermediate	801	0.58	0.48	0.48
USA	High	530	0.38	0.42	0.42

Table A4: Comparing unweighted and weighted data for age.

Country	Age	Sample N	Sample % (unweighted)	Sample % (weighted)	Population %
France	15-24	129	0.09	0.16	0.15
France	25-54	891	0.61	0.50	0.46
France	55-64	306	0.21	0.16	0.15
France	65 +	134	0.09	0.18	0.24
Germany	15 - 24	79	0.08	0.12	0.12
Germany	25 - 54	604	0.61	0.46	0.46
Germany	55-64	206	0.21	0.17	0.17
Germany	65 +	95	0.10	0.25	0.25
Italy	15-24	98	0.07	0.10	0.11
Italy	25 - 54	1075	0.74	0.56	0.49
Italy	55-64	188	0.13	0.16	0.15
Italy	65 +	92	0.06	0.18	0.25
Spain	15-24	185	0.14	0.11	0.11
Spain	25-54	620	0.46	0.54	0.54
Spain	55-64	271	0.20	0.14	0.14
Spain	65 +	273	0.20	0.21	0.21
UK	15-24	62	0.06	0.14	0.14
UK	25 - 54	604	0.55	0.49	0.49
UK	55-64	232	0.21	0.16	0.15
UK	65 +	199	0.18	0.21	0.22
USA	15-24	103	0.07	0.16	0.16
USA	25 - 54	806	0.58	0.49	0.49
USA	55-64	312	0.23	0.16	0.16
USA	65 +	165	0.12	0.19	0.19

2 Coding of domains

2.1 Codebook

Commercial broadcasting: Privately owned television and radio stations.

Digital-born outlets: Providers of political contents that are distributed exclusively via digital channels, i.e., not via print or traditional broadcasting. This excludes the online versions of traditional media.

Hyperpartisan news: Hyperpartisan news are online only media which also overlap with the concept "alternative news" in the academic literature, even though there is no one clear-cut definition. Hyperpartisan news sites promote a narrow and skewed political agenda without making an effort towards a balanced representation of major political issues, events or political actors. For instance, we code the HuffPost as "a digital-born outlet", and Breitbart News or Daily Kos as hyperpartisan news (see similarly Pennycook and Rand (2019)). Additionally, we exclude parody sites from this category.

Legacy press: These are broadsheets, (weekly or monthly) magazines or regional newspapers with professional staff following journalistic standards. These outlets feature so-called "hard news" topics prominently. We also assign news agencies like Reuters or Agence France-Presse to this category.

Public broadcasting: State funded public service media, i.e., television and radio stations with a public mandate.

Tabloid press: Newspapers published as red top tabloids. Coverage is characterized by sensationalism, personalization and a focus on "soft news" (Esser 1999).

2.2 Coding procedure

Figure A1 visualizes the coding in a flowchart. All of the codings were conducted by the authors and a student assistant who speak the language of all countries and know the respective media systems well.




Figure A1: Flowchart of the domain coding.

All four participating coders coded the 193 news domains for the UK and the U.S. independently. This selection was made because all coders speak English, yet not all are experts on the media systems of these countries. Given the diverse backgrounds of coders, we achieved good interrater reliability values (Krippendorf's $\alpha = 0.79$; Fleiss' $\kappa = 0.8$). Disagreements were discussed and solved consensually. The only major systematic issue occured in the case of U.K. regional newspapers, as these tend to be difficult to code as tabloid or legacy press without a large-scale content analysis. As an additional interrater test, the first author and the student assistant both coded randomly selected 1,000 domains from the US and UK (500 from each country). Interrater reliability was very good (Krippendorf's $\alpha = 0.892$; Fleiss' $\kappa = 0.904$). The list of coded news domains can be found in the Supplemental Material.

2.3 Descriptive data on domain visits

Here we provide descriptive data on the most visited domains per news type (Table A5) and the top visited news domains per country (Table A6).

Table A5: Top five visited domains per news type.

Commercial broadcasting		Digital-born outlets		Hyperpartisan news	
Domain	Visits	Domain	Visits	Domain	Visits
mediaset.it	61,111	elconfidencial.com	18,581	okdiario.com	6,919
tf1.fr	44,346	buzzfeed.com	16,218	dailykos.com	$3,\!159$
sky.com	36,725	news-und-nachrichten.de	$14,\!548$	westernjournal.com	2,761
itv.com	$27,\!516$	eldiario.es	12,986	breitbart.com	2,214
sky.it	$21,\!858$	linternaute.com	$9,\!451$	patriotnewsalerts.com	1,694
$Legacy\ press$		$Public\ broadcasting$		$Tabloid\ press$	
- ·					
Domain	Visits	Domain	Visits	Domain	Visits
Domain elpais.com	Visits 49,997	Domain bbc.co.uk	Visits 316,366	Domain dailymail.co.uk	Visits 34,693
elpais.com	49,997	bbc.co.uk	316,366	dailymail.co.uk	34,693
elpais.com repubblica.it	49,997 49,709	bbc.co.uk raiplay.it	316,366 39,015	dailymail.co.uk 20minutes.fr	34,693 33,781

Table A6: Top five visited news domains per country.

France		Germany	401114	Italy	
Domain	Visits	Domain	Visits	Domain	Visits
tf1.fr	44,315	bild.de	31,623	mediaset.it	61,085
20minutes.fr	33,669	zdf.de	21,769	repubblica.it	48,536
lefigaro.fr	30,541	news-und-nachrichten.de	14,548	raiplay.it	38,844
france.tv	$22,\!555$	spiegel.de	11,635	corriere.it	23,892
ouest-france.fr	21,057	welt.de	10,035	sky.it	21,856
Spain		United Kingdom		United States	
Domain	Visits	Domain	Visits	Domain	Visits
elpais.com	48,524	bbc.co.uk	313,952	foxnews.com	13,715
elmundo.es	39,048	sky.com	35,945	buzzfeed.com	11,360
abc.es	21,654	dailymail.co.uk	30,880	cbs.com	9,719
rtve.es	21,495	itv.com	27,046	cnn.com	9,695
atresplayer.com	20,746	theguardian.com	21,412	roughlyexplained.com	6,977

3 Evaluation of the web tracking data

The most established source for website domain traffic data is Alexa, a service of Amazon. Alexa tracks the website visits of more than 300 million users who have installed a web browser plugin. These statistics are routinely used in the social sciences as a benchmark for website popularity. We got data from the Alexa API to compare the top 500 visited domains in their country specific rankings to the aggregated domain visits by the tracking panelists. The Alexa data refers to website visits in the last 6 months before data collection at the end of May 2019.

The comparison serves the purpose to show that the most popular news sites in our tracking panel are also prominently visited by internet users more generally. However, due to the non-random recruitment process and lacking data on the number of Alexa panelists per country, it has to be cautioned that the Alexa data is also not representative for the online population.

Figure A2 compares the top news sites per country in our tracking panels to Alexa usage statistics per country. Spearman's rank correlations vary across countries, but generally reveal a high correspondence between the rankings of news websites in both data sources ($\rho \ge 0.48$ in all countries).




Figure A2: Comparison of Alexa domain visit rankings and domains visited by web tracking panelists. Both axes are logged. p = Spearman's rank correlations.

Even better external data is available for evaluating the German tracking data. The "Informationsgemein-schaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.V." (IVW) is a Joint Industry Committee that aims to enhance transparency in the advertising market and determine the marketing value of brands. Media providers/publishers, advertisers and advertising agencies share their original data, e.g., on their sales of print products and, most importantly here, visits to their websites. Figure A3 compares the visits by panelists in the German web tracking panel to website visits from within Germany during March to June 2019 in the IVW data.




