

Engineers & Exploits: The Quest for Security

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OWASP/Sage

Sage

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SMITHY





Summary

Threat Modelling

Insights

Cornucopia

Engineers & Exploits



APPSEC
VILLAGE



whoami



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Principal Application Security Specialist

OWASP London Chapter Leader




Spyros Gasteratos

Security Engineer & Architect

OWASP OpenCRE Leader

Threat Modelling

The basics



What is threat modelling?

Tabletop diagram 'hacking' 🧐
Security by design


*"a **structured, human-readable** representation of all the information that affects the security of a system. A view of the system and its environment through the lens of security."*



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
When should we do threat modelling?



Security by design



Getting the full picture of a system/data flow



Exposure = Asset + Attack + Vulnerability

| | | |
|---|-----------------|---|
| | Asset | What we're trying to protect |
| | Attack | What we're trying to protect against |
| | Vulnerability | A weakness in our protection efforts |
|  | Exposure / Risk | What happens when an asset is vulnerable to an attack |



The 4 questions

Framework

What are we building?

What can go wrong?

What are we going to do about it?

Did we do a good job?




Data flow diagrams

External Entity



Any entry controlled by the system or application

Process



Command executables, libraries, services, endpoints

Data Store



Databases, files, queues, any data processed

Data Flow




Any communication, traffic, call, etc between entities or process

Trust Boundary



Where trust levels change. Identifying the software's trust boundaries will help you focus on analyzing the areas of greater concern.

- Assets
- Use cases
- Dataflows
- Threats



An example of a real world threat model – end goal

Approaches

STRIDE

PASTA

DREAD

LINDDUN

Attack trees

...



Tools

Games

EoP

Cornucopia

Threat modelling as code

PyTM

Threagile

HclTM


Threat modelling as diagrams/graphs

ThreatDragon



Insights

Practical advice



Lessons learned ...

from the battle front of threat modelling in the real world

People have little **time**, engineers have even less

- be efficient with the time you're given by the team
- make sure everyone's on the same page about what's being built and delivered

Don't assume familiarity with **terms**

- all of the above
- SQLi, XSS, etc.

Don't just point and ask where the threats are on a data flow

Do not assume every threat needs to be mitigated - **context** matters!

Threat models can easily get out of hand

- focus on parts of the system (**incremental** threat modelling)
- don't try to cover everything



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
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Cornucopia

The game



What is Cornucopia?

- An  OWASP® Project
- **Leaders & team:**
 - Colin Watson, Grant Ongers, Johan Sydseter, Xavier Godard
- Created & first user for developer training in **August 2012**
- 2 current decks
 - Web App & Mobile versions
- A threat modelling **mechanism** in the form of a card game
- Language & platform - agnostic
- Helps development teams
 - **identify** appsec requirements
 - **develop** security-based user stories



Web App suits



Pros

- Easy to start playing
- Tactile, has physical aspect / Fun online game
- Great for threat modelling with developers



Cons

- Security people often struggle to pick it up
- If you play with specific threats in your mind, you can overlook exploits
- Security beginners struggle to go from “what is a risk” to “how do I rephrase the risk out of technical jargon”




Engineers & Exploits

How it's different

Why it helps



Threat modelling best done by teams in their own time



*trainers = other security people, architects, developers, etc.





APPSEC
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Introducing ... Engineers & Exploits


→ D&D for threat modelling nerds



APPSEC
VILLAGE

What is it?

- Sample diagrams → ***"What are we building?"***
- Reference app provided to introduce security people to threat modelling with **Cornucopia**
- As secure as the Game Master wants it to be 😊



Rules



1 Game Master (preferably an experienced threat modeller /
TheMostConfidentDevEver 🤨)

Up to **7** players (better with **4**) 🧑🧑🧑🧑🧑🧑🧑

Players are threat modeling consultants: → ***“What can go wrong?”***

- take turns playing cards trying to find as many threats* as possible
- need to convince the GM that their threat is worth fixing

WIN: The person with the most threats wins ♠️

*You CAN steal points if a player can't explain a card, but you find it applicable otherwise



Tips & Tricks



As a Game Master


- You are a dev who's unaware of security - not thick
- Be a little bit precious with points - threats must be valid

→ ***What are we going to do about it?***

- Encourage a positive atmosphere



Tips & Tricks



As a player:

- You are there to learn a new way of hacking or organizing your thoughts
- Have fun!
- Play your cards
- Try to win, but in the end it's all about learning



Activity: Threat modelling fun session with Cornucopia



August 11, 11:00 – 13:00

Questions?

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Spyros Gasteratos - [linkedin.com/in/spyr/](https://www.linkedin.com/in/spyr/)