Figure A3: Comparison of IVW domain visit rankings and domains visited by web tracking panelists. Both axes are logged. p = Spearman's rank correlations.

Correlations between the ranking of news sites visited by our German tracking panelists and the "ground truth" data from the IVW are even stronger than for the Alexa data ($\rho = 0.72$). While website visit data of such quality is not available for all countries, both evaluations give us confidence that the tracking data provides a fairly accurate representation of the news sources visited by internet users in the countries under investigation.

²However, public broadcasters do not submit their website visits data to the IVW.

4 Offline news consumption of panelists

It is important to evaluate whether our panel diverges from the general population on another dimension, offline news media use. If panelists are particularly digital savvy people, this would put the generalizability of our findings into doubt. In order to test this, we implemented identical media use batteries asked in the Reuters Digital News Report (DNR) 2019 (Newman et al. 2019) in our survey. The surveys for the DNR 2019 were conducted by YouGov and are nationally representative for all of our target countries.³

Figure A4 shows the weekly offline news brand use by Reuters survey participants and by our web tracking panelists. Correlations are very high ($\rho \ge 0.93$). This demonstrates that the web tracking panelists consume the same offline news sources like the general population, mostly television news.




Figure A4: Comparison of weekly offline news media brands as reported in the Reuters Digital News Report 2019 and offline news media brands visited weekly by web tracking panelists. Both axes are logged. p = Spearman's rank correlations.

 $^{^{3}}$ We thank Richard Fletcher for sharing the survey items and a detailed breakdown of results with us.

5 Privacy attitudes of panelists

We follow the procedure by Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) to evaluate to what extent privacy attitudes of tracking panelists diverge from panelists who participate in surveys but do not have tracking tools installed. To identify a potential "opt in bias", we implemented the privacy attitude battery from Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) in a sample of German participants drawn from the regular online access panel of Netquest without web tracking. 1,002 participants were sampled according to German population margins for gender, age and education. Respondents were presented the following statements and asked about their (dis)agreement on a five-point scale.

- Personalized advertising makes me afraid.
- I am concerned about how much data there is about me on the Internet.
- My privacy on the Internet does not matter to me.

Figure A5 shows that there are only marginal differences in the privacy attitudes of online panelists with and without web tracking technology installed.




Figure A5: Comparison of privacy attitudes in a survey of German online access panelists and web tracking panelists.

6 Descriptive statistics

Table A7 shows the main dependent, independent and control variables used in the regression models.

Table A7: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables and individual-level covariates.

N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
7,729	51.38	250.17	0	6,555
7,729	26.48	164.19	0	5,441
7,729	4.54	59.09	0	3,077
7,729	87.87	415.14	0	16,205
7,729	70.84	399.29	0	12,142
7,729	26.98	167.70	0	4,334
7,417	-0.56	0.77	-3.21	0.93
7,606	1.90	1.74	0.00	5.00
7,729	0.16	0.36	0	1
7,720	2.73	0.89	1.00	4.00
7,729	3.87	0.80	0.00	5.67
7,557	2.95	0.85	1.00	5.00
	7,729 7,729 7,729 7,729 7,729 7,729 7,417 7,606 7,729 7,720 7,720	7,729 51.38 7,729 26.48 7,729 4.54 7,729 87.87 7,729 70.84 7,729 26.98 7,417 -0.56 7,606 1.90 7,729 0.16 7,720 2.73 7,720 3.87	7,729 51.38 250.17 7,729 26.48 164.19 7,729 4.54 59.09 7,729 87.87 415.14 7,729 70.84 399.29 7,729 26.98 167.70 7,417 -0.56 0.77 7,606 1.90 1.74 7,729 0.16 0.36 7,720 2.73 0.89 7,729 3.87 0.80	7,729 51.38 250.17 0 7,729 26.48 164.19 0 7,729 4.54 59.09 0 7,729 87.87 415.14 0 7,729 70.84 399.29 0 7,729 26.98 167.70 0 7,417 -0.56 0.77 -3.21 7,606 1.90 1.74 0.00 7,729 0.16 0.36 0 7,720 2.73 0.89 1.00 7,729 3.87 0.80 0.00

Figure A6 visualizes the skewed distribution of the dependent variables. Since many panelists did not visit some news types at all, zeros are very prevalent. Therefore, the X axis is log+1 transformed for this illustration.




Figure A6: Distribution of dependent variables. The X axis is transformed as log(visits+1).

7 Regression models

Table A8 shows the full regression results used for Figure 1 in the main text. These results are based on weighted data.

Table A8: Full regression models reported in the main text.

	Commercial broadcasting	Digital-born outlets	Hyperpartisan news	Legacy press	Public broadcasting	Tabloid press
Populist attitudes	0.02 (0.04)	$-0.23 (0.03)^{***}$	0.28 (0.07)***	$-0.19 (0.03)^{***}$	-0.11 (0.04)**	-0.10 (0.04)**
Political extremism	$-0.04 (0.02)^*$	$0.11 (0.02)^{***}$	$0.13 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.03 (0.01)^*$	$-0.11 (0.02)^{***}$	-0.00(0.02)
R-W populist party ID	$0.61 (0.08)^{***}$	-0.01(0.08)	$0.42 (0.15)^{**}$	0.02(0.06)	$-0.74 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.38 (0.09)^{***}$
Political interest	0.01(0.04)	$0.24 (0.03)^{***}$	0.02(0.07)	$0.32 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.38 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.13 (0.04)^{***}$
Total visits (logged)	$2.19 (0.05)^{***}$	$3.08 (0.05)^{***}$	$2.61 (0.11)^{***}$	2.30 (0.03)***	$1.92 (0.05)^{***}$	$2.69 (0.05)^{***}$
Intermediate education	0.01(0.08)	0.22 (0.07)**	0.10(0.14)	0.15 (0.06)**	$0.56 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.02(0.08)
High education	$0.21 (0.09)^*$	$0.33 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.38 (0.15)^*$	$0.34 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.29 (0.09)^{**}$	-0.08(0.09)
25-54 years	-0.09(0.09)	-0.01(0.09)	-0.32(0.18)	0.28 (0.07)***	$0.48 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.71 (0.10)^{***}$
55-64 years	0.22(0.11)	0.15(0.10)	$1.05 (0.21)^{***}$	$0.72 (0.08)^{***}$	0.99 (0.12)***	1.38 (0.12)***
65+ years	-0.02(0.11)	$0.68 (0.10)^{***}$	$2.39 (0.20)^{***}$	$0.86 (0.08)^{***}$	$1.29 (0.12)^{***}$	$1.17 (0.11)^{***}$
Gender (male $= 1$)	$-0.17 (0.06)^{**}$	$0.16 (0.05)^{**}$	$0.82 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.43 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.13 (0.07)^*$	$0.17 (0.06)^{**}$
Germany	-0.12(0.11)	$0.62 (0.10)^{***}$	$1.13 (0.20)^{***}$	$-0.23 (0.08)^{**}$	0.08(0.11)	$0.91 (0.11)^{***}$
Italy	$0.42 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.62 (0.09)^{***}$	$-0.78 (0.18)^{***}$	$0.34 (0.07)^{***}$	-0.05(0.10)	-1.28 (0.10)***
Spain	$0.21 (0.10)^*$	$1.57 (0.09)^{***}$	$1.84 (0.18)^{***}$	$1.03 (0.07)^{***}$	-0.06(0.11)	-0.10(0.10)
United Kingdom	$0.61 (0.11)^{***}$	-0.06(0.10)	$-1.49(0.21)^{***}$	$-0.46 (0.08)^{***}$	$1.86 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.79 (0.11)^{***}$
United States	$-0.19 (0.10)^*$	0.27 (0.09)**	$1.34 (0.17)^{***}$	$-1.29 (0.07)^{***}$	$-1.73 (0.11)^{***}$	-1.53 (0.10)***
Intercept	$-5.56 (0.24)^{***}$	$-11.98 (0.26)^{***}$	$-12.19 (0.55)^{***}$	$-7.38 (0.18)^{***}$	$-6.31 (0.25)^{***}$	$-8.77 (0.27)^{***}$
AIC	45411.47	38718.57	12583.12	57849.16	41354.97	35640.73
Log Likelihood	-22687.74	-19341.28	-6273.56	-28906.58	-20659.49	-17802.37
Deviance	6944.27	6634.30	2491.46	8137.43	6310.01	6182.58
Num. obs.	7293	7293	7293	7293	7293	7293

Note: Results from negative binomial regression models. "Low education" is the reference category for education. "Female" is the reference category for gender. "18-24 years" is the reference category for age. France is the reference category for country dummy variables. Weighted data. ****p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A9 shows the full regression results with *unweighted* data. Compared to the weighted models, populist attitudes are not significant in the models for tabloid press and public broadcasting.

Table A9: Full regression models, unweighted data.

	Commercial broadcasting	Digital-born outlets	Hyperpartisan news	Legacy press	Public broadcasting	Tabloid press
Populist attitudes	-0.03(0.04)	$-0.22 (0.04)^{***}$	0.25 (0.07)***	$-0.18 (0.03)^{***}$	-0.04(0.04)	-0.05(0.04)
Political extremism	-0.01 (0.02)	$0.09 (0.02)^{***}$	$0.14 (0.03)^{***}$	0.02(0.01)	$-0.08 (0.02)^{***}$	-0.02(0.02)
R-W populist party ID	$0.47 (0.08)^{***}$	-0.06(0.08)	$0.79 (0.15)^{***}$	0.02(0.06)	-0.74 (0.09)***	$0.34 (0.09)^{***}$
Political interest	-0.04 (0.04)	$0.23 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.16 (0.06)^*$	$0.32 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.35 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.11 (0.04)^{**}$
Total visits (logged)	$2.23 (0.05)^{***}$	$3.05 (0.05)^{***}$	$2.85 (0.11)^{***}$	$2.34 (0.03)^{***}$	$2.01 (0.05)^{***}$	$2.64 (0.05)^{***}$
Intermediate education	-0.15 (0.10)	$0.20 (0.09)^*$	0.05(0.17)	0.14(0.07)	$0.50 (0.11)^{***}$	-0.14(0.10)
High education	0.04(0.10)	$0.29 (0.09)^{**}$	-0.02(0.18)	$0.33 (0.07)^{***}$	$0.39 (0.11)^{***}$	-0.20(0.10)
25-54 years	-0.20(0.11)	-0.09(0.10)	-0.09(0.20)	$0.38 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.29 (0.12)^*$	$0.70 (0.12)^{***}$
55-64 years	-0.04(0.12)	0.12(0.11)	$0.91 (0.22)^{***}$	$0.67 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.75 (0.13)^{***}$	$1.27 (0.13)^{***}$
65+ years	-0.19(0.13)	$0.62 (0.12)^{***}$	$2.45 (0.23)^{***}$	$0.89 (0.10)^{***}$	$1.22 (0.14)^{***}$	$1.03 (0.14)^{***}$
Gender (male $= 1$)	-0.06(0.06)	$0.17 (0.06)^{**}$	$0.71 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.45 (0.04)^{***}$	-0.09(0.07)	$0.34 (0.06)^{***}$
Germany	$-0.27 (0.11)^*$	$0.71 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.60 (0.19)^{**}$	-0.15(0.08)	0.14(0.12)	$1.03 (0.11)^{***}$
Italy	$0.43 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.58 (0.09)^{***}$	$-1.03(0.18)^{***}$	$0.32 (0.07)^{***}$	-0.11(0.10)	$-1.25 (0.10)^{***}$
Spain	0.12(0.10)	$1.74 (0.09)^{***}$	$2.04 (0.18)^{***}$	$1.08 (0.07)^{***}$	$-0.26 (0.11)^*$	-0.04(0.10)
United Kingdom	$0.54 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.24 (0.10)^*$	$-1.44(0.20)^{***}$	$-0.50 (0.08)^{***}$	$1.70 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.81 (0.11)^{***}$
United States	$-0.23 (0.10)^*$	$0.51 (0.09)^{***}$	$1.27 (0.17)^{***}$	$-1.36 (0.07)^{***}$	$-1.98 (0.11)^{***}$	-1.40 (0.10)***
Intercept	$-5.36 (0.25)^{***}$	$-11.84 (0.27)^{***}$	$-13.59 (0.57)^{***}$	$-7.59 (0.19)^{***}$	$-6.37 (0.27)^{***}$	$-8.56 (0.28)^{***}$
AIC	46193.57	38643.98	12036.62	58042.71	41501.23	35899.03
Log Likelihood	-23078.79	-19303.99	-6000.31	-29003.35	-20732.61	-17931.51
Deviance	7046.36	6647.10	2463.34	8142.02	6319.67	6219.97
Num. obs.	7293	7293	7293	7293	7293	7293

Note: Results from negative binomial regression models. "Low education" is the reference category for education. "Female" is the reference category for gender. "18-24 years" is the reference category for age. France is the reference category for country dummy variables. Unweighted data. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; **p < 0.05

In the UK, political ideology, from which the political extremism scale is constructed, was asked in another survey one month after the first wave. Therefore, 109 tracked UK respondents from wave 1 who did not participate in the second wave have missing values for political ideology. There might also be theoretical concerns about multicollinearity between populist attitudes, political extremism and right wing populist party ID. Tables A10, A11 and A12 present models excluding these variables. This only affects the results for public broadcasting.

Table A10: Regression models reported in the main text excluding political extremism.

	Commercial broadcasting	Digital-born outlets	Hyperpartisan news	Legacy press	Public broadcasting	Tabloid press
Populist attitudes	0.03 (0.04)	$-0.23 (0.03)^{***}$	0.25 (0.07)***	$-0.20 (0.03)^{***}$	-0.04(0.04)	-0.11 (0.04)**
R-W populist party ID	0.57 (0.08)***	0.06(0.07)	$0.53 (0.15)^{***}$	0.05(0.06)	$-0.82 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.38 (0.08)^{***}$
Political interest	-0.01 (0.04)	$0.30 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.13 (0.06)^*$	$0.34 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.38 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.13 (0.04)^{***}$
Total visits (logged)	2.20 (0.05)***	$3.08 (0.05)^{***}$	2.84 (0.11)***	2.31 (0.03)***	$1.85 (0.05)^{***}$	$2.68 (0.05)^{***}$
Intermediate education	-0.07(0.08)	0.20 (0.07)**	0.03(0.14)	$0.14 (0.06)^*$	$0.49 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.02(0.08)
High education	0.15(0.09)	$0.27 (0.08)^{***}$	0.15(0.15)	$0.33 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.39 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.07(0.09)
25-54 years	-0.08(0.09)	-0.05(0.09)	-0.29(0.18)	$0.29 (0.07)^{***}$	$0.25 (0.10)^*$	$0.70 (0.10)^{***}$
55-64 years	$0.29 (0.11)^*$	0.09(0.10)	1.10 (0.21)***	$0.73 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.74 (0.12)^{***}$	1.37 (0.12)***
65+ years	-0.03(0.11)	$0.60 (0.10)^{***}$	$2.38 (0.20)^{***}$	$0.84 (0.08)^{***}$	1.10 (0.12)***	$1.15 (0.11)^{***}$
Gender (male $= 1$)	$-0.19 (0.06)^{**}$	$0.18 (0.05)^{***}$	$0.77 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.44 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.19 (0.06)^{**}$	$0.17 (0.06)^{**}$
Germany	-0.08(0.11)	$0.55 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.89 (0.19)^{***}$	$-0.24 (0.08)^{**}$	0.15(0.11)	$0.92 (0.11)^{***}$
Italy	$0.41 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.64 (0.09)^{***}$	$-0.72(0.18)^{***}$	$0.35 (0.07)^{***}$	0.17(0.10)	$-1.28 (0.10)^{***}$
Spain	0.18(0.10)	$1.60 (0.09)^{***}$	$1.89 (0.18)^{***}$	$1.05 (0.07)^{***}$	-0.14(0.11)	-0.10(0.10)
United Kingdom	$0.66 (0.10)^{***}$	-0.13(0.09)	$-1.32 (0.20)^{***}$	$-0.53 (0.08)^{***}$	$1.87 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.76 (0.10)^{***}$
United States	$-0.21 (0.10)^*$	$0.33 (0.09)^{***}$	$1.47 (0.17)^{***}$	-1.28 (0.07)***	$-1.75 (0.11)^{***}$	-1.53 (0.10)***
Intercept	$-5.56 (0.23)^{***}$	$-11.89 (0.26)^{***}$	$-13.15 (0.55)^{***}$	$-7.42 (0.18)^{***}$	$-5.94 (0.24)^{***}$	$-8.77 (0.27)^{***}$
AIC	46160.61	39090.10	12681.59	58484.60	42438.64	36364.58
Log Likelihood	-23063.30	-19528.05	-6323.79	-29225.30	-21202.32	-18165.29
Deviance	7052.14	6708.87	2513.06	8248.41	6444.67	6299.42
Num. obs.	7409	7409	7409	7409	7409	7409

Note: Results from negative binomial regression models. "Low education" is the reference category for education. "Female" is the reference category for gender. "18-24 years" is the reference category for age. France is the reference category for country dummy variables. Weighted data. ****p < 0.001; **p < 0.05

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Table A11: Regression models reported in the main text excluding R-W populist party ID.

	Commercial broadcasting	Digital-born outlets	Hyperpartisan news	Legacy press	Public broadcasting	Tabloid press
Populist attitudes	0.08 (0.04)*	$-0.23 (0.03)^{***}$	0.26 (0.07)***	-0.19 (0.03)***	$-0.17 (0.04)^{***}$	-0.10 (0.04)*
Political extremism	-0.01(0.02)	0.11 (0.02)***	0.15 (0.03)***	$0.03 (0.01)^*$	$-0.12(0.02)^{***}$	0.03(0.02)
Political interest	0.04 (0.04)	0.24 (0.03)***	0.05(0.07)	0.32 (0.03)***	0.39 (0.04)***	$-0.13(0.04)^{***}$
Total visits (logged)	2.16 (0.05)***	3.08 (0.05)***	2.54 (0.11)***	2.30 (0.03)***	1.86 (0.05)***	2.69 (0.05)***
Intermediate education	-0.08(0.08)	0.22 (0.07)**	0.11(0.14)	0.15 (0.06)**	0.60 (0.09)***	-0.03(0.08)
High education	0.17 (0.09)*	0.34 (0.08)***	0.40 (0.15)**	0.34 (0.06)***	0.34 (0.09)***	-0.12(0.09)
25-54 years	-0.13(0.09)	-0.01(0.09)	-0.18(0.18)	0.28 (0.07)***	0.45 (0.10)***	0.73 (0.10)***
55-64 years	0.10(0.11)	0.15(0.10)	1.26 (0.21)***	0.72 (0.08)***	0.99 (0.12)***	1.38 (0.12)***
65+ years	-0.05(0.11)	0.68 (0.10)***	2.47 (0.20)***	0.87 (0.08)***	1.24 (0.12)***	1.21 (0.11)***
Gender (male $= 1$)	$-0.19 (0.06)^{**}$	$0.16 (0.05)^{**}$	0.81 (0.11)***	$0.43 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.17 (0.07)^{**}$	$0.16 (0.06)^*$
Germany	-0.17(0.11)	0.62 (0.10)***	1.28 (0.20)***	-0.23 (0.08)**	0.13(0.12)	0.92 (0.11)***
Italy	0.50 (0.10)***	0.62 (0.09)***	$-0.64(0.18)^{***}$	0.34 (0.07)***	-0.08(0.10)	$-1.16(0.10)^{***}$
Spain	0.12(0.10)	$1.57 (0.09)^{***}$	1.87 (0.18)***	1.03 (0.07)***	0.06(0.11)	-0.13(0.10)
United Kingdom	0.66 (0.11)***	-0.06(0.10)	$-1.38 (0.21)^{***}$	$-0.46 (0.08)^{***}$	1.85 (0.11)***	0.81 (0.11)***
United States	-0.04(0.10)	0.27 (0.09)**	$1.49 (0.17)^{***}$	$-1.29 (0.07)^{***}$	$-1.76 (0.11)^{***}$	$-1.47 (0.10)^{***}$
Intercept	$-5.32 \ (0.23)^{***}$	-11.98(0.26)***	-12.17 (0.55)***	$-7.38(0.18)^{***}$	$-6.19(0.25)^{***}$	$-8.78(0.27)^{***}$
AIC	45460.12	38716.60	12598.18	57847.22	41410.74	35654.93
Log Likelihood	-22713.06	-19341.30	-6282.09	-28906.61	-20688.37	-17810.46
Deviance	6949.92	6634.36	2492.44	8137.64	6316.15	6182.83
Num. obs.	7293	7293	7293	7293	7293	7293

Note: Results from negative binomial regression models. "Low education" is the reference category for education. "Female" is the reference category for gender. "18-24 years" is the reference category for age. France is the reference category for country dummy variables. Weighted data. ****p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table A12: Regression models reported in the main text excluding political extremism and R-W populist party ID.

	Commercial broadcasting	Digital-born outlets	Hyperpartisan news	Legacy press	Public broadcasting	Tabloid press
Populist attitudes	0.08 (0.04)*	$-0.23 (0.03)^{***}$	0.24 (0.07)***	-0.19 (0.03)***	$-0.09 (0.04)^*$	-0.10 (0.04)**
Political interest	0.03(0.04)	$0.30 (0.03)^{***}$	0.18 (0.06)**	$0.34 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.37 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.12 (0.04)^{**}$
Total visits (logged)	2.17 (0.05)***	3.08 (0.05)***	2.78(0.11)***	2.31 (0.03)***	1.78 (0.05)***	2.70 (0.05)***
Intermediate education	-0.13(0.08)	$0.20 (0.07)^{**}$	0.05(0.14)	$0.14 (0.06)^*$	$0.52 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.04(0.08)
High education	0.13(0.09)	$0.26 (0.08)^{***}$	0.17(0.15)	$0.32 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.45 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.12(0.09)
25-54 years	-0.12(0.09)	-0.04(0.09)	-0.12(0.18)	0.29 (0.07)***	$0.20 (0.10)^*$	0.72 (0.10)***
55-64 years	0.18(0.11)	0.09(0.10)	$1.35 (0.21)^{***}$	$0.73 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.71 (0.12)^{***}$	$1.37 (0.12)^{***}$
65+ years	-0.05(0.11)	$0.61 (0.10)^{***}$	$2.45 (0.20)^{***}$	$0.85 (0.08)^{***}$	$1.03 (0.12)^{***}$	$1.19 (0.11)^{***}$
Gender (male $= 1$)	$-0.21 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.18 (0.05)^{***}$	$0.76 (0.11)^{***}$	0.44 (0.04)***	-0.23 (0.06)***	$0.16 (0.06)^*$
Germany	-0.15(0.11)	$0.56 (0.10)^{***}$	$1.03 (0.20)^{***}$	$-0.24 (0.08)^{**}$	0.22(0.11)	$0.89 (0.11)^{***}$
Italy	$0.49 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.65 (0.09)^{***}$	$-0.53 (0.18)^{**}$	$0.35 (0.07)^{***}$	0.15(0.10)	$-1.13 (0.10)^{***}$
Spain	0.10(0.10)	$1.60 (0.09)^{***}$	$1.92 (0.18)^{***}$	$1.05 (0.07)^{***}$	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.13(0.10)
United Kingdom	$0.68 (0.10)^{***}$	-0.13(0.09)	$-1.19 (0.20)^{***}$	$-0.53 (0.08)^{***}$	$1.87 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.77 (0.10)^{***}$
United States	-0.05 (0.10)	$0.33 (0.09)^{***}$	$1.66 (0.17)^{***}$	$-1.28 (0.07)^{***}$	$-1.78 (0.11)^{***}$	$-1.46 (0.10)^{***}$
Intercept	$-5.33 (0.23)^{***}$	$-11.89 (0.26)^{***}$	$-13.20 (0.55)^{***}$	$-7.41 (0.18)^{***}$	$-5.77 (0.24)^{***}$	$-8.79 (0.27)^{***}$
AIC	46204.20	39088.80	12695.67	58483.26	42507.86	36381.21
Log Likelihood	-23086.10	-19528.40	-6331.83	-29225.63	-21237.93	-18174.61
Deviance	7058.12	6708.64	2513.94	8249.02	6452.87	6299.41
Num. obs.	7409	7409	7409	7409	7409	7409

Note: Results from negative binomial regression models. "Low education" is the reference category for education. "Female" is the reference category for gender. "18-24 years" is the reference category for age. France is the reference category for country dummy variables. Weighted data. ****p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Trust in traditional media matters theoretically in the context of populist attitudes. Media trust is constructed as a mean index of trust in newspapers, private radio, private television, public radio and public television ($\alpha = 0.88$, M = 2.95, SD = 0.84).

Table A13: Regression models reported in the main text including media trust.

	Commercial broadcasting	Digital-born outlets	Hyperpartisan news	Legacy press	Public broadcasting	Tabloid press
Populist attitudes	0.02 (0.04)	$-0.22 (0.03)^{***}$	0.30 (0.07)***	-0.19 (0.03)***	-0.15 (0.04)***	$-0.10 (0.04)^*$
Media trust	0.06 (0.04)	$0.08 (0.03)^*$	-0.02(0.07)	$0.10 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.20 (0.04)^{***}$	0.06(0.04)
Political extremism	$-0.04 (0.02)^*$	$0.12 (0.02)^{***}$	$0.14 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.03 (0.01)^*$	$-0.09 (0.02)^{***}$	0.01(0.02)
R-W populist party ID	$0.63 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.01(0.08)	$0.37 (0.15)^*$	-0.02(0.06)	$-0.72 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.34 (0.09)^{***}$
Political interest	-0.01 (0.04)	$0.24 (0.03)^{***}$	-0.02(0.07)	$0.32 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.35 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.08 (0.04)^*$
Total visits (logged)	$2.19 (0.05)^{***}$	$3.13 (0.05)^{***}$	$2.56 (0.11)^{***}$	$2.28 (0.04)^{***}$	$1.97 (0.05)^{***}$	$2.68 (0.06)^{***}$
Intermediate education	$0.01\ (0.08)$	$0.25 (0.07)^{***}$	0.06(0.15)	0.11(0.06)	$0.58 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.06(0.08)
High education	0.22 (0.09)*	$0.32 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.40 (0.16)^*$	0.34 (0.06)***	$0.38 (0.09)^{***}$	$-0.18 (0.09)^*$
25-54 years	-0.12(0.10)	-0.03(0.09)	$-0.39 (0.18)^*$	$0.30 (0.07)^{***}$	$0.39 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.71 (0.10)^{***}$
55-64 years	0.22(0.12)	0.16(0.10)	$0.98 (0.21)^{***}$	$0.68 (0.08)^{***}$	$1.01 (0.12)^{***}$	$1.34 (0.12)^{***}$
65+ years	-0.03(0.11)	$0.74 (0.10)^{***}$	2.35 (0.20)***	0.80 (0.08)***	1.26 (0.12)***	1.07 (0.12)***
Gender (male $= 1$)	$-0.16 (0.06)^{**}$	0.09(0.06)	$0.81 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.41 (0.04)^{***}$	-0.07(0.07)	0.10(0.06)
Germany	-0.10(0.11)	$0.65 (0.10)^{***}$	$1.60 (0.20)^{***}$	$-0.24 (0.08)^{**}$	0.07(0.12)	$0.94 (0.11)^{***}$
Italy	0.40 (0.10)***	$0.62 (0.09)^{***}$	$-0.70 (0.19)^{***}$	$0.24 (0.07)^{***}$	-0.01(0.11)	$-1.26 (0.10)^{***}$
Spain	$0.20 (0.10)^*$	$1.59 (0.09)^{***}$	$1.95 (0.18)^{***}$	$1.03 (0.07)^{***}$	0.01(0.11)	-0.20(0.10)
United Kingdom	$0.62 (0.11)^{***}$	-0.08(0.10)	$-1.46 (0.21)^{***}$	$-0.49 (0.08)^{***}$	$1.91 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.75 (0.11)^{***}$
United States	$-0.20 (0.10)^*$	$0.21 (0.09)^*$	1.51 (0.18)***	$-1.30 (0.07)^{***}$	$-1.67(0.11)^{***}$	$-1.52 (0.10)^{***}$
Intercept	$-5.65 (0.26)^{***}$	-12.41 (0.28)***	$-11.81 (0.58)^{***}$	-7.53 (0.20)***	$-7.15 (0.28)^{***}$	$-8.95 (0.29)^{***}$
AIC	44286.13	37653.68	12344.21	56206.35	40211.70	34784.17
Log Likelihood	-22124.06	-18807.84	-6153.11	-28084.17	-20086.85	-17373.08
Deviance	6775.98	6454.94	2426.51	7930.01	6146.27	6041.40
Num. obs.	7142	7142	7142	7142	7142	7142

Note: Results from negative binomial regression models. "Low education" is the reference category for education. "Female" is the reference category for gender. "18-24 years" is the reference category for age. France is the reference category for country dummy variables. Weighted data. ****p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; **p < 0.01; **p < 0.05

The tracking data also provides information on the duration of visits in seconds. We use this data for an alternative operationalization of news consumption by aggregating the seconds each panelist spent on domains from a given news type. Table A14 shows that the coefficients of public broadcasting and hyperpartisan news become insignificant under this alternative specification, which suggests that the selection of news and the intensity of news consumption are driven by different processes.

Table A14: Regression models reported in the main text with duration instead of number of visits as dependent variable.

	Commercial broadcasting	Digital-born outlets	Hyperpartisan news	Legacy press	Public broadcasting	Tabloid press
Populist attitudes	0.09 (0.05)	$-0.25 (0.05)^{***}$	-0.01 (0.10)	$-0.19 (0.04)^{***}$	-0.04 (0.06)	$-0.27 (0.05)^{***}$
Political extremism	-0.00(0.02)	$0.09 (0.02)^{***}$	0.04 (0.05)	0.03(0.02)	$-0.15 (0.03)^{***}$	-0.01(0.03)
R-W populist party ID	$0.72 (0.11)^{***}$	$-0.31 (0.10)^{**}$	$1.10 (0.22)^{***}$	0.02(0.08)	-1.03 (0.12)***	0.38 (0.12)**
Political interest	-0.09(0.05)	$0.32 (0.04)^{***}$	$-0.22 (0.09)^*$	$0.35 (0.03)^{***}$	$0.40 (0.05)^{***}$	$-0.23 (0.05)^{***}$
Total visits (logged)	$2.14 (0.05)^{***}$	$3.26 (0.05)^{***}$	$3.05 (0.12)^{***}$	$2.33 (0.04)^{***}$	$1.65 (0.05)^{***}$	$2.52 (0.05)^{***}$
Intermediate education	0.11(0.10)	$0.24 (0.09)^*$	0.15(0.21)	$0.26 (0.07)^{***}$	$0.52 (0.12)^{***}$	0.06(0.11)
High education	$0.31 (0.11)^{**}$	$0.40 (0.10)^{***}$	$1.07 (0.22)^{***}$	$0.36 (0.08)^{***}$	0.02(0.12)	$-0.29 (0.12)^*$
25-54 years	-0.01 (0.12)	$0.49 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.01\ (0.25)$	$0.37 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.71 (0.14)^{***}$	$1.46 (0.13)^{***}$
55-64 years	$0.34 (0.15)^*$	$0.78 (0.13)^{***}$	$1.46 (0.30)^{***}$	$0.88 (0.10)^{***}$	$1.50 (0.17)^{***}$	$1.98 (0.16)^{***}$
65+ years	-0.07(0.14)	$1.24 (0.13)^{***}$	$3.32(0.29)^{***}$	$1.23 (0.10)^{***}$	1.94 (0.16)***	$1.76 (0.15)^{***}$
Gender (male $= 1$)	$-0.33 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.16 (0.07)^*$	$0.54 (0.16)^{***}$	$0.31 (0.06)^{***}$	$-0.32 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.25 (0.08)^{**}$
Germany	$-0.36 (0.14)^*$	$0.74 (0.13)^{***}$	$1.09 (0.28)^{***}$	0.10(0.10)	0.22(0.16)	$1.40 (0.15)^{***}$
Italy	0.22(0.13)	$1.31 (0.12)^{***}$	$-1.06 (0.26)^{***}$	$0.42 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.12(0.14)	$-1.41 (0.14)^{***}$
Spain	0.12(0.13)	$2.15 (0.12)^{***}$	$2.12 (0.26)^{***}$	$1.33 (0.09)^{***}$	0.08(0.15)	0.09(0.14)
United Kingdom	0.25(0.14)	0.17(0.13)	$-1.03 (0.28)^{***}$	$-0.25 (0.10)^*$	$1.65 (0.16)^{***}$	$1.45 (0.15)^{***}$
United States	-0.13(0.13)	$0.79 (0.12)^{***}$	$1.44 (0.26)^{***}$	-1.14 (0.09)***	$-1.50 (0.14)^{***}$	$-0.87 (0.14)^{***}$
Intercept	$-0.79 (0.27)^{**}$	$-9.83 (0.28)^{***}$	$-9.95 (0.62)^{***}$	$-3.98 (0.19)^{***}$	$-0.99 (0.29)^{***}$	$-4.59 (0.29)^{***}$
AIC	78216.59	70687.83	22269.11	99974.81	70852.93	64174.26
Log Likelihood	-39090.29	-35325.92	-11116.55	-49969.40	-35408.47	-32069.13
Deviance	7156.19	6937.77	2337.44	8587.00	6399.65	6311.05
Num. obs.	7293	7293	7293	7293	7293	7293

Note: Results from negative binomial regression models. "Low education" is the reference category for education. "Female" is the reference category for gender. "18-24 years" is the reference category for age. France is the reference category for country dummy variables. Weighted data. **** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05

Table A15: Regression models of public broadcasting visits. Conservative coding of only news subdomains.

	Weighted data	Weighted data, no RW ID	Unweighted data
Populist attitudes	-0.03(0.06)	-0.10(0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Political extremism	$-0.09 (0.03)^{**}$	$-0.11 (0.03)^{***}$	$-0.12 (0.03)^{***}$
R-W populist party ID	$-0.86 (0.12)^{***}$		$-0.82 (0.12)^{***}$
Political interest	$0.55 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.53 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.57 (0.06)^{***}$
Total visits (logged)	$1.48 (0.07)^{***}$	$1.43 (0.07)^{***}$	$1.61 (0.08)^{***}$
Intermediate education	$0.44 (0.12)^{***}$	0.49 (0.12)***	$0.47 (0.14)^{**}$
High education	$0.61 (0.12)^{***}$	$0.66 (0.12)^{***}$	$0.83 (0.15)^{***}$
25-54 years	0.05(0.13)	0.04(0.13)	-0.11(0.17)
55-64 years	$0.84 (0.16)^{***}$	$0.84 (0.16)^{***}$	$0.60 (0.18)^{***}$
65+ years	1.46 (0.18)***	1.40 (0.18)***	1.66 (0.22)***
Gender (male $= 1$)	$0.50 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.49 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.34 (0.09)^{***}$
Germany	$0.72 (0.16)^{***}$	$0.73 (0.16)^{***}$	$0.95 (0.16)^{***}$
Italy	$-1.14(0.14)^{***}$	$-1.20 (0.14)^{***}$	$-0.77(0.14)^{***}$
Spain	$-1.09 (0.15)^{***}$	$-1.01 (0.15)^{***}$	$-0.97 (0.15)^{***}$
United Kingdom	2.73 (0.15)***	$2.68 (0.15)^{***}$	$2.61 (0.15)^{***}$
United States	-0.05(0.17)	-0.09(0.18)	$-0.34 (0.16)^*$
Intercept	$-7.21 (0.39)^{***}$	$-7.06 (0.39)^{***}$	$-7.62 (0.43)^{***}$
AIC	20879.22	20922.35	20794.40
Log Likelihood	-10421.61	-10444.18	-10379.20
Num. obs.	7293	7293	7293

Note: Results from negative binomial regression models. "Low education" is reference category for education. "Female" is reference category for gender. "18-24 years" is reference category for age. France is reference category for country dummy variables. ****p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

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8 Regression models by country

On the following pages, we present individual regression models per country for each news type.

Table A16: Commercial broadcasting. Regression models per country.

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
Populist attitudes	-0.14(0.10)	0.03 (0.17)	$-0.24 (0.10)^*$	-0.05(0.10)	0.33 (0.11)**	-0.09(0.09)
Political extremism	-0.03(0.04)	-0.16(0.09)	-0.03(0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02(0.06)	-0.03(0.04)
R-W populist party ID	$0.46 (0.21)^*$	-0.11(0.40)	0.32(0.17)	-0.44(0.27)	0.41(0.28)	$0.77 (0.17)^{***}$
Political interest	-0.15(0.08)	0.16(0.18)	0.12(0.08)	-0.19(0.10)	-0.13(0.11)	$0.19 (0.08)^*$
Total visits (logged)	$2.37 (0.11)^{***}$	$2.16 (0.19)^{***}$	$2.18 (0.12)^{***}$	$3.06 (0.12)^{***}$	$1.55 (0.13)^{***}$	$2.14 (0.11)^{***}$
Intermediate education	0.19(0.19)	-0.21(0.33)	$0.47 (0.17)^{**}$	0.35(0.19)	-0.03(0.32)	0.07(0.25)
High education	0.59 (0.22)**	-0.28(0.33)	-0.05(0.21)	0.31(0.17)	0.05(0.34)	0.80 (0.26)**
25-54 years	-0.01(0.20)	$-0.87 (0.38)^*$	0.34(0.23)	-0.25(0.23)	$1.20 (0.27)^{***}$	0.11(0.22)
55-64 years	-0.02(0.25)	$-2.15(0.44)^{***}$	0.14(0.29)	0.25(0.29)	$1.71 (0.34)^{***}$	$1.42 (0.25)^{***}$
65+ years	0.45(0.26)	-0.66(0.42)	-0.36(0.28)	0.16(0.26)	$1.48 (0.35)^{***}$	0.33(0.24)
Gender (male $= 1$)	$-0.29 (0.14)^*$	$-0.79 (0.27)^{**}$	0.06(0.15)	$-0.54 (0.15)^{***}$	$0.46 (0.18)^{**}$	0.20(0.14)
Intercept	$-6.23 (0.58)^{***}$	$-4.59 (0.89)^{***}$	$-6.08 (0.54)^{***}$	$-8.18 (0.55)^{***}$	$-3.67 (0.66)^{***}$	$-7.15 (0.47)^{***}$
AIC	9215.13	4120.25	9259.93	7752.43	6473.42	8194.57
Log Likelihood	-4594.57	-2047.12	-4616.97	-3863.21	-3223.71	-4084.29
Num. obs.	1380	953	1386	1297	951	1326

Table A17: Digital-born outlets. Regression models per country.

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
Populist attitudes	0.04 (0.07)	0.21 (0.16)	$-0.22 (0.06)^{***}$	-0.14(0.09)	-0.13(0.17)	$-0.65 (0.10)^{***}$
Political extremism	$0.07 (0.03)^*$	0.07(0.08)	$0.07 (0.03)^{**}$	0.01(0.03)	$0.31 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.20 (0.04)^{***}$
R-W populist party ID	-0.25(0.16)	$1.10 (0.34)^{**}$	0.13(0.11)	-0.28(0.23)	$-0.70 (0.33)^*$	$-0.52 (0.18)^{**}$
Political interest	0.11(0.07)	-0.07(0.14)	$0.21 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.55 (0.08)^{***}$	0.20(0.13)	0.16(0.09)
Total visits (logged)	$2.78 (0.11)^{***}$	$3.06 (0.17)^{***}$	$2.92 (0.10)^{***}$	$3.38(0.12)^{***}$	$2.78 (0.23)^{***}$	$3.43 (0.16)^{***}$
Intermediate education	-0.16(0.14)	0.08(0.29)	-0.09(0.11)	0.06(0.16)	$2.14 (0.38)^{***}$	$1.18 (0.29)^{***}$
High education	0.23(0.15)	$0.81 (0.34)^*$	-0.09(0.14)	$0.30 (0.14)^*$	$1.95 (0.36)^{***}$	$1.48 (0.30)^{***}$
25-54 years	$-0.64 (0.15)^{***}$	$-0.78 (0.38)^*$	0.06(0.16)	0.26(0.20)	$1.45 (0.32)^{***}$	0.13(0.23)
55-64 years	$-0.38 (0.19)^*$	$-1.52 (0.42)^{***}$	0.32(0.18)	$1.24 (0.23)^{***}$	0.42(0.41)	$0.70 (0.27)^{**}$
65+ years	$0.51 (0.19)^{**}$	-0.24(0.45)	$1.34 (0.18)^{***}$	$1.35 (0.22)^{***}$	$2.05 (0.41)^{***}$	-0.19(0.28)
Gender (male $= 1$)	$0.45 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.98 (0.24)^{***}$	$-0.20 (0.10)^*$	$0.37 (0.12)^{**}$	-0.47(0.25)	0.13(0.16)
Intercept	$-9.68 (0.53)^{***}$	$-10.05 (0.81)^{***}$	$-10.43 (0.43)^{***}$	$-12.74 (0.55)^{***}$	$-13.54 (1.15)^{***}$	$-14.41 (0.76)^{***}$
AIC	7588.02	3900.60	8535.79	8164.94	3376.97	6219.64
Log Likelihood	-3781.01	-1937.30	-4254.90	-4069.47	-1675.49	-3096.82
Num. obs.	1380	953	1386	1297	951	1326

Table A18: **Hyperpartisan news**. Regression models per country.

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
Populist attitudes	0.19 (0.18)	1.56 (0.38)***	-0.01 (0.21)	-0.08(0.12)	-0.03(0.33)	0.88 (0.20)***
Political extremism	$0.19 (0.09)^*$	-0.05(0.20)	$0.20 (0.09)^*$	$-0.17 (0.05)^{**}$	0.22(0.16)	$0.23 (0.08)^{**}$
R-W populist party ID	$-1.65 (0.46)^{***}$	1.33(0.92)	0.34(0.38)	$1.02 (0.31)^{***}$	$2.04 (0.83)^*$	$0.68 (0.33)^*$
Political interest	$0.37 (0.16)^*$	$-1.13 (0.38)^{**}$	$0.89 (0.23)^{***}$	0.13(0.12)	-0.37(0.30)	$0.89 (0.18)^{***}$
Total visits (logged)	$3.79(0.41)^{***}$	$2.94 (0.69)^{***}$	$3.41 (0.40)^{***}$	$2.81 (0.16)^{***}$	$4.56 (0.87)^{***}$	$2.83 (0.29)^{***}$
Intermediate education	0.51(0.49)	1.32(0.68)	-0.40(0.41)	$0.45 (0.22)^*$	$2.44 (1.16)^*$	0.09(0.49)
High education	0.40(0.51)	4.19 (1.04)***	-0.51 (0.50)	$0.64 (0.20)^{**}$	$2.64 (1.29)^*$	-0.71 (0.52)
25-54 years	0.80(0.48)	-1.50(0.83)	$-1.48 (0.51)^{**}$	$0.94 (0.28)^{***}$	$-2.46 (0.95)^{**}$	-0.95(0.49)
55-64 years	$2.72 (0.65)^{***}$	-1.13(0.99)	-0.32(0.63)	$2.59 (0.33)^{***}$	-1.98(1.05)	0.26 (0.57)
65+ years	$2.90 (0.57)^{***}$	-0.61(1.20)	$1.50 (0.56)^{**}$	$2.32 (0.31)^{***}$	$-2.54 (1.27)^*$	$2.20 (0.52)^{***}$
Gender (male $= 1$)	$0.85 (0.29)^{**}$	0.23(0.60)	-0.21(0.33)	$0.57 (0.17)^{***}$	$1.71 (0.63)^{**}$	-0.08(0.30)
Intercept	$-19.57 (1.89)^{***}$	$-9.05(2.58)^{***}$	$-17.29 (1.98)^{***}$	$-12.12 (0.71)^{***}$	$-22.38(3.87)^{***}$	$-13.18(1.24)^{***}$
AIC	2119.31	894.87	1439.43	4094.89	503.95	2966.61
Log Likelihood	-1046.65	-434.44	-706.71	-2034.45	-238.98	-1470.31
Num. obs.	1380	953	1386	1297	951	1326

Table A19: Legacy press. Regression models per country.

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
Populist attitudes	$-0.10 (0.05)^*$	$-0.37 (0.08)^{***}$	$-0.26 (0.07)^{***}$	-0.08(0.07)	$-0.37 (0.09)^{***}$	-0.02(0.08)
Political extremism	$-0.06 (0.03)^*$	0.05 (0.05)	$0.06 (0.03)^*$	$-0.10 (0.03)^{**}$	$0.28 (0.06)^{***}$	0.03(0.04)
R-W populist party ID	0.09(0.13)	-0.11(0.22)	-0.08(0.12)	0.10(0.19)	0.32(0.23)	$-0.31 (0.14)^*$
Political interest	$0.27 (0.05)^{***}$	$0.49 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.21 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.18 (0.06)^{**}$	$0.45 (0.10)^{***}$	$0.39 (0.07)^{***}$
Total visits (logged)	$2.44 (0.07)^{***}$	$2.41 (0.09)^{***}$	$2.57 (0.09)^{***}$	$2.29 (0.07)^{***}$	$2.30 (0.13)^{***}$	$2.40 (0.10)^{***}$
Intermediate education	$0.35 (0.12)^{**}$	$0.72 (0.16)^{***}$	$0.42 (0.12)^{***}$	0.05(0.14)	0.43(0.27)	$-0.94 (0.24)^{***}$
High education	$0.68 (0.13)^{***}$	$0.48 (0.19)^*$	$0.65 (0.16)^{***}$	0.39 (0.12)**	0.29(0.25)	-0.44(0.25)
25-54 years	0.24(0.13)	0.38(0.21)	$0.37 (0.17)^*$	$0.75 (0.17)^{***}$	0.42(0.22)	0.01(0.17)
55-64 years	$0.97 (0.16)^{***}$	$0.73 (0.23)^{**}$	$0.51 (0.20)^*$	$1.44 (0.20)^{***}$	$0.62 (0.28)^*$	-0.01 (0.21)
65+ years	$1.17 (0.15)^{***}$	0.19(0.22)	$1.52 (0.20)^{***}$	$1.72 (0.19)^{***}$	0.03(0.29)	-0.29(0.20)
Gender (male $= 1$)	-0.14(0.09)	0.08(0.13)	$0.41 (0.11)^{***}$	0.19(0.10)	$0.85 (0.17)^{***}$	$0.53 (0.12)^{***}$
Intercept	$-7.71 (0.35)^{***}$	$-8.81 (0.47)^{***}$	$-8.32 (0.38)^{***}$	$-6.08 (0.33)^{***}$	$-9.10 (0.69)^{***}$	$-7.87 (0.44)^{***}$
AIC	12329.49	6962.21	11852.87	11950.58	6497.79	7690.44
Log Likelihood	-6151.74	-3468.10	-5913.43	-5962.29	-3235.89	-3832.22
Num. obs.	1380	953	1386	1297	951	1326

Table A20: Public broadcasting. Regression models per country.

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
Populist attitudes	-0.14(0.08)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.20(0.12)	-0.20(0.13)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.18(0.15)
Political extremism	0.01(0.04)	-0.09(0.07)	$-0.19 (0.05)^{***}$	-0.08(0.05)	$0.10 (0.05)^*$	$-0.15 (0.06)^*$
R-W populist party ID	-0.10(0.17)	$-1.21(0.31)^{***}$	$-0.90 (0.20)^{***}$	$-1.72(0.33)^{***}$	$-0.51 (0.22)^*$	-0.39(0.25)
Political interest	0.14(0.08)	$0.55 (0.13)^{***}$	$0.32 (0.11)^{**}$	$0.22(0.11)^*$	$0.49 (0.08)^{***}$	$0.25 (0.12)^*$
Total visits (logged)	$2.09 (0.10)^{***}$	$2.51 (0.17)^{***}$	$2.48 (0.15)^{***}$	$2.68 (0.15)^{***}$	$2.59 (0.11)^{***}$	$0.94 (0.17)^{***}$
Intermediate education	$0.85 (0.17)^{***}$	$1.43 (0.25)^{***}$	$0.92 (0.21)^{***}$	0.28(0.21)	0.20(0.22)	$1.07(0.42)^*$
High education	$1.00 (0.18)^{***}$	$0.77(0.31)^*$	0.23(0.25)	-0.22(0.20)	0.63 (0.22)**	$1.55 (0.41)^{***}$
25-54 years	$0.50 (0.19)^{**}$	$0.92 (0.32)^{**}$	0.53(0.30)	-0.13(0.28)	0.70 (0.22)**	-0.23(0.31)
55-64 years	$1.61 (0.24)^{***}$	$0.81 (0.36)^*$	$1.26 (0.37)^{***}$	-0.10(0.33)	$1.07 (0.27)^{***}$	0.68(0.39)
65+ years	$0.96 (0.23)^{***}$	$0.80 (0.32)^*$	1.03 (0.36)**	$0.70 (0.30)^*$	$1.31 (0.26)^{***}$	$1.09 (0.45)^*$
Gender (male $= 1$)	-0.05(0.12)	-0.06(0.20)	-0.25(0.20)	$-0.94(0.18)^{***}$	$0.73 (0.15)^{***}$	$-0.43 (0.21)^*$
Intercept	$-7.24 (0.45)^{***}$	$-9.70 (0.82)^{***}$	$-8.45 (0.71)^{***}$	$-7.80 (0.69)^{***}$	$-8.54 (0.61)^{***}$	$-4.32 (0.87)^{***}$
AIC	9397.44	5449.52	6852.99	6190.77	9267.42	3563.26
Log Likelihood	-4685.72	-2711.76	-3413.49	-3082.38	-4620.71	-1768.63
Num. obs.	1380	953	1386	1297	951	1326

Table A21: Tabloid press. Regression models per country.

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
Populist attitudes	-0.07(0.06)	$-0.65 (0.16)^{***}$	$-0.40 (0.13)^{**}$	0.06 (0.13)	-0.17(0.09)	-0.05(0.10)
Political extremism	-0.02(0.03)	$-0.24 (0.07)^{***}$	0.12(0.07)	-0.11(0.06)	0.04(0.05)	$0.13 (0.05)^{**}$
R-W populist party ID	0.20(0.15)	-0.67(0.34)	$1.27 (0.31)^{***}$	$-1.52(0.33)^{***}$	0.21(0.22)	-0.16(0.17)
Political interest	$0.24 (0.06)^{***}$	$0.57 (0.18)^{**}$	-0.23(0.12)	$-0.67(0.12)^{***}$	$-0.22(0.08)^{**}$	0.10(0.07)
Total visits (logged)	$2.96 (0.10)^{***}$	$2.24 (0.17)^{***}$	$3.53 (0.23)^{***}$	$2.93 (0.15)^{***}$	$2.98 (0.15)^{***}$	$2.29 (0.13)^{***}$
Intermediate education	$-0.30 (0.13)^*$	-0.56(0.31)	$1.06 (0.29)^{***}$	-0.11(0.25)	0.57(0.33)	0.34(0.27)
High education	-0.11(0.15)	$-1.10 (0.38)^{**}$	0.23(0.32)	$0.64 (0.21)^{**}$	0.28(0.34)	0.08(0.27)
25-54 years	$0.64 (0.15)^{***}$	1.90 (0.36)***	0.21(0.36)	$0.90 (0.27)^{***}$	0.38(0.23)	$0.52 (0.21)^*$
55-64 years	$1.74 (0.19)^{***}$	$2.65 (0.39)^{***}$	$1.32 (0.43)^{**}$	$1.31 (0.35)^{***}$	0.43(0.28)	$1.21 (0.25)^{***}$
65+ years	$1.44 (0.18)^{***}$	$1.19 (0.41)^{**}$	0.26(0.46)	$1.23 (0.34)^{***}$	$1.30 (0.36)^{***}$	$0.50 (0.25)^*$
Gender (male $= 1$)	$0.32 (0.10)^{**}$	0.36(0.26)	-0.23(0.23)	$0.36 (0.18)^*$	-0.20(0.16)	0.24(0.15)
Intercept	$-10.98 (0.48)^{***}$	$-8.68 (0.88)^{***}$	$-14.13 (1.15)^{***}$	$-8.60 (0.66)^{***}$	$-9.03 (0.71)^{***}$	$-9.52 (0.65)^{***}$
AIC	9343.97	4490.05	3893.84	5146.13	6847.95	4983.15
Log Likelihood	-4658.98	-2232.02	-1933.92	-2560.06	-3410.97	-2478.57
Num. obs.	1380	953	1386	1297	951	1326

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